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BEHAVIORISM AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM:
A REVISED ACCOUNT OF THE ALLIANCE
by
LAURENCE D. SMITH 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1983
The primary aim of this work is to show that the wide­
spread belief that the major behaviorists drew importantly 
upon logical positivist philosophy of science in formulating 
their approach to psychology is ill-founded. Detailed 
historical analysis of the work of the neobehaviorists 
Edward C. Tolman, Clark L. Hull, and B. F, Skinner leads to 
the following conclusions: 1) each did have significant
contact with proponents of logical positivism; but 2). their 
sympathies with logical positivism were quite limited and 
were restricted to those aspects of logical positivism which 
they had already arrived at independently; 31 the methods 
which they are alleged to have imported from logical positi­
vism were actually derived from their own indigenous con­
ceptions of knowledge; and 41 each major neobehaviorist 
developed and embraced a behavioral epistemology which, far 
from resting on. logical positivist assumptions, actually 
conflicted squarely with the anti-psychologism that was a
xii
cornerstone of logical positivism. It is suggested that 
the myth of an alliance between behaviorism and logical 
positivism arose from the incautious interpretations of 
philosophical reconstructions as historical conclusions, 
This and other historiographical issues are discussed in 
the concluding chapter, where it is argued that the anti­
psychologism of the logical positivists is an unnecessary 




INTRODUCTION: BEHAVIORISM AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM
Like the sciences which developed before it, psych­
ology grew largely out of philosophy, both intellectually 
and institutionally. The gradual separation of psychology 
from philosophy, which became a matter of open debate 
around the turn of this century, was reinforced by the 
rise of behaviorism in America during the second and third 
decades of this century. Yet by the late thirties, there 
was widespread talk among American psychologists of a 
rapprochement between psychology and philosophy.^" This 
reconciliation was by no means a general return to the 
pre-divorce status, but rather a specific convergence of 
new movements within the two disciplines. These new 
schools of thought were neobehaviorism and logical posi­
tivism.
Logical positivism arose in the German-speaking 
world during the 1930s as an affirmation of the natural 
scientific world-view and a polemic against the powerful 
tradition of German idealism. Most of its proponents were 
trained as scientists, mathematicians, and logicians 
rather than as philosophers. Their fundamental principle 
was the claim that all statements are either analytic
2(e.g., All bachelors are unmarried men; 2 + 3 = 5 ) ,  veri­
fiable by observation (e.g., This meter reads 43 volts), 
or meaningless (e.g., The world of sense experience is 
unreal). In this trichotomous system, the assertions of 
traditional philosophy could purportedly be shown to 
belong to logic (if analytic), to science (if empirically 
verifiable) , or else to be not an assertion at all (.if 
meaningless). With the help of new developments in logic 
and the famous verifiability principle, the logical posi­
tivists assigned metaphysics to the category of nonsense.
All that remained of philosophy, in their estimation, was 
the logical analysis of science and its concepts.
A similar sort of anti-metaphysical bent character­
ized behaviorism even before it came into contact with
2
logical positivism. In his 1913 proclamation of behavior- 
3ism, John B. Watson clearly expressed the urge to avoid 
the speculative and metaphysical and to focus instead on 
the concrete and pragmatic. According to Watson and most 
of the behaviorists who were to follow, the goal of psych­
ology was not to explore the realm of subjective experience 
or mental phenomena, but to predict and control behavior.
The standard arguments for behaviorism were mainly meth­
odological: unlike the phenomena revealed by introspection, 
observations of behavior were assumed to be reliable and 
intersubjective. Claims about behavior were thus empiri­
cally testable. In both behaviorism and logical positivism,
the anti-metaphysical attitude was tied to empiricism in 
the form of an explicit or implicit principle of veri­
fiability .
Within the framework of these broad similarities 
between behaviorism and logical positivism, there were 
additional strong parallels between the two movements.
For one, the thrust of both movements was more methodo­
logical than substantive. Logical positivism made no 
claims about the nature of the world, as did traditional 
philosophy, but rather recommended linguistic and logical 
analysis as the method of philosophy. Similarly, behavior­
ism did not advance any particular psychological theory, 
but rather recommended the experimental investigation of 
behavior as the method of psychology. Secondly, the pro­
ponents of behaviorism and logical positivism often de­
picted their movements as turning points in the histories 
of their respective disciplines. For instance, the logical 
positivist Moritz Schlick argued that the age-old con­
flicts between the various systems of philosophy would
evaporate once logical analysis showed those systems to
4have asserted nothing meaningful. Likewise, many 
behaviorists believed that behaviorism would le^d psychology 
to a new and fruitful path, one from which traditional 
psychological issues (.e.g., imageless thought, the number
i
of sensation qualities), could safely be ignored. In 
effect, both behaviorism and logical positivism rejected
4the historical problems of their disciplines as pseudo- 
problems.^ A third and related parallel was the common 
conviction of behaviorists and logical positivists that 
eliminating historical problems from consideration would 
clear the way for the achievement of piecemeal progress.
In many cases, this progress was viewed as all but guar­
anteed by the consistent application of the methods of 
logical analysis and behavioral research.
In addition to these general parallels in intellec­
tual orientation, behaviorism and logical positivism shared 
a common style as movements. Both were scientistic and 
"tough-minded," in William James's well-known sense of the 
term.^ In light of the'rejection of their disciplines' 
historical problems, both movements were viewed from with­
in and without as radical developments. As a result, both 
were often promulgated with radical rhetoric and propa­
ganda. Because both arose in somewhat hostile intellec­
tual environments, they were defended in aggressive and 
polemical fashion. Finally, viewing their movements as 
the keys to progress in their respective disciplines led 
behaviorists and logical positivists alike to express 
wildly optimistic claims about the future benefits of 
acting on their presuppositions. The writings of both 
groups frequently showed a sort of missionary zeal, a 
zeal which was reflected in their occasional references to 
winning "converts."
5One further dimension along which the behaviorist 
and logical positivist movements showed strong parallels 
is the historical one. Behaviorism was formally pro­
claimed about fifteen years before the official founding
7
of logical positivism, but the historical parallels 
between them were much closer than this fact would suggest 
Both movements arose from ideas which began to coalesce 
in the 1910s out of various strains of late nineteenth 
century thought. In both cases, these ideas took on 
more definite form in the 1920s, and then flowered in the 
1930s. By the late thirties, both were clearly the domi­
nant orientations within their disciplines (.in the English 
speaking world, at least), and their ascendancies con­
tinued through the 194 0s. In the mid-thirties, both 
movements began to undergo liberalizations of their 
formerly more strict formulations. By the fifties, there 
was a growing recognition of how seriously these liberal­
izations compromised the original founding principles of 
each movement. Coupled with continuing criticism from 
outside, this recognition contributed to a decline of 
influence through the fifties. The sixties saw both 
movements lose their domination over their respective 
fields. In the philosophy of science, logical positivism 
was replaced by philosophies with historical, sociological 
and psychological— rather than logical— orientations. In 
psychology, behaviorism was succeeded as a dominant per-
6spective by the information-processing, computer-simulation
g
brand of cognitive psychology.
With their common intellectual background and 
orientation, behaviorism and logical positivism were 
naturally disposed to form some sort of alliance. But 
only after both movements were well under way was there 
any significant interaction between them. Prior to the 
surge of mutual interest in the 1930s, behaviorism was 
mostly confined to America while logical positivism was 
little known outside certain parts of central Europe.
This geographical isolation ended during the thirties when 
two sorts of events began to transpire. First, certain 
prominent behaviorists traveled to Europe, where they 
encountered logical positivism, and subsequently became 
involved in the logical positivists' Unity of Science 
movement. Second, and more importantly, the thirties saw 
the arrival of leading positivists in America during the 
pre-war migration of European intellectuals. After the 
intellectual migration, there were personal interactions, 
and occasionally professional collaborations, between 
behaviorists and logical positivists. Eventually, Ameri­
can psychology as a whole came to be dominated by a view 
of science which coincided.in broad outline with the 
shared view of the behaviorists and logical positivists.
In the American psychology journals of the 1940s and 1950s, 
this fact was reflected in the considerable amount of
7discussion devoted to such matters as theory construction
and operationism, theoretical postulates and physicalistic
data language. This period of active concern on the part
of American psychologists with the philosophy and method-
9
ology of science has been dubbed the "Age of Theory."
The kinship of behaviorism and logical positivism 
and the general influence of them on American psychology 
are topics of considerable interest to historians and 
philosophers of psychology. In light of the strong his­
torical and substantive parallels between the two move­
ments, it is perhaps not surprising that they are commonly 
assumed to have been associated with one another in a 
close-knit intellectual alliance. It would be no exaggera­
tion to say that the presumed alliance of behaviorism and 
logical positivism has become a central story in both the 
written histories of twentieth century American psychology 
and in the lore or "folk history" that is informally 
propagated among American psychologists. The extent to 
which the presumption of such an alliance is ingrained in 
historiographical habits is indicated by the fact that 
Edwin G, Boring, America's most eminent historian of 
psychology, treated behaviorism, behavioristics, opera­
tional psychology, and logical positivism as though they 
were but aspects of a single movement.^ Standard his­
torical texts and various papers and volumes on the 
philosophy of psychology routinely link behaviorism, or
8at least neobehaviorism, with logical positivism. The 
presumed association has also been commented on by philoso­
phers, often in the context of arguments about psychology’s 
reliance on outmoded models of science.
It is thus widely recognized that there was some 
sort of alliance between the behaviorist and logical 
positivist movements and that they jointly held sway over 
much of American psychology in the. second quarter of 
this century. At the same time, however, there has been 
little detailed analysis of the alliance, its historical 
preconditions, the actual interactions in which it was 
manifested, and the type and degree of intellectual con­
fluence which underlay it. Those who comment on the alli­
ance usually take it as a historical given and then pro­
ceed to make historical or philosophical points either 
from that perspective or in rejection of it. This ten­
dency is no doubt partly due to the recency of the his­
torical episode in question: commentators are still very 
much engaged in the active defense or criticism of the 
intellectual framework under scrutiny. Such circumstances 
have produced some interesting analyses of the relation­
ship between behaviorism and logical positivism, but 
these analyses have not tended to include serious detailed 
attention to the historical dimensions of that relation­
ship. The most detailed treatments of this topic are 
provided in the semi-historical works of Sigmund Koch and
9Brian D, Mackenzie. The following section describes 11 the 
standard account of behaviorism and logical positivism that 
has emerged from the analyses of Koch and Mackenzie and 
2) the incorporation of this account into a recent textbook 
on the history of psychology.
The Standard Account of the Behaviorist- 
Logical Positivist Alliance ~
Koch: The Importation and Evaporation of
Behaviorism's Methodology
Sigmund Koch has written a number of essays analyzing 
and evaluating behaviorism and its philosophy of science. 
These essays focus on the deductive methods of the prominent 
neobehaviorist Clark L. Hull and their relationship to the 
logical positivist philosophy of science, but they include 
treatments of other major behaviorists as well and the con" 
elusions Koch draws are by no means restricted to the Hull— 
ian brand of behaviorism. According to Koch, "neobehaviorism 
may be seen as a marriage between the orienting attitudes of 
classical behaviorism and one or another interpretation of 
the 'new' model of science," This new model or "new view" 
of science is depicted by Koch as a rather haphazard amal­
gamation of logical positivism, neopragmatism, and opera- 
tionism. Koch states that the "dominant contours" of this 
view of science were provided by logical positivism and that 
psychologists, and neobehaviorists in particular, regulcirly 
drew upon this model throughout the 1930s,^
10
As Koch points out, the logical positivists based 
their philosophy of science almost entirely on their logi­
cal analyses of selected theories in physics. Accordingly, 
he views psychology's turn to logical positivism as another 
chapter in the traditional emulation of physics by psy­
chology. In this particular episode, Koch has written,
psychology did not go directly to physics but 
turned instead for its directives to middlemen.
These were, for the most part, philosophers of 
science (especially logical positivists) and 
a number of physical science methodologists 
who had been codifying a synoptic view of the 
nature of science and who, by the early thirties, 
were actively exporting that view from their 
specialties to the scholarly community at
large.-*-2
Koch often speaks of the psychologists of the thirties, 
especially the neobehaviorists, as having "imported" their 
methodology from logical positivism. Furthermore, in his 
view, they did so inappropriately— what psychology needed 
then (and still needs), he says, is an indigenous epistem- 
ology, not an imported methodology. As we shall see, 
the conclusion that neobehaviorism imported its method­
ology is an important one that has influenced much thinking 
on the topic of behaviorism and logical positivism.
Koch's other major conclusion is closely related to 
the first one but is more directly historical in character. 
It begins with the assumption— one widely held by 
philosophers of science— that logical positivism is defunct
both as a movement and as a viable account of the nature 
13of science. Coupled with the first conclusion, this
11
assumption is taken by Koch to entail the demise of 
behaviorism as a viable approach to psychology. That is, 
having rested on logical positivist presuppositions, 
neobehaviorism is left with justification for its pre­
mises by the demise of logical positivism. Thus, 
behaviorism, which was all along primarily a methodological
position, suffers seriously-^indeed fatally— as a conse-
14quence of its "evaporating methodological support.
Koch qualifies this claim only with the admission 
that, as is generally the case in science, there can be 
no "final and crushing refutation of behaviorist epistem- 
ology." Behaviorism he assigns to that "class of posi­
tions that are wrong but not refutable," and he proceeds 
to argue against the viability of behaviorism on several 
grounds. He states that his recounting of the relation­
ship between behaviorism and the "new view" of science
suggests the story of the gradual attenuation 
of a position that was never seriously tenable, 
never consistent, based on thin and shifting 
rationales, and adopted more to serve needs 
for comfort and security than a passion for 
knowledge. . . .  I think that our story begins 
to suggest the unfruitfulness of the position, 
its restrictive effects on problematic curiosity, 
its scholastic character, perhaps most of all, 
its basic ludcrousness. . . . When the ludi­
crousness of the position is made sufficiently 
plain, perhaps it will be laughed out of 
existence.15
For Koch, then, the behaviorist outlook is certainly dis­
credited by its affiliation with the obsolete philosophy 
of logical positivism, but behaviorism has all along been
12
an implausible and self-discrediting position.
According to Koch, the joint failure of behaviorism
and logical positivism leaves psychology in a peculiar
position, indeed in an ironic and paradoxial position.
In the wake of logical positivism's collapse as a tenable
account of knowledge, new views of the nature of knowledge,
and of science in particular, have assigned to psychology
an important role in explicating epistemological pro- 
16cesses. These new views, in Koch's words, are working 
toward "a redefinition of knowledge based on an empirical 
analysis of inquiry of a sort which must largely depend 
on psychological modes of analysis." In particular, 
says Koch, "philosophy and, more generally, the method­
ology of science are beginning to stand on foundations 
that only psychology can render secure." Yet— and here 
lies the paradox— "psychology seems hardly cognizant of 
the challenge implicit in these circumstances." Psych­
ology's failure to take up Cor even perceive) the challenge 
of contributing to the new conception of knowledge is 
attributed by Koch to the fact that "almost alone in the
scholarly community, it remains in the grip of the old 
17conception." Thus, for Koch, the major lesson to be 
drawn from the failure of the behaviorist-logical posi­
tivist alliance is a two-sided one: first, it was 
inappropriate for psychology to have imported an alien 
conception of knowledge and science; and second, the
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importation of and adherence to this ill-fated conception 
has prevented psychology from developing its own indigenous 
epistemology, an epistemology now demanded and badly needed 
by scholarly culture at large. This conclusion is an 
extremely important one which will be discussed at some 
length in the conclusion of the present volume.
Interestingly enough, Koch is not only a major 
commentator on the behaviorist-logical positivist alliance 
but was also an important figure in the formation and 
development of that alliance. As will be described in 
Chapter 7, Koch studied under the logical positivist 
Herbert Feigl during the late thirties. He was among the 
first to explicitly connect Hullian behaviorism with logi­
cal positivism and was the very first to give an extended 
analysis of psychological theory from the perspective of 
logical positivism. As will become evident in subsequent 
chapters, Koch's interpretations of the behaviorist-logical 
positivist alliance have (.not surprisingly) been strongly 
colored by his participation in the historical developments 
under consideration.
Mackenzie: The Subordination of Substance to Method
Another prominent critic of the behaviorist- 
positivist alliance is Brian D. Mackenzie. In his 
Behaviorism and the Limits of Scientific Method (.197 7),
Mackenzie has followed Koch in identifying neobehaviorist
14
presuppositions with logical positivism and in judging the
alliance to have been a clear and significant failure.
Mackenzie's reconstruction of the alliance relies heavily
on Koch's account, but differs from it in important
respects. First, Mackenzie does not view neobehaviorism
or its attempted integration with logical positivism as
patently implausible or deserving of ridicule: "The
failure of the attempt, both in practice and in principle,
may quite properly stimulate a reappraisal of the limits of
scientific technique; but it seems odd to take it as
18grounds for our scorn." Second, with respect to Koch's
claims about the demise of logical positivism discrediting
behaviorism, Mackenzie tends to put the shoe on the other
foot. From his perspective, it is the failure of
behaviorism that reflects back on and discredits the
positivist dictates on which it is said to rest. As
Mackenzie puts the conclusion of his analysis, "the main
systematic contribution of behaviorism to psychology is
its practical.. demonstration of the untenability of the
19methodological principles on which it was founded."
Mackenzie's account of behaviorism and positivism 
is lengthier and broader than Koch's and is not as 
focused on neobehaviorism and logical positivism. Unlike 
Koch, Mackenzie explicitly acknowledges that behaviorism's
positivism grew out of what he calls "the indigenous
. . . . 20positivism of comparative psychology." On the other
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hand, he agrees with Koch that 11 the neobehaviorists
imported their methodology from the logical positivists
and 2). that it was inappropriate to do so. Thus,
according to Mackenzie, behaviorists took on "external
standards of objectivity" and adopted "their methodological
21formalisms" from logical positivism. But, he argues 
further, the methodological techniques of logical posi­
tivism were inappropriate for neobehaviorist purposes 
because they constituted a set of procedures or rules by 
which theories and concepts could Cperhapsl be recon- . 
structed and assessed for metaphysical content, but which 
were incapable of guiding the construction of new theories. 
Mackenzie writes:
The behaviorists, for their part, had effected 
their own elimination of metaphysics from 
psychology already. Their problem was how to 
develop theories, given their established 
commitment to an objective observation base.
Thus, they adopted the formal positivist 
measures, not so much to keep their theories 
free of metaphysics, as to enable them to 
develop theories at all. ^
Mackenzie places repeated emphasis on the alleged
reliance of behaviorism on rules. Indeed, he asserts at
the outset of his book that behaviorism
is important because it was the most sustained 
attempt ever made to construct a science of 
psychology through the use of detailed and 
explicit rules of procedure, because these 
rules were the outcome of the most sophisti­
cated and rigorous analysis of the logic of 
science ever made, and because the attempt 
and the movement were ultimate failures.
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Likewise, Mackenzie's concluding remarks contain the 
claim that
behaviorism was the only— or at least the most 
detailed, uncompromising, and sophisticated—  
serious attempt ever made to develop a science 
on methodological principles alone.
Not surprisingly, then, Mackenzie views the story of the
behaviorist-positivist alliance as one that has "profound
consequences for our understanding of the complementary
25roles of method and substance in science. He proceeds 
directly to spell out the major lesson of this revealing 
episode:
. . . while both substantive and methodological 
principles are necessary, the substantive ones 
are more important. . . . Any tendency of method­
ological considerations to direct research 
needs . . .  to be subordinated to the particular 
substantive issues present in individual cases
in science.
In sum, Mackenzie's diagnosis is that behaviorism suffered
tand died), from having subordinated subject matter to
method; his prescription for psychology's recovery from
this blow is to reverse the situation by subordinating
27method to subject matter.
Leahey: The Empirical Refutation of Logical Positivism
The account developed by Koch and Mackenzie appears 
to be a rather widely accepted version of the history 
of behaviorism and logical positivism, and it has been 
incorporated into a recent textbook on the history of 
psychology. In his A History of Psychology C1980).,
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Thomas H. Leahey follows Koch and Mackenzie in attributing
to logical positivism a strong and formative influence
on behaviorism. He states that the logical positivists
"had a considerable influence on behaviorism," and
especially on the neobehaviorists Clark Hull and Edward
C. Tolman. Referring to these two behaviorists, Leahey
claims that "their belief in an objective theory they
2 8learned from the logical positivists." He thus seems to 
- accept the notion that the neobehaviorists, in some sense, 
imported their views of science from logical positivism.
Like Koch and Mackenzie, Leahey further accepts that
both behaviorism and logical positivism were failures and
then proceeds to analyze these failures in light of the
presumed association between these two movements. After
reviewing what he takes to be the unsuccessful attempts
of Hull and Tolman to establish general theories of
behavior, Leahey draws the following conclusions:
Their failure may lie with them, or with posi­
tivism. Given the intelligence and diligence 
of Tolman, Hull, and their students, it is 
unlikely that they failed through want of 
effort or intelligence. The failure, then, 
is probably traceable to logical posi­
tivism. . . . Logical positivism and opera- 
tionism seemed to hold hope that a set of 
procedures existed that, if followed faith­
fully, would produce psychological science.
Hull and Tolman made every effort to follow 
these procedures and by 1950 they had come 
to a dead end. Logical positivism was tried 
and found wanting.
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Being based mainly on Mackenzie's work, Leahey's account 
leads to much the same conclusion: the demise of behavior­
ism reflects back upon and discredits the logical posi­
tivist view of science on which it was grounded.
Near the end of his text, this lesson from the
history of the behaviorist-positivist alliance is stated
even more forcefully. Leahey writes:
Behaviorism to a large degree proceeded on 
the premise that the positivist analysis of 
science was correct, and adopted methods and 
theories consistent with positivism's pre­
cepts. If the analysis is wrong, can the 
science be right? The crisis of behaviorism, 
especially the learning theory crisis of 1950, 
can be seen as an empirical refutation of 
logical positivism. The formal behaviorists, 
especially Hull, seriously tried to practice 
positivist psychology. As we have seen, they 
failed. Hull's theory, despite his best 
efforts, was never able to conform to posi­
tivist precepts, and in the end it became a 
sterile exercise in quantification, . . .
Formal behaviorism showed that positivism's 
recipe for science is impossible to follow.-^
Leahey’s textbook account thus contains the essential fea­
tures of the Koch and Mackenzie accounts of the relation 
between behaviorism and logical positivism. Those fea­
tures are the claims that 1). behaviorism and logical 
positivism were closely associated, 2) the former imported 
its view of science from the latter, and 3) the fates of 
the two movements were therefore linked, i.e., that the 
failure of one reflected on the viability of the other *
The codification and inclusion of this interpretation of 
the behaviorist-positivist alliance in Leahey's textbook
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history of psychology suggests that it has indeed become 
the standard account of the episode.
History versus Reconstruction
It is a significant fact that none of the writers 
whose views comprise the standard account of the behavior­
ist-logical positivist alliance has given serious con­
sideration to the historical details or dimensions of 
that alliance. Koch admits to presenting "a shamelessly 
abstract historical rundown of the chief phases of
behaviorism" in order that "a broad historical picture
31may be suggested, if only dimly." Similarly, Mackenzie
acknowledges that his book "is not . . .  a history of
behaviorism," but rather a work in which "the alternation
of historical and philosophical analysis is presented
32without apology." The historical analysis that Mackenzie
does offer is largely on nineteenth century comparative
psychology and in no case does it involve archival research.
His historical account of logical positivism's influence
on neobehaviorism is almost entirely based on Koch's
admittedly sketchy account. Leahey's textbook version of
the story, in turn, relies heavily on Mackenzie's version.
None of these works utilizes any archival materials or
detailed analyses (.although Koch's account is informed by
33some anecdotes and first-hand experiences.)
Much the same may be said of two additional works
which give extended treatments of the behaviorist- 
positivist alliance. The first is Robert E. A. Shanab's 
unpublished dissertation "Logical Positivism, Operation- 
alism, and Behaviorism" (.1969) . Shanab introduces his 
work with the statement that the "primary aim of this 
study is to exhibit the influence of both logical posi­
tivism and operationalism on neo-behaviorism." Focusing 
his analysis on Tolman1s behaviorism, Shanab provides 
a rational reconstruction of the Tolmanian system, 
showing how closely it matched the logical positivist 
model of scientific theory, especially in its emphasis 
on the verifiability of scientific claims. Shanab writes 
"Although Toman has not specifically asserted which of 
the various meaning criteria he was appealing to, one can 
still detect the general tenets of logical positivism 
in his writings. . . . "  In concluding his chapter on 
Tolman, Shanab states that the "preceding discussion 
clearly indicates that Tolman, a leading exponent of neo­
behaviorism, has been influenced directly or indirectly
by the scientific movement of operationalism and the
34philosophic movement of logical positivism." These 
rather weak conclusions are based entirely on an examina­
tion of published works. Shanab's work was not intended 
as a historical analysis, but his conclusions are largely 
historical in character, and (.as will be shown in due 
course) they misleadingly contribute to the impression
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of a close association between logical positivism and 
neobehaviorism.
A second work which contributes to the same 
impression is Cornells Sander's Die behavioristische 
Revolution in der Psychologie (.1972/1978) . Sanders 
follows the standard account in assigning to logical 
positivism an important role in the development of neo­
behaviorism. Asserting that neobehaviorism cannot be 
understood except in light of its grounding in the logical 
positivist philosophy of science, Sanders devotes a long 
chapter to logical positivism and operationism and then 
proceeds to reconstruct from that perspective the theories 
of the major neobehaviorists. Again, this is done with 
scant attention being given to the historical details.
Sanders does, for instance, point out that the names of 
Hull and Toman appear among the advisory committee of
the logical positivists' International Encyclopedia of Unified 
35Science ; but rather than pursuing the historical cir­
cumstances of this fact, Sanders uses it merely to suggest 
the necessity of understanding their work in the context 
of logical positivism.
It is important at this point to recall that logical 
positivism was the dominant philosophy in America during 
behaviorism's heyday. Indeed, it was widely regarded as
the philosophy of science, rather than as one approach 
3 6among others. In light of this hegemony, it was quite
natural that neobehaviorist theories were reconstructed
from the perspective of logical positivism and even that
individual neobehaviorists were interpreted as having been
logical positivists. The first explicit analysis of a
neobehaviorist theory from the vantage point of logical
37positivism was performed by Koch in 1941. This and 
subsequent analyses by him played no small role in pro­
moting the widespread identification of behaviorist 
philosophy of science with logical positivism. In combina­
tion with Koch's personal experiences, these analyses have 
also (as will be argued in the sequel! strongly colored 
his own rendering of the history of the' behaviorist- 
logical positivist alliance— a rendering on which many 
other writers have relied in their discussions of the 
alliance.
The various reconstructions of the behaviorist-
logical positivist alliance have served several useful
functions. They have, for instance, drawn attention to
the very striking, and very real, parallels between the
logical positivist view of science and the views of
various neobehaviorists. They have served the vital
critical function of evaluating neobehaviorist theory.
In particular, Koch':, det iled and masterful assessment
3 8of Hullian theory was instrumental in curtailing Hull's 
once-dominant influ.ji.ee over learning theory. At the 
same time, these retrospective reconstructions have often
22
presented a limited, unbalanced, and sometimes misleading
characterization of the relationship between behaviorism
and logical positivism. Recent research in the history
and philosophy of science has clearly shown that rational
reconstruction is an importantly different enterprise from
39the genuinely historical study of science. Most perti­
nent to the topic here under discussion is the realization 
that misunderstanding is apt to arise when the results of 
rational reconstruction are confused with those of histori­
cal analysis. With respect to the alliance of behaviorism 
and logical positivism, the problem is not so much that 
the reconstructions are incorrect or inappropriate as 
that they are by their very nature too limited to support 
the historical Cor semi-historical) conclusions that have 
sometimes been drawn from them.
Even though the greatest danger of reconstruction 
lies in the confusion of philosophical conclusions with 
historical ones, there are also numerous specific hazards 
involved in reconstructing scientific views Cor even views 
of science) from a current or past perspective other than 
the historical context in which those views arose. For 
present purposes, two examples of such hazards will 
suffice. First, there seems to be a widespread impression 
that the neobehaviorists, and Hull in particular, believed 
in the value of crucial experiments Ci.e., individual 
experiments which could conclusively decide between com­
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peting theories1. This is not an unreasonable belief, 
especially in light of Hull’s well-known advocacy of 
deductive methods in psychology; but a careful examination 
of the historical evidence shows that neither Tolman nor 
Skinner, and not even Hull, believed in crucial experi­
ments, Yet, for example, Mackenzie speaks rather indis­
criminately of the behaviorists’ "dependence on the notion 
of 'crucial experiments'" and states that " e ach theorist 
or school of theorists , , , tended to expect that the 
results of 'crucial experiments' cited by them would be
impossible to explain by a (.rigorously construed! competing 
40theory," Now the neobehaviorists may have acted at
41times as if they believed in "crucial experiments," but 
their views of science did not countenance such experi­
ments in anything like their traditional sense. The
42neobehaviorists themselves did not use the term, and a
faith in crucial experiments can be attributed to them
only by removing their scientific views and activities
43from the appropriate historical context.
A second example of the capacity of reconstruction to 
distort Cor at least be confused with) history is the 
collapsing of historically important distinctions which 
are not respected by the temporal or philosophical per­
spective from which the reconstruction is made. In regard 
to the case at hand, this difficulty is exemplified by 
the tendency of commentators on the behaviorist-positivist
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alliance to downplay or neglect deep differences between 
various forms of behaviorism and between the various posi­
tivisms with which those behaviorisms were associated. As 
will be shown throughout much of the present work, the 
behaviorisms of Tolman, Hull, and Skinner differed 
importantly from one another, as did their positivisms. 
Tolman's operational positivism was similar in many (but 
not all) respects to logical positivism, but Hull's posi- 
tivisim was closer to that of Auguste Comte than to that 
of the Vienna Circle, and Skinner's is a distinctly 
Machian version of positivism. The reconstruction of 
these positions from a single perspective, rather than in 
their own several historical contexts, has led to a false 
impression of uniformity. It has been claimed, for 
instance, that "Hull's conception of a hypothetico-
deductive science . . . owes a great deal to the work of
Moritz Schlick and other members of the Vienna circle"
and even that Skinner's system was "developed under the
44aegis of logical posxtxvxsm." A major axm of the pre­
sent volume is to exhibit not only the distinctions 
between the major types of behaviorism but also between 
these behaviorisms' various forms of positivism, on the
one hand, and logical positivism, on the other.
25
The Revised Account of the Behaviorist- 
Logical Positivist Alliance
The present volume can be viewed above all else as 
an attempt to bring to our understanding of the behavior­
ist-logical positivist alliance the historical dimension 
that has never received adequate attention and that has 
been obscured by philosophical analysis. This undertaking 
has proven to be no mere matter of fact-mongering: the 
picture of behaviorism and its relation to logical posi­
tivism changes in important and intriguing ways when the 
topic is approached from a distinctly historical per­
spective. In the context of their own intellectual 
developments, the major neobehaviorists— Tolman, Hull, and
B. F, Skinner— can be seen to have developed views of 
science which evolved out of and alongside their res­
pective presuppositions about the nature of organisms., 
behavior. That is, their "philosophies" of science
stemmed by and large from their behavioral psychologies,
45not vice versa as is commonly supposed. To neglect thxs 
deep dependency of their views of science on their 
psychological thought is to pluck those views of science 
from their historical context and, eventually, to mis­
interpret them.
The historical analysis presented in this volume is 
based on an extensive, detailed investigation of the 
historical record. This record includes published and
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unpublished writings, archival materials including insti­
tutional documents and personal correspondence, and first­
hand reports obtained through correspondence and inter­
views with numerous philosophers and psychologists who 
played a role in the historical developments under 
scrutiny. As we shall see, the available evidence suggests 
that there was both more and less to the behaviorist- 
logical positivist alliance than the existing accounts 
would indicate. For example, the record presented here 
offers more than has been previously known about the 
activities of Hull and Tolman in the logical positivists1 
Unity of Science movement. There is even evidence that 
Tolman actually attended meetings of the Vienna Circle 
in 1933-34. On the other hand, this record also clearly 
suggests that the association of behaviorists with logical 
positivists was not a close one. In general, the associa­
tion was based on relatively superficial convergences of 
opinion on broad issues and on matters of rhetoric and 
propaganda. In matters of substance, however, there lay 
beneath the surface agreements some deep divergences 
between behaviorists and logical positivists on the nature 
of science and its methods.
As the research, for the present volume progressed, 
three lines of evidence emerged which, taken together, 
began to cast doubt on the notion that there was in 
general a close association between behaviorism and logical
positivism. First, the logical positivists' interests in 
psychology were not at all restricted to behaviorist 
approaches, nor wt re the neobehaviorists1 interests in 
theories of science and methodology limited to those of 
logical positivism. Thus, the logical positivists took 
an interest in Gestalt theory, psychophysics, and psycho­
analytic theory, while the behaviorists read and cited the 
metatheories of science advanced by John Dewey, Ernst Mach,
Henri Poincare and other philosophers who were not logical 
46positivists. The second, and more directly relevant7 
line of evidence is that there is remarkably little in 
the writings (published or unpublished) of the major 
neobehaviorists to indicate that logical positivism was an 
important influence on them. In this respect, a simple 
citation count from the published works of the major neo­
behaviorists is revealing: scattered throughout the vol­
uminous writings of Tolman are but three references to 
the works of Rudolf Carnap, a central figure in logical 
positivism; Tolman's other citations of logical positivists 
are confined to a single paragraph of a 1935 paper. 
Similarly, Hull cited Carnap only once, and his works 
are otherwise devoid of references to major logical posi­
tivists.. Skinner's works contain only three incidental 
citations of Carnap and occasional passing mention 
(without citation) of him and other logical positivist
figures. In most of these latter cases, the logical posi-
47tivists are being criticized by Skinner.
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The third type of evidence discrediting the notion 
of a close intellectual alliance between behaviorism and 
logical positivism comes from an extensive correspondence 
with former students and colleagues of the major neo­
behaviorists. When queried about links with logical posi­
tivism, only a few among the nearly one hundred respondents 
could recall any discussions of logical positivism. Not 
a single respondent could recall having been aware of
Hull's or Tolman's involvement in the Unity of Science 
48movement. Although many respondents acknowledged that 
logical positivism was congenial with the approaches of 
Hull and Tolman, several explicitly denied that logical 
positivism had influenced either of them. Those who had 
more than a passing familiarity with logical positivism 
pointed out that they had not acquired their knowledge 
of it from Hull or Tolman.
Of course, none of these three lines of evidence is 
in itself unambiguously damaging to the standard account 
of behaviorism and logical positivism; but taken together 
they begin to reveal the sorts of problems which a care­
ful examination of the historical record poses for the 
standard account. At the very least, they suggest that 
any general claim to the effect that behaviorism and logi­
cal positivism were closely associated needs a great deal 
more substantiation than has been given in the past.
The evidence just discussed points to the need for
a revised account of behaviorism and logical positivism, 
and the sum of evidence which will be presented in the 
following chapters justifies major revisions of the 
standard account, A careful investigation of the views 
of the major neobehaviorists shows that their relation­
ships to logical positivism were generally much more 
restricted than is commonly supposed. The present work 
attempts not only to document the extent and limitations 
of these relationships but also to account for their 
restricted scope. From the historical perspective, the 
lines of evidence cited above can be understood as surface 
manifestations of the underlying intellectual limits on 
the behaviorist-logical positivist alliance. The impor­
tance and severity of these limits can best be appreciated 
in light of the following claim (.the documentation of 
which is a central undertaking of this work]: In their 
separate ways, Tolman, Hull, and Skinner all believed that 
science is at root a psychological phenomenon and that 
their respective theories of learning could Cat least 
eventually), account for scientific knowledge. In effect, 
they were striving to develop empirical epistemologies 
that would extend even to science itself. Their efforts 
in this direction began early in their careers and con­
tinued to shape their thinking about their own scientific 
endeavors and science in general. In fact, Tolman, Hull, 
and Skinner all embarked on careers in psychology with 
strong and formative interests in epistemology. In sum,
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the limits of the behaviorist-logical positivist alliance 
can be understood as a consequence of the fact that the 
"philosophies" of science of the major neobehaviorists • 
were in reality psychologies of science derived from their 
deeply held theoretical and pre-theoretical views of 
psychology. If this is the case, then one of the major 
claims of the standard account— that the neobehaviorists 
imported extraneous methodologies into psychology— is in 
serious need of revision. Indeed, as will be argued in 
Chapter 10, the neobehaviorists' psychologies of science 
actually anticipated, in important respects, the new 
approach to the philosophy of science that has recently 
displaced the logical positivist approach as the dominant 
interpretation of science.
If in fact behaviorist views of science were cru­
cially dependent on behaviorist views of psychology, then 
it becomes imperative to closely examine each behavior­
ist 's psychological theory in order to understand his 
interpretation of science. The present volume provides 
just such examinations, in turn, for the major neobehavior­
ists Tolman, Hull,and Skinner. In the course of these 
examinations, the presentation of the revised account will 
emerge along four broad lines of argument. The resulting 
four themes can be briefly stated as follows:
1. Limited Sympathies. Each of the major neobehaviorists 
had limited sympathy with logical positivism. For
Tolman the area of sympathy was operationism, for 
Hull deductive methods, and for Skinner positivism 
itself.
Priority. In each case, the major neobehaviorists 
arrived at the area of agreement with logical posi­
tivism prior to contact with logical positivism.
Thus, Tolman had worked out the essentials of his 
operationism before he encountered logical positivism
(and even before he encountered P. W. Bridgman’s 
49operationism ); Hull's interests m  deductive 
methods were well-formed by 1927, approximately a 
decade prior to his encounter with logical positi­
vism; Skinner's positivism was drawn from a reading 
(.around 19301 of Mach, before he had developed any 
any interest in logical positivism.
Indigenous Methods. Each neobehaviorist * s (limited), 
convergence with logical positivism was developed 
in close connection with a deep-seated conception of 
organismic behavior. Tolman's operationism stemmed 
from his neorealist view of the manner in which an 
organism's purposes and cognitions are expressed in 
behavior. Hull's deductive methods grew out of his 
belief that behavior possesses a determinate and 
hierarchicial causal structure, like that of a 
complex, logically designed machine. Skinner's 
positivism arose from his Machian view that behavior,
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including scientific activity, is a biological pro­
cess of adjustment to an evironment. Thus, the 
methods of these behaviorists were not so much 
imported from outside of psychology as they were 
developed indigenously from their conceptions of 
psychology.
504. Behavioral Epistemology. For each of the major 
neobehaviorists, the area of shared interest with 
the logical positivists was part of a behaviorial 
epistemology in which the same conception of learning 
was applied equally to the scientist and the sub­
ject. Each believed (.though in ways differing from 
each otherl that knowledge is ultimately a manner 
of responding to an environment; each was consistent 
in applying this principle to rats and humans alike. 
These four themes suggest immediately why the actual 
intellectual overlap between behaviorism and logical posi­
tivism was so limited. In the final analysis, the behav­
iorists saw knowledge in general and science in particular 
as psychological phenomena, whereas the logical positivists 
viewed knowledge and science as relatively abstract matters 
of language and logic. Beneath the surface agreements, 
naturalistic epistemologies were being pitted against 
formal epistemologies.
In the historical account comprising the bulk of 
this work, the deep difference between behaviorist and
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logical positivist construals of science will be manifested 
in many different forms. It will become evident, for 
instance, -that the three behaviorists considered here were 
closer philosophically to pragmatism than to logical posi­
tivism. It will also become apparent that their views of 
science placed greater emphasis on the context of dis­
covery than did those of the logical positivists, who
51stressed the context of justification. Another manifesta­
tion— indeed, a decisive one— of the-deep differences 
between the major neobehaviorists and the logical posi­
tivists is the fact that each of the former gave logic 
itself a psychological (.and more precisely, a behavioral) 
interpretation. In doing so, they set themselves in 
direct opposition to what was perhaps the most fundamental 
of logical positivism's tenets— namely, that logic is 
tautologous, devoid of empirical content, and never pro­
perly construed in psychological terms.
Plainly, much of the present account of behaviorism 
and logical positivism is at odds with the standard account. 
But there is also much in the present account that corro­
borates and extends previous accounts. To be sure, logical 
positivism did exert an influence on neobehaviorism.
At one time or another and in different ways, Tolman,
Hull, and Skinner were all actively interested in and 
(in differing degrees) influenced by logical positivism. 
However, from a richly historical perspective this
influence can be seen to have been more restricted than 
is commonly supposed and also more varied in nature. 
Sometimes, logical positivism was a reinforcing— although 
not formative— influence on neobehaviorism. It shaped the 
mode of expression and the details of neobehaviorism's 
methodologies, but without having instigated them. At 
other times, it altered and diverted developments within 
neobehaviorism, sometimes suppressing novel and significant 
ideas. And, as suggested above, it occasionally stood in 
direct opposition to certain neobehaviorist views, thereby 
obscuring unique behavioral theses.
The revised account of the behaviorist-logical posi­
tivist alliance calls attention to certain fundamental 
epistemological issues. If in fact the neobehaviorists1 
"philosophy" of science was really a set of psychologies 
of science, what becomes of the epistemological status 
of their methodologies, which presumably rest on their 
views of science? Is it not circular to pursue a psych­
ological science with methods that depend in the final 
analysis on the outcomes of that pursuit? If so, is this 
a vicious sort of circularity? If psychological methodology 
is not only relativized to psychological theory but to 
different theories at that, can the methodology provide 
an antecedently defensible means of evaluating and deciding 
between psychological theories? Is a set of theory-neutral 
methodological principles therefore a chimera? This
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cluster of important issues, along with others of a his­
torical, philosophical, and historiographical nature, will 
be discussed in the concluding chapter of this work.
The Nature of the Present Volume
As has already been described, the main works com­
prising the standard account of behaviorism and logical 
positivism have largely been carried out as rational recon­
structions, with at most a semi-historical emphasis. As 
such, these works have tended to focus on the "Age of 
Theory," which began in the late thirties and ended in 
the mid-fifties. By way of contrast, the present account 
focuses on the period from roughly 1925 to 1938 in order 
to give a genetic account of those theories and the views 
of science with which they were intimately connected. For 
an understanding of behaviorism in its relation to logical 
positivism, this early focus is necessary for at least 
two reasons: because once logical positivism had assumed 
its position of hegemony in the philosophy of science, it 
became difficult to separate neobehaviorist theories of 
learning from that context; and because the indigenous 
psychological views of science developed by the major 
neobehaviorists were well-formed by the late thirties, 
when logical positivism had become an important influence 
on American psychology.
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Just as the present work focuses on a relatively-
restricted period in the history of behaviorism, so too
it focuses on a subset of the neobehaviorists, namely,
Tolman, Hull, and Skinner. This restriction of range can
be justified on two counts. First, these three figures
are the most important neobehaviorists, both in the
(.intellectual! sense that they initiated and developed
eminent theories of behavior and in the (.sociological).
sense that they established influential traditions of
research that have recognizably endured to the present 
52time. Second, all three of these figures have been 
explicitly linked with logical positivism in the litera­
ture and lore of the recent history of psychology. Since 
allegations of associations with logical positivism have 
been much more frequent for Tolman and Hull than for 
Skinner, greater emphasis has been placed on the accounts 
of Tolman and Hull, Nonetheless, Skinner is also treated,
though much more briefly, because 1) he is sometimes
53linked with logical positivism , 2! he has since 1960 
become the most important behaviorist, and 31 his relative 
aloofness to logical positivism is due to significant 
and characteristic reasons, the elaboration of which will 
help illuminate central themes of this work.
Although the present work contains a chapter on the 
development of logical positivism, it is primarily a work 
in the history of neobehaviorism. However, this is not
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to say that it is purely a work in the history of science 
per se. While it does describe the development of certain 
theories in science, it concommitantly describes certain 
theories of science Cas should be clear from the foregoing 
precis of the revised account!. Accordingly, this work 
aims to provide, from a historical standpoint, a considera­
tion of developments in three areas: behavioral psychology, 
philosophy of science, and psychology of science.
Historiographically speaking, the developments 
treated herein are approached from an internalist perspective. 
The emphasis throughout is on the internal evolution of 
ideas rather than on their sociological, cultural, and 
political context. Although a coherent picture of these 
developments emerges from the internalist perspective 
employed herein, the adoption of that perspective remains 
of course partly arbitrary. Indeed, external factors in 
the story being told here occasionally loom prominently 
in the background. Two examples may be briefly noted.
First, the Unity of Science movement through which 
behaviorists and logical positivists came into contact with 
each other was explicitly designed in part to spread logi­
cal positivism outside of the hostile cultural and politi­
cal climate in which it arose. Second, Hull's prominence 
among psychologists is at least partially attributable to 
the fact that his research was being liberally funded by 
the Rockefeller Foundation during the Depression, a time
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when funding was extremely scarce and unemployment among
psychologists was high. Clearly, these and other external
factors deserve a more careful treatment than the present
account has undertaken, and the entire story could no
doubt profitably be retold from an externalist orienta- 
54tion.
As a related historiographical matter, it is the 
strategy of the present work to include biographical 
material only as it impinges on themes important to the 
book. Although details of personal lives have been kept 
to a minimum, they are often quite significant, Hull's 
early fascination with machinery and his background in 
engineering, for example, turn out to be crucial factors 
in his intellectual development. Likewise, Tolman's up­
bringing in the context of Unitarian liberalism seems to 
have engendered in him an openness of attitude and 
intellect which influenced his eclectic approach to 
science. Factors such as these are discussed in the 
treatments of each behaviorist, but in general they are 
deemphasized relative to the internal conceptual develop­
ments .
t Finally, the reader should be alerted to the overall 
structure of this work. Following an introductory over­
view of logical positivism, the main body of the work 
consists of detailed historical treatments of the 
major neobehaviorists. For each of these figures, the
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narrative is laid out sequentially in three parts. First, 
the ideas that each behaviorist held (roughly), in common 
with logical positivism are presented in an account that 
emphasizes their elaboration prior to and independent of 
the influence of logical positivism on psychology. Second, 
each behaviorist's actual interactions with logical posi­
tivism are described. Third, the divergence of each 
behaviorist from the logical positivist views of science 
is discussed, and in each case this divergence is shown 
to be the result of each behaviorist's psychologistic 
approach to science. In sum, the pattern is as follows: 
anticipation of logical positivist ideas, interaction 
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CHAPTER 2
THE LOGICAL POSITIVIST VIEW OF SCIENCE
In 1922, Moritz Schlick arrived at the University 
of Vienna to assume a chair in the history and theory 
of inductive science, a position which had once been held 
by Ernst Mach. Like Mach, Schlick was a physicist- 
philosopher interested in the epistemology of the natural 
sciences. Schlick*s arrival at Vienna would prove to be 
a decisive event in the history of Western philosophy, for, 
in the years following his arrival,there grew up around 
him a discussion group which came to known as the "Wiener 
Kreis" or Vienna Circle. The ideas developed in this 
group exerted a powerful influence on philosophical and 
scientific thought in the Western world, especially in 
English-speaking countries, during the subsequent three 
or four decades.
Even though the Vienna Circle was known as a school 
of philosophical thought, its members were trained 
mostly in science, mathematics, and logic rather than in 
philosophy. Among its members trained in physics were 
Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Schlick, and Schlick*s 
student Herbert Feigl. The mathematicians in the Circle 
included Kurt Godel, Hans Hahn, and Gustav Bergmann.
49
Several of the members were trained in logic, the more 
expert among them being Carnap and Hahn. Although physics 
and the formal sciences were the predominant fields in the 
Circle, other disciplines were represented as well. There 
was the economist-sociologist Otto Neurath, the historian 
Victor Kraft, and the lawyer Hans Kelsen.1 The guiding 
theme which held together these thinkers of diverse back­
grounds was the idea that all knowledge could be accounted 
for, without resort to metaphysics, from the perspective of 
the scientific world-view. In their general aim of pro­
moting the scientific outlook, they saw themselves as 
followers of Mach, but they believed that Mach had seri­
ously underestimated the role of mathematics and logic 
in science. For the members of the Vienna Circle— and 
especially for those who, like Carnap, were both scientists 
and logicians— a major aim was to depict knowledge in a 
way that did full justice to its empirical and logical 
components,
It was this dual emphasis in the Vienna Circle that 
led its members to refer to their philosophical position
as "logical positivism" or, equivalently, "logical empiri-
2cism." In either form the designation emphasized their 
belief that knowledge is grounded in experience. But 
whereas earlier forms of positivism had stressed the 
biological and sociological aspects of knowledge and 
earlier versions of empiricism had emphasized the importance
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of perception, the logical positivists concerned them­
selves primarily with knowledge in its linguistic and
logical aspects. They gave empiricist philosophy what
3
has been fittingly described as a "linguistic turn."
The logical thrust, they believed, complemented the empiri­
cist view of knowledge and provided a resolution of the 
age-old opposition of rationalism and empiricism. The 
complementarity of logic and empiricism in the logical 
positivists' thought was manifested in their endorsement 
of a strong distinction between analytic and synthetic 
propositions. It was also revealed in their three-way 
classification of sentences into logical claims, empirical 
claims, and nonsensical utterances. According to them, 
there could be no meaningful discourse outside the realm 
of logic and science.
As it turned out, the logical positivist aim of 
clarifying the roles of logic and mathematics, on the 
one hand, and the role of empiricism, on the other, was 
never realized in a completely satisfactory way. The 
strong distinction between logical and empirical proposi­
tions, as well as a host of related sharp distinctions, 
proved difficult to maintain when subjected to close 
scrutiny or when applied to science in any detailed way.
It was as if, having once dichotomized the logical and the 
empirical, the logical positivists were never quite able 
to reunite them into a plausible picture of scientific
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knowledge. Their attempts to do so constitute much of 
the story of their philosophical movement.
The following section provides a brief review of 
the historical background of logical positivism. It 
focuses on the intellectual heritages of both the logical 
and empiricist-positivist sides of the movement and on 
the intellectual tensions that resulted from this dual 
heritage.
Historical Precursors: The Roots of Intellectual Tensions
Frege and the New Logic
After a long period of little or no development in 
the field of logic, the nineteenth century saw revolution­
ary changes in which logic became a more exact and power­
ful discipline. These changes, which were inspired by 
the need for clarification of the foundations of mathe­
matics, began to appear with the publication in mid­
century of important works by Augustus de Morgan and
George Boole. But the most important advances were made
4
later in the century by Gottlob Frege. Frege’s over­
riding aim was to formalize mathematics in a manner 
sufficiently rigorous as to eliminate the need to appeal 
to intuition in mathematical proof s . Mathematics had 
grown rapidly since the scientific revolution, but without 
corresponding increases in the understanding of its 
foundations. Mathematicians generally relied on intuition
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rather on explicit statements of their assumptions.
Frege stressed that such a reliance on intuition was 
risky— as had been shown by the discovery of non-Euclidean 
geometries— and he set out to remedy that situation.
In his attempt to clarify the foundation of mathe­
matics, Frege's efforts were focused on the reduction of 
arithmetic to logic. He was only partially successful in 
carrying out this "logicist" program, but his general 
approach to the problem and the system of logic he 
developed for the undertaking were to have a profound 
influence on twentieth century philosophy. In terms of 
his general strategy, Frege had employed the Cantorian 
theory of sets in defining the concept of natural number. 
This was an approach later followed not only by Russell 
and Whitehead in their treatment of mathematics but also 
by Russell and Carnap in their logical constructions of 
the empirical concepts of science. In terms of his system 
of logic, Frege • s precise formalization of the logic of 
relations, with its introduction of quantified predicates, 
superseded the older Aristotelian logic of subject and 
predicate— an accomplishment that made Frege the founder 
of modern mathematical, logic.
The new power and flexibility of the Fregean logic 
raised hopes that traditional philosophical problems would 
succumb to careful logical analysis. Many who followed 
Frege believed that the new logic provided philosophy
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with a solidly grounded method which would ensure philoso­
phical progress, just as they believed scientific progress 
was guaranteed by the application of scientific methods.
For Russell, who believed that Fregean logic had made 
possible the resolution of age-old perplexities con­
cerning the nature of numbers, the methods of logic meant 
that philosophy could be "piecemeal and provisional like 
science."^ For Frege’s student; Rudolf Carnap, the new 
logic was at once the key to epistemology and to the 
elimination of metaphysics. He wrote that "the theory of 
knowledge, which is after all nothing but applied logic, 
can no more dispense with symbolic logic than physics 
can dispense with mathematics." As for the traditional 
systems of philosophy, whatever could not be adequately 
formulated in symbolic logic would have to be rejected as 
metaphysical. "EIJn the new logic . . . said Carnap, 
"lies the point at which the old philosophy is to be
g
removed from its hinges."
Both Frege and the logical positivists after him 
recognized that in seeking a precise yet general language 
for the expression of ideas they were revitalizing a 
tradition begun by Leibniz. In his works on logic, Leibniz 
had enunciated the goal of developing an ideal language, 
one which was capable of expressing facts and inferences 
with such clarity and accuracy that all of human reasoning 
could be carried out by straightforward calculations within
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that language. Such a language would not only form a 
basis for the unity of science but it would permit the 
settlement of all disputes by mere calculation. Frege, 
who was not as sanguine about the possibility of a com­
pletely universal language, aspired to Leibniz's goal only 
for the realm of mathematics. But the successes of Russell 
and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica (1910-131 in revis­
ing and extending Frege's logicist program and in develop­
ing a convenient system of notation inspired in the logical 
positivists a somewhat greater optimism over the prospects 
for an ideal language that would encompass the empirical 
as well as formal sciences. Although this optimism faded 
with time, the logical positivists continued to adhere 
to the more general notion that traditional philosophical 
puzzles and metaphysical disputes arise from the unfor­
tunate formulations and grammatical traps of imprecise 
language. In Leibnizian fashion, Frege once characterized 
his work in logic as "a battle against the logical blemishes
of language,'1 and the logical positivists were also guided
7
by this conception of the role of logic.
Related to this distinction between ideal and 
ordinary languages was another position espoused by Frege 
and the logical positivists— their anti-psychologism. 
Psychologism was the doctrine, commonly held by naturalists 
and empiricists, that the laws of logic are laws of 
psychology or, more generally, that epistemology is a
branch of psychology. John Stuart Mill’s works on logic 
epitomized nineteenth century psychologism with the claim 
that logic rests on empirically induced rules of thought 
and therefore belongs to the field of psychology. Later 
in the century, naturalism spawned other psychologistic 
interpretations of logic as well, and Frege vehemently
g
denounced psychologism in all of its guises. For Frege 
and others of a formalist bent, it was difficult to see 
how the laws of logic could have their character as uni­
versal and necessary truths if they were based on the 
inexact and ephemeral psychological processes of indivi­
dual human psychological activity. Certainly, any psych­
ologistic view ofilogic would .appear to render it in­
capable of serving as a foundation for mathematics and 
thus would undercut Frege's major intellectual aim of 
reducing mathematics to logic. Accordingly, Frege wrote 
the following admonition against psychologism:
Never let us take a description of the origin 
of an idea for a definition, or an account of 
the mental and physical conditions on which we 
become conscious of a proposition for a proof 
of it. A proposition may be thought, and again 
it may be true; let us never confuse these two 
things. We must remind ourselves, it seems, 
that a proposition no more ceases to be true 
when I cease to think of it than the sun ceases 
to exist when I shut my eyes.^
Frege's attacks on psychologism were relentless. He
spoke of "the devastations which have been brought about
by the incursion of psychology into logic" and denounced
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psychologism as "a widespread philosophical disease.
The image of disease was a recurring feature in Frege's
harshly worded critiques of psychologism. W. C. Kneale
has written of Frege that
he insisted always on the need for a sharp dis­
tinction between logic and psychology, and 
condemned the logic teaching of his day as 
psychologisch verseucht, that is, infected 
with psychology, or perhaps even more strongly, 
rotten with psychology.H
Frege's distinction between a proposition and its 
psychological use or occurrence would be difficult to 
uphold for most naturalists and empiricists. For them, 
a proposition is of interest only in its natural occurrence. 
For Frege, an avowed rationalist, this was no problem.
His interest was only in demonstrating the a priori basis 
of mathematics and logic. But for Russell and the logi­
cal positivists, the situation was not so simple. They 
were attempting a synthesis of logic and empiricism, and 
their aspirations were to extend the application of the 
new logic to the natural, and even social, sciences. In 
accord with his background in the British epistemological 
tradition, Russell admitted that propositions are mental 
events; but the logical positivists rejected Russell's 
psychologistic tendencies and, with respect to logic 
itself, held an anti-psychologistic position akin to 
Frege's. With respect to the boader issue of psychologism 
in epistemology as a whole, the logical positivists had
57
to reformulate their anti-psychologism in such a way as 
to acknowledge a certain role for psychology. Carnap's 
early claim that epistemology is merely applied logic 
required a slight modification to accommodate the empiri­
cist claim— one difficult to dispute— that knowledge in 
fact has psychological origins. The logical positivists' 
attempted reconciliation of Fregean anti-psychologism and 
empiricism eventually took the form of a distinction 
between the context of discovery and justification, an 
important distinction that will be discussed below.
Mach and the Empiricist Tradition
In their empiricist aspect, the logical positivists 
claimed to be descendents of the intellectual tradition 
which began in earnest with the British empiricism of 
the eighteenth century. An important early representative 
of this tradition, and one who anticipated major themes 
of logical positivism, was David Hume. Hume distinguished 
between matters of fact and relations of ideas. Whereas 
statements about matters of fact were to be tested by 
direct reference to experience, statements about relations
t *-  *
of ideas could be evaluated without reference to exper­
ience by mere introspective examination of the relevant 
ideas. What later became known as "necessary" truth 
could be found only among relations of ideas. Any state­
ments that could not be verified either empirically or
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through the analysis of ideas were rejected by Hume as
meaningless discourse. In his Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding (1748)., Hume gave colorful expression to
these ideas:
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these 
principles, what havoc must we make? If we take 
in our hand any volume; of divinity or school 
metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it 
contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity 
or number? No. Does it contain any experimental 
reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?
No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can 
contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Hume's distinction of the empirical and the necessary and 
his rejection of all other candidates for knowledge clearly 
foreshadowed the logical positivists' trichotomy of empiri­
cal, logical, and nonsensical expressions. Furthermore, 
his vitriolic rejection of metaphysics presaged the anti­
metaphysical temper of logical positivism.
However, despite these close parallels between Hume's 
views and logical positivism, Hume's epistemology differed 
deeply from that of the logical positivists in being a 
psychologistic theory of knowledge. Empirical knowledge, 
for Hume, consisted of habits in which sequences of sense 
impressions were strung together by the psychological 
laws of association. In Hume's account, even the know­
ledge embodied in necessary truths was given a psycholog­
istic interpretation, In the first place, ideas were 
said to be sense impressions which endure in memory or 
reflection or else combinations of such sense impressions 
conjoined by psychological laws of association. In the
second place, the processes by which knowledge of 
necessary truth was said to be gained were the psycho­
logical processes of introspection and analysis. Thus, 
even the necessary knowledge which Hume admitted to exist 
was psychologized by him in a way that would have been 
unacceptable to Frege and the logicians of the Vienna 
Circle,
Among the major figures in nineteenth century empiri 
cism, two who were frequently claimed by the logical posi­
tivists as intellectual forbearers were Auguste Comte and 
John Stuart Mill. Comte, who coined the term "positivism, 
insisted that all genuine knowledge is based on experience 
The laws of science, in his view, are statements of 
succession and similarity among observed phenomena, and 
the claims of theology and metaphysics which transcend 
direct experience are to be rejected. Comte’s rejection 
of metaphysics was backed by a theory of history according 
to which the theological and metaphysical stages of 
human development are superseded by a positive stage 
dominated by science. In this last stage, he believed, 
the crowning development would be a positive sociology 
which would permit a rational and harmonious social order 
to be established along scientific lines. The atavistic 
religious needs of people would be met in the positive 
stage by the eglise de raison— the church of reason— of 
which Comte was the self-appointed high priest. Although
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the quasi-religious aspects of Comtean positivism were 
rather an embarrassment to the logical positivists, they 
endorsed his scientistic view of positive knowledge, and 
those who, like Neurath, gave serious attention to the 
social implications of science drew upon his view of the 
relation between social unity and the scientific out­
look.
Mill sympathized.with many of Comte's .ideas and
*
integrated some of them with the British empiricist tradi­
tion. Like Hume and Comte, he held that all knowledge 
is founded on experience and that transcendent claims to 
knowledge are unnecessary and impossible. He accepted 
Comte's doctrine of the three stages of human progress 
and acknowledged the need to organize society on a scien­
tific basis. But whereas Comte had emphasized the socio­
logical ramifications of science, Mill's writings on 
science stressed its methodological aspects. According 
to him, all sciences— including psychology— investigate 
causal regularities through the use of a set of inductive 
methods. Mill's codification of these methods in his 
Logic was a major contribution which paved the way for 
the logical positivists' views on the unity of scientific 
methods. However, Mill's epistemological views, methodology 
included, were like Hume's in being psychologistic and 
highly empiricistic, For him, mathematics was a very 
abstract, general description of empirical regularities,
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and the rules of inference in logic and methodology were 
psychologically derived laws of thought. As was the case 
with Hume, Mill's psychologism was at odds with the later 
views of both Frege and the logical positivists.
The empiricist who- is usually credited with having
had the greatest influence on the logical positivists 
13is Ernst Mach. Mach was identified by the members of 
the Vienna Circle as their immediate predecessor in the 
empiricist tradition, and the group which they organized 
in the twenties to spread the ideals of logical positivism 
was named the "Verein Ernst Mach" in his honor. Like 
Schlick, who succeeded him in his chair at the University 
of Vienna, Mach was a philosophizing physicist rather than 
a pure philosopher. The logical positivists were especially 
drawn to his views on the unity of science and its rela­
tion to the rejection of metaphysics. According to 
Mach's radical empiricism and experiential positivism, 
the aim of all science is to provide concise descriptions 
of the functional dependencies among phenomena. In Mach's 
neutral monism, the elements which are related in the 
descriptive laws of science are pure experiences which 
are neither mental nor physical but neutral givens. As 
such, they enter into all science equally, whether the 
science be physics, physiology, or psychology. The special 
sciences thus differ from one another only in their modes 
of organizing experience. Which mode is chosen will
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depend on its practical convenience, but at root all 
sciences are alike in yielding descriptions of experience. 
Moreover, for Mach, complete description is all one can 
ask of science; any attempt at explanation which goes 
beyond the bounds of description is to be eschewed as 
metaphysical. Whereas many philosophers had attempted to 
unify knowledge by invoking all-embracing metaphysical 
systems, Mach thus held that science could be unified 
only by the elimination of metaphysics in favor of a 
strict empiricism. Mach's explicit connection of the 
unity of science with the rejection of metaphysics was 
a great source of inspiration to the logical positivists, 
although their subsequent elaborations of this notion 
depended more on logical analysis than on radical empiri­
cism.
In his complete rejection- of transcendental and a
priori claims to knowledge, Mach construed epistemology
14as nothing more than the "psychology of knowledge."
In his view, all knowledge, including science, consists 
of efficient adaptation to an environment. Consequently, 
knowledge must be studied in terms of the concrete 
psychological processes of the knower and, ultimately, 
in terms of biological behavior. All thought--even logic 
and mathematics as well as the less exalted forms of 
thinking— is experiential in origin and subject to what 
Mach called the principle of biological economy. Mach's 
positivism and psychologism were little more than out-
63
growths of his submission of epistemology to the demands
of expedient biological adaptation. Mach was not only
uninterested in formal logic but was even hostile to it,
at least to the substantial extent that it was irrelevant
to furthering the aims of survival. At most, logic would
be for him something like a "universal economy of 
1 5thought." Mach's psychologistic interpretations of 
epistemology in general and logic and mathematics in 
particular meant that his views diverged deeply from those 
of the logical positivists. As Hans Sluga has recently 
commented: "In spite of their appeal to the name of Mach, 
it is therefore open to doubt whether the logical empiri­
cists can really be considered his successors.
All::ofl.the major empiricists recognized by. the Vienna 
Circle as part of its intellectual heritage held positions 
that were more thoroughly empiricistic than that of the 
logical positivists themselves. Whether from the per­
spective of psychology, sociology, or biology, they all 
attempted naturalistic accounts of knowledge and these 
accounts generally included psychologistic views of logic. 
On the other hand, the truly novel impetus for logical 
positivism came from the development of the new logic; 
and this development, in turn, was accompanied by an 
emphatic rejection of psychologism. Before logical 
positivism even got under way, then, there were already 
intellectual tensions that needed to be resolved in order
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for it to become a viable philosophical movement. By the 
time the movement was recognized as a movement in the 
twenties, a number of its immediate predecessors had 
attempted reformulations of the relation between the 
empirical and the formal that would reconcile the empiri­
cist and logical trends that led up to it. These formu­
lations are briefly considered in the following section.
Realignment of the Formal and Empirical
Henri Poincare was primarily known as a brilliant
mathematician, but he also contributed major works in
the philosophy of science. He was a follower of Mach,
but like many others who worked in the formal sciences
he was unsympathetic to psychologistic interpretations of
mathematics and logic. In two books published shortly
after the turn of the century, he developed the important
notion of conventions. The discovery of non-Euclidean
geometries, said Poincare, cast serious doubt on the
empirical view that geometry describes the properties of
observable space. When confronted with rival geometries
each of which is logically coherent, one cannot test
between them empirically but rather one simply chooses
between them: the chosen axiom system is adopted as a 
17convention. But the choice is not therefore arbitrary. 
On the contrary, it is guided by concerns such as coher­
ence, convenience, and economy of expression with respect
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to observations. Conventions, which have the character 
of disguised definitions, are also found in science. The 
principle of conservation of energy is one such conven­
tion. It is neither an empirical generalization nor a 
synthetic a priori truth but rather an agreed upon stipu­
lation concerning the use of the concept of energy. 
Poincare's formulation of conventions thus assigned to 
the formal sciences a role in empirical science. A 
priori claims were to serve a regulative function--not as 
transcendental conditions of knowledge, as Kant would 
have it— but as stipulations chosen to govern the linguis­
tic usage of scientists.
A somewhat similar account of the relation between 
the formal and the empirical was inspired by the axiomatic 
method of the mathematician David Hilbert. Around the 
turn of the century, Hilbert depicted geometry as a sys­
tem of axioms which are abstracted from their putative 
subject matter and treated as a purely formal system.
These axioms, taken together with the theorems which can 
be derived from them without reference to intuitions 
of geometrical objects, form a relational structure which 
in itself has no content. Such a system can, however, be 
applied to an empirical domain by demonstrating that cer­
tain objects and relations in the world satisfy the 
axiom system. This process of empirical interpretation 
amounts to establishing an isomorphic relation between
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the formal structure and a system of empirical entities 
plus the lawful regularities by which they are related.
In the case of Poincare's conventions and Hilbert's 
formal axioms, there is no question of truth other than 
coherence or logical "truth." Even in their applications 
to natural science, they can (strictly speaking) only be 
said to be appropriate or inappropriate, convenient or 
inconvenient, or satisfied or unsatisfied. In this way, 
conventions and axiom systems retain their formal status ■ 
while finding a place in natural science.
The approaches of Poincare and Hilbert were inte­
grated by Moritz Schlick in his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre 
(.1918), First, he characterized Hilbert's axioms as
implicit definitions, a strategy later employed in the
18logical positivist account of scientific theories.
Because axioms are unprovable, their validity had often 
been thought to be demonstrable only through appeal to 
intuition. But intuition was not only imprecise and 
unreliable (_as the abandonment of the parallel postulate 
had shown), but reliance on it was a form of psychologism. 
Hilbert had shown that axioms require no validation, and 
Schlick took this to mean that the primitive concepts 
involved in an axiom system are defined only by their 
implicit role in the system and not by their capacity to 
be imagined in the intuition. Then, Schlick argued that 
the purely formal concepts can be connected to empirical
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concepts by the appropriate choice of coordinating
definitions-, which he took to be conventions in Poincare's
19sense. To be sure, the choice of these conventions 
would be governed by their usefulness for a given empiri­
cal domain, but they would remain stipulations governing 
linguistic usage and thus would be devoid of empirical 
content. Once the implicit and coordinating definitions 
were set, whatever remained— for example, the statements 
of laws, the empirical or "concrete" definitions— would 
constitute the empirical content of the overall con­
ceptual system.
For obvious reasons, Schlick's approach was best 
suited to the analysis of highly developed physical 
theories. But he also undertook to analyze various claims 
in biology, psychology, and phenomenology. In all cases, 
he attempted to show that the sentences in question were 
either analytic or empirical, depending entirely on the 
conventions chosen for their interpretation, but in no 
case were they synthetic a priori. Those which had 
appeared to be synthetic a priori gained that appearance 
only through being expressed in logically faulty or unclear 
fashion. In other words, all meaningful expressions were 
either analytic or synthetic and none could be both at 
once.
Around the time of Schlick's work, Bertrand Russell 
was developing applications of the Principia Mathematica
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logic to traditional problems of empiricism. He suggested 
that the entities of the empirical world could be logi­
cally constructed as sets of sense-data or appearances 
in a manner analogous to Frege's construction of numbers 
as sets. This approach, he thought, would prove especially 
valuable in giving an account of the abstract unobservable 
entities (e.g., electrons, matter, mental processes in 
others), which science had found it useful to postulate 
but which resisted straightforward analysis in empiricist 
terms. At the root of Russell's strategy was his dictum 
to substitute logical constructions for inferences when­
ever possible. Epistemology would thus be given a firm 
foundation by removing psychological (hence unreliable) 
inferences and replacing them with purely logical rela­
tions, which were precise and now well understood because 
of the new logic.
Like Schlick, Russell believed that the logical 
analysis of science would reveal a distinct separation 
between its formal and empirical components. As long 
as all knowledge was held to be derived by inference 
from experience, one was led like Mill to impute empirical 
content to even the most abstract of expressions— those 
of logic and mathematics. But according to Russell the 
replacement of inferences by constructions shows other­
wise, not only for mathematics and logic but also for 
some of the principles of physics. The principle of the
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impenetrability of matter was one such case in Russell’s
view. He wrote:
One cannot help feeling that impenetrability is 
not an empirical fact, derived from observation 
of billiard balls, but is something logically 
necessary. This feeling is wholly justified, 
but it could not be so if matter were not a 
logical construction. An immense number of 
occurrences coexist in any little region of 
space-time; when we are speaking of what is not 
logical construction, we find no such property 
as impenetrability, but, on the contrary, end­
less overlapping of the events in a part of space­
time, however small. The reason that matter is 
impenetrable is because our definitions make it 
so. . . . Impenetrability is a logically nece­
ssary result of definition,* though the fact 
that such a definition is convenient is empiri­
cal . 20
Russell went on to argue that such analyses could profit­
ably be applied to psychological phenomena, that cognition
for example "must be preserved as a construction, not as
21inferred entity." The only reason to hesitate m  
doing so, he felt, was that psychological theory was 
perhaps not sufficiently advanced to indicate just what 
concepts would be useful to reconstruct.
In the celebrated Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
22C1921/22). , Russell's pupil Ludwig Wittgenstein gave
what was to become the canonical formulation of the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions, 
Therein he developed the propositional calculus and the 
method of truth tables for ascertaining the truth value 
of propositions compounded out of atomic propositions 
by means of logical connectives. Those propositions
which are true for any combination of truth values of 
its constituent propositions were defined as tautologies—  
the analytic truths of logic. And here was the crucial 
point: because their truth is independent of the truth 
of the atomic propositions, they have no content, empiri­
cal or otherwise. These empty tautologies could be used 
as syntactical rules which, when applied to empirical 
propositions, would yield other empirical propositions 
without any change in their truth value; but, in themselves, 
logical truths have no content. Furthermore, since 
mathematics was believed to be reducible to logic, its 
propositions were also empty tautologies. Wittgenstein's 
formulation was hailed by the logical empiricists as 
a major breakthrough in the history of empiricism. No 
longer, they felt, was there any justification for the 
psychologistic view that logic and mathematics are general 
descriptions of either the world or the working of thought. 
Nor was there any need for the belief— which even Frege, 
the rationalist, held— that logic and mathematics des­
cribe a subject matter in the rationalist realm of 
transcendent entities. Without either an empirical or 
rational subject matter, logic and mathematics were 
believed to be free of metaphysics and could therefore 
serve as neutral instruments for the excision of meta­
physics from all discourse. The previously metaphysical 
opposition of rationalism and empiricism had been
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transformed into the ostensibly innocuous linguistic 
distinction between analytic and synthetic truths.
The system elaborated by Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus came to be known, appropriately, as logical 
atomism. In some respects, it was akin to Hume's psy­
chological atomism, but differed from it in two important 
23respects. First, Hume's epistemology stressed con­
cepts over judgments; atomic ideas and impressions were 
compounded into ideas not propositions. Second, the pro­
cess of compounding simples into complexes was for Hume 
a psychological process governed by the natural laws of 
association. For Wittgenstein, the process was a purely 
logical relation involving only the logical connectives 
and their definitions. According to Wittgenstein's scheme 
of logical atomism, the world is composed of possible 
states of affairs (arrangements of objects!.. Each possible 
state of affairs is pictured, in an ideal language, 
by an atomic proposition the structure of which perfectly 
mirrors that of the corresponding state of affairs. If 
the state of affairs actually obtains, the atomic proposi­
tion which pictures it is said to be true; otherwise it 
is false. The molecular propositions compounded out of 
the atomic propositions depict complex states of affairs. 
Unlike tautological molecular propositions, which are 
true for all possible states of affairs, these molecular 
propositions have a truth value which depends on the truth
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value of their component propositions and on the specific 
logical connectives which occur in them. Along these 
lines, Wittgenstein construed a general statement such 
as "Something is F'1 as a disjunction of atomic statements: 
"a is F or b is F or c is F, etc." Likewise, the state­
ment "Everything is F" was construed as the conjunction 
"a is F and b is F and c is F, etc." The similarity of 
this latter example to the structure of scientific laws 
was not lost on the logical positivists, who drew heavily 
on Wittgenstein's formulation in their account of the 
verifiability of scientific claims (see belowl.
All of the figures discussed in the present section 
strove to distinguish sharply between the analytic and 
the synthetic and to clarify their respective roles in 
science. And all of these figures were important sources 
of the philosophy of science which was subsequently 
developed in the Vienna Circle, As logical positivism 
evolved, the analytic-synthetic distinction and the family 
of dichotomies which rested on it became gradually more 
difficult to maintain plausibly, especially when applied 
in detail to actual cases of scientific knowledge. Over 
time, the original strict formulations of logical posi­
tivism underwent liberalizations, and these revisions 
were in important respects concessions to empiricism. As 
a consequence, the naturalism of the empiricist tradition 
gradually crept back into the analytic philosophy of the >
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Vienna Circle. In this respect, Wittgenstein’s story is 
illuminating. No sooner had he exerted his decisive 
influence on logical positivism than he began to work out 
a new, more naturalistic philosophy— one which repudiated 
the formalist approach to language and science that his 
earlier work had helped to spawn. Hans Sluga has charac­
terized these developments as follows:
Analytic philosophy arose in reaction to a 
dominant naturalism. From the very beginning it 
opposed radical empiricism, psychologism, his- 
toricism, evolutionism, and subjectivism. In 
contrast, it concerned itself with logical, formal, 
or a priori questions. As the tradition developed 
from Frege through Russell to Carnap and finally 
the later Wittgenstein it was forced to make 
greater concessions to the claims of empiricism.
In Wittgenstein's later philosophy the tradition 
has reached a point at which it reconnects with 
the naturalism that emerged in the first half of 
the nineteenth century. . . . Frege thought he
had banished radical empiricism, but in Wittgen­
stein it has returned to haunt the analytic tradi­
tion, 24
The significance of these developments for the pre­
sent work is that the behaviorists discussed herein 
represented many of those very traditions— radical empiri­
cism, psychologism, and evolutionism— which analytic 
philosophy was opposed to. By the time they came into 
contact with logical positivism, they had all begun to 
develop naturalistic epistemologies on the basis of their 
psychological views. In each case, these epistemologies 
were largely incompatible with the epistemological views 
of analytic philosophy and even anticipated some of the
philosophical developments which subsequently overthrew 
the logical positivist view.
Logical Positivism 
The Vienna Circle and the 'Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung
In 1929, Moritz Schlick was offered a lucrative 
position in Bonn. Because he was the organizer and per­
sonal center of the Vienna Circle, his departure would 
no doubt have had serious consequences for the fate of 
the Circle. But in a momentous decision, Schlick chose 
to remain in Vienna. He then spent part of a year as 
a visiting professor at Stanford University. Upon return­
ing from America, he was presented with a pamphlet cele­
brating his return and his decision to stay in Vienna.
This short monograph--authored by Neurath, Carnap, and 
Hahn— reviewed the development of ideas that had led up 
to the Vienna Circle and proclaimed that the Circle's 
scientific approach to philosophizing constituted a new 
movement in philosophy. The basic orientation of the 
movement was reflected in the title of its manifesto:
"Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung— Der Wiener Kreis" or
25"The Scientific World-Conception: The Vienna Circle."
If the pamphlet was a manifesto of a movement, it was 
also a programmatic statement of an intellectual position. 
Pointing out the dual heritage of logical positivism, 
its authors emphasized that the integration of the new
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logic into the empiricist framework constituted a break 
with the traditional forms of empiricism and positivism. 
Echoing the anti-psychologism of Frege, they wrote: "It 
is the method of logical analysis that essentially dis­
tinguishes recent empiricism and positivism from the
earlier version that was more biological-psychological
2 6in its orientation." As for the logical side of this 
program, which was described as "Cljogistic and its 
application to reality," they cited the work of Leibniz, 
Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, and Hilbert.
In proclaiming a new movement, the authors of the 
"Wissenschaftlich Weltauffassung" were expressing their 
confidence that Schlick's decision to stay in Vienna was 
an auspicious sign of future productivity and growth for 
the movement. In fact, it proved to be just so. The 
period between 1929 and 1936, when Schlick*s assassination 
brought the heyday of the Vienna Circle to a tragic 
close, saw not only a systematic elaboration of the Circle's 
philosophy but also a considerable expansion of its influ­
ence. Even in 1929, a conference on the epistemology of 
the exact sciences held in Prague brought the members of 
the Vienna Circle into contact with like-minded thinkers 
from other parts of Europe and resulted in the dissemina­
tion of its views. In 1930, the logical positivists took 
over the journal Annalen der Philosophie, renaming it 
Erkenntnis and transforming it into an effective instrument
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for the articulation and dissemination of logical posi­
tivism. At the same time, logical positivism was being 
spread through personal channels. In 1930, Herbert Feigl 
went to Harvard University as a visiting scholar, and, 
after a brief return to Vienna, emigrated permanently 
to the United States. Schlick's visit to Stanford was 
followed by a second visit to America, this time at 
Berkeley, in 1931. In 1932, Schlick lectured on the 
Vienna Circle philosophy at the University of London, as 
did Carnap two years later. Just as important were the 
philosophers who were drawn to the Vienna Circle from 
their native countries and returned to them with word 
of the new philosophy. These figures included Charles 
Morris and W. V, 0. Quine from the United States, Arne 
Naess from Norway, and A. J. Ayer from England— all of 
whom visited the Circle in the years 1932-34. Ayer 
returned to England to publish his classic polemic 
Language, Truth and Logic C19361, a book which instantly 
established logical positivism as a philosophy to be 
contended with in the English-speaking world.
The most important of the Vienna Circle's philoso­
phical allies on the Continent were the scientifically- 
minded philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists 
in the Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy. Among 
the participants in this group were Hans Reichenbach, 
Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling, Carl Hempel, and
the psychologists Kurt Lewin and Wolfgang Kohler. The
Berlin Society, headed by Reichenbach, was contemporaneous
with the Vienna Circle and its members shared the same
general philosophical orientation as that of the Circle.
Their writings, however, lacked the strident denunciations
of metaphysics that were characteristic of Vienna Circle
writings, and it has been said that the members of the
Berlin Society "had some reservations about the tendency
of the Vienna Circle to form systems and set up prescrip-
27tions and prohibitions."
One reflection of the Berlin Society's more tolerant 
attitude toward scientific epistemology was Hans 
Reichenbach1s strong emphasis on th£ roles of probability 
and induction in science. To be sure, the Berlin group 
included logicians— notably Carl Hempel— who followed 
the Vienna Circle strategy of relying on deductive logic 
in giving rational reconstructions of science. But 
Reichenbach viewed all empirical knowledge as hypothetical 
and probabilistic and therefore preferred to formulate 
his reconstructions in terms of probability and confirma­
tion rather than logic and verification. Thus, for 
example, whereas the Vienna Circle members had claimed 
that two general propositions were identical in meaning 
when the same set of verifiable basic sentences could be 
deduced from them, Reichenbach held them to be identical 
when all possible observation sentences conferred the
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28same degree of probability on them. In general, logic 
was the appropriate tool of analysis when scientific laws 
were construed as deterministic and nomothetic, and 
probability was the analytic tool of choice when laws 
were viewed as only probabilistic. As we shall see in 
Chapter 7, this difference between dominant approaches 
in Vienna and Berlin later surfaced in the debates in 
psychology over the proper formulation of psychological 
laws.
The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification
As was discussed above, one of the basic assump­
tions of those who developed the new logic and advocated 
its application to science was that psychology was irrele­
vant to logic. In their view, the truths of logic and 
mathematics could achieve their necessary and universal 
status only by virtue of their independence from the 
psychological processes of those who devise and use them. 
To accept psychologism in any form was to relinquish the 
claim that logic and mathematics rest on a solid epistem- 
ological foundation and that they could in turn provide 
a firm footing for the sciences in which they are used.
But now in applying the techniques of the new logic 
to empirical science--something which Frege himself did 
not do— the logical positivists faced the problem of 
psychologism in a new form. Even granting that the formal
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sciences could do without psychology by virture of their 
explicitly stated axioms and rules of inference, the 
epistemology of the empirical sciences could hardly seem 
to avoid psychologism. After all, the empirical sciences 
are a product of empirical discoveries (some of them 
accidental), the psychological activities of observation 
and inference, the belief systems of individual scient­
ists, and the collective and individual use of images, 
metaphors, and analogies. The I'agirral positivists could 
not simply deny that such psychological processes do in 
fact enter into science. But, wanting to give empirical 
science a firm foundation, they attempted to neutralize 
the psychological dimensions of science by first isolating 
them from the realm of logic and validity and then by 
downplaying their importance.
The classic statement of the strategy used by the 
logical positivists was given in Reichenbach1s Experience 
and Prediction (1938). Reichenbach cited the example of 
mathematicians and theoretical physicists. They may 
arrive at their claims as well as the proofs for them by 
a variety of relatively haphazard psychological processes, 
but in publishing their results they communicate them in 
a reconstructed form that makes their rational justifi­
cation evident to the reader, Reichenbach wrote:
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There is a great difference between the sys­
tem of logical interconnections of thought 
and the actual way in which thinking pro­
cesses are performed. The psychological opera­
tions of thinking are rather vague and fluc­
tuating processes; they almost never keep 
to the ways prescribed by logic and may even 
skip whole groups of operations which would be 
needed for a complete exposition of the sub­
ject in question. 9^
The activities of science, then, are divided into two 
contexts which Reichenbach called the context of dis­
covery and the context of justification. The former 
includes the psychological factors and processes which 
enter into the discovery of scientific ideas. The latter 
includes all the factors involved in justifying a claim 
once it has been arrived at— the checking of inferences 
leading to and from it, the testing of the claim by empiri­
cal procedures, ascertainment of coherence between 
the claim and previously validated knwoledge, and so on. 
Only the products of the context of justification can 
qualify as scientific knowledge. Implicit knowledge, 
intuitions, and any heuristic guides to discovery are 
ruled out of the realm not only of science but of epistem­
ology in general. In this way, the logical positivists 
believed, all knowledge would necessarily be justified 
knowledge. Just as the elimination of psychologism from 
the formal sciences was to have ensured the objectivity 
and universality of logical and mathematical claims, 
so too would the laws of science be ensured an objective 
and universal status by the elimination of their
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dependence on the psychological processes of scientists.
Although the important distinction between dis­
covery and justification did not receive its canonical 
formulation until 19.38, it had already for some time been 
a crucial distinction in logical positivist thought.
In his celebrated tract Per logische Aufbau der Kelt 
C1928) , Carnap discussed the distinction as follows:
It must be possible to give a rational founda­
tion for each scientific thesis, but this does 
not mean that such a thesis must always be 
discovered rationally, that is, through an exer­
cise of the understanding alone. After all, 
the basic orientation and the direction of 
interests are not the results of deliberation, 
but are determined by emotions, drives, dis­
positions , and general living conditions.
This does not only hold for philosophy but also 
for the most rational of sciences, namely 
physics and mathematics. The decisive factor 
is, however, that for the justification of a 
thesis the physicist does not cite irrational 
factors, but gives a purely empirical— rational 
justification,
Carnap went on to apply the distinction to philosophy
itself:
We demand the same from ourselves in our phil­
osophical work. The practical handling of 
philosophical problems and the discovery of 
their solutions does not have to be purely 
intellectual, but will always contain emotional 
elements and intuitive methods. The justifi­
cation, however, has to take place before the 
forum of the understanding; here we must not 
refer to our intuition or emotional needs. We 
too, have "emotional needs" in philosophy, 
but they are filled by clarity of concepts, 
precision of methods, responsible theses, 
achievement through cooperation in which each 
individual plays his part.30
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In philosophy, as in science, the irrational and the 
merely psychological are screened out of knowledge when 
claims to knowledge are subjected to the demands of 
justification.
The place assigned to psychology in the logical 
positivist scheme was expressed even more clearly and 
forcefully in Carnap's later writings. Traditional 
philosophy was viewed as an admixture of metaphysical, 
logical, and psychological claims— a confusing hodge­
podge which could be straightened out only by careful 
logical analysis. The metaphysical claims were, of course, 
removed from philosophy on the grounds of being non­
sensical and placed with other purely emotive expressions, 
such as those of poetry. Turning to the consideration 
of psychology, Carnap wrote:
When we have eliminated metaphysical pro- . 
blems and doctrines from the region of knowledge 
or theory, there remain still two kinds of 
philosophical questions: psychological and 
logical. Now we shall eliminate the psychologi­
cal questions also, not from the region of 
knowledge, but from philosophy. Then, finally, 
philosophy will be reduced to logic alone (in 
a wide sense of this wordl.
This separation of psychology from philosophy was viewed
as an especially important distinction to maintain in
the realm of epistemology. As Reichenbach put it,
psychology and epistemology have two different tasks,
and "£mjany false objections and misunderstandings
of modern epistemology have their source in not separating
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32these two tasks." The logical positivists-' exclusion 
of psychology from epistemology was described by Carnap 
as follows:
Epistemology or theory of knowledge in its 
usual form contains both psychological and 
logical questions. The psychological questions 
here concern the procedure of knowledge, that 
is, the mental events by which we come to know 
something. If we surrender these questions to 
the psychologist for his empirical investigation, 
there remains the logical analysis of knowledge, 
or more precisely, the logical analysis of the 
examination and verification of assertions, 
because knowledge consists of positvely veri­
fied assertions,33
In other words, psychology addresses genuine questions but
only in the context of discovery, i.e., "how we come to
know something." But on the logical positivist view,
the context of discovery is of no philosophical concern,
Epistemology deals only with matters of justification and
validity.
From the logical positivist perspective, this 
separation of psychology and epistemology was a natural 
distinction to draw. From the outset, they approached 
science first and foremost as a linguistic phenomenon—  
a domain to be analyzed by means of the "logical syntax 
of language." Validity was thereofre analyzed from a 
logical perspective. The behaviorists, on the other hand, 
viewed science from a psychological— and ultimately 
a Darwinian functionalist— perspective. As we shall 
see, their psychologies of science were concerned not 
only with scientific discovery but also with validity
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in their own special Darwinian sense. For them, the 
"validity" of knowledge was a matter of the biological 
value of an outcome produced by some behavior executed 
under the guidance of that knowledge.
The Rational Reconstruction of Science
Once the logical positivists had purged epistemology 
of metaphysical and psychological questions, all that 
remained was the logical analysis of science. At this 
point, the logical positivists turned to Russell’s 
replacement program: the fallible and subjective psych­
ological processes involved in the actual attaining of 
knowledge were to be replaced by logical constructions by 
means of which the logical relations between the various 
concepts and claims of science would be exhibited. When 
in 1921 Carnap read Russell’s appeal urging philosophers 
to adopt such an approach, he responded with enthusiasm.
"I felt as if this appeal had been directed to me per­
sonally," he wrote. "To work in this spirit would be my
34task from now on!" In 1928, Carnap published his 
Aufbau, a work which despite its flaws remains a monu­
ment in the logical empiricist tradition. In that work, 
Carnap attempted what he called a "rational reconstruction" 
(rationale Nachkonstruktion). of science, that is, a 
rigorous logical reconstruction of science in its logical 
and epistemological relationships. Although the rational
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reconstruction was not meant to be a literal description
of the psychological processes that enter into science,
Carnap desired that it should nonetheless reflect actual
epistemological processes. Accordingly, he chose to
construct the system of concepts on a phenomenalistic
basis, somewhat along the lines of Mach's radical empiri-
35cist analysis of sensations. As Carnap later described
the enterprise:
The main motivation for my choice of a 
phenomenalistic basis was the intention to 
represent not only the logical relations 
among the concepts but also the equally impor­
tant epistemological relations. The system 
was intended to give, though not a descrip­
tion, still a rational reconstruction of the 
actual process of the formation of concepts.36
Carnap's decision to have rational reconstructions reflect 
actual epistemological processes rather than to capture 
purely logical relations was a momentous one. As critics 
of the Aufbau have subsequently argued, a purely logical 
reconstruction of science is governed by different cri­
teria of success than a partly epistemological reconstruc-
37tion, and indeed the criteria may be at odds, Carnap's 
decision was already a major concession to empiricism—  
a concession which threatened to blur the sharp distinction 
between the empirical and the formal and which opened 
the door to considerations which would have earlier been 
condemned as psychologistic. As it turned out, Carnap 
never abandoned the analytic-synthetic distinction, but 
all of the major revisions of his views since the Aufbau
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were justified by him, at least in part, by the claim 
that they provide a more accurate reflection of scientific 
practice.
If the general spirit of the logical positivists'
rational reconstructions was taken from Russell, their
basic distinctions and conceptions regarding science
were derived from their reading of Wittgenstein's
Tractatus. Twice during the 1920s, the Vienna Circle
devoted extended periods to reading and discussing the
3 8Tractatus at its meetings. Although the Circle members
were sometimes put off by the obscurity of Wittgenstein's
formulations and his tendency toward mysticism, they
gradually worked out an interpretation of his views which
appealed to them and greatly influenced their thinking
in the late twenties and early thirties. In addition
to the treatment of logical truths as empty tautologies
Cas described above)., three other closely related notions
were extracted from Wittgenstein's Tractatus and made into
tenets of early logical positivsm. These were: 1) the
rejection of metaphysics on purely linguistic grounds;
21 the notion of a pure observation language consisting
of basic propositions; and 31 the idea that non-analytic
general propositions are verifiable in terms of the
39 .basic statements of the observation language. Together 
with Wittgentstein's view of logical truth, these inter­
pretations of his work were transformed into the familiar
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three-fold classification of analytic, empirical, and non­
sensical claims. The aim of rational reconstruction was 
to first purge science of any metaphysical elements, 
then to distinguish its analytic and empirical components, 
and to show the latter to be reducible to the elementary 
statements of the observation language. In what follows, 
each of these three tasks will briefly be considered.
Metaphysics as Linguistic Violations
In the famous final statement of the Tractatus,
Wittgenstein wrote, "Whereof one cannot speak thereof one
40must be silent." For him, this was an assertion about 
the limits of language and an affirmation of the existence 
of a mystical realm incapable of being described linguis­
tically. But among the logical positivists, it was 
taken to be a denial of the intelligibility of metaphysics, 
rather than an acknowledgement of a metaphysical realm.
That is, having insisted that all genuine knowledge is 
expressible in language Cor at least in an ideal, logi­
cally purified language!, they'naturally viewed claims 
concerning the inexpressible as meaningless nonsense having 
no importance or cognitive significance. In their 
"linguistic turn," the logical positivists were giving 
positivism a novel twist. As A. J. Ayer stated it:
"The originality of the logical positivists lay in their 
making the impossibility of metaphysics depend not upon
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the nature of what could be known but upon the nature of
41what could be said."
In the early stages of logical positivism, logical
analysis was conceived to be a matter only of logical
syntax, that is, of the forms of language, not of their
42meanings or semantic interpretations. This meant 
that all meaningful discourse fulfilled the rules of 
logical syntax and, conversely, that meaningless expressions 
violated those rules. In certain difficult cases, meta­
physical claims appeared to be meaningful because they 
took on the superficial form of declarative sentences, but 
in each instance careful analysis could show them to be 
ill-formed formulations which violated syntactical con­
straints. Carnap cited the example of Martin Heidegger's
43claim that "The Nothing itself nothings." Although this 
statement is superficially of a subject-predicate form, 
argued Carnap, it is countersyntactical because of its 
use of the word "nothing" as a noun. In its proper logi­
cal form, "nothing" is not a name but rather an abbrevia­
tion of a logical form, specifically a negative existential 
statement. Other metaphysical claims considered by Carnap 
included "Pure Being and pure Nothing are one and the 
same," "The principle of the world is pure water," and 
"God is." But logical positivist analyses were not 
limited only to the obviously problematic assertions of 
traditional metaphysics and theology. They equally
89
rejected some claims that were often associated with the 
scientific world-view. Thus, assertions that the external 
world is real, that the world consists of material enti­
ties and their interactions, and that experience consists 
of neutral sensations were all eschewed as meaningless, 
despite their general congeniality with the scientific 
temper.
The most important class of linguistic violations 
involved the non-analytic statements which could not be 
reduced to basic statements of the observation language. 
These were the claims which were eschewed on the grounds 
of their failure to meet the requirements of verifiability.
Verifiability and Its Variants
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein spoke of atomic pro­
positions which express or "picture" the most elemental 
facts of the world. Any empirical proposition that was 
not an atomic sentence was said by him to be a molecular 
proposition logically compounded from atomic ones. But 
the truth value of atomic sentences is immediately 
evident, and genuine molecular propositions— i.e., those 
which are syntactically well-formed— are truth functions 
of their constituent atomic sentences. This meant, 
at least to the logical positivists, that all genuine 
empirical claims are verifiable either directly or else 
indirectly by means of logical derivation of their
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component elementary propositions, Wittgenstein himself
did not advance a verifiability criterion, saying only
that "tUo understand a proposition means to know what
44is the case if it is true.” But in Wittgenstein's
formulations, the members of the Vienna Circle saw a way
to make explicit the traditional empiricist idea that
genuine knowledge is grounded on experience.
In their empiricist rendering of Wittgenstein's
views, the logical positivists embraced the notion of
a basic observation language or pure data language. It
would consist of sentences analogous to Wittgenstein's
atomic propositions and would serve as the foundation of
all empirical knowledge. The exact nature of these
basic sentences was a topic of much debate in the Vienna
Circle, and in their various interpreations they appeared
as Schlick's "confirmations" (JKonstatierungenl , Neurath's
"protocol statements" (ProtokolSatzel, and Ayer's "basic 
45propositions." Regardless of their precise characteriza­
tion, they were assumed to stand in some clear logical 
relation to the more general statements which they 
supported.
Wittgenstein had claimed that for each genuine 
molecular proposition there would be one and only one
46"complete analysis" into its component atomic sentences. 
Schlick and Friedrich Waismann— the two members of the 
Vienna Circle most strongly influenced by Wittgenstein—
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gave early formulations of the verifiability principle
which closely followed Wittgenstein's uniqueness claim.
Thus, Waismann wrote in 1930, "A statement which cannot
be verified conclusively is not verifiable at all; it
47is just devoid of any meaning," In stating this strong 
criterion of verifiability, Waismann was modelling the 
general statements of science after Wittgenstein’s con- 
strual of the molecular proposition "Everything is F" 
as a conjunction of atomic propositions about individuals 
being F. But Wittgenstein had advanced this notion only 
for an idealized language, and the extension of it to 
general scientific claims was clearly based on faulty 
analogizing. This was readily recognized by other logical 
positivists, who noted that the universal laws of science 
apply to an unlimited number of cases and 
cannot be considered logically equivalent to a finite 
number of observation sentences. Furthermore, a universal 
law can have as logical consequences an unlimited number 
of basic statements about the past and future, and cer­
tainly not all of these can be verified. The strong 
principle of verifiability thus ruled out scientific laws 
as meaningless— a highly unacceptable outcome for a 
philosophical movement which upheld scientific knowledge 
as the paradigmatic form of.all knowledge.
Schlick attempted to evade the untoward consequences 
of the verifiability principle by giving a different inter-
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pretation to scientific laws. On this new view, laws 
were taken to be, not descriptions of states of affairs, 
but inference rules for passing from certain basic state­
ments to others. As such, they would presumably not 
need to be reducible to some one set of basic statements. 
However, as Carnap and others pointed out, the laws of 
science are routinely treated as descriptive statements 
which are subject to falsification; but it would make 
little sense to attempt to falsify a rule. For this 
and other reasons, Schlick’s instrumentalistic interpre­
tation of laws as inference rules was rejected.
By the mid-thirties, it was apparent that the early 
formulations of the verifiability principle were far too 
strict. The relationship between a general scientific 
claim and the empirical basis that assures it of a mean­
ingful status was obviously more complicated and less 
direct than the relation of logical equivalence between 
the claim and a determinate set of basic statements. In 
what became a vast literature in the philosophy journals, 
the principle of verifiability was subjected to heated 
debate. Numerous revisions of it were advanced in the hope 
that each new formulation would answer the criticisms 
of previous versions. But each newly proposed criterion 
of meaningfulness seemed either to exclude scientific 
claims that would ordinarily appear to be acceptable 
or else to admit as meaningful claims that appeared to
be metaphysical. As the debates went on, two general 
changes took place: 11 there were more concessions to 
empiricism, both in the sense of a reduced role for logi­
cal deduction in the formulation of the relation between 
observation and knowledge claim and in the sense of that 
relation being tailored to reflect actual acientific 
practice; 2) the unit of analysis for cognitive signifi­
cance shifted from the proposition to the concept. Both 
of these changes were revealed in Carnap's writings.
The first concession to empiricism was to acknow­
ledge that, even though a general statement was still to 
be regarded as strictly equivalent to a set of observa­
tion statements, the equivalence between them need not 
be analytic. That is, the interderivability between them 
could be achieved by means of valid scientific laws 
(independent of the law in question! rather than by means 
of only the rules of logical syntax, as the Wittgenstein 
truth-functional model would have it. In his Philosophy 
and Logical Syntax (.19.351, Carnap remarked that the 
possibility of empirical, as opposed to formal, equiva­
lences had not been taken sufficiently into account in 
previous explications of the criterion of meaningfulness.
In 1936-37, Carnap published his lengthy article
on "Testability and Meaning"— a landmark in the liberal-
49ization of logical positivism. 'Therein, he admitted 
that no general proposition of science can ever be con-
94
clusively verified. Such, claims could, however, be tested 
and gradually confirmed in increasing degrees, and the 
meaningfulness of them would depend on this property,
Carnap distinguished between testability and confirmability, 
A sentence was said to be testable if known procedures 
Ce.g., particular experiments!, were available which would 
confirm or disconfirm it in some degree, A sentence was 
said to be confirmable if it were possible to state what 
sort of evidence would confirm or disconfirm it, regard­
less of whether that evidence were obtainable through 
available procedures. Carnap advocated the weaker of 
these requirements, partial confirmability, as a new 
criterion of meaningfulness. This approach had the advan­
tage of admitting scientific laws and hypotheses as 
meaningful assertions and it reflected scientific prac­
tice in which laws are held in varying degrees of belief; 
but it proved to be difficult to give a sound technical 
explication of the notion of confirmation. Carnap 
devoted much of the rest of his career to studies of the 
"logic" of confirmation. He also continued to revise the 
criterion of meaningfulness, giving his last, highly 
liberalized version of it in 1956.^ Despite his con­
tinued efforts, and those of Carl Hempel and others, it 
is widely agreed that no fully satisfactory formulation 
of the empiricist criterion of meaningfulness was ever 
devised,
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Carnap's "Testability and Meaning" also contained 
important developments in regard to the problem of empiri­
cal definition. In a break from the Fregean tradition 
of giving judgments priority over concepts, Carnap began 
to consider the "observable predicate" as fundamental and
to define the "confirmable sentence" in terms of the predi-
52cate or predicates occurring m  it. Accordingly, the 
definability of terms began to take precedence over the 
confirmability of statements. Here, too, Carnap greatly 
liberalized the earlier formulations. In previous 
characterizations of empirical definitions, Carnap and 
others had emphasized the explicit definability of con­
cepts. A concept was explicitly defined in terms of 
observations when the observations were asserted to be 
logically equivalent to the attribution of that concept 
to an entity. Thus, to say that person a is angry is to 
say that the person's body shows certain observable 
characteristics which are strictly equivalent to the 
anger. In symbolic notation (where F stands for "angry" 
and P for certain bodily states):
Fa - Pa
But explicit definitions were open to two sorts of criti­
cism. First, explicit definitions were rigid in the 
sense that they strictly identified the concept in ques­
tion with a fixed set of manifestations and therefore 
could not be extended to new manifestations without
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redefining the concept. But, it was argued, the flexibility
of concepts was not only characteristic of their actual
53use in science but even a source of their utility.
Second, many concepts of science are dispositional in 
character and have no observable manifestations except 
under particular conditions. A concept of this sort, 
such as "solubility," cannot plausibly be identified with 
a set of previously determined observations.
In response to these points, Carnap proposed the 
notion of a "reduction sentence" or "conditional defini­
tion" which would in many cases take the place of an 
explicit definition. A dispositional predicate such as 
"soluble" is I would be defined as follows: If an object 
Cal is placed in water (_W) , then it is soluble if and 
only if it dissolves (D) . In notation:
Wa =£> CSa = Da).
Such a definition is conditional in the sense that it 
leaves the predicate S undefined unless the antecendent 
(Wal is fulfilled. Therefore the predicate cannot in 
general be eliminated by replacing it with equivalent 
observation terms— a fact that has led some to question
whether the reduction sentence can properly be considered
54as a definition at all. In any case, reduction sentences 
were acknowledged to capture the open-ended character 
of scientific concepts since they- do not pretend to 
exhaust the meaning of the concept. When new applications 
of the concept are discovered, new reduction sentences
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could simply be added to the old. Each one is then said 
to provide a "partial interpretation" of the concept.
The logical positivists recognized that their views of 
verifiability and empirical definition had a certain affin­
ity to the views of the pragmatists and operationists in 
55America. Pragmatism was founded by the American phxl-
osopher Charles S. Peirce, who anticipated its central theme
in his 1878 paper "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" when he stated
that "there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to con-
56sist in anything but a possible difference in practice."
Since Peirce tended to mean by "practice" the activities of 
scientists in their experimental investigations of nature, 
his statement can easily be read as saying that ideas or dis­
tinctions which have no counterpart in the manipulations or 
outcomes of scientific experimentation play no important role 
in knowledge, William James took up this general line of 
reasoning and assimilated it to his functionalist theory of 
thinking, according to which the value of ideas lies in the 
practical outcome of their use in satisfying the needs and 
interests of the individual. In his view, the techniques of 
scientific verification fulfill these same functions by pro­
viding laws which permit the prediction of the future and ad­
justment to the environment. Along similar lines, John Dewey 
characterized scientific theories as "leading principles" 
which have the practical consequences of guiding future 
inquiry and mediating activity in' the world. Although
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James actually used the pragmatic view of truth to justify 
religious belief Con the grounds that it had favorable 
outcomes}, the general pragmatist notion that "a differ­
ence must make a difference to be a difference" was broadly
congenial to the anti-metaphysical spirit of logical posi-
.. . 57tivism.
Nevertheless, there were important differences 
between pragmatism and logical positivism, and these differ­
ences are of considerable relevance to the eventual rela­
tionship between behaviorism and logical positivism. Where­
as logical positivism approached the problem of knowledge 
from a linguistic perspective, pragmatism tended to approach 
it from a biological perspective, especially once it had 
become closely assoicated with James's functionalism. In 
James's hands, pragmatism showed a special concern for the 
particulars of concrete experience and the demands placed 
on the individual in coping with the environment. Logical 
positivism, on the other hand, focused on the universal 
characteristics of knowledge and attempted to use the power 
and comprehensiveness of modern logic to formulate those 
characteristics in terms of the forms of language. But 
those differences which "make a difference" will not nec­
essarily be the same in the contexts of pragmatism and 
logical positivism. In the logical reconstruction of 
science, the distinctions of traditional metaphysics made 
no difference, but in the struggle of daily living, James
9-9.
could say, religious beliefs might well make a difference. 
Conversely, in the concrete activity of science the fine 
logical distinctions drawn by the logical positivists 
might make no difference. The scientist of a pragmatist 
bent would be likely to view such distinctions as mere 
"logic-chopping"' which would only get in the way of the 
quotidian conduct of inquiry and the solution of specific 
problems. Indeed, as we shall see in the chapters that 
follow, some of the behaviorists who stood in the prag­
matist tradition held just such views about the uses of 
logic.
A variation of pragmatism which was closer in spirit
to the logical positivist notion of verifiability was the
operationism of P. W, Bridgman. As articulated in his The
Logic of Modern Physics (1927), Bridgman's principle of
operationism stated that "We mean by any concept nothing
more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous
5 8with the corresponding set of operations." Thus, the
concept of length would be defined in terms of the speci­
fic operations used in arriving at it (_e.g., the repeated 
placing of a measuring rod along some body). Concepts for 
which there were no corresponding operations were to be 
rejected as incompatible with empiricism. In a passage 
which closely resembled Carnap's treatment of "pseudo­
problems," Bridgman went on to discuss "meaningless ques­
tions," that is, questions for which there were no opera-
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59tions for arriving at answers. In much the same way
that the logical positivists were denouncing metaphysicsr
Bridgman remarked that meaningless questions "poison" one's
thought, not only in the realm of physics but also in
social and philosophical matters.
The logical positivists quickly recognized Bridgman’s
6 0operationism as a view closely allied to their own. His
statements seemed especially close to Shlick’s early claim
that "the meaning of a proposition is the method of its 
61verification." But the similarities should not be over­
stated. For Schlick, "method" meant the logical technique 
of performing a Wittgensteinian truth-functional analysis. 
For Bridgman, an operation was a concrete activity per­
formed by a practicing scientist. Operationism also 
differed from verificationism in generally concerning it­
self with the empirical sense of concepts rather than pro­
positions, This feature of operationism, along with its 
emphasis on the availability of actual operations for 
assessing the applicability of a concept, led Carnap to
view the "principle of operationism" as approximately
6 2equivalent to the requirement of testability. But even 
this interpretation distorts the fundamental character 
of operationism by forcing it into the mold of analytic 
philosophy. Testability was nominally a thesis— in the 
context of the rational reconstruction of science— about 
the linguistic form of the logical relationship between
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basic statements and meaningful concepts. In Bridgman's
view, operationism was not a linguistic thesis nor was it a
"principle"— rather it was an "attitude toward concepts" and
6 3a "point of view." That is, it was a practice engaged in by 
scientists in the course of dealing with their subject matter.
The Structure of Theories: Empirical and Formal Components
One of the recognized aims of the rational reconstruc­
tion of science was to clarify and distinguish between the 
empirical and formal components of science. Having drawn 
a sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic claims, 
the logical positivists were forced to trace that distinction 
into the complex logical structure of theories. Giving a 
plausible formal account of theories which maintained all the 
desired distinctions proved to be no easy task. In parallel 
with the repeated revisions of the logical positivist cri­
terion of meaningfulness, the logical positivist view of the 
structure of theory underwent many reformulations as it 
evolved into what has become known as the "received view" 
of theories.
On the received view, a theory was characterized as 
a linguistic structure having a kind of hierarchical 
nature. At the top of the structure was a purely formal 
set of axioms. In the manner of Hilbert and Schlick, the 
axioms themselves were taken to be an "uninterpreted 
system" or a "formal calculus" which provided implicit
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definitions of the high-level theoretical concepts. As in 
Poincare's conventionalism, these axioms are simply to be 
chosen on some basis and are not derived from experience. 
Just below the axioms in the hierarchy are the various 
theorems— also part of the formal calculus— which are 
derivable from the axioms on the basis of logic alone.
At the base of the theoretical structure lie the basic 
statements expressing pure observations. From these, the 
empirical concepts and low-level laws of science are con­
structed by means of empirical defintions, whether they 
be in the form of explicit definitions or some form of 
reduction sentence. At this point, the formal and 
empirical components are, at least in principle, distinct. 
With the appropriate selections of correspondence rules 
Cor coordinating definitions), the empirical and formal 
levels can be joined together, making the theoretical 
structure a continuous hierarchy. This permits the post­
ulate system, which floats' or 'hovers’ freely above 
the plane of empirical facts," to partake of empirical 
content. The whole system is said to be infused with
significance by virture of an "upward seepage" of empiri-
6 5cal meaning from the data base to the theoretical terms.
In this scheme, a considerable burden is placed on 
the correspondence rules since they provide the link 
between what are, at least putativeiy, the purely formal 
and purely empirical components of the structure. Not
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surprisingly, the epistemological status of the correspon­
dence rules has been the subject of considerable contro­
versy. They have most commonly been construed as analytic 
propositions or as conventions regarding the use of term­
inology. But they have also been alleged to have empiri­
cal content, especially in light of the historical obser­
vation that they sometimes change as a consequence of
66empirical research. All of this means that the tradi­
tional logical empiricist distinction— one necessitated 
by the analytic-synthetic distinction— between the obser­
vation language and the theoretical language is called 
into question. It has been acknowledged that actual 
scientific theories seem not to embody any such sharp 
distinction. Recognizing this difficulty, Carnap has 
attempted to evade the issue by suggesting that the
theory-observation distinction be regarded as a matter of
6 7convention rather than a question of empirical fact.
Physicalism and the Unity of Science
The Physicalist Doctrine
In the Aufbau, Carnap had adopted a phenomenalistic 
data base from which to erect his logical constructions.
In doing so, he was following the tradition of Mach, who 
believed that all science is based on the experience of 
neutral sensations. Since the special sciences differ
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only in how they organize those sensations, according to 
Mach, experience could provide the basis for the unifica­
tion of science- All members of the Vienna Circle shared 
Mach's basic goal ,of unifying science, but the Marxist 
sociologist Otto Neurath came to dispute the desirability 
of a phenomenalistic data base. He felt that it was 
dangerously close to the idealistic metaphysics which pre­
dominated in Germany at the time and which in his view 
tended to counteract social progress. He further feared 
the phenomenalist language would reinforce the popular 
distinction in German thought between natural sciences 
and Geisteswissenschaften (.social sciences) , a distinction 
which he regarded as a barrier to the extension of logical 
positivist methods to the social scineces. Around this 
time, Karl Popper, who was not himself a member of the 
Vienna Circle but frequently interacted with its members, 
was emphasizing that no sentence of science can be 
regarded as irrevocably true. If even observation sen­
tences are falsifiable, they must be expressed in a 
language that admits of intersubjectivity rather than a 
phenomenalistic language. ~ -
Under the influence of Neurath and Popper most mem­
bers of the Vienna Circle had by 1930 adopted physicalist 
language as the universal language of science. Physicalism 
was widely regarded by members of the Circle as a recommen­
dation for a language in which to formulate a data base
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rather than as an assertion about reality. Because of
their intersubjective nature, observation statements such.
as "this thing is black and heavy" were to be recommended
over statements such as "there is now a red triangle in
my visual field." Neurath even went so far as to argue
that the observation statements (Protokolsatzel. should be
formulated in the third person. An observation reported
by Neurath himself would thus be expressed in sentences
such as "Otto now sees a red circle" or "Otto now 
6 8joy." The behavioristic character of such basic sen­
tences was a reflection of Neurath's philosophical motives 
and did not in itself constitute an endorsement of psy­
chological versions of behaviorism. Neurath was, in 
fact, sympathetic to psychological behaviorism, but as 
we shall see below his insistence on a physicalist data 
language was independent of psychological concerns.
In regard to the purely linguistic character of 
the physicalist doctrine, Carnap in particular was quick 
to emphasize that physicalism was not a version of mater­
ialism— physicalism, like his earlier phenomenalism, 
carried no ontological commitment. As always, sentences 
making ontological claims were to be eschewed as devoid 
of cognitive meaning. The choice of one data language 
over another, in Carnap's view, could be made at will or 
according to pragmatic concerns.. In other words, the 
choice was a matter of adopting a convention, a notion
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that Carnap later made explicit in his "principle of
languages not be carelessly mixed, for to do so was to
invite the metaphysical perplexities associated with such
pseudo-problems as the mind-body issue. The linguistic
neutrality licensed by the principle of tolerance was
reminiscent of Mach's neutral monism. But neutral monism
was itself rejected as meaningless metaphysics by the
logical positivists. As Neurath put it:
It would be misleading to express the phys­
icalist thesis by saying that the distinction 
of "psychical" and "corporeal" no longer 
existed, but had been replaced by "something 
neutral." It is not at all a question of •
of correlations of
The adoption of physicalism as the basis of unified
science turned the attention of logical positivists toward
psychology, because it necessitated the problematic
requirement that every sentence of psychology be capable
of formulation in physical language, Carnap’s "Psychology
in Physical Language" appeared in Erkenntnis in 19.32,
just a year after his first published proclamation of 
71physicalism. The essay self-consciously called for 
openness of mind on the part of the reader to help over­
come "emotional resistance" to the advent of physicalism. 
Carnap's thesis is captured in the following passage:
6 9tolerance." The sole requirement was that different
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We are not demanding that psychology form~ 
ulate each of its sentences in physical 
terminology. For its own purposes, psychology 
may, as heretofore, utilize its own term­
inology. All that we are demanding is the 
production of the definitions through which 
psychological language is linked with physical 
language. We maintain that these definitions 
can be produced, since, implicitly, they 
already underlie psychological- practice. 2
Carnap went on in the paper to specify the form of these 
definitions as follows: for every sentence P in psycholog­
ical language there must be a sentence Q in physical 
language such that P and Q can be logically deduced from 
each other. This requirement of explicit definability 
was, as we have seen, soon thereafter dropped by Carnap 
in favor of the weaker relations of confirmability and 
reducibility. He later viewed reduction sentences as 
eminently suited to the definition of psychological dis­
position predicates.
In 1935, the physicalist thesis involving Carnap's 
original strict formulation was dubbed "logical behavior­
ism" by Carl Hempel, Like Carnap, Hempel emphasized that 
physicalism would place no restrictions on the subject 
matter of psychology. "Logical behaviorism claims neither 
that minds, feelings, inferiority complexes, voluntary
actions, etc., do not exist, nor that their existence is
73m  the least doubtful." The linguistic or logical, 
rather than empirical, character of physicalism was 
exhibited most stikingly by Hempel's assertion that
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physicalism is a "logical theory about the propositions 
of scientific psychology" which "seeks to show that if 
in psychology only physicalistic statements are made, 
this is not a limitation because it is logically impossible 
to do otherwise,"74 In a similar vein, Neurath stated that 
"it is a matter of indifference for the position here main­
tained whether certain individual theses of Watson's,
75Pavlov's or others are upheld or rejected." The mter- 
subjective nature of the physicalist data base thus made 
its adoption a desideratum, or even a necessity, for 
psychology quite aside from the success of specific 
behaviorist programs.
In marked contrast to the views of Carnap, Hempel, 
and Neurath, Moritz Schlick claimed that physicalism was 
indeed an empirical thesis. According to him, the uni­
versal and intersubjective qualities of the physicalist 
language arise from contingent features of the world; the 
fact that psychological or phenomenalistic language seems 
to lack these properties is likewise contingent. Schlick 
advocated that physicalism be treated "as a paradigm, as
one possibility among others" rather than as a philosophical 
7 6movement. In his realist tendencies Schlick diverged 
from the general stance of the Circle, despite being 
recognized as its personal center.
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The Logical Positivists and Scientific Behaviorism
The fact that the logical positivists adopted logi­
cal behaviorism leaves entirely open the question of their 
relationship with scientific behaviorism of the sort that 
was being practiced by American behaviorists. Being 
nothing more than the extension of the physicalist doc­
trine to psychology, logical behaviorism was a linguistic 
thesis or theory of meaning, not an approach to scientific 
psychology. Although practicing behaviorists sometimes 
offered behavioral definitions of mentalistic terms, 
their doing so was by no means an essential part of 
scientific behaviorism. Logical and scientific behaviorism 
were thus rather different enterprises with differing aims 
and differing methods.
Nevertheless, the logical positivists showed an 
interest in behaviorism even during the. 1920s, In reading 
Russell's Analysis of Mind (JL921) , the members of the Vienna
Circle first became acquainted with Watsonian behaviorism, and
77several of them subsequently read Watson's works, Scattered
references to Watson and behaviorism soon began to appear in
7 8their writings. Watson's polemicizing for science and 
against metaphysics no doubt struck a sympathetic chord in the 
Circle, and once physicalism had been proclaimed, the names 
of Watson and Pavlov could be invoked in support of the
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physicalist thesis. This was so despite the fact that, 
strictly speaking, the achievements of Watson and Pavlov 
were irrelevant to the legitimacy of adopting the physi­
calist language. The logical positivists perceived that 
the apparent implausibility of a physicalist treatment of 
psychology would be an obstacle— a source of "emotional 
resistance"— to the acceptance of the doctrine, and they 
were prepared to make propagandistic use of Watson’s and 
Pavlov’s names.
There was, however, one area of genuine common 
ground shared by the logical positivists and the early 
behaviorists. Both groups held a primitive epistemological 
assumption to the effect that certainty of knowledge is 
to be sought by reducing the objects of knowledge to their 
atomic forms. In philosophy, this meant reducing laws 
to basic statements and in psychology it meant the reduc­
tion of observable behavior to physiology, Donald Campbell 
has written:
Both psychology and philosophy are emerging 
from an epoch in which the quest for puncti- 
form certainty seemed the optimal approach to 
knowledge. To both Pavlov and Watson, single 
retinal cell activations and single muscle 
activations seemed more certainly reidenti- 
fiable and specifiable than perceptions of 
objects or adaptive acts. The effort in 
epistemology to remove equivocality by found­
ing knowledge on particulate sense data and 
the spirit of logical atomism point to the 
same search for certainty in particulars.
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By the 1930s, when the extension of physicalism to psy- 
chology was being actively pursued, the logical positivists 
were relying on physiological reduction in their defini­
tions of psychological concepts in terms of physicalist
language. They routinely appealed to states of the nervous
8 0system, for example, in their definitions of "anger."
To be sure, reference was sometimes made to overt behavior, 
but the translations of psychological predicates into 
physicalist language usually resorted eventually to 
physiology— especially in those cases in which the pre­
dicates appeared to have no reliable manifestations in 
overt behavior.
Interestingly enough, this reductionistic strategy 
was already outmoded by the early thirties, Although the
logical positivists were unaware of it until near the
81end of the decade, behaviorism had undergone a major 
transformation. As will be described in the following 
chapters, the "molecular" or physiological behaviorism 
of the classical behaviorists had been superseded by the 
"molar" behaviorism of the neobehaviorists. This develop­
ment had many far-reaching implications. The most signifi­
cant of them in the present context is that the phenomena 
of molar behavior were shown to be just as law-like as 
the phenomena of molecular behavior, and sometimes even 
more so. As a result, an appeal to the laws of molar 
behavior in defining psychological predicates would have
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been more justifiable than an appeal to laws relating those 
predicates to physiology— laws which neither Watson nor 
Pavlov had even come close to discovering.
Sophisticated versions of molar behaviorism were 
already being formulated in 1932 when Carnap wrote 
"Psychology in Physical Language." Yet among the examples 
he gave of psychological definitions in terms of gross 
behavior was an extended example of character analysis 
through handwriting. The only supporting reference he 
gave was to a book on graphology that had been published 
in 1920. If the logical positivists were not exactly 
abreast of relevant developments in psychology, it is 
only fair to point out that the behaviorists equally failed 
to keep up with developments in logical positivism. As 
will be argued in what follows, the relationship between 
behaviorists and logical positivists rested more on 
mutual support in matters of polemic and rhetoric than it 
did on genuine intellectual understanding.
Unity of Science
With the advent of physicalism, the logical positi­
vists believed they had finally found the last essential 
ingredient for realizing the long-held dream of the 
unification of science. Leibniz's dream of unification 
had been thwarted by the lack of'an adequate symbolic 
logic; but now the new logic was available- On the
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empiricist side, Mach’s version of that dream had been 
flawed by the solipsism inherent in his phenomenalism; 
but now the physicalist language was believed to provide 
an intersubjective empirical foundation of knowledge.
On the twin foundations of the new logic and a refined 
data lanaguage, the erection of an integrated system of 
the sciences was thought to be not only possible but per­
haps even inevitable given sufficient time.
In the final system, the unity of science would be 
effected on three distinct but related fronts. The first 
would be the unity of all scientific concepts. This would 
amount to no more than showing that all concepts are re­
ducible, by one means or another, to the physicalist 
observation language. All concepts in unified science 
would thereby be assured of empirical significance. The 
adequacy of the physicalist language for this purpose was 
taken to be established. As Carnap wrote, "there is a
unity of language in science, viz., a common reduction
^  8 2 basis for the terms of all branches of science. . . . "
The second kind of unity was to be the unity of
scientific laws. On this conception, Carnap wrote, "The
construction of one homogeneous system of laws for the
whole of science is one aim for the future development 
8 3of science," The scenario was as follows: Since all
the concepts of the various sciences belong to a common 
physicalist language, they can be compared and connected
114
by means of logical analysis. Certain laws can then be 
shown to be logically derivable from others, and gradually 
there would emerge a deductive hierarchy in which the laws 
of psychology and social science are reduced to those of 
biology, and the laws of biology are in turn reduced to 
those of physics and chemistry. The unity of laws was 
acknowledged not to be an accomplished fact, but Carnap 
noted that the achievement of partial reductions of 
biology to chemistry was a hopeful sign of future pros­
pects .
The third type of unity of science was unity of 
method. Given the received view of the logical structure 
of theories, the unity of method was quite naturally 
conceived as based on hypothetico-deductive method. Hempel 
has characterized this type of unity:
The thesis of the methodological unity of 
sciences states, first of all, that notwith­
standing many differences in their techniques 
of investigation, all branches of empirical 
science test and support their statements in 
basically the same manner, namely by deriving 
from them implications that can be checked 
intersubjectively and by performing for those 
implications the appropriate experimental or 
observational tests. This, the unity of method 
thesis holds, is true also of psychology and 
the social and historical disciplines.®^
Although logical positivists disclaimed any intention of
accounting for the genesis of knowledge in the context
of discovery, many of them did not hesitate to offer one
or another version of the hypothetico-deductive procedure
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as the appropriate method for assessing all knowledge 
within the context of justification. The claim of method­
ological unity has been justly attacked as both an inade­
quate description of actual scientific practice and as an 
overly restrictive prescription for practice— especially 
when applied to the less advanced sciences. Of the 
behaviorists considered in the present work, only Hull was 
receptive to hypothetico-deductive method, and even so he 
interpreted it in an unorthodox way.
In addition to the unities of concepts, laws, and 
method, the logical positivists advocated a unity of 
science at the social level. Following Comte, they 
believed that the elimination of metaphysics and the 
acceptance of the scientific frame of mind would lead to 
social cooperation in the furthering of scientific aims. 
Neurath's slogan "Einheitswissenschaft— ohne Emotion" 
(unity of science, without emotion) captured the spirit 
of their thinking. Without the emotion engendered by 
needless metaphysics, the world would supposedly be set 
to accept the scientific world view and to work to pro­
mote it. With Neurath as its primary organizer, a Unity 
of Science movement was formed to advance these ideals.
The movement held a series of International Congresses 
for the Unity of Science and eventually published a series 
of monographs under the general title of the International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science. The Congresses were
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held at Paris (.19351, Cambridge, England (19.381, Cam­
bridge, Massachusetts (.19.39.1, Chicago (19.431, and Berkeley 
(19531. As we shall see, efforts were made to recruit 
objectivistic psychologists into the movement— and among 
those recruited were Tolman and Hull.
Conclusion
Logical positivism arose as the joint product of 
two intellectual traditions which conflicted deeply with, 
one another. In attempting to unite these traditions, 
its adherents created an extremely influential approach 
to philosophy but one that embodied serious intellectual 
tensions from its dual ancestry. The blending of Fregean 
logicism and Machian empiricism was an unstable philoso­
phical position. The sharp dichotomies inherited from 
the rationalist side began to blur as concessions were 
made to the empiricist side. Some of the proponents 
of logical positivism gradually surrendered the analytic- 
synthetic distinction as well as the family of distinctions 
that went with it. Carnap was not among those willing 
to relinquish the analytic-sythetic distinction, and as 
early as 1940 he found himself lamenting its abandonment
8 5with, the query: "are we now back with John Stuart Mill?"
In his famous critique of logical positivism, "Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951}, Quine argued from a prag­
matist perspective that the analytic or synthetic character
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of a proposition is only a matter of degree. But, in
fact, he had already argued in 1936 that the distinction
could not be absolute because in the actual world one
8 6acts on beliefs only with degrees of certitude. Here 
was a Fregean distinction being relativized on natural­
istic— or worse yet, psychologistic— grounds. Since then, 
epistemology in general and the philosophy of science 
in particular have moved steadily away from a reliance 
on logic and toward a reliance on empirical analysis of 
science, whether of a historical, sociological, or psycho­
logical nature. Philosophers of science are seriously 
entertaining the possibility that their discipline will 
actually become the psychology of science. Even Hempel
has recently remarked that he is "now putting psychology
8 7and logic closer together." The pendulum of philosophi­
cal opinion seems to be swinging back toward psychologism 
for the first time in this century.
As will be shown in the following chapters, the 
major neobehaviorists developed their own psychologistic 
accounts of science and, in doing so, anticipated some 
aspects of current epistemological trends. Preferring, 
to subordinate logic to psychology, they were all along 
more empiricistic than the logical positivists. In this 
regard, they were not unlike nineteenth century proponents 
of psychologism. But what made this psychologism unique 
was that it was a behavioristic psychologism. If
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psychology could be made an objective science, there would 
no longer be any reason to reject psychologism on the 
grounds of subjectivism. And certainly behaviorists have 
believed above all else that behaviorism could make 
psychology objective.
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CHAPTER 3
PURPOSIVE BEHAVIORISM AND 
ITS PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND
In terms of its immediate intellectual antecedents, 
behaviorism is usually considered, and rightly so, to have 
been a product of Pavlov's research on conditioned re­
flexes, Thorndike's work on trial-and-error learning and 
the law of effect, and Watson's vigorous polemics for 
objectivism in psychology. It is thus a measure of 
Edward C. Tolman's originality and independence of thought 
that the neobehaviorism which he began developing in the 
1920s embodied a self-conscious rejection of all three 
of these traditions. For those who expect all behavior­
ists to come out of the same mold, Tolman is indeed a 
puzzling figure. He downplayed Pavlov’s reflexology, out­
right repudiated Thorndike's connectionism, and criticized 
Watson's equivocal conception of the learned response. He 
openly embraced Gestalt psychology at a time when it 
had become the target of many a behaviorist diatribe, and 
he designated Kurt Lewin and Sigmund Freud as the great 
psychologists of his era."*" With characteristic icono- 
clasm, he disputed the mechanistic picture of behavior 
presented by many versions of behaviorism and insisted 
instead that behavior is inherently purposive and cog­
nitive. Such unusual features of Tolman's behaviorism
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have led some to question whether his system was really
2a behaviorism at all , but Tolman certainly viewed himself 
as a behaviorist and tried to justify that self-ascription 
by consistently defining his elaborate system of con­
cepts in terms of observable behavior.
In fact, it was Tolman's unique combination of 
behaviorism and cognitivism, his simultaneous emphases on 
observability and conceptual complexity, that forced him 
to pay careful attention to the constellation of issues 
surrounding the problem of empirical definition. Had 
he been less of a behaviorist, he could have let his 
theorizing range further from his data base of experiments 
in animal behavior. Had he been less of a cognitivist, 
he might have sacrificed some of the complexity of his 
concepts by simply basing them on the relatively standard­
ized models of Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning.
As it turned out, his unwillingness to compromise in either 
direction left him with the substantial task of ensuring 
the empirical content of his higher-order, quasi- 
mentalistic concepts. This was no mean task, but Tolman's 
behaviorism possessed a degree of epistemological soph­
istication not evident in the classical behaviorism of 
Watson. The solution to the task, as proposed by Tolman 
in the thirties, was an operational behaviorism in which 
cognitive concepts were represented as intervening 
variables— that is, variables which intervene between the
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independent variables of antecedent conditions and the 
dependent variables of consequent behavior. The opera­
tional intervening variable paradigm quickly became the
fashion of the day in psychology, and it still stands
3as Tolman's major methodological contribution. As we 
shall see, Tolman's proclivity for operationalizing his 
concepts derived from his background in neorealist 
philosophy, but his operationism of the thirties was 
worked out under the additional influence of logical 
positivism. His interest in empirical definition was his 
major intellectual link with the logical positivists.
Tolman's Background and Career: An Overview
Tolman was born in Newton, Massachusetts, in 1886
4
to a well-to-do family of manufacturers. With the 
expectation of entering the family business, he and his 
older brother Richard both attended the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. Richard found the academic life
agreeable, however, and went on to become a prominent
5 . . .theoretical physicist. Having identified more closely
with his brother than with his father, Edward followed 
Richard into scholarly pursuits. A reading of William 
James in his senior year led Edward to consider philosophy 
as a career, but after taking a single philosophy course 
at Harvard he decided that psychology was closer to his 
interests. Psychology, he felt, offered "a nice com-
130
g
promise between philosophy and science."
But Tolman had other reasons for entering a career
in psychology. These were the specifically humanitarian
concerns instilled in him by the social milieu in which 
7
he was raised. Tolman wrote that there
persisted in our family and in those of some 
of the neighbors the legacy of reformism, 
equal rights for Negroes, women's rights,
Unitarianism and humanitarianism from the 
early days of the "Flowering of New England."
These social tendencies were combined with 
the special Bostonian emphasis on "culture" 
together with, in our family, a special dose 
of moral uplift and pacifism.
Tolman added that he and his brother were "set to increase
the sum of human knowledge and presumably were to apply
9
such an increase to the betterment of mankind." To 
implement these aims, he considered becoming a Unitarian 
minister but decided on psychology in the belief that 
discovering "what made people tick" would be "much more 
successful than preaching at them."^ Tolman's pacifism, 
liberalism, and humanitarianism were evident throughout 
his career. For example, he addressed his major work on 
motivation to the causes of war, he was an active member 
and one-time president of the Society for the Psychological 
Study of Social Issues, and he led the protest against 
the University of California's infamous loyalty oath 
during the McCarthy era.^ Tolman's concern with human 
problems had important implications for his theoretical 
work, for it meant that theory had to extend beyond the
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confines of the laboratory to address the complex issues 
of human life. Before his death, several of his colleagues 
wrote:
He believes that a theorist's job is to try 
to describe and account for the entire field 
that lies within his discipline, and not to 
restrict it arbitrarily to the more amenable 
areas. Tolman has never been interested in 
writing a "small scientific theoretical sys­
tem"— he has always sought the complete 
formulation. This has meant the witting 
rejection of attempting finalistic formula­
tions at this stage of the science, and the 
characteristically cheerful acceptance of 
a programmatic role. 2
The implied contrast in this passage between Tolman and
Hull is a revealing one. The rigor of formulation
achieved by Hull was gained largely at the expense of
assuming all psychological phenomena to be conditioned
habits. Tolman, with his broader and more applied focus,
placed comprehensiveness above rigor, or at least formal
rigor, and remained skeptical about the prospects for
achieving both.
Tolman began his graduate studies at Harvard in 1911
13and received his doctorate in 1915. There he took 
courses in philosophy and psychology and was exposed to 
the works of William McDougall, Edward B. Titchener, and 
John B. Watson. Most importantly, he studied with the 
neorealists Ralph Barton Perry and Edwin B. Holt, whose 
philosophically inspired behaviorism laid the foundation 
for Tolman's later neobehavioristic rejection of Watsonian 
behaviorism. But this development did not come right
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away. Tolman spent the first three years after graduate 
school as an instructor at Northwestern, where he was 
"still thinking largely in terms of classical introspec- 
tionism and associationistic problems" and conducting 
research on "such pre-behavioristic problems as retro­
active inhibition, imageless thought, and association times
14for pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral words." It was 
not until after his arrival at Berkeley in 1918 that he 
began to view himself as a behaviorist. In that year he 
introduced a course on comparative psychology and shortly 
thereafter initiated the studies of rats in mazes which 
became the hallmark of his behaviorism.
In the course of his long career at Berkeley, the 
maze became for Tolman what the conditioned-reflex 
machine was for Hull— a centerpiece of laboratory activity, 
a heuristic source of concepts and hypotheses, and event­
ually a general metaphor for psychological phenomena.
As a means of constraining learned behavior into spatial 
patterns, the maze was an apparatus highly suited to 
Tolman's penchant for thinking in spatial terms. Tolman 
perceived himself as having weak verbal imagery but good 
spatial abilities. As he put it:
. . . I feel comfortable only when I have 
translated my explanatory arguments into dia­
grams . I always did like curves better than 
equations. Analytic geometry was a lot 
more fun than advanced algebra.- . . .  I
am very unhappy whenever I do not'have a black­
board in my office.15
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With the help of his diagrams, Tolman's spatial images 
and metaphors were developed into not only his concepts 
of learned behavior but also, as we shall see, the con­
cepts which underlay his interpretaion of science itself.
Tolman combined the conception of learned behavior
which he had absorbed from his neorealist teachers with
his experimental research of the twenties into his magnum
16opus of 1932, Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men.
This tome is rightfully regarded as the first book-length 
work of neobehaviorism. In it, Tolman addressed the 
issue of the definition of the learned response, arguing 
that learning is not normally a matter of acquiring iso­
lated, punctate movements in response to punctate stimuli 
but rather one of acquiring entire "emergent" patterns 
of action in response to environmental objects or even 
global environmental situations. Watson had spoken of 
both conceptions, the narrow reflexological one and the 
more integrated wholistic one, but he usually fell back 
on the former conception in his polemics for objectivism. 
Tolman caricatured the former conception as "Watsonian 
Muscle Twitchism" and took up the challenge of showing the 
latter conception to be equally objective and more fruit­
ful. In drawing the important distinction between these 
two coneptions of learned behavior, Tolman adopted the 
terms "molecular" and "molar" from- the philosopher Donald 
C. Williams.^
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Purposive Behavior represented the culmination of
Tolman's early career, a period in which he tended to
view the purposive and cognitive features of behavior
as immediately presented in that behavior. But it was
also a transitional work, for therein Tolman adumbrated
the notion of what would later be called the intervening
variable. Upon completion of the book, Tolman took a
sabbatical and went to Europe, where he spent seven months
in Vienna. Having polished his German during trips to
18Germany in 1912 and 1923, Tolman was equipped to make 
the most of his stay in Vienna. The influences he came 
under there, specifically Egon .Brunswik' s probabilistic 
functionalism and the Vienna Circle's brand of empiricism, 
served to reinforce trends that were already evident in 
his thought when he wrote Purposive Behavior. By the late 
thirites, he had incorporated the influence of logical 
postivism and was prepared to move beyond it in the latter 
part of his career.
For Tolman, moving beyond logical positivism meant 
assimilating what he found worthwhile in it to his own 
conception of knowledge as a psychological phenomenon, 
but it meant no more than that. Although Tolman's prag­
matic empiricism made him generally sympathetic to the 
methodological prescriptions of logical empiricism, fixed 
prescriptions of any kind were basically incompatible with 
his view of knowledge acquisition as a highly flexible,
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tentative, and exploratory activity. In Tolman*s view, 
the scientist, like any other organism, needs to maintain 
an adaptive flexibility in the face of a complex and 
changing environment. All ideas, all perspectives on 
psychology, were seen by Tolman as deserving of explora­
tion, and any methodological pronouncements which would 
constrain the range of investigation were to be regarded 
with a skeptical eye.
In philosophy and psychology alike, Tolman was 
skeptical of restrictive pronouncements, especially those 
advanced with an air of authority. He remarked in his 
autobiography that his family background seemed to be 
the type "conducive to the developing of arabitiaus., but
19
non-authoritarian personalities." The non- and even 
anti-authoritarian aspect of Tolman*s character was 
revealed in his political views, in his style of teaching, 
in his psychological views, and in his conception of 
science. As mentioned above, Tolman did not bow to the 
authority of Pavlov or Thorndike, and he showed an equal 
degree of independence in regard to his respected con­
temporaries. While Hull was deriving Pavlovian con­
ditioning as a special case of instrumental conditioning 
and Skinner was codifying the two into the operant-
respondent distinction, Tolman was arguing for the exist-
20ence of at least six kinds of learning. Proposals to 
limit investigations of learning to one or two paradigms
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were accordingly rejected by Tolman.
Tolman's open-ended style of theorizing was not 
modelled after any other style, and his theoretical state­
ments were advanced tentatively and often with self-
21deprecating humor. As his colleagues put it:
System building for him is not a grim business.
It is a happy, gay, creative activity, and 
his papers express all of this to the full.
No matter what the subject, how abstract the 
treatment, his wit, humor, magnanimity, and 
tolerance are written into each analysis.
He is constitutionally incapable of writ^l 
dogmatically or of publishing a polemic.
Tolman's students testified to the fact that his non­
authoritarian character and his exploratory style of 
thinking were carried into the classroom.
His classes twhich frequently evolve into 
loud free-for-alls in which student and 
teacher cannot be differentiated) reveal the 
searchings and fiimblings of the creative 
scientific mind rather than a digest of 
conclusions already reached, organized, and 
neatly filed away. Nothing has ever been 
authoritarian, static or finished either in 
his systematic psychology or in his personal 
relations.23
Tolman's skepticism about authority went hand-in-hand 
with his free-wheeling scientific style. And, as we shall 
see, these characteristics led him to oppose any narrow 
or dogmatic version of logical positivism.
The extraordinary openness shown by Tolman to 
various ideas and approaches to psychology gave his 
theorizing a high degree of eclecticism. His psychological 
views incorporated strains of neorealist epistemology,
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Gestalt psychology, Lewinian theory, neutral monism, 
probabilistic functionalism, Stephen C. Pepper's context- 
ualism, and Freudian theory. In contrast to the relative 
single-mindedness with which Hull and Skinner pursued 
their respective brands of behaviorism, Tolman developed 
his purposive behaviorism in a diffuse, varied, and 
shifting fashion. For the historian of psychology, the 
task of sifting out and making sense of the strains of 
influence is a difficult one; Tolman's work, resists 
description and interpretation in any fixed or univocal 
way. Nevertheless, there are general patterns in the 
development of his thought which, when drawn out, reveal 
much about his relationship with logical positivism.
Any proper understanding of Tolman's views must begin 
with an examination of the neorealism of his Harvard 
teachers Holt and Perry.
The Neorealist Background
24The adherents of neorealism viewed the oscillations 
of ninetennth century philosophy as ample demonstration 
of the inadequacies of the idealist, dualist, and mater­
ialist traditions. Their primary aim was to steer a 
course through these traditions leading directly to a 
thoroughgoing naturalism, one which would sacrifice 
inclusiveness for a more compatible relationship with 
the special sciences. The movement initially arose as a 
critique of idealism, first expressed in America in the
138
attacks of Perry and William Montague on the Harvard
25 . .idealist Josiah Royce m  1901 and 1902. Voicing a 
theme that would often be repeated, these authors assaulted 
the idealist notion that the world is constituted by the 
pre-eminent act of cognition. Rather then decisively 
conditioning the world, cognition was to take its place 
within the natural world and provide the basis for the 
more complex derivative phenomena of value and ethics.
Although the neorealist program was first and fore­
most a criticism of idealism, it quickly broadened into 
a further critique of dualism and materialism. Perry in 
particular argued against the dualist view that "one1s 
own mind, or the mind at home, must be preferred as more 
genuine than the mind abroad" and that mind is a private
2 6entity "encased in a non-mental and impenetrable shell."
The New Realism held that the world is presented to an
observer rather than being represented by "invisible pawns"
in the perceiver's private sphere, a dualist fiction
regarded as having adverse implications for both psychology
and philosophy. To the neorealists, materialism was an
equally fallacious doctrine primarily because it erred
in "denying the facts, as well as the theory, of con- 
27sciousness." Materialism's assignment of mental events 
to the realm of epiphenomena collided with the New 
Realism's insistence that the things of thought be given 
the same ontological status as physical entities.
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The American neorealist movement was formally pro­
claimed in a statement coauthored by Holt, Perry, and four 
collaborators just a year before Tolman's arrival at 
Harvard in 1911. An elaboration of the neorealist posi­
tion appeared two years later in a manifesto entitled
28The New Realism. During this heyday of the movement,
Tolman was introduced to and "excited by" the New Realism
29through a seminar taught by Holt. This proved to be 
an important intellectual discovery for Tolman. As we 
shall see, it provided him with 1 ) relatively complex 
but workable conceptions of stimulus and response,
2 ) an enduring predisposition to view the psychologist 
and the subject as operating on the same epistemological 
level, and 3) a realist epistemology which formed the 
basis of his early research on animal behavior and which 
established his propensity for operationalizing 
psychological concepts.
Behavior as Purposive and Cognitive
At about the time that Tolman was being exposed to 
the New Realism, Perry and Holt began extending the 
neorealist program to psychology by formulating a behavior­
ism which gave the concepts of purpose and cognition an 
objective status in the natural world. In doing so, they 
characterized organismic behavior in a way that adumbrated 
the later concept of "molar" behavior.
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Holt's seminal paper on "Response and Cognition" 
and his book The Freudian Wish both appeared in 1915.
These works criticized the adoption of the materialist's 
"bead theory" of causality in the realm of behavior. As 
opposed to the materialist view of behavior as a chain 
reaction of isolated reflexes touched off by isolated 
stimuli, Holt contended that true behavior is an integrated 
and novel synthesis which exhibits "objective reference" 
to environing objects. The immediate stimulus (_e.g., 
light on the retinal governing the isolated reflex 
"recedes" in importance as behavior becomes more highly 
organized until the environing object itself controls 
the response. Holt's important notion of the recession of 
the stimulus enabled him to define the act of cognition 
as simply the "objective reference" of an integral res­
ponse to an object. The synthetic response, the object 
reponded to, and the relation of objective reference 
between them were thus all "out there" waiting to be 
recognized and investigated by the psychologist.
According to Holt, the putative and suspect rela­
tion, much discussed by philosophers, between the sub­
ject and object of consciousness is nothing more than the 
relation of objective reference between behavior and 
object. To ignore the functional reference of behavior is 
to succumb to the dualist superstition that "ideas" in the 
"sensorium" somehow represent the environment. Anticipating
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later attempts by psychologists to evade the philosophical 
puzzles of dualism by operationalizing mentalistic con­
cepts, Holt identified consciousness with a manner of 
responding. He wrote:
When one is conscious of a thing, one's move­
ments are adjusted to it, and to precisely 
those features of it of which one is conscious.
The two domains are coterminous.-^
Consciousness, long considered to reside exclusively in a 
private mental world, was thus externalized; the genuine­
ness of the "mind abroad" was affirmed.
At about this time, Perry was pursuing a similar analy­
sis of the concept of purpose. In "Purpose as a Systematic 
Unity" (1917), he argued against the idealist notion that 
purpose is a global characteristic underlying the uni­
verse and advocated a behavioral interpretation of con­
crete instances of purposiveness. In "Purpose as Tendency 
and Adaptation" (.1917), he examined mechanistic biological 
treatments of purpose as tendencies and homeostatic 
adjustments and found them to be too limited to account 
for the purposive nature of highly organized plastic 
behavior. In its most general case, said Perry, purpose 
must be identified with adaptability rather than mere 
adaptation, a crucial insight which he developed in his 
1918 essay "Docility and Purposiveness."
In that paper, Perry identified purpose with docility 
or "teachable-ness." He wrote:
142
Docility thus construed requires that the 
behavior of the organism shall be variable 
in all three of the aspects into which it can
be analyzed: namely, feature of the environ­
ment attended and responded to, physical 
movement, and effect. Purposiveness thus 
appears in life pari passu with variability 
or~modifiability of behavior.31
As Perry explained it, each combination of environmental 
feature (.e) and response tr) produced a particular con­
sequence (e.g., a, b, or c). The three elements would 
combine in varying fashion Ce.g., ej + r^_ = a, ei + r2 = 
b) until one produced the desired outcome m le.g., + 
r3 = m). This successful combination was said to in­
stantiate the general set or governing propensity (.E + R = 
M) , and r3 could then be said to be performed for the
sake of the goal M. The observed variability and modi-
fiability of responding with respect to the goal were for 
Perry the crucial features of purpose.
In identifying purpose with that "margin of modi- 
fiability" which characterizes the activity of a docile 
organism, Perry was denying the internal locus and pri­
vate status of purpose. Like Holt, he was affirming the 
genuineness of the "mind abroad" by emphasizing the 
functional relatedness of the response to its setting, 
in particular to the object being responded to and for. 
Cognition for Holt and purpose for Perry could be identi­
fied with manners of responding because responding was 
for them a cohesive pattern of behavior rather than a mere 
discrete movement.
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By 1918, Holt and perry had thus arrived at their 
shared conception of behavior as a highly integrated, 
synthetic, and modifiable pattern of responses. This con­
ception was motivated philosophically by their desire to 
objectify and naturalize the metaphysically charged 
concepts of purpose and cognition rather than consign 
them to oblivion in a materia 1 is.tic world-view. In a 
sense, the neorealists1 conception of behavior was a 
natural extension of the doctrine of external relations 
to the realm of behavior. Purpose and cognition involved 
the observable actions of an organism in relation to gross 
objective features of the environment. Any narrowly 
physiological definition of behavior would necessarily 
fail to acknowledge this crucial relatedness of response 
and environment.
Although Tolman was exposed to this orientation 
during his Harvard years, it was not until after his arrival 
in Berkeley in 1918 that he worked it into the full­
blown research program which he came to designate "molar 
behaviorism." Neither Holt nor Perry had directed their 
reconceptualizations of behavior against Watson, but their 
viewing the response as more liek an act than a muscle 
movement or a glandular activity laid the foundation for 
Tolman’s later critique of Watson. Tolman’s early theor­
etical papers leading up to the publication in 1932 
of his Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men often cited
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Holt and Perry as important early proponents of a non-
physiological behaviorism. Tolman also repeatedly
acknowledged having borrowed from Perry the idea that a
molar behaviorism must recognize the purposive or docile
32character of behavior.
Neorealist Epistemology
While the influence of Holt and Perry on Tolman's 
concept of the response is relatively direct and well- 
known, the influence of their general epistemological 
views on Tolman's psychology has gone unrecognized by 
historians of psychology. The neorealist epistemology 
involved some unusual, perhaps even extreme, philosophical 
positions. These were implicitly adopted by Tolman early 
in his career but were later gradually abandoned as the 
epistemological base of his molar behaviorism shifted from 
a problematic direct realism to a more workable probab­
ilistic functionalism. The epistemological views of the 
New Realism which underlay Tolman's early theorizing 
are the topic of the present section.
In their eagerness to reject the idealist claim 
that the cognitive act constitutes the world, the New 
Realists were unwilling to admit that anything experienced 
depends for its existence on the fact of being experienced. 
The English neorealist T. P. Nunn had already in 1909 pur­
sued this stance to the point of asserting that even pain
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is external to the mind— that it is an objective exper­
ience to be reckoned with just as any material object.
Holt followed suit by arguing that such allegedly non- 
veridical perceptions as illusions, hallucinations, and 
mirror images likewise reside outside the mind and that 
one's behavior can exhibit objective reference to them. 
Since the contents of experience do not come tagged as 
"real" or "unreal," Holt simply assigned all experiences 
to the ontological realm of neutral "subsistents."
Holt and Perry were devoted students and admirers 
of William James, and they followed him— as did Bertrand
Russell somewhat later— in subscribing to a neutral
33 imonism. In the neorealists' neutral monism, subsistents
were neutral in the sense of having "being" without any
connotation of reality or unreality. According to Holt,
"every content . . . subsists of its own right in the all-
34inclusive universe of being." A content could thus occur
in consciousness without depending on it. Whereas the
idealists had claimed that direct knowledge is possible
only if the known depends on the knower, the neorealists
asserted as their cardinal tenet "the independence of the
immanent." Subsistents were both immanent, i.e., directly
presented in experience, and independent of that exper- 
35lence.
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In denying that the act of knowing involves any 
constructive activity on the part of the knower, the neo­
realists were led to the further important conclusion of 
denying the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities. Holt was especially willing to educe' the 
bolder implications of this rather extreme view. Secondary 
qualities such as color subsist, according to him, out
there in the thing which consciousness selects and are
3 6therefore just as objective as primary qualities. The
neorealists had maintained all along that "the knower . . .
is homogeneous with the environment . . . and may itself
37be known as are the the things it knows." In conjunction 
with the contention that qualities are presented, not 
represented, in perception, this claim meant that the 
psychologist who studies cognition in another organism 
has rather direct access to another mind. Taken literally 
in its strongest form, the New Realism implied that the 
mental qualities of another organism are just as objective 
as its bodily qualities and are therefore directly pre­
sented to, rather than being constructed or inferred by, 
the observer.. Being of equal stature on the objective 
plane • of subsistence, mind and body were viewed as 
equally manifest to the observer of behavior.
By following James in his refusal to draw distinc­
tions between the real and the unreal, the neorealists 
felt that they could liberate psychology from the
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conceptual shackles of idealism and dualism, and thereby 
enhance its claim to equal membership in the natural 
sciences. Idealism had given mind too central a role in 
nature; dualism had given it too isolated a role. Only 
a direct realism could restore the harmony of mind and 
nature, and i.t did so by making nature's contribution to 
the contents of experience indifferent to the distinction 
of mind and body. With respect to the psychological 
experiment, both the subject and experimenter were con­
ceived as directly receiving the complex presentations 
of the world. To think of the subject as receiving only 
isolated sensations while the experimenter perceived 
objects and relations in the environment was to fall
prey to one of the many "concretely intolerable" implica-
3 8tions which dualism held for psychology. If knowing 
was an objective relation occurring in the natural world, 
then knowing about knowing was also just such a relation.
In its application to psychology, the epistemology 
of neorealism entailed two separable themes. First, there 
was the claim that a direct realism governs the perception 
and cognition of organisms. Second was the more general 
claim that the subject and the experimenter, the known and 
the knower, share an equivalent epistemological standing. 
As we shall see, Tolman initially accepted both theses 
but later abandoned the first while retaining the second.
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Tolman*s Early Behaviorism 
Concept of Behavior
Foremost among what Tolman acquired from his neo­
realist mentors was the idea that behavior stands in a 
patterned relation to the environemnt in which it occurs. 
The "bead theory" of causation which Holt had ridiculed 
was viewed by Tolman as the Achilles' heel of Watsonian 
behaviorism. In his first theoretical paper on behavior­
ism, "A New Formula for Behaviorism" (1922), Tolman called 
Watsonianism into question. According to Watson, behavior­
ism aims to predict a response from knowledge of a given 
stimulus. Tolman replied:
Very goodi But how does he define stimulus 
and response? He defines them, he says, in the 
terms in which physiology defines them; that is, 
stimuli are such things as 'rays of light of 
different wave lengths, sound waves differing 
in amplitude, length, phase and combination, 
gaseous particles given off in such diameters 
that they affect the membranes of the nose," 
etc., and responses are such things as 'muscle 
contractions and gland secretions.' 3 9
But in Tolman's reckoning, Watson was unable to see the
behavior for the reflexes: by defining causal stimuli in
narrow physical terms he was led to view their behavioral
effects as equivalently bead-like. On the stimulus side,
he had ignored the recession of the stimulus; on the
response side, he had failed to notice the objective
reference of behavior. Taken together, Watson's physio-
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logical leanings rendered him unable to recognize that 
behavior inherently displays purpose and cognition. In his 
papers of the twenties, Tolman's aim was to counter 
Watsonian behaviorism by arguing that the more complex 
and higher-order neorealist notion of behavior was just 
as objective and even more workable than the Watsonian ver­
sion. As Tolman later put it, he had learned from his 
Harvard teachers "to be complicated but to remain natur­
alistic .
Tolman's positive program for redefining the learned 
response can be viewed as a working and reworking of the 
idea that behavior is inherently related to and directed 
toward objects in the environment; that is, behavior is not 
mere movement elicited by stimuli but rather a pattern of 
adjustment involving functional reference to the world. 
Tolman recognized that he was not alone in this quest and 
cited the formulations of behavior given by J.R. Kantor 
and Grace de Laguna in addition to those of Holt and 
Perry. For instance, de Laguna had already written in 
1919 that:
In order to understnad behavior we must resolve 
it into a system of interrelated func­
tions, . . . Now just as there is a physio­
logical economy, so there is a larger vital 
economy in closest union with, yet distinguish­
able from it. This is the system of behavior, 
by means of which the being, animal or human, 
maintains his relations with .the environ­
ment. . . . The science of behavior has the 
task of tracing the lineaments of this larger 
economy.41
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In this passage, which Tolman quoted, were the ideas 
congenial to his own that behavior is functionally related 
to the environment and can be distinguished from mere 
physiology.
In developing the relational definition of the res­
ponse, Tolman took issue with Watson's treatment of the 
emotions. Watson had tried to define emotions such as 
fear by simply enumerating stimuli and responses; but 
because the enumerated responses were often unobserved 
visceral responses, Tolman argued, Watson had to resort 
to his intuitive knowledge of fear-producing situations 
in order to identify relevant stimuli. Watson's diffi­
culty, according to Tolman, was due to his failure to
recognize that emotions are necessarily "total behavior 
42situations." Thus, wrote Tolman, "It is not a response, 
as such, nor a stimulus situation, as such, that con­
stitutes the behavior definition of an emotion but rather
43the response as affecting . . . the stimulus situation."
In his causal analysis of stimuli and responses, Watson 
had neglected the objective reference of the response 
to the stimulus. Emotional responses normally act back 
on the stimuli which produce them in such a way as to 
eliminate them or mitigate their effects. As such, they 
exhibit cognitive reference to the stimuli as well as 
purpose with respect to them. In accounting for behavior, 
Watson had dowplayed any sort of "back action" or effect,
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a notion he felt was tinged with subjectivity, in favor 
of the more automatic processes of frequency and recency. 
Any adaptive value, or seeming purpose, in a response 
had to be attributed to the biological value of the ori­
ginal innate response on which it was based, i.e., from
44which it was conditioned. Without denying an important 
adaptive role for innate behavior, Tolman objected to the 
narrowness and mechanical character of Watson's notion of 
behavior. As always, he found inadequate any account of 
behavior limited to a few principles.
The relatedness of environment and response, qua 
purposive' and cognitive, became a recurring theme in 
Tolman's early papers. This motif took on added promi­
nence after Tolman's 1923 visit to Giessen where he 
absorbed the doctrines of Gestalt psychology from Kurt 
Koffka. In 1926, Tolman distinguished two kinds of 
features of the environmental stimulus or situation to 
which behavior has objective reference. The manipulation 
features were those environmental properties capable of 
supporting given sorts of behavior with respect to the 
environing object. Thus, a chair might present a "to-
be-sat-on-ness" feature to a human and perhaps a "to-
45hide-behind-ness" feature to a rat. The discrimination
features of an object or situation were those cues given 
off by it which could serve as sighs for its manipulation 
features. They were thus not neutral givens but rather
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always bound up with behavior possibilities. Having dis­
tinguished between discrimination features and manipula­
tion features, Tolman then asserted that the two kinds
of features could unite, given the appropriate experiences,
46into what he called "the ultimate units of behavior." 
Learning was thus a matter of forming relations between 
the discriminations and manipulations or, in other words, 
of learning what can be done with what.
It was in the elucidation of his concept of the 
ultimate unit of behavior that Tolman revealed the influ­
ence of Gestalt psychology on him. He wrote:
These units of behavior . . . can be of very 
different degrees of generality or extensiveness.
For not only "entering an alley," "clawing at 
a loop," and the like, are to be described as 
5 such units of behavior, that is, of discrimina- 
tion-manipulation wholes, but also such more 
extended operations as "setting out of the box," 
"running through the total maze," "buying a 
house," "going to Europe," or even "embarking 
on a career." But in these more extended units 
it is obvious that the defining discriminations 
must be less specifically detailed than in the 
cases of "clawing at a loop," and "entering an 
alley." A wider variety of different particu­
lar stimuli and of different particular supports 
can be substituted in them and have them still 
preserve their defining characters. All that 
is necessary is that the general pattern of dis­
criminations and manipulations remain the same.
And here, it may be noted, is where the Gestalt 
psychology comes in. For the Gestalten, as I 
see it, are just such discrimination-manipulation 
units, which as the Gestalt psychologists them--- 
have emphasized, do retain their specific defining 
outlines in spite of wide changes and variations 
among their constituent elements,4 7
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Here was the neorealist relation of objective reference 
transformed into the Gestalt of a discrimination- 
manipulation whole. By placing added emphasis on the 
inherent functional relatedness of discrimination and 
manipulation, Tolman was able to subordinate the elements 
of stimulus and response to the more fundamental patterned 
relation between them. The relation became the defining 
property of the unit of learning, and the particular 
stimuli and responses were reduced to the status of 
something like accidental properties. The intersubstitut- 
ability of particulars was the key to molar behaviorism, 
for it permitted a definition of the learned response 
without reference to the mere movements ■ and physiological 
activities invoked by Watson in defining behavior.
As of 1926, then, Tolman*s molar conception of 
behavior involved a two-term relation between a set of 
discriminations and a set of manipulations. As was the 
case with Holt's notion of objective reference, Tolman's 
Gestalt concept of the response omitted any explicit 
distinction between the responded-to object as a source 
of cues and the object as a goal to be achieved or avoided. 
In 1927, however, Tolman did draw this distinction and 
incorporated it into his revised concept of learning as 
a "grand total Gestalt." Discussing a discrimination 
situation in which a rat learns that an alley marked with 
a white cue leads to food whereas an alley marked with
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a black cue leads to no food, Tolman characterized the
acquired Gestalt as follows:
This total Gestalt would contain the differ­
entiation of white from black, of food from 
nonfood, and of the sign relationship of 
white as leading to food from that of black 
as leading to nonfood.48
Under the revised concept, learning thus involved three
components fused into a single Gestalt: the cues, the
goal object, and the relation of "leading-on-ness" between
them.. The neorealists had held that relations could be
directly perceived, and Tolman had found that rats
in mazes could learn spatial and causal relations. The
concept of Gestalt offered itself as a natural way for
Tolman to express these psychological facts.
By the time Purposive Behavior had appeared in 1932, 
Tolman's excogitations on the redefinition of behavior 
had culminated in his fundamental concept of the sign- 
Gestalt. Like its forerunner, the sign-Gestalt consisted 
of three parts: the sign-object Cor cuel, the signified 
object (or goal), and the means-end-relation. The latter 
was a kind of behavioral route for getting from the 
sign-object to the signified object. But Tolman recog­
nized that in the typical environment there is a multip­
licity of mutually equivalent, intersubstitutable routes 
leading from a sign to its object. This "multiple track- 
ness" meant that
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means-end-relations . . . are . . . probably 
never adequately represented by single lines, 
but always rather by some degree of spreading, 
fanning, or networking of the lines. Means- 
end-relations are, to put it another way, 
essentially field-relations.^ 9
Once again the intersubstitutability of particulars was 
a crucial feature of the molar response definition. 
Responding was rendered independent of physiology by 
conceiving it as an equivalence class of movements, routes, 
or means. The response concept foreshadowed by Perry's 
three-term relation of stimulus, response, and effect—  
each of which was conceived as variable— found its ulti­
mate expression in the sign-Gestalt. So conceived, the 
learned response was close to the notion of a psycho­
logical act and remote from the notion of a colorless 
movement.
Tolman's formulation of the sign-Gestalt capped a 
decade of refinements of the molar concept of behavior.
This development was important not only for understanding 
Tolman's thought and the history of behaviorism, but also 
for understanding the relationship between behaviorism 
and logical positivism. First, in separating the science 
of behavior from that of physiology, the molar concept 
of the response rendered naive and dated the logical 
positivists' repeated appeals to physiology for justifying 
their own versions of behaviorism (.see Chapter 21,
Second, when Tolman complicated his sytem by asserting 
that organisms could form expectations of sign-Gestalts,
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he was led to seek an operationism sophisticated enough 
to handle such complexity— and in doing so, he was brought 
into contact with the Vienna Circle (.see Chapter 4). Third, 
the sign-Gestalt was the basic concept underlying Tolman's 
psychological view of science, a view largely incompatible 
with the logical positivist picture of science. As we 
shall see (in Chapter 101, Tolman1s purposive behaviorism 
was proposed to the logical positivists as a framework 
highly suited to the study of science as an empirical 
phenomenon; but not surprisingly, given the anti­
psychologism of the logical positivists, the proposal 
fell on deaf ears.
Tolman's Early Epistemology and Proto-Operationism
Tolman's derivation of molar behaviorism from the 
early formulations of Holt and Perry was one important 
legacy of neorealism. Equally important in terms of 
the story to be told here was Tolman's adoption of the 
neorealist stance on epistemology. Implicit in Tolman's 
conception of behavior was the notion that organisms
directly perceive and cognize the environing objects and
»
relations in which they are interested. And like the 
neorealists, Tolman saw no need to invoke one theory of 
knowledge for the observed organism and another for the 
observing organism; in psychology, the subject and experi­
menter were, epistemologically speaking, on a par.
157
In his early theoretical papers of the twenties, Tol-
man often spoke of mental characteristics'— as would be
consistent neorealist— as if they were presented directly
to the observer of behavior, that is, as if they were
primary qualities. Purpose, for example, was viewed
simply as a "descriptive phenomenon" which when adequately
conceived "is itself but an objective aspect of behavior."
As such, purpose was considered to be identical with a set
of behaviors which exhibit a certain "persistence until"
character, but was not to be inferred from behavior. To
infer prupose from behavior was, according to Tolman,
to eschew behaviorism in favor of a mentalism of the
sort advocated by William McDougall. Tolman wrote that
"the fundamental difference between him and us arises
in that he, being a 'mentalist,' merely infers purpose
from these aspects of behavior; whereas we, being behavior-
50ists, identify purpose with such aspects."
Purpose, according to Tolman, did not need to be
inferred or "read into" behavior because it was there to
be directly "read off” the behavior. Purpose, he said,
could be "pointed to" and "discovered by looking at
another organism." In Tolman’s words,
It is a descriptive feature immanent in the 
character of behavior qua behavior. It is 
not a mentalistic entity supposed to exist 
parallel to, and to run along side of, the 
behavior. It is out there in' the behavior; 
of its descriptive warp and woof.^l
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This is a strong statement, one that not only reveals 
Tolman's embracement of the neorealist epistemology but 
also reflects the neorealists1 bold style of assertion.
In the statement we see a recapitulation of the realist 
docitrine of the "independence of the immanent": the purpose 
of another organism is directly presented in the observer’s 
experience and yet is independent of it.
Much the same can be said of Tolman’s early treat­
ment of cognition. Cognition, qua the objective refer­
ence of behavior to an object of relation in the environment, 
was an immanent descriptive feature of behavior. Con­
sisting of an organism's adjusting to and commerce with 
an object, cognition was not something to be inferred 
from behavior, much less to be introspected, but rather 
a point-at-able feature out there in the behavior.
Knowing about cognition was therefore no more problematic, 
in principle, than ordinary cognition. As with any other 
subsistent, the cognition of one organism (.say, a rati 
could itself be cognized, i.e.,' responded and adjusted 
to, by another organism (such as a scientist!. Likewise 
for purpose: to point to, describe, and investigate 
another's purpose was to exhibit objective reference with 
respect to that purpose. The epistemological views of 
the New Realism were bold and perhaps not wholly plausible, 
but they supplied just the epistemological leverage that 
was needed for a behaviorism that claimed to be purposive,
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cognitive, and objective.
Tolman's early epistemological biases thus arose 
from his philosophical background, but they did not 
operate in isolation from his experimental research. As 
has already been mentioned, Tolman's research from 1918 
on was conducted with mazes. Of all the types of appara­
tus in use by psychologists at that time, the maze was 
probably the type most appropriate for a neorealist 
because it made the objective reference of the investi­
gator toward the rat's purposes and cognitions a matter
52of percexving spatxal relatxons. The rat's cognxtxons 
could be directly observed as its sequence of turns toward 
the goal box. Its purposes were presented as gettings- 
away-from the start box and gettings-toward the goal.
Any investigator who merely observed these patterned 
behaviors was immediately privy to cognitions and pur­
poses qua relations in physical space. Tolman's philoso­
phical views and his chosen experimental method were thus 
mutually reinforcing aspects of his research program.
As is probably already evident from the foregoing 
account of Tolman's background and early behaviorism, 
his approach to psychology during this period constituted 
a type of what would later be called operationisrn. From 
his neorealist forbears, he had learned that mind was 
not an internal, private entity but rather something 
public and scientifically tractable. By virture of its
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inherent functional relatedness to its environment, the 
"mind abroad" could be directly perceived and therefore 
identified with events and relations in the outer world.
In effect, Tolman's papers of the early twenties repre­
sented a series of efforts to operationalize psychological 
concepts previously thought of as inescapably "mentalistic." 
For each such- concept, Tolman sought a criterion for its 
application, and in each case, he said, "this criterion,
whatever it may be, is to be found somewhere in the
53externals of the situation." As Tolman later put it,
"when I began to try to develop a behavioristic system of
my own, what I really was doing was trying to rewrite
a common-sense mentalistic psychology . . .  in operational
54behavioristic terms."
Tolman's use of the maze both as an experimental 
apparatus and as a conceptual device fit in neatly with 
his proto-operational viewpoint. Indeed, for defining 
mentalistic notions in terms of the '.externals of the 
situation," it was unsurpassed because, unlike the 
typical Pavlovian conditioning apparatus, the maze environ­
ment by its very nature imparted an observable structure 
to the behavior which took place in it. The role of 
the maze in Tolman1s proto-operational approach is 
revealed in the concluding statement of an address given 
by him in 1926 to a group of philosophers:
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Human beings . . . can not convey per se 
private mental contents to their fellows. If 
their fellows do not understand what they are 
talking about, then all they can do is to 
point and grossly to behave. Or, better yet, 
they can take their fellows over to a really 
good laboratory and show them a really good rat 
in a really good maze, and say, 'See, this is 
what I mean, this is the sort of thing that is 
going on in my mind.'55
If Tolman's operationism was born of his philosophical
background, it was nonetheless his maze experiments that
transformed it into a working program of research.
Explicit references to operationism did not appear
in psychology until 19 30, and operationism as a movement
5 6did not begin to make itself felt until around 1935.
But Tolman had certainly worked out the essentials of 
it during the twenties. Recognizing this fact, the emi­
nent historian of psychology E. G. Boring wrote that:
Some— Holt and Tolman first— were clear that 
behaviorism does not exorcise consciousness, 
but absorbs it, reducing it to the behavioral 
observations by which it. is observed. One 
can not say that operationism began at any 
point. It was there all along, to be under­
stood and used by the astute who were not 
blinded by their own impetuousness.57
In the second half of the 1930s, the operationist move­
ment came to be explicitly identified with, the logical 
positivist movement. Tolman's early operationism anti­
cipated not only that development but also came before 
any influence of logical positivism had reached American 
shores. For our present purposes, "the important con­
clusion is that operationism— the very point of intellectual
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contact between Tolman and the logical positivists—  
was developed by Tolman prior to his knowledge of logical 
positivism and in a fashion that was indigenous to his 
evolving behavioristic thought. As such, it was not so 
much a methodological device for combatting metaphysical 
influences in psychology or for neutralizing mind; rather, 
it was a natural outgrowth of his neorealist metaphysical 
presuppositions and the scientific research based on those 
premises.
Pitfalls of Neorealism: The Challenge to Tolman
With its conception of behavior and its epistemo­
logical views, the New Realism launched a novel brand of 
behaviorism and an early version of operationism. Its 
philosophical stance lent support and credence to those 
new developments during their crucial infancy. But the 
philosophical claims of neorealism were peculiar, if not 
outright extreme, and not endowed with great initial 
plausibility. The idea that miiid is not exclusively 
private was not difficult to accept, but the implication 
that another mind could be directly presented to an ob­
server strained one's credulity. Surely most knowledge 
of other minds is inferred from, rather than read off, 
other's behavior. The neorealists had advanced their 
arguments with audacity and originality, but as one 
historian of philosophy put it, "there was something
163
suspect in the very ingenuity which Perry and Holt
5 8brought to bear on their epistemology."
The mental qualities of another organism were said 
by the neorealists to "subsist," like any other qualities, 
as givens in experience. They were thus neither more nor 
less real than other subsistent qualities. But in the 
absence of compelling arguments to the effect that mental 
qualities need not be inferred, the invoking of a realm 
of subsistence proved to be a philosophically awkward 
maneuver and lent little support to the program of 
objectifying mental phenomena. As a consequence both Holt 
and Perry frequently fell back on neurophysiological inter­
pretations in their pursuit of objectivity, especially 
in those cases in which mental events were not so clearly 
revealed in behavior. They spoke, for instance, of expecta 
tions as nascent physiological adjustments and of ideas 
as centrally stimulated signs. But in resorting to such 
interpretations, they not only compromised their anti­
materialist position, but also undercut their claims that 
mind is directly presented in behavior. In the early 
twenties, Tolman was aware that physiologizing was a pit­
fall for a molar behaviorist, and he was criticizing Perry 
for not being "wholly self-conscious of this essential
difference between such, a true behaviorism and a mere 
59physiology."
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As a movement, the New Realism had begun as a reac­
tion against the excesses of idealism and ended as a victim 
of its own excesses. Although its radical implications 
were drawn out with considerable ingenuity, they were soon 
recognized as untenable overreactions. By 1920,' the 
Critical Realism of Arthur 0. Lovejoy, Roy Wood Sellars, 
and others had reasserted the activity of the observer 
in conditioning the known, the representational character 
of knowledge, the philosophical import of nonveridical
experience, and the need for an ontology of greater com-
6 0plexity than simple subsistence. Holt and Perry them­
selves abandoned neorealism, the former pursuing instead
a materialistically inclined philosophical behaviorism
61and the latter developing a theory of value.
After his theoretical papers of the early 1920s,
Tolman rarely cited the works of Holt and Perry, but he 
was no doubt aware of the fate of- neorealism. To the sub­
stantial extent that his early behaviorism rested on a 
neorealist foundation, it was left in something of a 
philosophical vacuum by the demise of neorealism. The 
neorealist legacy placed Tolman in an awkward trilemma 
where he wavered for a time between three equally to-be- 
avoided alternatives. The first alternative was to con­
tinue in neorealist fashion to claim that the mental life 
of another organism, its purposes and cognitions, could 
be read directly off its behavior. Faced with the essential
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implausibility of this approach, he could have, secondly, 
resorted to physiological interpretations of mental events. 
As a third alternative, he might have abandoned his 
attempts to objectify mental phenomena by defining them in 
terms of observables. This last possibility was; for 
Tolman the empiricist, out of the question all along.
The second, he entertained briefly early in his career 
but then quickly rejected. But the first alternative 
proved difficult for Tolman to give up. Although he began 
to move away from it as early as 1926, he did not completely 
renounce it until 1935, the year after his stay in Vienna.
Tolman's short-lived flirtation with physiological
interpretations of mental events is revealed in a paper
of 1918 entitled "Nerve Process and Cognition." In this,
his very first theoretical paper, he attempted a neuro—
physiological rendering of cognition in much the fashion
of his neorealist teachers. Seeking "a definition of
cognition which naturally and of itself provides its own
6 2neurological explanation," he defined cognition as an 
internal neural sorting of qualities resulting in a sys­
tem of interconnected neural paths; a path for an idea 
like "finance" would have connections with paths for the 
ideas of "commerce" and "industry" as well as with paths 
for sensory qualities such as "dollar signs," These 
speculations conflicted with Tolman's empiricism and 
were deeply incompatible with the molar behaviorism which
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he was just then beginning to develop. By 1922. he had
clearly recognized the futility of such speculation and
was even, as remarked above, criticizing Perry for his
incomplete eschewal of physiologizing.
Tolman's move away from direct realism and his
gradual acknowledgement of the inferred status of mental
properties was a much slower development. In 1&25, he
began referring to purpose and cognition as both "des-
6 3criptive aspects" and "determiners" of behavior. This 
equivocal treatment of the concepts as having both mani­
fest-descriptive and underlying-explanatory roles per­
sisted in Tolman’s thought for a period of ten years.
Thus, in 1926, he was claiming that purpose was "out
64there in the behavior" and could be pointed to." But 
in 1928, Tolman was forced by the criticisms of the 
Chinese behaviorist Z. Y. Kuo to admit that purpose "has 
to be inferred from its effects and cannot be directly 
sensed." Even so, Tolman followed this concession with 
the qualifying assertion that purpose is a "perfectly 
objective feature which appears in behavior" and is
6 5therefore neither mentalistic nor introspectionistic. 
Tolman's vacillation on this issue suggests that he 
realized the philosophical difficulties involved in 
applying direct realism to purpose and cognition, but that 
he found it difficult to forgo the conceptual advantage 
of construing prupose and cognition as immediate features
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of behavior.
As to whether mental characteristics are given in
behavior or inferred from it, Tolman's thinking continued
to vacillate through the appearance in 1932 of his
classic Purposive Behavior. E. G. Boring has remarked
that the concepts employed by Tolman in that work "show
how necessarily indeterminate is the line between the
direct observation of datum, on the one hand, and the
not-so-fully conscious inference of function, on the 
6 6other." Nowhere was the fuzziness of this line more 
apparent than in the case of Tolman's most fundamental 
concepts of purpose and cognition. Within a single- 
paragraph of Purposive Behavior, Tolman described purposes 
and cognitions on the one hand as "immanent" in behavior, 
"in-lying," "immediate," and "discovered" by observers, 
and on the other hand as "determinants" and "causes" of
6 7behavior which are "invented" or "inferred" by obervers.
Tolman's lack of resolution on this crucial matter, 
even through the time of his magnum opus, reflected the
demise of the philosophy which had spawned and supported
%
his molar behaviorism and his proto-operational epistemo- 
logy. He was unwilling to give up behaviorism, but he 
could no longer view mental qualities as primary-like 
qualities of observable behavior. Likewise, he could not 
physiologize them away or assign them to some contrived 
ontological realm such as "subsistence." Those strategies
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had been tried and found wanting; they were the pitfalls
of neorealism. The collapse of the New Realism presented
Tolman with a challenge: how could he retain purpose and
cognition as objective, naturalized, and in some sense
"operationalized" concepts while avoiding the untoward
implications of the neorealist epistemology? That is,
could purpose and cognition be "read into" or inferred
from behavior and still be objective?
What was needed was some sophisticated version of
operationism by means of which mental properties could be
admitted to have an inferred status and yet at the same
time be objectified by being give empirical definitions.
Purposive Behavior, in which Tolman’s equivocation on
the observed-versus-inferred issue had been so blatant,
appeared the year before his trip to Vienna, Tolman later
wrote that he was struggling during this period toward
definitions of purpose and cognition as intervening 
6 8variables. If so, it was significant that he chose. 
Vienna for his sabbatical in 1933-34, for it was there 
that he worked out a resolution of the conceptual diffi­
culties that had beset his budding purposive behaviorism. 
Under the twin Viennese influences of logical positivism 
and probabilistic functionalism, Tolman formulated his 
influential response to the challenge presented by the down­
fall of neorealism. These developments are the topic of 
the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
PURPOSIVE BEHAVIORISM AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM
The preceding chapter has described Tolman'1 s back­
ground, his early behaviorism, and the epistemological 
premises which underlay that behaviorism. According to the 
neorealist epistemology, an organism could directly cognize 
objects and relations in its environment, and the psycho­
logist studying such an organism could directly cognize 
its cognitions. Since the "mind abroad" was taken to be 
mind itself and not merely outward manifestations from 
which mind might be inferred, Tolman saw that mental 
phenomena could be defined in terms of, in fact identified 
with, the "externals of the situation." This strategy 
of definition, frequently used by Tolman during the 
twenties, amounted to an early version of operationism.
This was an operationism which unlike the "ametaphysical" 
operationism of the mid-thirties had the metaphysical 
support of a philosophy of direct realism. With the demise 
of neorealism, however, Tolman's proto-operationism lost 
its philosophical support and he was confronted with the 
challenge of revising his epistemological views; but he 
needed to do so without abandoning the program of objecti­
fying and naturalizing mentalistic concepts.
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The aim of this chapter is to characterize Tolman’s 
relationship to logical positivism, particularly in the 
context of the role played by logical positivism in 
Tolman's response to the challenge facing his behaviorism 
at the turn of the decade. To do so, it will be'necessary 
also to examine the probabilistic functionalism of Egon 
Brunswik, for the influence of logical positivism on 
Tolman is intimately bound up (.both historically and 
conceptually) with the influence of Brunswik on him. But 
the twin influences of probabilistic functionalism and 
logical positivism were ones which had already been anti­
cipated in the development of Tolman1s own thought; that 
is, they were influences that reinforced Tolman's ideas, 
not ones that instigated or formed them. Accordingly, 
the present chapter begins with accounts of Tolman's 
psychological and philosophical views as they stood just 
prior to his trip to Vienna in 1933-34.
Tolman's Thought: Pre-Vienna
The Shift from Immediate to Mediate Cognition
As was described in the preceding chapter, Tolman 
vacillated during the period 1925-35 over whether purposes 
and cognitions could be directly known by an observer 
of behavior or whether they had to be inferred from that 
behavior. Over this ten year span there was in Tolman's 
thinking a gradual transition from the former alternative
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to the latter. Part of this change can no doubt be 
attributed to Tolman's awareness of the fate of neo­
realism: By 1920, the critical realists had laid bare the
implausibility of much of the New Realism and had shown 
that it could not adequately account for error in the 
knowledge process without making some concessions to 
dualism. But by the mid-twenties, Tolman was focusing more 
on his experimental research than on purely philosophical 
matters. It is thus appropriate that a major impetus for 
his shift toward viewing cognition as a mediate process 
came from his studies of rats in mazes.
In a paper of 1925, Tolman reported a set of experi-' 
ments in which rats were placed in a simple T-shaped maze 
and reinforced indifferently for selecting the right or 
left arm of the maze. Under such conditions, the rats 
showed stable strategies of responding, e.g., always 
choosing the left or consistently alternating left and 
right. Tolman referred to these persistent patterns of 
responding as "cognitive hunches," and said that such 
behavior "can be observed quite definitely to impute 
(whether correctly or incorrectly)" a structure to a parti­
cular part of the maze.^ In 1926, Tolman was claiming 
that behavior "postulates, expects, makes a claim for" 
whatever feature of the environment is being responded to. 
In 1927, he was speaking not only of "postulations" of 
objects by behavior but also of "representations" of goal
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objects. He wrote, "To make an adjustment to an act is
to achieve a representation (based, or course, upon what
has happened upon previous occasions when this act or
similar ones have actually been performed! of the probable
2 .stimulus results to be expected from the act."
In these reformulations, Tolman was moving toward 
the general notion that knowledge of an evironment is 
mediated by claims or postulations about, or representa­
tions of, features of that environment. In other words, 
the rat was beginning to be conceived as playing an active 
role in constructing knowledge of the world and not as 
simply receiving direct presentations of the world. It 
is a symptom of Tolman's vacillation on the issue of direct 
versus indirect cognition that he was still at the same 
time claiming that the rat's purposes and cognitions, 
and even its postulations, could be directly read off its 
behavior. But there was a degree of inconsistency in 
holding that the psychologist's objective reference to 
the rat's cognitions could be direct and immediate while 
the functional ..reference of the rat's behavior to its 
environment was mediated by postulations. Apparently, 
Tolman recognized this difficulty, for it was around this 
time that he began to admit, although not without equivoca­
tion, that the purposes and cognitions of another organism 
have to be inferred by the investigator from its behavior. 
Although Tolman was moving away from the direct realism
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of the neorealists, he was still striving to observe their 
maxim that the observing organism and the observed organism 
operate at the same epistemological level.
This attempt to maintain a consistent epistemology
was even more pronounced after the turn of the decade.
In the early thirties, Tolman1s student Ivan Krechevsky
(later to be known as David Krech}. undertook a series of 
3
studies on the persistent response patterns, which Tolman 
had earlier called "cognitive hunches." In the course of 
analyzing these patterns and their modifiability under 
different conditions of reward, Krechevsky began to refer 
to them as "hypotheses" in much the same way that Tolman 
had viewed behavior as "making a claim" or "postulating" 
about the environment. But Krechevsky's work went further 
because it emphasized the control of the behavior patterns 
by the conditions of differential reinforcement. A 
good hypothesis could be confirmed by reinforcement and 
a bad one could be disconfirmed by nonreinforcement. A 
hypothesis could be shown to be in error and thus had to 
be regarded as always tentative and fallible.
The tentative and fallible character of hypotheses 
pushed Tolman further toward the recognition that the 
purposes and cognitions of another organism must be imputed 
to that organism. Such imputations, like those of the 
observed organism itself, had to be regarded as tentative 
and subject to error. This suggested for purposes and
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cognitions a hypothetical rather than observed status.
In a joint paper which appeared in 1933, Tolman and
Krechevsky referred to cognitions as variables which
intervene in functions relating the observable variables
of stimulus and response. But even this formulation was
subject to equivocation, for they also spoke of cognitions
as immanent in the functions relating observables, or more
4
specifically as the forms of those functions.
Although Tolman accepted Krechevsky’s notion of 
hypotheses, he also developed in his own system the 
analogous concept of the sign-gestalt-expectation. This 
was, in fact, the fundamental concept of Purposive Behavior. 
The sign-gestalt, it will be recalled was the unit of 
learning in which the sign-object, means-end-relation, 
and signified object were fused into a single pattern.
But, Tolman now reasoned, this pattern itself may be 
immediately cognized or postulated; that is, the organism 
may form a sign-gestalt-expectation. Like a hypothesis, 
this expectation (which is an organic event) may be con­
firmed or disconfirmed depending on the nature of the 
actual sign-gestalt (which is any "objective environmental 
complex"I."* Like a hypothesis, a sign-gestalt-expectation 
had to be inferred from behavior, although Tolman was 
reluctant to admit it, and such an inference required 
a fallible imputation, hypothesis, or expectation on the 
part of the observer. The sign-gestalt-expectation
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was clearly an "immanent determiner" of behavior, one of 
the cognitive variables which was said to intervene in 
functions relating behavior to its antecedent conditions. 
But, as we have seen, Tolman had not in 1932 completely 
settled the issue of whether such variables had a hypo­
thetical or observable status.
Tolman later reflected on the development of the
intervening variable paradigm as it stood in Purposive
Behavior. The "immanent determiners" of which he had
spoken in that book
were my first step toward what I later conceived 
as 'intervening variables.' I felt vaguely at 
that time that the cognitive and purposive fea­
tures of behavior, which I was postulating, were 
somehow statements about the shapes of the func­
tions connecting the final dependent behavior to 
its various independent determiners of environ­
mental stimuli and physiological drive states. 
Therefore I said the cognitive and purposive 
features were "immanent" in these connections 
or functions. It was only later that I hit upon 
the notion of breaking up the total functions 
into two or more successive steps and inserting 
'intervening variables' . . . between such 
successive steps or functions.6
The revised notion of intervening variables was first
expressed by Tolman early in 1935, the year following his
return from Vienna. As we shall see, it thus seems likely
that he "hit upon" the intervening variable paradigm under
the influence of logical positivism.
The present section has described the transition 
in Tolman's views from a direct realism to a mediated 
cognitivism. In the concluding remarks of Purposive
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Behavior, Tolman confessed to propounding an epistemo-
logical dualism. He wrote that
in terms of our system, idea and object are two.
It is clear that discriminanda-, manipulanda-, and 
means-end-readinesses and -expectations are logi­
cally, and usually also temporally, prior to the 
realities which would verify them, or in cases of 
error, fail to verify them. . . . Our doctrine is,
therefore, in this degree, an epistemological 
dualism.7
In this important respect, Tolman had abandoned neorealism. 
This abandonment had begun with the attribution of hunches 
and postulations, and later hypotheses and expectations, 
to his experimental subjects. While attributing indirect 
cognitions to his rats, he still clung for a brief time 
to the neorealist belief that the rat's purposes and cog­
nitions could be directly cognized by the investigator.
But his even deeper conviction that the observer and the 
observed must be granted an equal epistemological s-tatus 
gradually took precedence. The demand for parity, meant 
that the scientist, too, had to hypothesize and infer in 
order to know the world. In large measure, Tolman was 
being led by his rats to rethink and (ironically) to 
complicate his own epistemology.
j
As has been pointed out, neorealism provided just 
the epistemological leverage needed for a behaviorism to 
objectify complex mental phenomena. Under appropriate 
conditions, it was believed, such phenomena could be 
directly and unambiguously known. But this proved to be 
an unstable position, because it led to findings- which
reflected back unfavorably on the presuppositions.
Tolman had observed that his rats could be in error, that 
their postulations could be disconfirmed and altered by 
experience. To account for these facts, he had to attri­
bute underlying determinants to their behavior. ' But since 
such determinants were, strictly speaking, unobservable, 
his attributions of them became likewise subject to ambi­
guity and error. The neorealist assumptions, which had 
never been able to adequately account for error in the 
knowledge process, could no longer be relied upon to 
guarantee a direct knowledge of another's cognitions.
For scientists as for rats, the seeking of knowledge 
therefore became an ambiguous, error-prone, and risky 
enterprise. What Tolman needed, then, was some means 
of reducing the risk of error, perhaps a sophisticated 
operational method to govern the imputation of unobservable 
mental properties,
Contextualism, Pragmatism, and the Ineffability Doctrine
Tolman1s adoption of an epistemological dualism was 
a development with deep implications, but it by no means 
constituted a shift to any sort of ontological dualism.
As Tolman put in in Purposive Behavior, "Our doctrine is
g
not . . .  a transcendentalism or a metaphysical dualism." 
Tolman continued to view hemself, as he had all along, 
as an adherent of a pragmatic naturalism, or in the
185
terminology of Stephen C. Pepper, of a "contextualism."
Pepper's contextualism was a version of pragmatism updated
with strains of Gestalt psychology and Tolman’s own
purposive behaviorism. The mutual influence of Tolman
and Pepper on each other throughout their long and parallel
careers was substantial. They had both been students of
Ralph Barton Perry at Harvard, where Pepper finished his
Ph.D. in 1916, just a year behind Tolman. Pepper became
a professor at Berkeley in 1919, again just a year behind
Tolman, and the two transplanted Easterners remained there
for the duration of their careers. During this time
they were close friends who found in each other an ongoing
source of ideas.
Pepper developed contextualism primarily as a basis
for his esthetic and value theory, but these theories
in turn rested largely on Perry’s and Tolman's notion of
the purposive act. As a consequence, contextualism showed
a strong kinship with Tolman1s purposive behaviorism.
As Pepper himself noted, "what is owing to Tolman is
so interwoven with my own ideas that there can be no
9
unravelling of it." In contextualism, an environment 
was said to be composed of textures, each of which was 
a sort of complex Gestalt of patterned relations of events. 
Each texture, despite its wholistic character, could be 
analyzed into strands which "extend into environmental 
t e x t u r e s . A  strand could be followed up, analyzed,
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or operated on in the context of any one of the textures 
to which it belonged, but it could never be analyzed in 
isolation from any texture. Contextualism, then, was the 
generalized, explicitly philosophical formulation of the 
basic notion which Tolman was already operating under: 
the elements of learning— stimuli, responses, and goals—  
cannot be understood except as they are funtionally bound 
together in a single complex whole.
As a species of epistemological dualism, contextualism 
distinguished between a sign, cue, or idea and its referent; 
but the relation of reference between them was far from 
the usual dualistic notion of reference. In his lengthy 
commentary, written in 1933, on Purposive Behavior, Pepper 
described the contextualist notion of reference.
Analysis is an operational affair, a matter 
of following references from one texture to 
another. There is no assumption of similarity 
between the analyzed texture and the analyzing 
texture. If you call the latter texture the 
idea of an object, and the former texture the 
object, you have the type of all knowledge for 
a contextualist. The idea of an object is an 
instrument that will guide you to the object.
The idea symbolizes the object in that sense.
It does not need to copy the object in any manner 
whatever. To know an object does not mean that 
. you have a picture of it. It simply means that 
you have an instrument by means of which you can 
obtain the object.H
Although Tolman never stated it so baldly, this was
essentially his view also. Whether the relation was
between percept and object, sign-object and signified
object, or sign-gestalt-expectation and sign-^-gestalt, it
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was not one of representation in the usual sense but
rather one of leading—on-ness. A strand could be followed
from one point to another, but the first point was a guide
to, not a reproduction of, the other. Pepper wrote that
"perception is not an inner ’idea' corresponding in some
puzzling way with an 'outer' object; it is a traceable
12 . .relation of strands in a texture." Similarly, Tolman
held that in perception "the smallest unit of experience
is not just a free sensory-perceptual pattern but such
13a pattern suffused with instrumental meaning." Per­
ception is thus bound to a context of leading-to and -from 
and is necessarily relative to the goals and needs of 
the organism as well as its past.
If this principle was believed to hold for percep­
tion, then it applied all the more clearly to more complex 
forms of cognition. A rat's hypothesis concerning the 
locus of a goal and the means to it was not a passive 
description or representation of a goal in a maze but 
an instrument for getting to it. As such, the hypothesis 
was perforce conditioned by the drives and history of 
the organism. Tolman wrote in 1926 that
we may liken the environment to a multidimen­
sional spider's web radiating out from the 
behaving organism in many directions. The 
far ends of the threads terminate in the to- 
be—sought-for quiescences of final to-be-avoided 
disturbances. Environmental objects and situa­
tions are responded to and cognized only in their 
character of providing bridges or routes along
these threads.14
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In operating on such, a complexly textured environment, 
an organisms would need to employ hypotheses and expecta­
tions about the various strands or routes because the 
final ends of the strands could simply not be known 
directly. Cognition in a contextualist environment became 
a guided movement along a strand of a texture, an operation 
mediated with varying degrees of success by the cognitive 
instruments of hypotheses and expectations.
But as we have seen, Tolman viewed the activities
of the scientist as like those of the rat. Consequently,
he extended the contextualist notion of cognition to
scientific knowledge. This was done near the end of
Purposive Behavior in a section titled "Methodology and
Status of Science." Therein, Tolman addressed the issue
of "the ultimate methodology and status of .science which
we have been adopting," and developed his answer in the
context of Pepper's philosophy. Just as the rat is guided
through its textured environment by expectations, so
the scientist explores the world with the help of a
theory, or in Pepper's terminology, a "map,"
All science necessarily presents, it seems to us, 
but a map and picture of reality. If it were 
to present reality in its whole concreteness, 
science would not be a map but a complete replica 
of reality. And then it would lose its useful­
ness, , , , One of the first requisites of a 
science is, in short, that it be a map, i.e., 
a short-hand for finding one's way about from 
moment of reality to the next— that it be a 
symbolic compendium by means of which to pre­
dict and control.
18 9
Having come to acknowledge the mediate character of per­
ception and cognition, Tolman was led to interpret theories 
in an instrumentalistic fashion. Without the possibility 
of direct knowledge of the world, the best a scientist 
could hope for was to construct a useful map. Like any 
other map, a theory could be constructed only relative 
to certain purposes and would necessarily leave out certain 
features of the environment being mapped,
Tolman agrees with Pepper that scientific naturalism 
was but one among many viable metaphysical systems for 
what Pepper termed "root metaphors." Naturalism itself 
was a kind of general map which leaves something out and 
is therefore necessarily incomplete and relative to cer­
tain ends. Tolman wrote:
Naturalism is the type of metaphysics which 
takes the features of prediction and control as 
all-important. And we are adopting the natural­
istic position, but we are going further and 
admitting with Pepper that it is only a map. We 
tend, however, it may be noted, to differ from 
Pepper in that we believe the naturalistic map 
to be the only map. The other maps, i.e., 
mysticism, idealism, etc., seem to us to be 
not maps but poems. . . .  They are momentary 
attitudes, not expandable into compelte maps.
Prediction and control are the very essence of 
'mappishness.’17
For Tolman, naturalism was one viable root metaphor among
others, but it alone could be said to provide maps in the
proper sense of the term.
What was left out of the naturalistic map, according
to Tolman, were the "raw feels" which make up the "concrete,
iaa
18but ineffable, richness of real experience, as it comes."
In scientific maps, the "raw feels" have no place and can
simply be ignored. "They are mere scientific will-of-the-
wisps," wrote Tolman. "They are subject matter for poetry
19and esthetics and religion, not for science," ' The objec­
tion to "raw feels" was one that Tolman had voiced as 
early as 1922 and then frequently theareaftsas: any such pure
experiences could not be differentially responded to or
20talked about and thus had no place in science. In 
Purposive Behavior, Tolman simply quoted the philosopher
C. I. Lewis on this matter:
In the end, the supposition of a difference 
in immediate experience [i . e. , our raw feels] 
which is not to be detected through divergence 
in discrimination and relation, is a notion 
very difficult to handle. Because such a 
difference would, ex hypothesi, be ineffable,
• we can have no language for discussing what no 
language or behavior could discriminate. And 
a difference which no language or behavior 
could convey is, for purposes of communication, 
as good as non-existent.21
This doctrine of the ineffability of immediate experience
was a recurrent theme in Tolman's writings as well as
a major point of Lewis's Mind and the World-Order (1929).
Like Tolman and Pepper, Lewis had been a student
of Perry at Harvard, and like them he had gone to Berkeley
to teach after graduating. He and Tolman were colleagues
there in 1918-20 and continued to stay in touch after
22Lewis's return to Harvard xn 1920, Tolman read and 
admired Lewis's Mind and the World-Order, a work which
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went to press in 1928 and which independently developed 
many of the positions concurrently being worked out in the 
Vienna Circle. Lewis’s philosophy is, in fact, often 
regarded as a version of logical empiricism.
But Lewis identified his philosophy as a "doncept-
ualistic pragmatism," and if it was a version of logical
empiricism, it was one with important differences arising
from his pragmatism.. For present purposes, there are
two such differences to be noted. First, Lewis did not
accept the logical positivist notion of logic as an
empty tautology. He attributed to logic an a priori
status but emphasized its pragmatic character. Logic, he
said, is a useful instrument for acting in the wrrld
because it can be used to analyze the consequences of
alternative actions regardless of which alternative might
actually be chosen. In fact, the utility of logic is
grounded in its capacity for illuminating possible but
nonexistent states of affairs. Logic is a tool of thought,
and thinking is for Lewis "an activity by which we adjust
ourselves to those aspects of the environment which are
23not immediately apprehended m  experience,"
The second important difference between the standard 
versions of logical positivism and Lewis's philosophy 
concerns the empirical foundation of knowledge. The logical 
positivists had spoken of single atomic propositions or 
Protokolsatze (.formulated in either physicalistic or
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phenomenalistic language}, as the basis of empirical know­
ledge. For Lewis, such unitary expressions of experience 
were not a form of knowledge at all. Empirical knowledge 
was rooted, rather, in a type of observation statement 
that was conditional in form. Such a statement which 
later became known as a "terminating judgment," was of 
the form: given some sensory cue, if some action is taken, 
then some expected result will occur. For example, a 
terminating judgment might be "given an impression of 
red directly before me, if I turn my head to the right, 
then the red will move to the left in my visual field."
The most basic kind of knowledge is thus relational and 
active rather than atomic and passive. As with the 
pragmatistic views of knowledge found in Perry, Pepper,
and Tolman, Lewis maintained that knowledge involves a
24cure-, an action, and an actual or expected outcome. If 
there were any such thing as a "dead given" in experience, 
it could not count as knowledge without having entered 
into a relation with action and outcome. Lewis's 
philosophy was thus a logical empiricism with a pragmatic 
twist in both its logical and empirical aspects.
Tolman's familiarity and sympathy with the philosophi­
cal views of Pepper and Lewis are important clues for 
understanding his Relationship with logical positivism. 
Pepper's contextualist metaphysics, which was essentially 
the same as Tolman's own metaphysics, provided the
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philosophical basis for Tolman's convergence wi.th Brunswik's 
probabilistic functionalism and thus the framework to 
which Tolman eventually assimilated logical positivism, 
Lewis's conceptualistic pragmatism was the brand of logical 
empiricism to which Tolman was exposed and predisposed 
before his contact with the European version. Signifi- 
cantly both contextualism and conceptualistic pragmatism 
were far more pragmatic, and less linguistic, in thrust 
than European positivism. In their similarities to logical 
empiricism, they foreshadowed Tolman's positive response 
to it, and in their differences from it, they adumbrated 
the limits of that positive response.
Schlick at Berkeley
In 1931, the Vienna Circle leader Moritz Schlick 
went to Berkeley as a visiting professor. Along with 
Herbert Feigl, who went to Harvard in 1930, Schlick was 
part of the vanguard that brought logical positivism to 
America. Having been under the influence of Wittgenstein 
sJLncel927, Schlick was avidly propounding a strongly 
Wittgensteinian form of positivism at the time of his 
stay in California, It was during this visit that he 
delivered his influential lecture "The Future of Philoso­
phy," in which he declared that the task of future 
philosophers would be to work with scientists in clari­
fying the meanings of scientific claims. It was also
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during this visit that he became personally acquainted
25with Pepper and Tolman.
By 1931, Schlick and Tolman had already developed
similar ideas on a number of issues and had even advanced
similar arguments for them. As early as 1925, Schlick
had analyzed the nature of purposive activity and argued
against vitalists such as Hans Driesch that the "concept
of purposiveness which is perfectly sufficient for the
description of the facts of biology contains nothing
that transcends, in principle, the processes and laws
2 6characteristic of inorganic matter." Like Tolman, he 
had sought to "list the characteristics" of organic 
behavior which lead one to speak of purposiveness. And 
like Tolman, he associated purposiveness with a pattern 
of responding with respect to some outcome. Schlick wrote 
that
a group of processes or organs is called pur­
posive with respect to a definite effect, if 
this effect is the normal effect in the 
cooperation of the processes or organs. The 
accent here is on co-operation; in a scientific 
case, these processes, depending upon the cir­
cumstances, may occur in a variety of ways, but 
they are dependent upon one another and linked 
together in such a way that on the whole the 
same sort of effect always ensues. . . .
Purposiveness, therefore, is tantamount 
to a certain type of relation, interaction, 
or concatenation.^7
Schlick went on to give purposiveness, qua the coopera­
tion of processes with respect to some end, a function­
alist interpretation in terms of the preservation and 
development of the organism.
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At the time of his visit to Berkeley, Schlick was 
also advocating a version of the ineffability doctrine, 
which as we have seen was subscribed to by Tolman. Follow­
ing Wittgenstein, Schlick drew a sharp distinction between
the form and the content of experience. Language was 
said to be capable of expressing only the form or structure 
of experience; the content of experience, the "raw feels" 
discussed by Tolman, were viewed as inherently inexpress­
ible or ineffable. Consequently, communication could 
involve, at most, the transmission of the structure of an 
experience. The recipient of the communication had to 
provide the content from his own immediate experience.
As Schlick put it:
What you call the *understanding of the true 
meaning1 is an act of interpretation which
might be described as the filling in of an
empty frame: the communicated structure is 
filled with content by the understanding indivi­
dual . 28
As Tolman had done, Schlick emphasized this point with
29reference to the experience of colors. The experience 
of greenness, the pure enjoyment of the quality, was 
taken to be inexpressible for purposes of communication.
One could never know, or even meaningfully ask, whether 
one organism's experience of greenness was the same as 
another's. Only the structure of the experience could be 
communicated, and in the case of colors this meant that 
two observers could agree at most on the standing of
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green relative to other colors. This relative standing 
would necessarily be revealed as the structure of their 
expressions or the pattern of their respones in the pre­
sence of a green stimulus. ^
For both Schlick and Tolman, the doctrine of 
ineffability thus led in the final analysis to a sort of 
behaviorism. The structural character of all knowledge 
meant that it was ultimately to be expressed as a set 
of responses, usually linguistic ones. In 1932, Schlick 
stated that psychological facts, like physical facts, 
were expressible only by repeating their structure in 
propositional form. He continued:
Old-fashioned psychologists used to think that 
we can "know1 more about our own minds than 
about other people's, because only our own mind 
can be investigated by introspection. But this 
view rests again on a confusion of intuition 
and knowledge in the legitimate sense of the 
word. What we really know by introspection, 
can be expressed in our propositions and if 
this is the case we can learn just as much 
from the propositions in which other persons 
describe their own mental life, and from other 
manifestations in which that life expresses 
itself. As all bodily manifestations, including 
speech, form part of a person's behaviour, we 
may maintain that all psychological truths rest 
on behaviour as their only and absolutely suffi­
cient basis.
If it is this, and nothing else that is 
implied by the doctrine of 'behaviourism' Cof 
which I am not sure), the behaviouristic view 
seems to be absolutely unassailable.31
Schlick's behaviorism, like Tolman's, thus admitted intro­
spective reports as valid evidence for a psychological 
science but not as evidence having a special status.
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Schlick among logical positivists, and Tolman, 
among behaviorists, were both relatively undogmatic in 
their views. Schlick arrived at his behaviorism from 
mainly linguistic considerations and Tolman his largely 
from considerations of comparative psychology, but both 
arrived at a relatively catholic version of behaviorism. 
Both had been realists in the twenties and had moved toward 
positivism in the thirties, but even then their positivism 
and instrumentalism were tempered with realist leanings.
All told, they had a lot in common in terms of their 
intellectual views and their open and flexible style of 
defending them.
Perhaps their greatest common ground was in their 
views of how empirical significance is to be achieved 
for the claims of science. According to Schlick, all 
proper knowledge is communicable structure, but the 
language which expresses this structure must end at some 
point. To be sure, the terms of a language can be de­
fined with reference to other terms, but this process 
will eventually come up against the limits of language.
As Wittgenstein had insisted, the process of definition 
must always terminate in the act of pointing. In "The 
Future of Philosophy," Schlick stated:
All of our definitions must end by some 
demonstration, by some activity. . . . The 
discovery of the meaning of any proposition 
must ultimately be achieved by some act, some 
immediate procedure, for instance, as the 
showing of yellow; it cannot be given in a 
proposition. 2^
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The notion that the contents of experience can be shown
but not expressed had already been clearly formulated
by Tolman. As we have seen, he had stated in 1926 that
"human beings . . . can not convey per se private mental
contents to their fellows. . . . all they can do is to
33point and grossly to behave." Schlick and Tolman had
arrived at the ineffability doctrine from rather different
directions, but the outcome was much the same: empirical
34significance boiled down to the act of ostension.
Schlick and Tolman alike were thus led to a type of 
operationism. With his linguistic emphasis, Schlick 
formulated the operationalist conclusion in terms of the 
verification of propositions: "The Meaning of a Proposi­
tion is the Method of its Verification." But he also 
formulated it in terms more amenable to the pragmatist 
climate of America when he said that "a proposition has
meaning for us only if it makes some kind of difference
35to us whether it is true or false." It was this formula' 
tion, with its echo of Peirce and James, that was clearly 
applicable to Tolman's conception of scientific claims 
as constituting a map for the guidance of organismic 
activity.
It is unclear just how well Tolman knew Schlick and 
his ideas in 1931. Tolman's assertion in Purposive 
Behavior that mysticism and idealism "seem to us to be 
not maps but poems" appears to be one reflection of
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3 6Schlick's influence. Most important for Tolman was the 
fact that Shlick, a prominent physicist and philosopher, 
was offering a fairly detailed account of how theories 
acquire their empirical content. Even the great "hypo­
thetical-deductive" systems of physics, according to
Schlick, make their final contact with reality by a compli-
37cated act of pointing. In 1931, as we have seen, Tolman 
was still clinging to the hope that, in some way, pur­
poses and cognitions could still be defensibly construed 
as "point-at-able" features of behavior. Perhaps the 
new empiricism of the Vienna Circle, where theoretical 
systems were being treated with the tools of modern logic, 
would provide the key to resolve Tolman's difficulties 
with empirical definition.
Once Purposive Behavior was published, Tolman took
a full sabbatical during which he went to Vienna, where
38he stayed for a period of seven months. There was 
obviously much in Vienna to draw Tolman's interest.
His trips to Giessen in 1912 and 1923 had awakened him 
to the richness of the European psychological tradition. 
Vienna was the center of psychoanalytic theory, a topic 
of increasing interest to him. It was also the home of 
the Pedagogical Institute headed by the influential 
psychologists Karl and Charlotte Buhler. The Vienna of 
this period has been described as a "mecca," and it has 
been pointed out that "after the First World War Vienna
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began to rival the Gentian universities as an attraction
39to American psychologists." But for Tolman, it appears
to have been the Vienna Circle that provided the major
impetus for going there. Edna Heidbreder has written that
Tolman's interest in logical positivism ante­
dated his year in Vienna in 1933-34. He 
chose to spend his sabbatical there because 
of his interest in logical positivism and 
because he wanted to become familiar with it 
at its source.
The problems facing Tolman in his psychological theor­
izing were for the most part psychological ones, but they 
involved issues in the methodology and philosophy of 
science. The system of psychology presented in Purposive 
Behavior was a complex one involving relatively high- 
level cognitive concepts, and he began to look for out­
side help in ensuring their empirical definability. Such 
were the issues being dealt with in the Vienna Circle, 
and Tolman1s personal acquaintance with its acknowledged 
leader provided his entree into the group.
Tolman's Thought: Vienna and After
Brunswik's Probabilistic Functionalism
Like Tolman, Egon Brunswik (1903-1955) turned to 
psychology after studying engineering. As a graduate 
student at the University of Vienna, he studied under 
Karl Buhler and came under the influence of Moritz 
Schlick,^ Upon receiving his doctorate under Buhler
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in 1927, he became a research assistant at Buhler's 
Psychological Institute and in 1934 was made a Privat- 
dozent at the University of Vienna. He also attended 
meetings of the Vienna Circle during these years.
As we have seen, Tolman had by the time of his visit 
abandoned his earlier direct realism in favor of an 
epistemological dualism. When he met Brunswik during his 
sabbatical there, Brunswik was also propounding an epistemo­
logical dualism, especially in the context of perception.
As a student of Buhler, Brunswik stood in the European 
functionalist tradition which stemmed from the work of 
Franz Brentano. Just as Brentano and Buhler distinguished 
between the knower and the known, and yet held them to 
be functionally related, so Brunswik distinguished between 
a perceiver's "intending" (.or focusing upon) an environ­
mental object or situation and the perceiver's "attaining"
42of the object or situation. When the perceiver's cues 
Cor "proximal" stimuli) and the to-be-perceived object 
C'distal" stimulus)_ stand in a strong functional relation­
ship, the perception is relatively successful and exhibits 
its achievement character. But as Brunswik's own research 
showed, perception occurs with various degrees of success 
depending on the relative validity of the cues afforded 
by the environment; intendings become attainings only when 
the organism is able to exploit reliable cue-object 
correlations in the world. Just as Tolman’s newfound
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epistemological dualism made room for error in the know­
ledge process, so did Brunswik's functionalist dualism 
allow for the fallibility of perception.
Tolman and Brunswik recognized the strong similar­
ities between their conceptual systems. Tolman' had 
addressed the problem of knowledge from the response side 
and Brunswik had addressed it frOm the stimulus side, 
but they saw their respective approaches as complementary 
and mutually supportive. Brunswik's distinction between 
the intended and the attained was paralleled in Tolman's 
distinction between expectation (or hypothesis) and con­
firmation. In each case the former was a kind of psycho­
logical act and the latter was the (by no means inevitable) 
consequence of that act. Brunswik's perceptual intention-
alism was the complement of Tolman's behavioral pur-
. . 43posivxsm.
But the similarities in their approaches went even 
further. Where Tolman emphasized that molar behavior 
achieves stability through the intersubstitutability of 
particular responses in reaching goals, Brunswik stessed 
the intersubstitutability of perceptual cues in the 
achievement of perceptual stability. Brunswik's extensive 
research on object constancy had demonstrated how per- 
ceivers could switch to the use of alternative cues or 
signs when previously used ones became unreliable or 
unavailable. Brunswik came to refer to this prpcess,
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which was equivalent to Tolman's "multiple trackness"
44of means-end relations, as "vicarious mediation."
Vicarious mediation is necessary, according to Brunswik, 
because any single cue-object relation in the environment 
is, at least to some degree, ambiguous. Likewise, for 
Tolman any particular means-end relation (such as a path 
in a maze) is likely to be unreliable (as when a path is 
blocked). For both Brunswik and Tolman, then, efficient 
adaptation to an environment requires the learning and 
utilization of a set of alternatives by which a perceptual 
object or goal may be achieved.
The major common features of Brunswik's and Tolman's 
approaches— their epistemological dualism, the inter­
substitutability of means-end relations, and the ambiguity 
of individual means-end relations— were features that were 
integrated into their respective functionalist metaphysics. 
Again, they recognized the strong kinship of their func­
tionalist world-views. For both, psychology is the study 
of the adaptation of organism to environment. The organism- 
environment relation is not direct but rather mediated 
through the positing, and subsequente correction, of 
intendings and hypotheses. The relation of knower to 
known is an activity, a functional relation, not a static 
logical relation; and because of the vagaries and 
ambiguities of the environment, this relation can be 
defined but not perfected.
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For Tolman, these views were all part of his con­
textualist metaphysics. On the analogy of the multi­
dimensional spider's web, knowing became a matter of 
choosing and following up strands or routes leading to 
goal states. Because of the multiplicity of these routes 
and the distances they often involve, hypotheses are needed 
to guide the organism's passage through the web. In a 
similar vein, Brunswik embraced a metaphysical view that 
fit with his functionalist psychology. He was drawn to 
the methodological objectivism of the Vienna Circle, 
but the Circle's insistence on the univocality of reference 
in scientific language and the determinate logical struc­
ture of scientific laws conflicted seriously with his own 
psychological research and theory. The one version of 
logical positivism that was consistent with Brunswik*s 
psychological view of knowledge was Hans Reichenbach.'s 
probabilistic epistemology, and it was Reichenbach's
approach that Brunswik integrated into his functionalist 
45framework. Following Reichenbach's notion that multiple 
causes can statistically produce a single effect,
Brunswik came to picture the environment as composed of 
relations of "partial causes and partial effects" —  
relations not unlike Tolman's strands of texture. The 
organism was portrayed by Brunswik as an "intuitive 
statistician" whose behavior is based on "the probabilities, 
or past relative frequencies, of relevant interrelation-
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ships lumped together." Analogous to Tolman1s hypotheses
and Brunswik's intendings were Reichenbach's posits. As
Brunswik wrote: "All a finite, sub-divine individual can
do when acting is— to use a term of Reichenbach— to make
46a posit, or wager." For Brunswik and Tolman, the knower
and the known are connected by functional relations,
relations which their own respective research had shown
to be fallible, and they accordingly saw Reichenbach's
probabilistic epistemology as amenable to their own
psychological formulations of knowledge.
During Tolman1s stay in Vienna, he and Brunswik
met regularly at the local coffeehouses to work out a
47joint statement of their theoretical position. The 
result was a major article which appeared in the 
Psychological Review of 1935 under the title "The Organism 
and the Causal Texture of the Environment." For Tolman 
and Brunswik, the molar phenomena of psychology were 
regarded as dependent on the environment, so they devoted 
much of their paper to a characterization of the environ­
ment. They wrote that the "whole uncertainty of knowledge
and behavior arises . . . out of . . . equivocality
48(Mehrdeutigkeit). in the causal surroundings." In a 
passage which revealed their functionalist metaphysics, 
they depicted the environment as follows:
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Consider for a moment the nature of the 
causal connections in the physical world 
independent of organisms. We observe that, 
whenever any individual event occurs, a more 
or less extended complex of many independent 
part causes must have been existentially 
operative. Further, any specific type of event 
will on different occasions and in different 
places have different causes, or more exactly 
speaking, different total complexes of part 
causes. And also, vice versa, any given type 
of an event will itself operate as a part cause 
on different occasions and in different places 
for the production of different final total 
events. The causal interweavings of unit 
events among one another are thus in both direc­
tions, equivocal. But some of these connections 
will be more probable than others.4 9
This passage ended with a reference to Reichenbach1s 
earlier work on "the nature of the causal'structure of 
the world in g e n e r a l . B u t  in such phrases as "total 
complexes of part causes" and "causal interweavings," 
the passage also shows the influence of Pepper’s context­
ualism. Indeed, Tolman and Brunswik acknowledged the 
contextualist influence at the outset of the paper:
"For the term ’texture’ as well as for advice on various
other English terms we wish to express special indebted-
51ness to Professor S. C. Pepper." The views of 
Reichenbach and Pepper were clearly compatible and were 
readily brought together as an underpinning for Tolman 
and Brunswik’s psychologically derived functionalist 
world-view. In the remainder of their joint paper,
Tolman and Brunswik elaborated the parallels between 
their molar psychologies, laboriously matching one by one 
Tolman’s neologisms with their German equivalents Ce.g.,
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H 52"means-objects" with "Mittel-gegenstande").
Although at the time of their meeting Tolman and 
Brunswik had already developed very similar positions, 
they clearly had different emphases and their encounter 
thus involved discernible influences as well as the mutual 
reinforcement of their general positions. As mentioned 
above, Erunswik came to molar psychology from the per­
ceptual side and Tolman from the behavioral side. Their 
interaction had the effect of broadening Brunswik's 
perspective to include action and Tolman's to include 
more consideration of perceptual issues. Brunswik's 
stress on the equivocality of perception and knowledge 
led to a deepening of Tolman's epistemological dualism, 
as reflected in his increasingly sharp distinctions 
between secondary and primary qualities, hypotheses
and confirmation, and even values (subjective) and valences 
53(objective). Tolman's emphasis on objective behavioral 
methods led Brunsik, who was already sympathetic to 
logical positivism, to a more thoroughgoing advocacy of 
methodological (but not thematic) physicalism and to the 
endorsement of operational criteria (although he con­
tinued to insist that such criteria can be applied only 
probabilistically).
The relationship between Tolman and Brunswik proved 
to be as congenial personally as it was intellectually.
At Tolman's instigation, Brunswik spent the year 1335-1936
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as a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow at Berkeley, where he
lectured and conducted research. He then returned to
Vienna for a year only to be invited back to Berkeley in
1937 to take a position as assistant professor. There he
remained active both as a psychologist and, as will be
described below, a contributor to the Unity of Science
55movement until his death m  1955.
Of all the views that Brunswik and Tolman held in 
common, perhaps the most important in the present context 
is that both of them were sensitive to the demands placed 
on methodology by psychological theory. Scientific 
methods need in general to be tailored to the subject 
matter at hand, but in psychology there is the further 
consideration that every finding and theoretical adjust­
ment carries implications for the nature of knowing and 
hence, at least potentially, for the methods of the
scientist. Brunswik has been hailed for his originality
5 6in deriving his method from his theory; but, although 
he was unusually explicit in this respect, he was by no 
means unique. As was shown previously, Tolman's early 
operational methods came out of his theoretical views 
on the psychology of cognition. Under the impetus of 
his experiemnts with Krechevsky on hypotheses, those 
views were undergoing revision at the time of his 
sabbatical in Vienna. In what follows, it will be argued 
that Tolman's new version of operationalism— a sophisticated
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operationalism that he elaborated in a series of papers 
shortly after his trip to Vienna— was likewise based on 
psychological concerns. To be sure, the new operationism 
bore clear earmarks of logical positivist influence, but 
logical positivism was being accommodated to the overall 
framework of Tolman's cognitive behaviorism rather than 
vice versa.
Logical Positivism and Ontological Neutrality
As we have seen, there is good reason to believe that
Tolman attended meetings of the Vienna Circle during his
sabbatical in Vienna. Unfortunately, however, Tolman
Cunlike Hull and Skinner1 did not keep personal records
concerning his career, and there is little evidence from
57other sources about his experiences m  Vienna. Such 
details as the frequency of his attendance at meetings 
of the Vienna Circle, the degree of his participation 
in them, and the nature of his interactions with its 
members remain unknown. It is possible, nonetheless, 
to reconstruct on the basis of his published works the 
sorts of positivistic influences he came under during his 
stay in Vienna. These influences are clearly reflected 
in his articles of the mid-thirties, even though, as with 
the many other influences Tolman absorbed in the course 
of his intellectual career, the strains of Viennese 
positivism were assimilated to his own conceptual framework
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for psychology. In this section and the next one, the 
impact of logical positivism on Tolman's thought will be 
discussed. The nature of that impact, it will be seen, 
was more to corroborate, extend, and refine already 
existing aspects of his thought than to instigate new 
ones. The final section of this chapter will be devoted 
to Tolman's involvement in the Unity of Science movement.
Tolman's sympathies with positivism in general were 
conditioned by his earlier abandonment of direct realism 
and his growing emphasis on the relativity of perception. 
Especially after his contact with Brunswik, he was acutely 
aware of the gap between what is presented in experience 
and the object of perception. The imperfection and 
ambiguity of the relation between the two meant that the 
objects of study in the world could not be directly 
grasped in the process of scientific observation. Under 
favorable conditions, certain proximal cues may serve as 
relatively reliable signs for objects, but immediate 
experience consists of a confusing welter of sensory 
qualities. To find one's way about in such a sensorily 
rich flux of experience, Tolman argued, one must seize 
upon the most reliable of the available cues and use 
them to construct a set of rules, maps, or equations by 
means of which experience can be predicted and controlled. 
The objects of science— in particular the psychological 
processes studied in psychology— which can not be reached
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through direct observation are thus assigned a status as 
logical constructs.
This line of argument was presented by Tolman in 
his paper "Psychology versus Immediate Experience," which 
was published in the journal Philosophy of Science in 
the year following his return from Vienna. Much in the 
manner that Hermann von Helmholtz had been led to reject 
the idea of a Kantian noumenon on the basis of scientific 
findings concerning the indirectness of perception,
Tolman was led to a positivistic construal of psychological 
processes on the basis of Brunswik's research on per­
ception. Tolman's paper began with a discussion of the 
relativity of perception and ended with a positivistic 
account of intervening variables in terms of "logical
constructs" and the "pointer-readings" by which they are
5 8related to observation.
In his discussion of the relativity of perception, 
Tolman noted that facts of perception had often in the 
history of philosophy been taken as support for a dualism 
of sense data and objects behind the sense data, and 
that this dualism was supported by a distinction between 
the mental and the physical as discrete domains for 
psychology and physics. Tolman was willing to admit a 
sort of primary quality-secondary quality distinction.
In perceptual experience, he said, there are characters 
"which are relatively independent and which may be said
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to inhere in the things or bodies themselves" and charact­
ers "which are dependent and determined not only by the 
character of the thing in question but also by the special 
relations of this thing to LtheU percipient"; the former
Tolman called "independents" and the latter "perspec- 
59tives." But he was eager to deny that such a distinction 
involved any ontological dualism of the mental and physical 
or any important difference between the sciences of psycho­
logy and physics. Brunswik had shown that when given 
appropriate instructions, experimental subjects could make 
the proximal stimuli the objects of study— that is, they 
could "intend" (more or less successfully) the proximal 
stimuli as well as the usual objects of study, the distal 
stimuli. Indeed, as Tolman argued, this is what intro­
spective psychologists do when they examine their sensa­
tions and what artists do when they attempt to reproduce 
their visual experience.^  But, Tolman insisted, when 
formulated in this way the distinction between indepen­
dents and perspectives, i.e., between primary and secondary 
qualities "no logner seems fundamental." "Immediate 
experience," he wrote, "is a matrix which contains both 
perspectives and independents perceptually . . . intended."^"1'
In this way, Tolman was able to maintain the epistemological 
distinctions that the demise of neorealism and Brunswik's 
research had shown to be necessary, and yet to divorce 
those distinctions from the traditional ontological
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dualism he wished to avoid. Tolman states his position 
outright:
I shall abandon Lthel conception of two sets of 
metaphysical stuffs— a physical world really 
"out there" to be studied by physics and a 
series of private mental worlds each in our own 
respective heads or minds to be studied by 
psychology.6 2
Like Carnap, Tolman embraced a position of ontological
neutrality, but, unlike Carnap, he was willing to speak
of reality, which he identified with immediate experience.
Following the Berkeley philosopher Jacob Loewenberg, he
characterized immediate experience as "the immediately
given preanalytical complex . . .  as this appears to the
naive man and before the subtleties of philosophical and
6 3scientific analysis have been applied to it." Tolman 
elaborated:
Immediate experience as thus composed is rich, 
qualitied, but perhaps in large part ineffable, 
that is, logically incommunicable from one 
sentient being to another. It is, however, 
real— the most real reality that we can have 
or desire. Its lack is that it does not pro­
vide in itself, or only in minor degree, its
own rationale.
By saying that immediate experience does not provide its 
own rationale, Tolman meant that it does not come struc­
tured in the form of laws, that it does not, as he put
it, "contain written on its face" the rules by which one
6 5is guided through it. To extract such rules from 
immedate experience is the goal of all science, and in 
this regard neither psychology nor physics enjoys a
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privileged relation to reality. Tolman wrote:
Immediate experience, as initially given, is 
not my private world or your private world. It 
is not something to be studied primarily by psy­
chology. It is, rather, an initial, common 
matrix out of which both physics and psychology 
are evolved. It is the only tangible real that 
we have. Physics does not present another real 
behind that of immediate experience. Nor does 
psychology, as such, study this real of immediate 
experience in a more firsthand way than does 
physics.
Psychology is like physics in being "a set of logical
constructs— a set of rules and equations whereby we are
aided in finding our way about from one moment of
immediate experience to another." Tolman continued:
The purpose of science, of psychology as well 
as of physics, is not to describe and relive 
experience but merely to explain it,— to help 
in predicting and controlling it,— or to use 
Professor Pepper's term, to give map accounts 
of it . . . my dichotomy will be between reality 
and its maps and not between two types of 
reality.°
Thus, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of Mach, Tolman 
spoke of physics and psychology alike as growing out of 
the same soil of immediate experience.
But this is not to say that physics and psychology 
are in all respects alike, rather they are for Tolman 
complementary in their aims. In elaborating the difference 
between physics and psychology, Tolman returned to the 
Brunswik-inspired notions of perspectives and independents. 
It was also in this context that Tolman cited the work 
of the logical positivists in the only extended reference 
to logical positivism that was to appear in his published
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writings. Tolman wrote:
As to the difference between physics and 
psychology my further thesis will now be that 
whereas physics is the system— the rationale—  
which attempts to explain all the possible 
'independents’ and 'perspectives’ any organism 
could conceivably intend and attain in given 
environmental set-ups, psychology is the system—  
the rationale— which attempts to explain what 
perspectives and independents the particular 
organism or type of organism, on the given 
occasion will actually . . ..intend; and why 
these intentions will have the specific 
degrees of success or failure of attainment 
that they do. In the rest of this paper I shall 
attempt to elaborate this thesis for psychology.
The 'logical positivists,1 that is such men as 
Wittgenstein, Schlick, Carnap in Europe and 
Bridgman, C. I. Lewis, Feigl and Blumberg in 
this country, have already done the task for 
physics. But no one as yet, so it seems to me, 
has satisfactorily done it for psychology. 7
This passage is a revealing one in several respects. First,
it suggests that Tolman was situating his thoughts about
logical positivism in the context of his psychology
rather than vice versa. As we shall see in the next
chapter, it was generally the case that Tolman subordinated
logical, methodological, and philosophical concerns to
psychological conerns. Second, Tolman's characterization
of the respective roles of physics and psychology in
regard to intendings and attainments, following his claim
that the logical positivists had already elaborated such
a thesis for the case of physics, suggests that his
acquaintance with their works was neither particularly
broad nor deep— or perhaps simply that he was speaking very
6 8loosely of their approach to physics. As will be dis-
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cussed shortly, Tolman selectively drew upon logical posi­
tivism for some of the details of his new version of 
operationism, but he was not sympathetic to other aspects 
of it and appears not to have ever studied it in any 
detail. Third, Tolman's list of "logical positivists" 
was rather inclusive, including as it did Bridgman and 
Lewis Cor, for that matter, Wittgenstein who, despite 
Schlick's unsparing admiration, was scarcely a logical 
positivist by 1935) . Again, this fact suggests that 
Tolman understood logical positivism only in a very general 
way. Lastly, it is significant that Tolman claimed that 
none of the logical positivists had given a satisfactory . 
treatment of psychology. The passage ended with a foot­
note citation of Carnap's "Psychology in Physical Language" 
C1932/33), and Feigl's "Logical Analysis of the Psycho­
physical Problem: A Contribution to the New Positivism" 
C1934).. But in the footnote, Tolman stated that "Carnap 
and Feigl have, to be sure, prepared the way, but they
have done it only for 'molecular behaviorism' and not for
69'molar behaviorism'." As discussed m  Chapter 2, the 
logical positivists had indeed relied heavily on physio­
logical interpretations in their explications of behavior­
ism. Tolman had already found such a reductionistic 
approach unfruitful and was in the process of reformulating 
his molar behaviorism.
If Tolman's 1935 paper was not a whole-hearted
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endorsement of logical positivism, still it evinced the 
influence of logical positivism. The nedtral monism he 
adopted therein was not the ametaphysical neutrality 
attempted by Carnap— Tolman was, after all, speaking in 
frankly metaphysical terms— but it was a form of, onto­
logical neutrality, and, as such, it was probably inspired 
by his experiences in Vienna. In depicting both psychology 
and physics as being evolved out of immediate experience, 
Tolman seemed to be following Ernst Mach although it is 
likely that his neutral monism was drawn more from Holt,
whose brilliant exposition of the doctrine was published
70in 1914 during Tolman's years in graduate school. Most 
importantly, Tolman's neutral monism gave him the bene­
fits of avoiding a mind-body dualism while permitting him 
the epistemological distinctions he needed. The major 
distinction that remained in Tolman's system was between 
immediate experience and its maps— a distinction which, 
although rendered in his own terminology, closely para­
lleled the logical positivist dichotomy of observation 
and theory. Just as the logical positivists encountered 
difficulties in accounting for the relation between theory 
and observation once they had made the distinction, so 
too Tolman faced the problem of bringing logical constructs 
into contact with experience. In the years immediately 
following his trip to Vienna, Tolman proposed for this 
problem a solution which constituted a sort of methodo-
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logical physicalism.
Methodological Physicalism and the Ideal of Measurement
In his neutral monism, Tolman distinguished, as 
we have seen, between the richly qualitied matrix of 
immediate experience and the systems of logical constructs 
which serve as guides to experience. He was left with 
the problem of relating the two epistemological levels. 
From the Brunswikian perspective, the desideratum was to 
determine which of the qualities or proximal stimuli 
found in immediate experience would provide the most 
reliable means of attaining the partially accessible 
events which have been logically constructed by science. 
From Tolman's own perspective, the desideratum was to 
continue, as he had been doing for more than a decade, 
to render observable the concept's of purpose and cognition. 
At this point, Tolman turned to Carnap's articulation of 
the doctrine of physicalism. Of course, Tolman's earlier 
proto-operationism had amounted to a version of physic­
alism, but in Carnap's writings he found a statement of 
physicalism which was explicit and which addressed the 
problem of relating a realm suffused with qualities to an 
unqualitied realm of constructs.
In reading Carnap's 1934 monograph Unity of Science,
Tolman focused on the section titled "The Physical Language
71as an Intersubjective Language." In that section,
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Carnap developed an argument to the effect that the
physical language is not only intersubjective but also
"inter-sensory." A peculiar feature of physical concepts
according to Carnap, is "their abstractness and the absence
of qualities from their enunciation." Carnap explained
this claim as follows:
The rules of translation from the physical 
language into protocol language are of such 
a kind that no word in the physical language 
is ever correlated in the protocol language 
with words referring only to a single sense 
field (e.g., never correlated with determina^- 
tions of colour only or sound only].. It 
follows that a physical determination permits 
the inference of protocol statements in every 
sensory field. 2^
As Schlick and Tolman himself had done, Carnap turned to 
the example of colors to clarify his argument. A parti­
cular green color, for example, could be represented as 
a line of a certain position in a spectroscopic chart, 
or the color's wavelength could be represented (.with the 
aid of appropriate devices attached to a spectroscope!
as a certain sound from a loudspeaker, or alternatively,
73as the position of a pointer which could be felt. In 
this way, the occurrence of a certain color could be 
detected even by a blind person, who could not experience 
the quality or "raw feel," as Tolman would have put it, 
of greenness. In a passage which Tolman underlined in 
his copy of the monograph, Carnap noted that such a 
physicalization of color was possible "only in virtue of 
the fact that the frequencies Li.e., wavelengths! in
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question can be recognized by signs other than their respec-
74tive colors. . . . "  Carnap concluded his discussion by
stating the principle— again underlined by Tolman— that
75"physical determinations are valid inter-sensorily."
Tolman had long since discussed the possibility of 
externalizing the experience of colors, but here was a 
statement that considerably enriched the argument. Color 
experiences could be rendered in a scientific account 
as a set of signs or "pointer readings" which not only 
served as reliable cues, as in Brunswik1s scheme, for the 
distal event of another's color experience but also 
eliminated the necessity of identifying that experience 
with its felt greenness. Raw feels, as Tolman had been 
urging, were thereby divested of any crucial status in a 
scientific account and relegated to their proper place 
in the ineffable flux of immediate experience. Tolman 
was already attuned to the implications of this stance 
for psychology in general. When Carnap extended his line 
of reasoning to the case of ascribing thirst to another 
person, stating that in doing so one recognizes the 
behavioral signs rather than the immediate experience of 
thirst, Tolman noted in the margin: "N.B. It is only
the wrong view which leads to the doctrine of 'raw
4T 1 | | 7 6feels 1 . "
As Carnap noted at the outset of his argument, the 
physicalization of sensory experience relies on the
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availability of precise physical concepts and the natural 
laws of physics and psychophysics. The strategy of 
correlating sensory experiences with pointer readings thus 
presupposes a system of measurement that is licensed by 
such laws. Tolman was surely aware that no such' laws 
were available in the case of the more complex psychological 
phenomena, but he nonetheless adopted the rhetoric of 
measurement and precision. In the period following his 
trip to Vienna, he began to emphasize the prediction and 
control of behavior as the goals of psychology. He spoke 
of pointer readings in connection with the logical posi­
tivists and began to use the notation of functional
77equations as a shorthand for the laws of behavior. In
the ideal, the quality-less variables and constructs of
a scientific system of psychology were to be related to
pure experience through, the process of measurement.
Experience would be reduced to pointer readings from which
a system could be constructed. Tolman’s theoretical
papers through the latter half of the thirties reflected
this positivistic ideal, but it was to remain no more than
an ideal. In practice, he never got much further than
identifying the basic dependent variable as the propor-
7 8tion of left turns at the choice point of a maze. When 
he spoke of pointer readings in his own system, he usually 
referred not to actual measurements but to qualitative 
observations of behavior. But he was always quick to
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acknowledge that his system was only a program for a 
future theory, a framework in which one could roughly 
situate the variables that could be expected to figure 
in a more advanced account.
Intervening Variables and Sophisticated Operationism
In his masterwork Purposive Behavior, it will be 
be recalled, Tolman had struggled with the problem of how 
to acknowledge the inferred status of the concepts of 
purpose and cognition while retaining their objectivity 
in the sense of intersubjective observability. At that 
time, he had blatantly equivocated on whether such con­
cepts were of a merely descriptive or an underlying 
explanatory nature, but he had also just begun to work 
out a formulation in which they were construed as inter­
vening variables along the lines of the unobservable con­
structs of physics. Toward the end of the book, he wrote 
that the system developed therein
conceives mental processes as functional 
variables intervening between stimuli, ini­
tiating physiological states, and the gen­
eral heredity and past training of the 
organism, on the one hand, and final 
resulting responses., on the other. These 
intervening variables it defines as behavior- 
determinants. . . . which are discovered,
in the last analysis, by behavior experi­
ments. They have to be inferred "back1' 
from behavior. . . . They are to behavior as 
electrons, waves, or whatever it may be, are 
to the happenings in inorganic matter. There 
is nothing private or "mentalistic" about 
them. They are pragmatically conceived, 
objective variables the concepts of which 
can be altered and changed as proves most 
useful.79
223
Tolman's thinking in 193 2 contained, at least in rudi­
mentary form, all the ingredients of his post-Vienna 
resolution of the problem that faced him. Mental pro­
cesses would be, in some sense, intervening variables; 
they would be discovered by and inferred from behavioral 
experiments; and they would have a status like that of 
physics' unobservables and be subject to pragmatic con­
straints. In Tolman's formulation of purpose and cog­
nition in the mid-thirties, these features were expressed 
in the positivistic framework of functional equations 
and prediction and control.
Shortly before Tolman's trip to Vienna, Carnap had 
been grappling with .a problem very similar to Tolman's. 
Giving a plausible account of psychological concepts in 
physicalistic terms was recognized as a crucial task for 
advancing the physicalist thesis as a universal account 
of science. Like Tolman, Carnap had originally attempted 
simply to identify psychological concepts with physical 
observations. He aimed to do this by means of strict 
explicit definitions. But by 1933, he had come to 
accept that certain abstract psychological concepts 
could not be related so directly to observations. When 
Neurath and some of his colleagues undertook to physica- 
lize Freudian theory by translating one of his works 
sentence by sentence into physicalist language, Carnap 
objected that a more appropriate strategy would be to
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analyze Freudian theory systematically in terms of its
concepts. He later described the approach he was
recommending as follows:
For some of the concepts, I thought, it would 
be possible to find behavioristic and thus 
physicalistic definitions. But the more funda­
mental concepts of Freud's theory should be 
treated as hypothetical concepts, that is, 
introduced with the help of hypothetical laws 
in which they occur and of co-ordinate rules, 
which would permit the derivation of sentences 
about observable behavior from sentences 
involving the fundamental concepts of the 
theory. I pointed out the analogy between 
concepts like 'ego,' 'id,' 'complex' and the 
field concepts in physics.®®
Carnap was thus noting at the time, as was Tolman, that 
certain psychological concepts had a status somewhat 
like the unobservables of physics, and he was further 
suggesting that such concepts could be related to obser­
vations by means of psychological laws.
Whether or not Tolman was in direct contact with
81Carnap during his stay in Vienna , his pronouncements
«
about intervening variables in the period immediately after 
his trip had much the flavor of Carnap's approach.
Instead of psychological laws in general, he spoke of 
functional relations between antecedent conditions 
and dependent behavior. As we saw earlier, Tolman 
stated that during this period he "hit upon the notion of 
breaking up the total functions into two or more successive 
steps and inserting 'intervening variables' . , . between
such successive steps or functions." He first presented this
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scheme in his Philosophy of Science paper of 1935 and 
further elaborated it in a second article of the following 
year. In the 1935 paper, behavior was said to be a 
function of stimulus conditions (.Si, the organism's 
hereditary make-up CHI, its past training CTl, and its 
physiological condition of appetite or aversion (Pi. In 
Tolman's quasi-mathematical notation:
But, Tolman continued, the form of this function is too 
difficult to determine all at once, so it is necessary to 
divide it into sets of "subordinate equations":
fied and the anc^  ^3 's determinedr the original overall
equation can be solved. But Tolman acknowledged that 
this would not be an easy task. All one could do would 
be to assert a set of intervening variables and seek the 
functions— analogous to Carnap's "hypothetical laws"—  
by which the intervening variables could be related to 
the observable antecedent and dependent variables.
Although Tolman set up his scheme in the form of 
equations to suggest the possibility of getting at inter­
vening variables through the process of measuring observable
B = f1 (.S,H,T,P)
f t (-1 , 1
and
Ia = f 3 <-S,H,T,P)
Ib = f ^ CS , H , T , P1 
Ic = f ^ (.S , H, T, P)
and so forth. Once the appropriate I's have been identi
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variables, he actually discussed the intervening variables 
which he asserted for his own system in terms of disposi­
tions or "readinesses" to respond. He wrote:
I define the I's as behavior readinesses. And 
I would divide them into two main groups which.
I shall designate, respectively as demands and 
cognitions.
The demands were what he had previously called purposes; 
thus purposes and cognitions became logical constructs 
expressing behavior readinesses. These were to be inferred, 
to the extent that it was pragmatically useful to do so, 
from behavioral facts or pointer readings. Despite their 
inferred status, they could in principle at least be 
tied to the observable realm via the f2 *s and f3 's> thereby 
retaining their objectivity. In this way, the purposes 
and cognitions that had earlier been given a neorealist 
ontological standing were now assigned a methdological 
status as intervening variables in equations for the pre­
diction and control of behavior. In their epistemological 
standing, they were rather like Carnap's hypothetical
concepts, but with a greater stress on their instrumental 
84value. As Tolman recognized and openly acknowledged, 
all of this remained a mere scheme, a program for the 
future development of psychology, rather than a state­
ment of psychological achievements.
The instrumentalistic character of purposes and cog­
nitions in Tolman's new formulation was phrased in an
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especially clear manner in his paper of 1936, In that
year, he wrote:
The particular map, the particular subset of 
predictions, in which psychology is interested 
concerns the to-be-expected behavior of organ­
isms— the behavior to be expected from other 
organisms, and the behavior to be expected from 
ourselves. And in these predictions, mental 
processes, whether they be those of another 
or of ourselves, will figure only in the guise 
of objectively definable intervening variables.
Or (to borrow a phrase from William James 1 the 
sole 'cash-value' of mental processes lies, I 
shall assert, in this their character as a set 
of intermediating functional processes which 
interconnect between the initiating causes of 
behavior, on the one hand, and the final result­
ing behavior itself, on the other.8 5
It is significant that Tolman here availed himself of 
James's language of pragmatism. As we have seen, Tolman's 
receptiveness to logical positivist ideas was conditioned 
by his association with Pepper and Lewis, both of whom 
were operating intellectually within the context of prag­
matism. Indeed, Tolman was also part of the Jamesian 
tradition. His functionalist psychology, his neutral 
monism, and now his views on science were all shaped 
by James's thought, albeit through the mediation of Holt 
and Perry, and later Pepper and Lewis. Tolman's generally 
pragmatistic orientation also made him, as will be dis­
cussed below, impatient with the niceties of formal logic, 
especially in its applications to science.
It has already been noted that Tolman's interest 
in logical positivism was limited to its empirical side—  
that is, to its operational, rather than logical aspect.
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Bridgman's Logic of Modern Physics, his original state­
ment of operationism, had been published in 1927; but 
despite the similarity of Bridgman's approach to Tolman's 
early definitions of purposes and cognitions, Tolman had
not read Bridgman at the time Purposive Behavior-was
8 6published, and he did not cite Bridgman until 1935. Not 
until 1936 did Tolman give Bridgman more than a passing 
mention. In his paper of that year, Tolman referred to 
his own brand of psychology as "Operational Behaviorism." 
Therein, he cited not only Bridgman but also S. S. Stevens's 
two papers of 1935, the two papers which proved to be 
primarily responsible for sparking the interest of 
psychologists in operationism. Conspicuously absent from 
Tolman's 1936 article as any mention of logical positivism 
or any citations of logical positivist works. His pre­
ference seemed to be for Bridgman's less formalized 
approach to the problem of empirical definition, and 
indeed it would remain his preference.
In the paper on Operational Behaviorism, Tolman 
gave his most complete and explicit account of the inter­
vening variable paradigm. Following his previously stated 
scheme of breaking up functional equations and inserting 
intervening variables into the component equations, Tolman 
specified that the goals of operational behaviorism were 
to assert a list of intervening variables (I'si, to 
ascertain the laws or functions by which the I's depend
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on the independent variables, and to ascertain the laws
by which behavior depends on the I's. The intervening
variables, said Tolman "are all that my operational
8 7behaviorism finds in the way of mental processes." He 
proceeded to sketch out the various categories and sub­
classes of intervening variables that he thought would 
be necessary in an adequate psychology of molar behavior.
The problem remained, of course, of finding a way 
to relate the intervening variables to the observable 
independent and dependent variables. Only the latter, 
Tolman admitted, can be directly operated on and controlled 
by psychologists. How, then can knowledge of the inter­
vening variables be attained? Tolman wrote;
My answer is as follows; In certain carefully 
chosen, controlled and 'standard' experimental 
setups, one tries to hold all but one, or one 
small group, of the independent variables con­
stant and studies the functional connection 
between the variations in this one independent 
variable, or this one limited group of indepen­
dent variables, on the one hand, and the corre­
lated variations in some quantitable feature of 
the final behavior on the other.
With the other independent variables held constant at 
some appropriately chosen "standard" value, Tolman con­
tinued, one can assume that the curve expressing the 
behavioral measure as a function of the selected inde­
pendent directly reflects the functional relation between 
the selected variable and values of the relevant inter­
vening variable. "In other words," said Tolman, "we 
must assume that we have chosen a setup such that the
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variations in the selected aspect of the behavior
mirror directly those of the desired intervening vari- 
8 9able. . . . "  Thus, for example, one might vary hours 
of food deprivation (P-^ l, record behavior as a function of 
deprivation, and take the resulting curve as a measure 
of the intervening variable "demand for food" (P-^ ). The 
vertical axis may then be rescaled and relabeled as 
strength of the demand rather than the specific measure 
of behavior. In saim, intervening variables are to be 
"operationally defined" by means of standard experiments. 
Tolman described the rationale for this procedure as 
follows:
Of course, the obtained behavior does 
actually depend upon a whole welter of other 
variables— general stimulus setup, number of 
previous presentations, other physiological 
drives, and the specific heredity factors, 
training factors, and maturity factors, as 
well as upon P.. So that we are assuming that 
the 'standard' values which we chose in this 
experiment for these other variables were such 
that they did not distort the picture. That 
is, we are assuming that we have obtained this 
functional relationship between and 
under standard conditions so that this same 
relationship will also hold between P^ and D. 
under all conditions, even though under many 
of these other conditions it will no longer 
appear simply and directly in some single 
aspect of the behavior.
Defined in this way, the intervening variables could then
play the role of independent variables in the functions
relating the final behavior to the I's. Furthermore,
when there was the need— as Tolman thought there was—
for additional levels of intervening variables, the
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component equations could be divided further so that 
"second-line" and "third-line" intervening variables could 
be inserted into the equations. In the resulting chains 
of equations, by which the investigator could in principle 
gain access to the further removed psychological processes, 
the intervening variables at each level would serve as 
independent variables for the next level closer to the 
dependent behavior.
Tolman recognized that his operational approach 
required a set of rather strong assumptions. First, he 
noted, it must be assumed that the form of the curve taken 
to reflect the intervening variable in its original 
defining experiment does not change when the variables 
held constant in that experiment are allowed to vary.
In other words, the intervening variable must not be 
subject to interactions between the independent variables. 
Second, the particular "standard" values assigned to the 
incidental variables in the defining experiment must be 
assumed to have been chosen in such a way that the 
resulting behavioral curve provides a pure reflection of 
the intervening variable in question. Finally, if inter­
vening variables defined this way are to be generally 
useful, the general form of their defining functions must 
be assumed to hold across other members of the same
species (.if not other species as welll and across a
91variety of situations. These were indeed strong
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assumptions and Tolman remained appropriately cautious
about presuming them to be sound in any unproblematic way.
He wrote that "all such assumptions are ticklish and of
very uncertain justification" and added that they are
92"dangerous" and "open to pitfalls." And problems raised 
by the failure of any of these assumptions would of course 
be compounded for the case of the second- and third-line 
intervening variables .
Tolman's 1936 statement of his operational behavior­
ism was the fullest and most sanguine expression of his 
positivistic scheme for psychology. It constituted a bold 
attempt to retain the purposive and cognitive features of his 
behaviorism, to acknowledge their necessarily inferred status, 
and yet to keep them objective by operationalising them. 
Tolman's earlier neorealist-inspired operationism had some­
what naively identified purposed and cognitions with observ­
able behavior. His new operationism was more sophisticated' 
in the sense of recognizing the indirectness and fallibility 
of the relation between his concepts and their observational 
basis. It is instructive to compare these two states in the 
development of Tolman's operationism with the parallel 
developments that physicalism was undergoing at the hand of 
the logical positivists. Herbert Feigl has described'the 
two phases of physicalism and alluded to their parallels in 
behaviorism:
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The first phase was rather rash in its claim 
of the translatability of the statements of 
physics and those of psychology into those of 
the thing-language, . . .  T his radical and 
crude form of physicalism may be said to amount 
to an identification of mental states with overt 
behavior. Early behaviorism Cespecially that of 
J. B. WatsonL has been rightly accused of just 
this fallacious reduction. This view was essen­
tially revised and corrected in the later form­
ulations, Strict translatability depends of 
course on explicit definitions. But no explicit 
definitions that would serve the purpose could 
plausibly be constructed. The concepts of physics 
and psychology could perhaps be introduced by 
means of test-condition-test-result-conditionals 
but not in any way be regarded as synonymous with 
concepts of the thing-language.93
For the logical positivists, this translation was a logical 
matter, that is, it was a question of reformulating the 
logical character of the linguistic links presumed to obtain 
between concepts and the observations on which they rested.
But for Tolman it was a psychological matter. The transi­
tion in his own thinking between the naive and sophisticated 
forms of operationism was motivated by psychological concerns, 
namely his and Krechevsky's research on hypotheses and 
Brunswik's research on perception. But more importantly, 
Tolman's reformulation of operationism was framed in psy­
chological terms. That is, the sophisticated view of 
empirical definition contained in his Operational Behaviorism 
was advanced as a descriptive account of the behavior of 
scientists. Furthermore, that descriptive account was along 
the lines of a psychological, not logical, analysis. To 
document these points, we return briefly to Tolman*s paper
of 1936,
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In presenting the intervening variable paradigm,
Tolman asserted that the paradigm closely approximated
the way in which psychologists in fact pursue their
investigations. His three-fold scheme of postulating
intervening variables, determining the laws which relate
them to independent variables, and finding the laws
which relate them to behavior, he said, was "a pretty
fair summary of what psychology today is actually,
94operationally, doing." Or, again, he stated that
a psychological operationism does no more than 
give a list of, and attempt to indicate the 
true functional interrelationship between, the 
actual types of experiment being done today in 
psychology.95
Indeed, through the paper he illustrated the various points 
of the scheme with examples drawn from his own work and 
the research of others. He attempted to show how the 
major lines of then-current research— sensory, Gestalt, 
and dynamic psychology as well as research on problem 
solving, individual differences, and so on— fit into his 
general scheme at various levels of the first-, second-, 
and third-line intervening variables. As for the ad­
mittedly treacherous assumptions which he described as
required by the scheme, he said that they were "the sort
96which m  psychology we actually do employ today." In 
sum, Tolman presented the intervening variable paradigm 
as a framework to be filled in by subsequent psychological 
research but also as a scheme which represented the 
activities of research as they stood in the 1930s. In
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concluding his article, he wrote:
So much for my attempt to indicate the gen­
eral operational meaning of the schema. You 
may, if you will, cavil at its details. But I 
doubt if you can get away from the general pro­
position which the schema embodies; namely that 
we do in psychology assume intervening variables 
more or less like the ones I have suggestedr and 
that we do attempt to define these intervening 
variables by going at them experimentally, i.e., 
operationally, from the two ends.^'
Tolman's intervening variable paradigm was thus in 
itself intended as a rough descriptive account of scient­
ific activity, but it was, more precisely, a psychological 
account. Not surprisingly, Tolman drew upon his own 
psychological views and his contextualist metaphysics 
in framing that account. This is revealed in a key 
passage at the beginning of his 1936 paper. Because the 
passage is crucial for understanding Tolman's indigenous 
epistemology, it bears quoting at length, Tolman wrote 
that
CtUhe term 'operational' has been chosen with two 
different meanings in mind. In the first place,
I have chosen it to indicate a certain general 
positivistic attitude now being taken by many 
modern physicists and philosophers and for which 
Professor Bridgman . . . has selected this word 
'operational.' In this sense, an operational 
psychology will be one which seeks to define its 
concepts in such a manner that they can be stated 
and tested in terms of concrete repeatable 
operations by independent observers. In this 
sense, to quote from S. S. Stevens, 'a term or 
proposition has meaning (denoted something1 if, 
and only if, the criteria of its applicability 
or truth consists of concrete operations which 
can be performed' . . . The behaviorism which
I am going to present seeks, then, to use 
only concepts which are capable of such con­
crete operational verification.
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But, in the second place, I have also 
chosen this designation, 'operational,' be­
cause of what seems to me a second connotation 
which in connection with the word 'behavior' 
it tends to have. For behavior as the thing 
observed also turns out to be essentially an 
activity whereby the organism in question 
'operates.' In behaving, an organism, as 
Brunswik . . , puts it, 'intends' and more or 
less successfully 'conquers' its environment.
It operates on its environment by such in­
tendings and conquerings. . . .
To sum up, then, I will call mine an opera­
tional behaviorism because (a) my type of 
psychology would self-consciously seek to dis­
cover the concrete operations which an experi­
menter, or any observer, has to carry out to test 
the applicability or nonapplicability in any 
given instance of a specific psychological 
concept or proposition; and because Cb) the 
observed behavior itself turns out to be a set 
of operations performed by the observed organ­
ism relative to its own environment. In a word, 
the activities of both of us, the observing and 
conceptualizing organisms, and of them, the 
observed and behaving organisms, are all ulti­
mately to be characterized as operations of 
organisms upon environments.
/
As we have seen, Tolman's earlier neorealist epistemology 
had been a consistent epistemology in the sense that it 
applied equally to animal subjects and humans. But, as 
the preceding passage makes clear, Tolman's revised 
"operational" epistemology was likewise consistent in that 
sense. Knowing, for animals and humans alike, is charact­
erized as a kind of operating on an environment. Because 
of the distal nature of the objects to be known, the opera­
tion called knowing- requires the use of intendings or 
hypotheses, which will only in some degree attain their 
objects. For Tolman, intervening variables are the 
objects of knowledge for psychology, and the laws which
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connect them with observables constitute the hypotheses 
through which psychologists seek to attain them in the 
course of their operations on the environment. . Such know­
ledge is fallible, not only because the necessary laws 
are not known with certainty, but also because of the 
questionable status of the assumptions involved in using 
the laws to get at the different levels of intervening 
variables. In Brunswikian terminology, the manipulable 
variables and observable outcomes serve as signs or 
proximal stimuli for the to-be-attained distal intervening 
variables. In the terms of contextualist metaphysics, 
the knowledge-seeking organism, whether animal or human, 
operates by following up strands of texture. And in 
Tolman's own spider-web metaphor, the organism must choose 
among the various strands of the multi-dimensional web 
that constitues the world and follow the chosen ones to 
goals or final states of quiescence. In every case, 
knowledge is tentative and fallible because its objects 
are at a remove from the organism's position. In sum, 
Tolman1s -later operationism was drawn from his underlying 
presuppositions about organismic behavior, just as his 
earlier proto-opera tionism had been. In other words, 
he was coordinating his method with his subject matter 
rather than subordinating subject matter to method. As 
before, the method was indigenous to the psychology.
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Tolman's intervening variable paradigm was pre­
sented once again in his presidential address of 19.37 to the 
American Psychological Association. At that time, 
psychology's "Age of Theory" was rapidly approaching its 
peak, and Tolman responded by addressing the issue of what 
constitutes theory in psychology. In the APA presidential 
address of the preceding year, Clark Hull had given a 
formalized account of theory in terms of postulates and 
theorems (as will be discussed in Chapter 7 below)., and 
Tolman reviewed Hull’s statement as- follows:
According to Professor Hull . . ., a theory is 
a set of definitions and postulates proposed by 
the theorists (on the basis presumably of some 
already found facts), from which other empirically 
testable facts, or as he calls them, theorems, 
can be logically deduced.
Continuing, Tolman presented his own view of theories:
For my own nefarious purposes, however, I 
wish to phrase this matter of the relationship 
of a theory to the empirical facts out of which 
it arises and to which it leads in somewhat other 
terms. A theory, as I shall conceive it, is a 
set of 'intervening variables.' These to-be- 
inserted intervening variables are 'constructs' 
which we, the theorists, evolve as a useful way 
of breaking down into more manageable form the 
original complete f^ function. 9^
Tolman's construal of theories was a humbler one than Hull's
and he seemed eager to emphasize the differences between
them. (In fact, Tolman had always avoided referring to
his own system as a "theory.")
Scattered throughout his address were remarks which 
cast some doubt on the feasibility of not only Hull's
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ambitious approach to theory but even his own relatively 
circumspect intervening variable scheme. For instance, 
he noted that certain basic features of the most funda­
mental behavioral law, the learning curve, were still 
unknown or in dispute. He added, "I doubt that the 
supposed laws of conditioning are as simple and as well- 
known as Hull a s s u m e s . m  considering the laws which 
would relate intervening variables to the resultant behavior, 
he expressed doubt that they could ever be portrayed 
adequately by mere algebraic addition of all the inter­
vening factors; rather, he thought, they would have to be 
stated in terms of complex vectorial combinations.'*'^ '*' 
Moreover, in thinking about such laws, Tolman stated,
"I am at present being openly and consciously just as 
anthropomorphic about it as I please," and added that
anthropomorphism is "a perfectly proper heuristic pro- 
102cedure." In all of these respects, Tolman was not
only setting himself apart from Hull but also moving
away from any position involving simplistic assumptions
about the pursuit of science by formula or the inevitabil-
103lty of progress m  the face of complex problems. Even
with all of its explicit cautions, Tolman's paper of 
1936 remained his most optimistic statement of the inter­
vening variable scheme. In formulating it, he had been 
influenced by logical positivism, but even in the following 
year he was beginning to retreat from a positivist per­
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spective on psychology. He had found some value in the 
formulations of logical positivism and had assimilated 
some of it to his own approach to psychology, but in 
the later part of hte lR30s and thereafter he simply 
forged ahead with research on the psychological topics 
that interested him.
After the thirties, there was only one other time
that a paper of Tolman1s contained even a single mention
of or reference to any of the logical positivists. That
reference occurred in a brief experimental report of 1946
coauthored by Tolman and two graduate students, Benbow
F. Ritchie and Donald Kalish. The experiment dealt with
expectancies in rats, and in their report the authors
attempted to give a logically precise formulation of the
concept of "expectation." Referring in a footnote to
Carnap's "Testability and Meaning" Cl936-37L, they adopted
a definition of expectation which had the form of Carnap's
104bilateral reduction sentences. But even though Tolman
was the first author on the paper, the effort to formalize 
the definition of expectation was not his idea, Ritchie 
had come to Berkeley after studying philosophy at Chicago 
with Carnap, Bertrand Russell, and MQ.rris Cohen; Kalish 
had begun working with Tolman while studying philosophy 
and logic at Berkeley.According to Ritchie and 
Kalish, the concern in the paper with precise definitions 
was entirely at their own instigation. The two had
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proposed the formal explication of expectation in a report
to Tolman's seminar, and Tolman had agreed to participate
in the relevant experiments. But according to Ritchie,
Tolman "never discussed logical positivism either in the
classroom or in [.the3 seminars or in the long coffee house
discussions that took place almost every afternoon between
Tolman and the graduate students that were running animal
106experiments under his guidance." Likewise, Kalish has
remarked, "I do not recall Edward ever commenting on, or
discussing with us, logical positivism, before or after
107that seminar report." The Tolman, Ritchie, and Kalish
paper has recently been cited as an example of the use of
108logical positivist formulations by behavioral scientists.
But it would be misleading to infer from this that Tolman 
was actively pursuing the logical positivist ideal of 
science at that time. As is argued in the foregoing, 
the limited influence that logical positivism did have 
on -Tolman was exerted during the mid-thirties and was 
declining in the 1940s.
Tolman's interaction with logical positivism took 
place in one further context, namely his involvement 
with the Unity of Science movement. That involvement 
is discussed in the following section.
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Tolman, Brunswik, and the Unity of Science Movement
At the 1934 planning conference for the Unity of 
Science congresses, the Chicago pragmatist Charles Morris 
reported on the status of scientific philosophy in America. 
After being asked to write up his report for the 19-35 
volume of Erkenntnis, Morris conducted an informal survey 
of scientific philosophers in America in order to broaden 
the scope of the report. The Berkeley physicist Victor F. 
Lenzen replied to Morris's inquiries with the suggestion 
that Tolman be included in the report. Lenzen noted that 
Tolman's Purposive Behavior presented "a systematic 
psychology of macroscopic behavior" and that the final
109chapter was "quite in the spirit of logical positivism."
In the first mention of any neobehaviorist in Erkenntnis,
Morris did include reference to Tolman's work in the
published r e p o r t . I n  the year 1935, the organizers
of the Unity of Science movement were just beginning to
actively recruit proponents of objective psychology for
the movement (see Chapter 71, and whether because of
Morris's report or through Tolman's contacts in Vienna,
they invited Tolman to present a paper on psychology at
the 19.36 congress in Copenhagen.
Tolman accepted the invitation and prepared a paper
entitled "An Operational Analysis of 'Demands’t " which
was to be presented at a session along with a paper by 
111Brunswik. As it turned out, Tolman was unable to
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attend the congress, but his paper was read and discussed
112there, and it was published in Erkenntnis m  1S3 7.
The paper was for the most part simply a statement of
the intervening variable paradigm and a description of
various psychological experiments on demands (i.e., motives
or p u r p o s e s I n  it, Tolman expressed the usual cautions
about the hzardous assumptions involved in defining the
I's by means of standard experiments, and he emphasized
the imprecision of the laws connecting the I's with
observable variables. He made no explicit mention of
logical positivism, although he did assert near the end
of the paper that "'Demands' and 'hypotheses' are grosser
wholes but they are just as 1physicalistic' as are reflex
113arcs and nerve currents." He also referred to Carnap's
"Psychology in Physical Language" in connection with his
claim that introspection was acceptable only in the form
of a set of Protokolsatze. O t h e r w i s e ,  the paper was
rather narrowly concerned with psychological issues.
Shortly before the Copenhagen congress, Neurath
invited Tolman to contribute a pamphlet on psychology to
the recently created monograph series, the International
115Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Tolman apparently
agreed to write the piece, and soon thereafter Brunswik 
was added as c o a u t h o r , B u t  there was concern on the 
part of Neurath and others that neither Tolman nor 
Brunswik would address the application of logic to
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psychology, and the Norwegian philosopher-psychologist
Arne Naess— who had attended meetings of the Vienna Circle
in 1934-35— was taken under consideration as a potential
author for the monograph. Late in 1936, Neurath wrote
to Morris and Carnap:
I know the difficulties if we use Tolman alone.
Perhaps in connection with Arne Naess? I 
appreciate Brunswik and I agree with you that 
he shall give also an addition, but I do not 
know in which extension he is willing to dis­
cuss our special logical aspect. (That is -^7 
the same as in the case Tolman— I think so.I
As will be documented in the following chapter, Tolman
was not sympathetic to logical analyses of science, and it
appears that he was not able to reach an agreement with
the Encyclopedia1s organizers as to how the pamphlet on
psychology would be handled. By 1938, Neurath was listing
the prospective monograph on psychology, under the title
"Theory of Behavior," with Brunswik and Naess as its
4 - U  118authors,
Tolman had been dropped from authorship of the
Encyclopedia piece, but this did not mark a complete end
to his involvement with the Unity of Science movement.
His name appeared on the membership lists Encyclopedia * s
Advisory Committee and the American Organizing Committee
for the International Congress which was held at Harvard 
119in 19-39. However, it is doubtful whether Tolman's
serving on these committees involved anything more than 
his lending his name to the movement. Tolman’s student
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Ritchie, who later became his colleague at Berkeley,
has reported that he never heard Tolman mention the Unity
of Science movement or his participation in it. Concerning
Tolman's committee memberships, Ritchie comments:
I rather imagine that his appointment to the 
organizing committee of that movement repre­
sented his prestige at that time as a behavior- 
ist, and his acceptance of the appointment 
represented his delight in finding a new aud­
ience for his w o r k .120
Tolman seems to have retained some degree of interest in
the actual congresses. He declined an invitation to speak
at the 1939 congress, but expressed an interest in
attending the 1941 congress held at the University of
Chicago, and chaired a session at the last Unity of Science
121conference, which was held at Berkeley m  1953,
However, it was Brunswik who continued to be the psycholo­
gist most active in the Unity of Science movement. He 
prepared papers for Unity of Science congresses in 1935
■ (Paris!, 19.36 (Copenhagen!, 1937 (Paris)., 1938 (Cambridge,
177England!, 1941 (Chicago), and 1953 (Berkeley!. He
was also a major organizer of the Berkeley conference,
and was eventually the sole author of the Encyclopedia
123monograph on psychology. Brunswik's enthusiastic
participation in the Unity of Science movement made him 
the acknowledged liaison between psychology and the move­




As part of his neorealist heritage, Tolman practiced 
an early brand of operationism throughout the 19.20s.
This proto-operational tendency was reinforced and set in 
a philosophical context through Tolman’s contact with the 
Berkeley philosophers Pepper and Lewis. It also predis­
posed Tolman to respond sympathetically to logical positi­
vism, or at least its empiricist side, when he became 
aware of the movement in the early thirties. At that time, 
Tolman's views on cognition had recently shifted from a 
direct realism to a view in which cognition was held to 
be mediated by hypotheses and other intervening processes. 
The latter view accorded well with the results of his 
research but raised difficulties with any attempt to ident­
ify the intervening processes in some simple way with 
observable behavior. Tolman was moving toward a resolution 
of these difficulties prior to his decision to spend a 
sabbatical in Vienna— a decision apparently motivated in 
part by the hope that logical positivism would help to 
clarify those difficulties.
Once in Vienna, Tolman met Brunswik, whose psycholo­
gical views, emphasis on objective methods, and interest 
in logical positivism closely paralleled Tolman’s own 
views. Like Brunswik, Tolman appears to have attended 
meetings of the Vienna Circle. The exact nature of his 
interactions with the logical positivists there is not
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known, but his papers of the years immediately following 
his stay in Vienna reflected some of their influence. 
First, he adopted a neutral monism which was close in 
some respects to the logical positivists' metaphysical 
neutrality. Like Schlick, he drew an epistemological 
distinction between the constructs of science and immed­
iate experience, the latter of which was said to be 
ineffable. Second, his post-Vienna papers showed a re­
inforced adherence to the operational approach, which was 
a kind of methodological physicalism, and the adoption 
of corresponding terminology— "functional relations," 
"pointer readings," "constructed variables," and the like. 
Third, he began to treat intervening variables somewhat 
along the lines of Carnap's hypothetical constructs and 
devised a sophisticated operationism in which the inter­
vening variables were related to observables by means 
of defining experiments. But if these developments 
reflect the influence of logical positivism, they do no 
more than that. With the exception of terminological 
matters, all of the above developments were already 
evident, in more or less refined form, in Tolman’s 
thinking prior to his trip to Vienna. He had been 
exposed to neutral monism through Holt, and his epistemo­
logical dualism and adherence to the ineffability doctrine 
were established by the early thirties. He had been 
practicing a sort of methodological physicalism for more
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than a decade and had already begun to construe intervening 
variables as having a status like that of the unobservable 
constructs of physics. Thus, watever influence logical 
positivism had on Tolman's thought, it was more of a 
corroborative than formative nature. That Tolman viewed 
it this way is suggested by the fact that he rarely men­
tioned logical positivism or cited its adherents.
Moreover, as has been argued in the present chapter, 
the developments in Tolman’s thought which paralleled 
developments in logical positivism were motivated by, and 
framed in terms of, psychological concerns rather than 
logical concerns. Just as his earlier version of opera­
tionism had been indigenous to his neorealist-based 
psychology, so was his sophisticated operationism of the 
thirties indigenous to his later psychology of mediated 
cognition and to the pragmatist-contextualist world-view 
which underlay his psychology. For Tolman, operationism 
was a psychological process in which an organism— whether 
human or rat— operates on an environment by following 
up strands of causal texture in an effort to achieve distal 
objects or goals. The process is guided by pragmatic con­
cerns and mediated by hypotheses, but it remains a fallible 
enterprise. In this operational epistemology, knowledge 
is achieved through activity in an environment and in 
this activity there is little use for narrow logical 
distinctions. Tolman did have sympathies with logical
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positivism but those sympathies were limited by the 
fact that he viewed science from the perspective of his 
own psychology. Tolmanfs psychological view of science 
and his critical attitudes toward the use of logic in 
science will be discussed in the following chapter.
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to the work as "The Mythological Foundations of Psychology" 
(Egon Brunswik to Charles W. Morris, 3 September 1950,
Unity of Science Collection). Tolman's teasing was 
undoubtedly more than a mere attempt at humor: as will 
become evident in the next chapter, his pragmatic- 
contextualist-functionalist epistemology was incompatible 
with foundational approaches to knowledge.
CHAPTER 5
TOLMAN'S PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
As we shall see in the chapters that follow, Hull and 
Skinner developed psychological accounts of science by 
explicitly building them up on the basis of their funda­
mental epistemological concepts. For Hull the basic 
epistemological unit was the serially conditioned habit, 
and for Skinner it is the operant. Having initially 
analyzed behavior to arrive at these basic units, they 
were left with the task of working backwards to synthesize 
accounts of the higher-level phenomena of cognition and, 
eventually, of science. But for Tolman there was no such 
problem because his basic concepts were already explicitly 
cognitive. The sign-Gestalt-expectation, for instance, 
was from the outset characterized in terms suited to the 
phenomena of cognition and science. That is, Tolman spoke 
of it as a kind of postulation, propositionalizing, or 
hypothesizing— in other words, as an activity which is 
subject to confirmation or disconfirmation, revision, and 
refinement. Because Tolman1s concepts were already form­
ulated at the cognitive level, his application of them to 
science itself was not as salient in his writings as were 
the more explicit applications of behavioral psychology 
to science that are found in the writings of Hull and Skinner.
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But Tolman did include science itself in the account of his 
systemtatic psychology, and the evidence of his having done 
so is scattered throughout his works.
Science as Behavior: Mazes, Hypotheses, and Maps
In Chapter 3, it was noted that Tolman relied heavily
in his scientific thinking on spatial diagrams, analogies,
and metaphors. This was true also of his thinking about
science. The mazes that he used in his animal studies
were well suited to his proclivity for spatial analogies,
and in time the maze became a fundamental metaphor for
him. He wrote, for example, that:
The world for philosophers, as for rats, is, in 
the last analysis, nothing but a maze for dis- 
crimination-manipulation possibilities, extended 
or narrow, complex or simple, universal or 
particular.
In one of his later classic papers, he spoke of "that great
God-given maze which is our human world" and asserted that
one of the causes of aggression and war is the narrowness
2of people's maps of the world. Clearly, Tolman took his 
metaphor seriously. It served him not only as a world-­
view in which psychology and science in general took their 
places but also as a heuristic for his research. In its 
contextualist version of a multidimensional spider's web, 
for instance, it was translated into experiments on "string- 
pulling," in which rats, literally and figuratively, 
followed up strands of texture (.strings) in order to
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3achieve goal objects (trays of food). And we have already 
seen how his maze apparatuses transformed his conception of 
purpose and cognition into spatial characteristics. The 
importance of the maze in Tolman1s thought is reflected 
in a poem with which he concluded his presidential address 
to the APA:
To my ratiocinations
I hope you will be kind 
As you follow up the wanderings 
Of my amazed mind.
The verse, with its pun on "amazed," neatly captured 
Tolman's attitude toward science. His mind was indeed 
"amazed," i.e., suffused with maze-thinking, but it was 
also amazed in the sense that Tolman approached science 
with a sense of wonderment and a respect for the complexity 
of the natural world. Moreover, as will be discussed 
below, science for Tolman was a series of wanderings, that 
is, an exploratory activity. Such activity was to be 
guided by hypotheses, but it was not to be constrained 
or routinized by preconceived formulas for inquiry. In 
sum, Tolman held the world to be a complex, richly arti­
culated maze which comes to be known in varying degrees 
by rats, ordinary humans, and scientists alike through 
their exploratory activity. Such activity was represented 
as strand-following or movement along a path.
This knowledge-seeking activity of movement through 
the world-maze was mediated and guided, according to Tolman,
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by hypotheses. In Tolman's equivalent of what Brunswik 
called "intendings" and "conquerings," the organism was 
said to "hypothesize" and "confirm" Cor perhaps discon- 
firm) its hypotheses through action in the environment. 
Tolman was speaking of the "confirmation" of hypotheses 
as early as 1933, and the concept played the role occupied 
by the notion of reinforcement in other learning theories. 
In describing Tolman1s cognitive behaviorism, the authors 
of a classic text on learning theory have written that 
"ttlhe goal-object, by its presence or absence, verifies 
or refutes hypotheses." They go on to characterize the 
role of confirmation in Tolman's theory:
The principle in Tolman1s system that most 
nearly replaces reinforcement is the principle 
of confirmation. If an expectancy is confirmed, 
its probability value is increased; if an expec­
tancy is not confirmed, its probability value is 
decreased (i.e., it undergoes extinction).. ^
Thus, Tolman was already construing learning in terms that 
made his account of it immediately applicable to science. 
Indeed, his definition of learning as "essentially the 
correction of old hypotheses and the formation of new 
ones" was in itself virtually a definition of science.^
For Tolman, as for his neorealist forbears, all knowledge, 
whether that of the scientist or the subject, is on the 
same epistemological plane. From the naturalistic per­
spective, the rat's knowledge is in principle no different 
from the scientist's.
Tolman's treatment of rats and humans in equivalent 
epistemological terms was rounded out in his well-known 
paper "Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men" C19481 . In that 
article, he took the final step of attributing maps to rats 
Ever since Purposive Behavior sixteen years earlier,
Tolman had construed theories as maps, and now he was, in 
effect, claiming that rats and humans are alike in having 
theories. Hypotheses, once confirmed, were representations 
of mean-end relations, i.e., of what leads to what, in the 
world-maze. A set of well-confirmed hypotheses could, just 
as in science, be joined together into a composite map 
or theory. A cognitive map, then, was a sort of global 
representation of the means-end field. But Tolman's 
attribution of cognitive maps to rats was not something 
he undertook lightly or merely for the sake of giving rats 
epistemological parity with humans. Rather, it was 
suggested by a series of experiments in which rats trained 
in highly complex mazes continued to respond efficiently 
when the maze was altered so that previously learned routes 
were blocked. The rats appeared to have learned, not 
specific responses, but something about the general layout. 
The results illustrated one of the features of maps which 
would make them useful instruments for rats or humans:
They could serve as effective guides for action in an 
ambiguous and changing environment. All in all, for Tolman 
science was to be understood not in logical terms but in
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psychological terms— or, to be more exact, in the spatial 
terms of his cognitive behaviorism.
But, as has often been argued, to construe science 
in a psychologistic fashion is to endanger its claim to 
provide genuinely universal laws and theories. .If the 
products of science are dependent on and constrained by 
the psychological make-up and history of the scientists 
who produce them, then those products can no longer be 
held up as absolute truths. Tolman did not deny it. All 
science is ultimately behavioral and therefore, he admitted, 
constrained by the psychological nature and needs of human 
beings. Moreover, such a view necessarily leads to a 
pragmatistic approach to science. In a passage of 
Purposive Behavior that expressed all these points, Tolman 
wrote:
. . . it is to be emphasized that in the
case of physics human knowledge of the external 
object is still limited and conditioned by a 
sort of distillation from all human behavioral 
needs and capacities. Even physics' account of 
the external world is, in the last analysis, an 
ultimately, though very abstracted, behavioral 
account. For all knowledge of the universe is 
always strained through the behavior-needs and 
the behavior-possibilities of the particular 
organisms who are gathering that knowledge.
That 'map' knowledge is 'true' which 'works,' 
given the particular behavior-needs and the 
particular behavior-capacities of the type of 
organism gathering such knowledge. Physics and 
purposive behaviorism are both, therefore, but 
humanly conditioned, 'behavioral' maps.
In conclusion, it seems— we ask the phil­
osopher— that we are asserting, are we not, a 
pragmatism? For we are asserting that all human 
knowledge, including physics, purposive behavior­
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ism and our own present remarks, are but a result­
ant of, and limited by, human behavioral needs 
and human behavioral capacities.8
A map or theory could be said to be "true" only in the sense
that it "worked," and what would work in any instance
was entirely relative to the specific needs and capacities
at hand.
If science in general was viewed as a constrained 
product of human psychological activity Tolman was acutely 
aware that his own purposive behaviorism was in no way 
exempt from such limitations. In fact, he was a con­
sistent champion of what one of his students has called
9
"epistemic humility," and he was not merely engaging in 
personal modesty when he pointed out the limitations of 
his own system or its- potential ill-effects on those who 
would take it too seriously. Near the end of Purposive 
Behavior, he wrote:
It is obvious that the preceding pages have 
attempted to offer a new 'system1 of psychology.
But system-making is very properly open to sus­
picion. It is the resort of arm-chair hiders from 
reality. And, once set up, a system probably does 
as much harm as good. It serves as a sort of 
sacred grating behind which each novice is commanded 
to kneel in order that he may never see the real 
world, save through its interstices. And each 
system is so obviously bound to be wrong. It is 
twisted out of plumb by the special cultural lack 
of building materials inherent in the time and 
place of its origin, as well as by the lack of 
skill of its individual architect or architects.
An apology, therefore, is in order. We can, 
in short, merely hope that the propositions 
summarized in the succeeding pages, when set up 
in front of you as a pattern of mullions through 
which to observe the psychological landscape, will
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serve Cbut only temporarily) to limn into promi­
nence for you new areas for the gathering of data.
But may neither you nor we ever seek to hold 
up these propositions, save in a somewhat amused, 
a somewhat skeptical, and a wholly adventure- 
seeking and pragmatic behavior a t t i t u d e . ^
As a sort of rough cognitive map, a system could serve as
a guide to the "psychological landscape" Cagain, a spatial
image) and suggest certain areas for investigation; but
a system could also blind and restrict one's investigations,
and it would turn out to be wrong in the long run anyway.
Cognition, whether in rats or scientists, is fallible,
and the best one can do in the face of this fallibility
is to keep exploring, remain open-minded, and maintain a
"pragmatic behavior-attitude."
Tolman continued to hold to this pragmatic orienta­
tion throughout his career. His refusal to systematize 
his views in precise terms became especially noticeable in 
the late 1930s when Clark Hull was vigorously urging all 
psychologists to formalize their systems. But Tolman 
remained skeptical of the value of formalizations, emphas­
izing instead the heuristic capacity of theories— especially 
loosely formulated ones— to suggest fruitful research.
In 1952, he wrote:
Theory is viable and to be justified only in so 
far as it stimulates, or is stimulated by, 
research. My theoretical pronouncements have, 
to be sure, usually been phrased merely loosely 
and programmatically. And so they have seldom 
made possible any precise theoretical deduc­
tions which could then be specifically subjected 
to experimental test. Nevertheless, these
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theoretical meanderings have conditioned me and 
my students to be interested in certain kinds of 
experiment. The theory though loose, has been 
fertile; perhaps fertile primarily because 
loose.11
Just as Tolman had observed his rats to learn about their
12environments by merely wandering and exploring, he felt 
that his own knowledge of the world-maze came through his 
"theoretical meanderings." The means of learning and 
the circumstances in which it takes place were, for Tolman, 
the same for the scientist as for the rat. Earlier, he 
had written that "Ch3ow fast and in what manner a rat 
'learns' will be conditioned among other things by the
range, methodicalness, and flexibility of his exploratory
13 .impulses." And it was just so for the scientist:
one needed, for sure, to be methodical, but not at the
expense of the range and flexibility of one's explorations.
In short, Tolman held a thoroughly psychological
view of science. He freely acknowledged the constraints
on science which that view entailed, and he embraced the
pragmatic view of theories and truth which supported his
view. Furthermore, he followed through with his pragmatic-
instrumentalist view of theories by emphasizing the function
they serve in the context of discovery. All of these facts
about Tolman's views of science have a significant bearing
on the nature of his relationship to logical positivism.
If labels must be used, Tolman was not a logical positivist
but rather a pragmatist. The differences between the two
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positions are not always easy to perceive, but they are 
not necessarily minor differences. Writing on the problem 
of knowledge, one philosopher has characterized the diff­
erence as follows:
Whereas most logical positivists and empiricists 
start with an analysis of scientific knowledge, 
pragmatic naturalists usually begin with the 
natural agent coping with a practical environ­
ment and struggling for survival and advance.
This setting completely transforms the nature 
of the problem.
For the logical positivists, knowledge was to be accounted 
for primarily in terras of its linguistic products, and logic 
therefore became the major tool of analysis. But for the 
pragmatist, as Tolman1 s friend C. I. Lewis put it, 1 Utlhe 
primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in 
its guidance of action; knowledge is for the sake of 
d o i n g . W i t h i n  the pragmatist framework, the narrow 
distinctions of formal logic were more otiose and burden­
some than they were a source of insight about knowledge.
That Tolman tended to view logical analysis in this light 
will be shown in the following section.
Logic and the "Pragmatic Behavior-Attitude"
For Tolman, science is a type of learning, and learning 
in the face of an ambiguous and oftentimes changing 
environment calls for flexibility on the part of the organ­
ism. In other words, the organism— rat or scientist—  
needs to maintain what Tolman called a "pragmatic behavior-
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attitude." For the pragmatic scientist, this attitude 
entails not letting one's concepts restrain one's explora­
tory impulses and not letting one's systematic thinking 
become overly rigid. As we have seen, Tolman even tended 
to regard his own theorizing as fruitful because it 
remained loosely formulated.
Tolman's general attitude toward science dictated 
his views on the use of logic in science, and he was, in 
fact, outspokenly skeptical and even critical of attempts 
to make science logically rigorous. This was the case both 
before and after his contact with logical positivism. As 
early as 1923, he was expressing his sentiments on the 
issue. In that year he wrote:
Perhaps fortunately . . . , men (including psy­
chologists! are not over nice in their logic 
so that, as a matter of actual practice, they 
have proceeded gaily with their experiments, 
leaving the purely methodological analysis of 
their procedure for post facto dissection,
But it was especially after Hull began making a method­
ological issue out of the use of logic in psychology that 
Tolman gave voice to his views. In 1944, Tolman wrote 
to Spence that he was deliberately keeping his system in
a programmatic rather than rigorous form because he did
17not want "to get hardened and rigid too soon." Or again,
as he later put it, "To attempt to build psychology on
the analogy of a closed mathematical or logical system
18seems to me a 'bad error'." Arne Naess, who spent a
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year (.1938-391 studying the research activities of both 
Tolman and Hull, has commented that "Ltlhe philosophical 
background of Tolman, and his anti-pedantic inclinations
19made him impatient with anything masquerading as logic." 
Similarly, after trying to interest Tolman and other 
psychologists in a project devoted to the logical explica­
tion of psychological concepts, Benbow Ritchie concluded 
that "psychologists are not to be distracted by logic- 
chopping no matter how carefully it is chopped.
Shortly before his death, Tolman gave one last,
lengthy exposition of his systematic psychology. The
account contained frequent expressions of his misgivings
over logical analyses of scientific method. Near the
beginning of the account, Tolman expressed himself in the
following words:
. . . I suppose I am personally antipathetic to 
the notion that science progresses through in­
tense, self-conscious analysis of where one has 
got and where one is going. Such analyses are 
obviously a proper function for the philosopher 
of science and they may be valuable for many 
individual scientists. But I myself become 
frightened and restricted when I begin to worry 
too much as to what particular logical and 
methodological canons I should or should not 
obey. It seems to me that very often major new 
scientific insights have come when the scien­
tist . . . has been shaken out of his up-until- 
then approved scientific rules. . . .
Later in the essay, Tolman commented on the distinction’—
one popularized by the logical positivists— between data
language and construct language, saying " . . .  I myself
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can neither get very interested nor completely under-
22stand much more refined logical distinctions." And,
again eschewing such distinctions, he wrote, "I shall not
say anything about 'implicit' definition, 'explicit'
definition, 'empirical or operational' definition, nor
'coordinating' definition, since my knowledge of these
23
logical distinctions is too slight." In short, Tolman 
was refusing to adopt and work with the conceptual frame­
work that had evolved under the auspices of logical posi­
tivism. In his view, psychology would best remain an 
exploratory undertaking not to be saddled with logical 
and methodological refinements that were of little or 
no relevance to ongoing investigation. In concluding his 
essay, Tolman penned the following oft-quoted remarks:
The system may well not stand up to any final 
canons of scientific procedure. But I do not 
much care. I have liked to think about psych­
ology in ways that have proved congenial to 
me. Since all the sciences, and especially 
psychology, are still immersed in such tremen­
dous realms of the uncertain and the unknown, 
the best that any individual scientist, espec­
ially any psychologist, can do seems to be to 
follow his own gleam, and his own bent, however 
inadequate they may be. In fact, I suppose 
that actually this is what we all do. In the 
end, the only sure criterion is to have fun.
And I have had fun.^4
When Tolman had earlier written approvingly of psychologists
proceeding "gaily" with their experiments, he was not merely
using a figure of speech. For him, science was properly a
joyful and often spontaneous process of discovery, not a
277
slavish following of rules, and certainly not what Hull
called "the long and grinding labor of the logical derivation
25of a truly scientific system."
In his final statement of his system, Tolman commented 
on the nature of intervening variables and, in doing so, 
shed new light on the role they were to play in his psy­
chology. Given the great number and complexity of functions 
relating the different levels of intervening variables 
(and potential unforeseen interactions between them)_,
Tolman expressed serious doubt as to the feasibility of 
working out an entire exact system of psychology. There
was simply not enough known about all the possible rela­
tionships between variables. As Tolman put it:
Psychology, given all its many parts, is today
still such a vast continent of unknowns that
it has always seemed to me rather silly to try 
to be too precise, too quantitative, too deduc­
tive and axiomatic, save in very experimentally 
overcontrolled and overlimited areas.
Tolman had adumbrated his concern with the heuristic value
of introspection in his APA presidential address, and now
he was emphasising the heuristic value of the intervening
variables in conjunction with phenomenology. In effect,
Tolman was suggesting that because of the unavoidable
complexity involved in the use of defining experiments the
intervening variables could not plausibly figure into the
context of justification, but they could at least play
27a valuable role in the context of discovery. In this 
conception, he wrote, intervening variables
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are merely an aid to thinking (.'my thinking,' if 
you will). All anyone really sees are the 
empirically stipulated independent and depen­
dent variables. In developing notions of 
what heppens in between— such as beliefs, expec­
tancies, representations, and valences and 
finally what I call performance vectors and 
their interactions— all I am really doing is 
setting up a tentative logic (or psychologic), of 
my own, for predicting what the dependent behav­
ior should be and how it should be affected by 
variations in such and such sets of independent 
variables.28
Tolman's assignment of intervening variables to a role in 
the investigator's "psychologic" constituted a retreat 
from the stronger claim that they could be experimentally 
defined, but it was a move he had foreshadowed and one 
which was consistent with his generally pragmatistic out­
look. It was pragmatism, after all, that emphasized 
the leading-on character of theories and concepts, that 
is, their fruitfulness in suggesting new routes in the 
process of discovery.
All told, Tolman's view of science as an uninhibited 
operation of exploration and discovery made little room 
for the careful logical distinctions that were charac­
teristic of the logical positivist view. As a result, 
Tolman was by and large unsympathetic to applications of 
logic to science, either in the form of reconstructions of 
its products or of codifications of its canons of pro­
cedure. Furthermore, Tolman appears to have held a view 
of the nature of logic itself that was at odds with the 
logical positivist view of logic. Only once in his written
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works did Tolman address the character of logic per se, 
as opposed to its applications. In Purposive Behavior/ 
he argued that an environment (means-end field) has cer­
tain abstract properties such as leading-to-ness, distance, 
direction, multiple trackness, mutual alternativeness, and 
hierarchicalness. In any given means-end-field, these 
features would be manifested in concrete particulars, 
but they would also have a status as what he called 
"formal" principles or relations. Then, in a brief sec­
tion titled "Means-End-Relations and Logic," Tolman 
proceeded to make the following remarks:
We shall now suggest that these ’formal'
(.field-, means-end-1 relations are fundamentally 
the sort of thing with which the logician qua 
logician is concerned. That is, as we see it, 
the especial task of the logician is to discover 
just how many such independent means-end-relations 
have to be assumed— or just in how far they may 
be reduced one to another. For we are asserting 
that logic does Cor should) concern itself with 
all the different kinds and complications and 
correlations of the fundamental means-end-facts 
of leading-on-ness and direction-distance correla­
tions, It is the task of logic to build up a 
set of abstract rules with regard to the types 
and kinds of mutual interdependence of the facts 
of leading-on-ness and direction and distance.
But we are not logicians and we must not try to 
usurp their function. We wish merely to suggest 
that this, as we see it, is the empirical stuff of 
logic. Logic, we assert, does naught but deal with 
the 'forms' to be found in means-end-field— as 
these 'forms' obtain for man, for apes, for cats, 
or for rats. For, if the logician be truly open- 
minded and catholic, he will be as much interested 
in the logic, i.e., the character of the means- 
end-relations, which obtain for the cat, or the 
rat, as he is in those which obtain for the man 
or the ape. 9^
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In other words, Tolman was claiming that, in some sense, 
logic expresses the abstract structure of the environ­
ment— at a level so abstract, in fact, that it is indepen­
dent of which species might be operating in the environment. 
From a logical point of view, it is not entirely clear 
just what Tolman meant by these remarks, and he never 
elaborated on them; however, it is clear that in speaking 
of the "empirical stuff" of logic, he was interpreting 
logic in a way that departed significantly from the logical 
positivist view that logic is empirically empty. As will 
be shown in the following chapters, Hull and Skinner 
developed psychologistic accounts of logic that were more 
explicitly formulated than Tolman's but, like Tolman's, 
were incompatible with the logical positivist view,
It is worth re-emphasizing, in conclusion, that 
Tolman was from the outset of his intellectual career a 
member of the pragmatist tradition. Holt and Perry were 
pragmatists, as was Tolman's fellow student and lifelong 
friend Pepper. Significantly, Pepper was a major critic 
of logical positivism. In 1936, he wrote an influential 
rebuttal of Herbert Feigl1s theory of mind,^ and later 
recorded his negative reaction to the logical positivists:
I felt from their attitude and the tone of their 
statements, even before critically studying them, 
that they were not meeting the problem that needed 
to be met, I doubted if many of them had ever 
fully felt the problem. . . . Here was a method 
running away with issues, evidence, and value it­
self. It was, as Loewenberg once remarked, 
methodolatry.31
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Pepper was the philosopher with whom Tolman was closest 
personally and probably also intellectually. It seems 
likely, then, that Tolman was well aware of Pepper's views 
and that they tempered his own response to logical posi­
tivism.
To be sure, Tolman was— especially in the thirties—  
sympathetic to and influenced by logical positivism, but 
the influence of logical positivism must be assessed in 
the context of Tolman's overall pragmatist orientation.
His receptiveness of logical positivism was both engendered 
and limited by that pragmatist outlook. As we shall see, 
much' the same conclusion may be drawn about Hull and 
Skinner.
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CHAPTER 6
CLARK L. HULL: HIS BACKGROUND AND 
VIEWS OF SCIENCE
Hull's Background 
Education and Early Career
At the peak of his career, Clark Leonard Hull was
the most influential and widely known behaviorist in the
world." His rise to pre-eminence during the thirties
was fueled by a self-conscious desire for fame, a genius
for the mechanical, and a record of successes in his
psychological research. By the time of his arrival at
Yale in 1929, Hull had already invented a sophisticated
machine for computing correlation coefficients, performed
pioneering studies in concept formation, and become known
for his work in the areas of aptitude testing and hypnosis
Also in that year he declared that he was "deliberately
making a bid for a certain place in the history of science
The source of that scientific recognition would be found
in the development through the thirties of an elaborate
deductive account of adaptive behavior. His would become
the grandest of the grand learning theories in what has
3
been called psychology's "Age of Theory."
Hull was born of an agrarian family in 1384, and 
found himself at an early age torn with conflict over the
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religious values of hi.s Midwestern surroundings. His reli­
gious crisis concluded with a rejection of ''the whole reli­
gious hypothesis/’ a rejection that left in him a strong urge 
to be educated. At prep school, Hull discovered geometry, 
a subject which held an enduring fascination for him. Hull 
later described this discovery as "the most important event 
of my intellectual life." Shortly thereafter, he attempted 
to apply the geometric method to the deduction of "some nega­
tive propositions concerning theology" and came to study and
4
admire the deductive technique of Spinoza's Ethics. Such de­
tails in the story of Hull's early life are revealing because 
they foreshadowed important characteristics of his later 
thought. Like other behaviorists who were hostile to reli­
gious and other nonscientific sources of knowledge and values, 
Hull was eager throughout his career to attack what he saw 
as the pernicious remnants of religion and idealist phil­
osophy: intuitive claims, subjective principles, entelechies, 
and such. Unlike the other behaviorists, however, Hull's 
faith in the deductive methods of science was such that 
he believed values as well as knowledge could be deduced 
from the laws of behavior.^
Hull's graduation from prep school marked the 
beginning of a period of ill health which had important 
consequences for his life's work. The period began with 
a serious case of typhoid fever which left him with, a 
memory deficit. Because of this amnesic tendency, Hull
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began while in graduate school a series of "idea books" 
in which he recorded questions and insights that he feared 
might otherwise escape his recollection. Convinced as he 
was that creativity is lost with age, Hull also felt that 
these records would provide him with a store of research 
ideas to be pursued later in his career. The books, which 
number twenty-seven in all, contain a wealth of detailed 
information on the development of his psychological thought 
as well as important clues to his character.
Hull went on to study mathematics, physics, and
chemistry for two years at Alma College in preparation for
a career in engineering. At this point, however, he was
struck by a second blow to his health: a case of polio
which required three years of convalescence and left him
able to walk only with the help of a leg brace which he
designed for himself. During the period of recovery, Hull
decided that he was too feeble to pursue engineering as
an occupation and chose psychology instead. Cf this
decision, Hull wrote:
What I really wanted was an occupation in a field 
allied to philosophy in the sense of involving 
theory: one which was new enough to permit rapid 
growth so that a young man would not need to wait 
for his predecessors to die before his work could 
find recognition, and one which would provide an 
opportunity to design and work with automatic 
apparatus
In Hull's view, psychology fulfilled these demands by 
providing an involvement with theory, a promising avenue
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for his ambition, and an opportunity to exercise his mech­
anical aptitude. In fact, much of Hull's subsequent success 
would lie in his ability to capitalize on these character­
istics of American psychology in the early twentieth century.
After his period of convalescence, Hull went to the 
University of Michigan to finish his undergraduate degree 
and then to the University of Wisconsin to pursue graduate 
work. At the outset of his graduate career, Hull wrote 
that his future would unfold "in the free atmosphere of a
great university" and would involve the creation of an
7
experimental science of the higher mental processes,
Despite his behavioristic turn in the late 1920s, Hull 
adhered to this goal throughout the course of his life.
Indeed, he viewed his work on the theory of conditioned 
habits as serving this goal, because for him habit pro­
vided the raw material— or, more precisely, the computational 
unit— of mental action. Hull's first investigation of 
mental processes consisted of a series of experiments on 
abstraction and concept formation. These studies, which 
employed the experimental technique of Hermann Ebbinghaus's 
memory studies, were accepted as his doctoral dissertation
g
and published as a monography in 1920.
For the next nine years, Hull taught at Wisconsin, 
gradually taking over the teaching duties of older professors. 
Two of these courses, those in aptitude testing and medical 
psychology, led to Hull's interests in testing and 
hypnosis. Research in these areas absorbed most of his
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energies during the twenties and culminated in the publica­
tion of his volumes Aptitude Testing Cl928).. and Hypnosis and
9 . .Suggestibility (.19-33). . Both books exhibited the method­
ological rigor of controlled experimentation and statistical 
treatment which were characteristic of Hull’s work.
In Aptitude Testing, he argued that aptitude pre­
dictions could be improved by refining the methods of test 
validation and combining the tests into batteries. Since 
implementing these suggestions would involve laborious 
calculations of correlation coefficients, Hull set out to 
devise a machine that would perform them. His idea books 
of the mid-twenties are filled with sketches of .various 
machine parts. Armed with university and federal grants, 
he completed the project in 1925. The machine, which is 
now on display at the Smithsonian Institution, won Hull 
renown among statisticians and psychologists and even made 
money for him. Yet for Hull the iny.enh'it>n held deeper 
significance. He saw in it a demonstration that a purely 
physical mechanism with the right organization of material 
components could perform operations characteristic of 
higher mental processes. Furthermore, such operations 
could take place without the intrusion of any intrinsically 
mentalistic powers. As we shall see, Hull's mechanistic 
bias came to play a crucial role in the elaboration of 
his behaviorism.
293
Like his work in aptitude testing, Hull's hypnosis 
research largely preceded his explicit theorizing about 
learned behavior but was not wholly unrelated to it.^
His quantitative studies of post-hypnotic suggestion 
revealed the functional similarity between this phenomenon 
and various forms of learning and forgetting. These 
findings suggested to Hull the interpretation that hypnotic 
effects are habits— in effect, conditioned suppressions of 
internally generated stimuli which permit the hypnotist's 
suggestions to assume control over the subject's responses. 
To explain such suggestions, Hull invoked a form of ideo- 
motor action in which the hypnotist's idea was presumed to 
elicit the subject's action. In a paper of 1931, Hull 
translated the notion of ideomotor action into that of the 
"pure stimulus act," a concept which was to figure centrally 
in his evolving theory of behavior,^ '*'
The conceptual continuity between Hull's earlier and 
later work was, for various reasons, downplayed by him.
His idea books reveal that once he had become the standard- 
bearer of an objective behavioral approach to psychology, 
he looked upon vocational forecasting and hypnosis as areas 
having rather disreputable scientific standing (.despite his 
efforts to objectify them),. He also eventually regarded 
his research on these topics as diversions which had cost 
him the precious resources of time and money in his rush to 
establish a general theory of learning.
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Hull's Turn to Behaviorism
Hull's shift of interest from his early work on
hypnosis and testing to his behavior theory began in 1925
when he taught a seminar in behaviorism. The period of
transition ended in 1933 with the appearance of the book
on hypnotism. After 1933, his efforts were completely
focused on the theory of behavior. Hull's seminar of 1925
has been identified as "the beginning of his behavioristic 
12theorizing," and this claim is well borne out by Hull's 
idea books of the period. The stated aim of the course 
was to provide "a critical constructive examination of the 
various behavioristic hypotheses." To this end, Hull chose 
as texts Watson's Psychology from the Standpoint of a 
Behaviorist (_1924)_, which was a vigorous defense of behavior­
ism, and A. A.. Roback' s Behaviorism and Psychology C1S23)., 
an early detailed critique of the movement. Following the 
early behaviorists, Hull saw the course as "an attempt to 
translate the older psychology into behavioristic terms, in 
detail to see how well it works." Thus, he gave as examples 
the claims that being hungry is food-seeking and that being 
afraid is the action of flight and nothing more. But like 
other neobehaviorists who were to follow, Hull viewed 
consciousness as a phenomenon in need of explanation rather 
than as something to be ignored or denied.
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In his behaviorism seminars of 1925 and 1927, Hull 
stressed the philosophical background of behaviorism. In 
identifying the forerunners of behaviorism, he cited 
Thomas Hobbes, Auguste Comte, the realists F. J. E.
Woodbridge and George Santayana, the neorealists Holt and 
Perry, and the pragmatists John Dewey and William James.
But although the influence of these thinkers can be dis­
cerned in Hull's thought, the greater influence, at least 
according to Hull's own reckoning, was that of the British
associationists. In fact, he viewed behaviorism as a
14"direct descendant" of traditional associationism.
Hull especially revered Hume's Enquiry concerning 
Human Understanding (.17481, which he referred to as "per­
haps the most successful treatise in philosophy of psychology 
ever written." Hull even went so far as to assert that "a
good deal of behaviorism is implicit in Hume and a consider-
15able amount of it is explicit also." Like his associa- 
tionist ancestors, Hull believed himself to be pursuing a 
theory of knowledge firmly based on a sound empirical 
pscyhology. His admiration of Hume was such that he con­
sidered modeling his magnum opus after Hume's Enquiry, 
treating the same topics and even adopting Hume's headings 
and chapter divisions. Hull of course abandoned this plan, 
but as we shall see he did develop a behaviorist theory of 
knowledge which included an empiricist interpretation of 
logic. Both Hull and the logical positivists claimed Hume
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as an intellectural ancestor, but they drew upon his work
in importantly different ways.
Hull's behaviorism seminars were clearly an important
factor in the transition from his earlier work to his
interest in behavior theory. Three additional 'factors
deserve mention in this regard. The first was Hull's
association with the famous Gestalt psychologist Kurt
Koffka. Out of a genuine interest in Gestalt psychology,
Hull had arranged for Koffka to spend a year (19.26-27).
at Wisconsin. As recounted in his autobiography, Hull found
Koffka's lectures interesting, but he was struck by the
amount of time Koffka spent attacking Watson.
While I found myself in general agreement with his 
criticisms of behaviorism, I came to the conclu­
sion not that the Gestalt view was sound but 
rather that Watson had not made out as clear a 
case for behaviorism as the facts warranted.
Instead of converting me to Gestalttheorie, the 
result was a belated conversion to a kind of neo­
behaviorism. . . .16
As was the case with Tolman, Hull's behavioristic thinking
was motivated from the beginning by the perception, one
shared with the Gestaltists, of inadequacies in Watsonian
behaviorism. Even in the twenties, Hull was criticising
17Watsonian behaviorism as "crude," naive," and "simple."
After reading Tolman's Purposive Behavior in the thirties,
Hull noted approvingly that good behaviorist theory would
obviate the need for Watson's "half-dishonest advertising"
18for the purpose of "putting over" behaviorism. Hull's
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aversion to behavioristic propaganda was partly responsible 
for his efforts to ground behaviorism on an objective 
methodology, although he would later admit to using propa­
ganda to advocate his own system.
A second factor which contributed to Hull’s transition
to behavior theory from testing and hypnosis work was the
publication in 1927-28 of Anrep's translation of Pavlov's
19Conditioned Reflexes. Hull's thorough study of Pavlov's 
work led him to theorize about the relationship between 
the conditioned reflex and trial-and-error learning. This 
duality of learning phenomena was viewed by Hull, in 
characteristic fashion, as a challenge to determine the 
fundamental behavioral laws from which these two classes 
of learning could be derived as special cases. This 
challenge, as well as the objectivity of Pavlov’s methods, 
spurred Hull’s interest in behavior theory.
The third factor which contributed to Hull's abandon­
ment of his early research was an event that took place 
shortly after his arrival at Yale. In 1930, after receiving 
a complaint from the parents of one of Hull's hypnosis 
subjects, the authorities at Yale conducted an investiga­
tion of Hull's research program. The resulting restrictions 
on Hull's use of subjects were so severe that he soon gave 
up his studies of hypnosis. The completion of the research 
which culminated in Hypnosis and Suggestibility was left to 
Hull’s former co-workers in the Midwest, where, as he put
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20it, "the superstitious fear of hypnosis was not so great."
Nevertheless, this episode bothered Hull for years and
produced in him a sense of caution that extended to his
21research on intelligent machines.
These events which were instrumental in Hull's turn
to behaviorism began to take place in the mid-1920s, but
it was not until 192 9 that Hull publicly entered the arena
22of behavior theory with his first paper on learning. By
that time, Hull was well into his forties. The delays
involving his poor health and his excursions into hypnosis
and testing caused his slow start on the work he regarded
23as his most important. Along with this late start, Hull's
failing health and his belief that creativity falters with
age left him engaged in what he gravely viewed as a race
against time. These concerns were often expressed in his
idea books during the 1930s and 1940s. For example, when
Hull turned fifty in 1934, he wrote the following reaction
to a medical report of weakness in his circulatory^system:
It is difficult to say how serious this is, but 
it looks very much like the premature onset of 
senility. Accordingly it may very well turn out 
that my expectation that fifty years marks the 
decline of creative ability will be truer in my 
case than many. . . . From what evidence I have 
been able to gather, I have something like even 
chances of two more fairly effective y e a r s . 24
Hull typically concluded remarks such as these by 
drawing up a set of plans for his professional activities 
in hopes of making optimal use of remaining time. Such
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plans usually involved a grueling schedule of publishing 
and research; significantly, they often called for sacri­
ficing experiment to theory and detail to generality.
These tendencies were reinforced by Hull's position in 
Yale's newly founded Institute of Human Relations, the man­
dated prupose of which was to coordinate a theoretical 
integration of social science research. In the race to 
establish his system of behavior, Hull increasingly took 
on the role of overseer, orgranizer, and theoretician,
while those around him carried out the empirical investiga-
25tions. This division of labor contributed to Hull's 
inclination to extend his theoretical framework beyond 
reasonable warrant in his effort to unify the social 
sciences.
As we shall see, it was this interest in the integra­
tion of the sciences that eventually brought Hull into 
contact with the logical positivists in the Unity of Science 
movement. But by the time of this contact in 1937, Hull 
had independently developed a philosophy of science which 
bore a strong kinship to that of the logical positivists.
Hull''s Anticipation of 
Logical Empiricism (1916-1937)
The primary aim of the remainder of this chapter is 
to describe the development of Hull's philosophy of science, 
especially as it was articulated prior to his encounter with 
the logical empiricist movement. His philosophy will be
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laid out in terms of four related themes which figured 
prominently both in Hull's thought and at least some ver­
sions of logical empiricism. The general parallels between 
these two independently developed philosophical stances will 
be sufficiently patent as to not require more than passing 
comment. The emphasis will instead be placed on the inter­
relations between the themes in Hull's system. Against 
this background, the subsequent chapter will describe 
specific interactions between Hull and representatives 
of logical empiricism. These episodes took place within 
a context of intellectual confluence— as would be expected—  
over broad issues, but they also reveal divergences over 
significant details. As a way of describing how signifi­
cant these details could be, the third and final chapter 
on Hull will show that his epistemological views included 
naturalistic interpretations of knowledge, including logic, 
which amounted to a behavioristic psychologism. Such a 
psychologism was sharply incompatible with the standard 




As we have seen, E. C. Tolman followed the lead of 
his neorealist mentors in embracing a position of meta­
physical neutrality. This neutrality, which corresponded
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in spirit if not detail to Carnap's ametaphysical stance,
stemmed in part from Tolman's distaste for the materialistic
and molecularistic implications of Watsonian behaviorism.
Clark Hull, on the other hand, criticized Watson not for
his materialism but rather for his failure to give it an
adequate defense. Hull was an out and out materialist.
In his idea book of 1927-28, Hull stated, "I feel quite sure
that all kinds of action, including the highest forms of
intelligent and reflective action and thought, can be
handled from the purely materialistic and mechanistic 
2standpoints." Significantly, this remark was recorded 
in reaction to anti-materialistic statements made by Holt 
in his Concept of Consciousness (1914), Hull would have 
no part of the Jamesian legacy of neutral monism that was 
an important element in the ametaphysical attitudes of the 
1930s. His avowal of materialism came early in his career 
and remained uncompromising throughout it,
Hull's undisguised enthusiasm for materialism did 
not, however, indicate any general sympathy with meta­
physical •commitments. On the contrary, in his published 
works, materialism was invoked most often as a basis for 
his polemics against idealist metaphysics or— to avoid what 
was for Hull a redundancy— simply metaphysics. So seduc­
tive and pernicious were the temptations of idealism, in 
Hull's view, that even the most objective-minded scientist 
needed to remain alert to its intrusions. Hull's writings
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are peppered with warnings, sometimes addressed to him­
self, against the "spirits and ghosts" which may "infest"
27 .the theory of the unwary scientist. (Social scientists
were considered especially susceptible to infestations of 
this sort but had no .monopoly on them.) Even in the ear­
liest stages of his theoretical development, Hull was 
expressing this concern. "If I am not careful," he wrote 
in the twenties, "I run the risk of putting an entelechy
into my symbolic system. . . . I must watch myself. If I
2 8should slip here it would spoil the whole system." The 
key to avoiding such a risk was firm adherence to a con­
sistent materialism.
Although materialism provided a defense against the
29"paralyzing influence of metaphysical idealism," it more 
commonly served Hull in his aggressive attacks on the pro­
ponents of idealism. In one typical discussion of "the old 
idealistic philosophy and its various modern attenuations," 
he remarked that a "few well placed bombs should bring 
down the whole structure t u m b l i n g . H e  roundly assaulted 
the "scholastic and theological perversions of intellect," 
and argued that the possibility of nonmaterial ideas 
producing physical action could be ruled out as a violation 
of the principle of conservation of energy,
Hull's offensives generally lacked philosophical 
subtlety, and they usually left his opponents unidentified. 
As a result, they had the flavor more of vague polemic
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than of reasoned argument. All the same, he was decidedly
not tilting at apparitions or straw men. Kis targets
included James Jeans, Sir Arthur Eddington, Alfred North
Whitehead, and Hans Driesch Cthe latter two of whom he had
32personally encountered during the twenties ). . ' The emi­
nent physicists Eddington and Jeans had written, in 1928 
and 1930 respectively, popular philosophies of science
in which the material world was subordinated to the mental
33world, which was taken to be the ultimate reality. The 
depth of Hull's disagreement with them can best be apprec­
iated by noting that Hull's plans for developing a mater­
ialistic theory of thought called for the explicit emulation 
of physics. Inevitably, idealist interpretations of 
physics were anathema to Hull, A similar point can be 
registered about the famed vitalist Driesch. Any.theory 
of behavior which would emphasize, as did Hull's, both the 
mechanistic and biologically adaptive characteristics of 
behavior would find its worst threat in an influential 
biologist's insistence that adaptation is mediated by a 
nonmaterial force. Thus, Hull's diatribes against idealist 
metaphysics can be seen as a natural consequence of his 
intellectual aims and not as mere rhetorical forays.
Despite the very real differences between physicalism 
and materialism, they served similar roles for their pro­
ponents. Like the physicalism of the Vienna Circle, the 
materialism espoused by Hull provided a metaphysical stance
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from which, to issue broadsides against idealist meta­
physics and, more generally, unscientific attitudes. Never- 
thless, while explicit metaphysics determined the general 
thrust of such criticism, the details were often framed in 
the narrower context of methodological issues. ’After the 
popularity of Hull's deductive methods had been achieved 
in the mid-thirties, objective methodology began to 
replace materialism as the basis of his published assaults 
on his "idealist" opponents. The immediate targets of 
these attacks were the Gestaltists. Hull criticized them, 
first, for their failure to state postulates and deductions 
therefrom, and only secondarily for their emphasis on 
subjective experience. After having an argument with the 
Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer in 1939, Hull complained 
to Spence that Wertheimer had been "unable to give, either
the number of postulates or the number of theorems in his
34system." By this time, such an observation sufficed, 
in Hull's view, to discredit an opposing position.
Even though Hull's materialism was the underlying 
basis for his polemics, he was not as dogmatic in his 
materialistic beliefs as might be supposed. In many respects, 
he was open-minded. He recognized, for example, that the
final analysis of matter was an empirical issue not yet
35settled. Furthermore, although he was eager to deny 
the ontological priority of the mental, he did not deny 
th.e reality or import of mental events. The phenomena of
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insight and purpose were in fact the focus of his explana-
3 6tory efforts during the thirties. In concluding his
detailed study of Hull’s work, Sigmund Koch lauded this
openness on Hull’s part by calling him '"the first S-R
theorist who made a dedicated attempt to avoid cutting down
37problems to the size of his concepts.'1 For Hull, the 
mental was a subcategory of the physical, but it was an 
important subcategory which could not be dismissed or 
ignored.
Here was a point at which Hull felt burdened by
Watson's negative tradition. He wrote in 1930 that:
"Despite some half-hearted suggestions within recent years,
no one has dared to challenge the dogma that an organism
made up of consciousless particles may not possibly mani-
3 8fest consciousness." Hull inclined to the view that 
organisms, unlike their component particles, really do 
exhibit consciousness. Along with purpose and insight, 
consciousness was regarded as something to be explained, 
not as an explanatory device in its own right. Such 
phenomena were emergent in the sense of being novel 
characteristics of whole organisms, but not in the sense of 
being inherently inexplicable or of existing apart from the 
material world. Hull firmly rejected the notion of an 
emergent as "an impassable gap" between physical science 
and mental phenomena, but was willing to apply the concept 
of "emergent" to a "significant novel phenomenon" such as
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39 . ■the habit-family hierarchy, (which will be discussed m
Chapter 8 below)..
Hull's willingness to invoke the concept of emergence
rested on his important and controversial contention that
habits in their various combinations and interactions
could eventuate in genuine novelty. Just as a machine could
generate higher-order "mental work" on the basis of a small
set of mechanical principles, an organism could generate
novel adaptive responses, including higher mental actions,
from various applications of habit principles. In 1930,
Hull voiced his regret that habit had the reputation of
being a "merely repetitive" and "rather stupid" process.
But if behaviorism's detractors failed to appreciate what
4 0Hull called "the real flexibility of habit interactions" , 
it was in part because he had not yet published his papers 
of the 1930s in which that theme was artfully developed.
At the time of his move to Yale, Hull gauged the time 
to be ripe for the full-blown pursuit of a materialistic 
psychology. Referring to the dialectical materialism of 
Russia as well as to the popularity of behaviorism and 
naturalism in America, Hull professed a "deep suspicion 
that the world is just now pausing for a leap into a pro­
found materialism." Hull’s proven skill in mechanical 
matters would, he felt, enable him to demonstrate the 
plausibility of a materialistic psychology by designing 
intelligent automata or, as he called them, "psychic
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machines." As Hull recognized, the general idea was not 
new— Hobbes had attempted a mechanistic psychology— but 
there had never before been sufficient knowledge of machinery 
to support the attempt. As of 1930, all of this had 
changed in Hull's view. He wrote: "The tide of'civiliza­
tion is running in my direction. An epidemic of the psychic
machines has sprung up within a year— a truly remarkable 
41phenomenon." Such machines were to assume an important
role in Hull's thought and in his efforts to "dissolve the
42age-old problem of the opposition of mind to matter." 
Mechanism
It will be recalled that Hull's interest in machines
antedated his career in psychology and constituted one
reason for choosing it. In fact, his fascination with
machinery was a recurrent theme in his life. Like Tolman,
he had studied engineering in college. In an undergraduate
4 3logic course under the critical realist Roy Wood Sellars,
Hull constructed a logic machine which employed a system 
of concentric metal plates to generate the implications 
of various syllogisms and fallacies. During and after his 
graduate training, his mechanical skills played no small 
role in his achievements as an experimenter, His automatic 
devices figure prominently in his autobiography, and his idea 
books of the mid-twenties brim with, sketches of myriad 
machine parts.
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The hard-won success of Hull's correlation machine 
evidently inspired in him the conviction that machines 
could play a central role in theoretical endeavors. "It 
is rather striking," he wrote, "as revealing the charact­
eristic nature of my talent, that the two major•scientific 
projects of my life ^testing and adaptive behavior3 should 
be associated with the design of an exceedingly complex 
automatic machine." The rationale for designing intelli­
gent mechanisms was formulated by Hull in 1926:
It has struck me many times of late that the 
human organism is one of the most extraordinary 
machines— and yet a machine. And it has struck 
me more than once that so far as the thinking 
processes go, a machine could be built which 
would do every essential thing that the body 
does. . . . CT3o think through the essentials
of such a mechnism would probably be the best 
wav of analyzing out the essential requirements 
of thinking, responding to abstract relations 
among things, and so on. . . . In fact the whole 
thing can probg^ly be reduced to a mathematical 
formula, . . *
In this passage, Hull went on to identify some of the
features he thought would be required for a machine to
exhibit adaptive behavior. Among these were a stock of
random movements to be selected upon and a hierarchical
system of control to govern the parts of the machine.
The recognition of the significance of hierarchical 
design is particularly noteworthy. Already in 19.26, Hull 
had arrived at the notion of stimulus-response or habit 
hierarchies and had attributed them to organisms as a 
means of generating the flexibility and variety of
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adaptive behavior. Mechanical hierarchies were now seen 
as a way of elucidating organic hierarchies,, making their 
existence plausible, and exploring their capacities. There 
is a further important implication. If in fact the whole 
mechanical design can be "reduced to a mathematical 
formula," that formula will itself most naturally have 
a hierarchical form, which for Hull meant the form of 
deductive logic. In effect, Hull gave an early and clear 
expression of what would become the rationale of cyber­
netics, thereby anticipating the founding of that field 
4 5by a decade. But as we shall see in the following 
section, Hull's skills for expressing the notion of 
hierarchical control were restricted to a limited knowledge 
of logic and simple geometrical reasoning. His mechanical 
genius seems to have exceeded his ability to give it 
formal expression.
Given Hull's interest in conditioned habits as the 
computational basis for higher psychological processes, 
it is not surprising that the machines actually bui.lt by 
him and his associates were designed to demonstrate 
conditioning phenomena. Although the mechanical, electri­
cal, and chemical details differed from case to case, 
all embodied a similar sort of strategy. There was 
devised some simple analogue of Pavlovian or trial-and- 
error conditioning which, when subjected to combinations 
of excitatory and inhibitory procedures, would exhibit
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an array of known conditioning pehnomena. These included 
such relatively complex phenomena as generalization, 
differentiation, higher-order conditioning, summation to 
a compound, and variability and persistence of responding 
until the attainment of a goal object.
The first of these machines was built at Wisconsin
46and was described in a brief article m  Science m  1929, 
the year in which Hull’s first article on conditioning 
appeared. From that time on, but especially until the 
mid-thirties, Hull's thinking about behavior was carried 
out largely in terms of machine design. In his idea 
book of 19.30, he expressed the hope that his planned 
theoretical work would be "a sufficiently original per^ 
formance in what really amounts to mechanical design to 
be fairly impressive.."^7 This remark reveals the inti­
mate relationship between Hull's mechanical interests 
and his behaviorism, but the relationship is not so evi­
dent in his published works. In fact, it is only hinted 
at in those theoretical papers of the 1930s which laid 
the foundation for his magnum opus of 1943, Principles of 
Behavior. For reasons to be discussed shortly, the issue 
was usually relegated to footnotes and asides. It was, 
however, raised in significant if inconspicuous ways.
In one case, after deducing a type of what might be called 
purposive behavior, Hull added:
311
if the type of explanation put forward above be 
really a sound deduction, it should be a matter 
of no great difficulty to construct parallel 
inanimate mechanisms, even from organic materials, 
which will genuinely manifest the qualities of 
intelligence, insight, and purpose, and which 
will insofar be truly p s y c h i c . 48
In another case, Hull deduced the outcome of an'experiment
which purported to show insightful problem-solving in
rats. He then wrote:
To say the same thing in other words, we appear 
to have before us here a deduction of insight in 
terms such that it might conceivably be con^ 
structed by a clever engineer as a non-living—  
even an inorganic— mechanism.49
The notion of the equivalence of machine design and 
theory received a boost in 1935 when a close associate of 
Hull, Douglas G. Ellson, published an account of an 
electromechanical device which operated on principles 
exactly analogous to those appearing in Hull's 1&3Q 
derivation of simple trial-and-error learning,^ Devices 
of this sort which exhibited intelligent behavior were 
referred to by Ellson as "mechanical hypotheses, M The 
expression was an apt one, for it suggested both the 
theoretical character of psychic machines and the mechani­
cal character of hypotheses (.the latter aspect will be 
developed below),. Given the assumed correspondence 
between the design of theory and machine, it was natural
for Hull to speak, as he did, of "translating" theoretical
51postulates into literal mechanisms.
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One of the parallels between theories and machines 
was that both could generate novelties. Just as a fruit­
ful set of postulates could combine, with the help of 
clever deductions, to yield novel predictions of empirical 
phenomena, a well-conceived mechanical design could pro­
duce correlation coefficients, novel adaptive responses, 
or even "insightful" solutions to problems. The exhibition 
of genuine intelligence by machines was quite naturally 
seized upon by the Hullians as dramatic confirmation of 
their belief in the sufficiency of a scientific, mater­
ialistic monism, As Ellson put it, "The gap between 
organismic behavior and the physical laws of nature, which
has generally been accepted as incapable of being crossed,
52is being slowly but surely bridged."
In the article in which they described their, psychic 
machine, Krueger and Hull drew conclusions which were more 
directly anti-metaphysical than Ellson's. They wrote:
It is believed that the construction and 
study of models of the type described above will 
aid in freeing the science of complex adaptive 
mammalian behavior from the mysticism which ever 
haunts it. The belief is very widespread and per­
sistent that certain complex., forms of adaptation 
cannot take place by any imaginable concatentation 
of materials without the mediation of some nous, 
entelechy, soul, spirit, ego, mind, consciousness, 
or E-insicht. There is, on the other hand, the 
opposed belief that the above explanatory concepts 
are but the names of disembodied functions 
(ghosts! which., insofar as they have any objective 
existence, are themselves in need of explanation 
and may conceivably be duplicated by adroit con­
catenations of materials. . . .  As progress is
made by the second group it may be anticipated 
that the first will retreat to the more and 
more inaccessible parts of the psychological 
terrain.53
The exercise of designing intelligent machines was later 
explicitly advocated by Hull as an "effective prophylaxis" 
against the sundry forms of "anthropomorphic subjectivism."
In sum, Hull's commitment to mechanism was a central 
feature of his early research program. It underlay both 
his conception of adaptive organismic behavior and his 
conception of theories about that behavior. It served 
him well in his materialism and in his anti-idealist 
polemics. Both chronologically and conceptually, Hull’s 
mechanism was prior to his behaviorism. A telling detail 
may help to crystallize this conclusion. Hull's idea 
books show in 19.28, as a possible title for his magnum 
opus, "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Mechanist"—  
for a mechnist, a most fitting paraphrase of Watson’s 
19.19 title.55
Hull's enthusiasm for the mechanistic outlook was
such that at one time (.19301 , he planned to establish
at Yale a museum of psychic machines. He listed several
extant machines that might be included and discussed how
more complex mechanisms could be developed out of these
earlier ones. Significantly, the museum was seen as a
way to attract physicists, chemists, physiologists, and
56engineers into his seminars. In light of the centrality
of mechanistic themes in Hull's psychology, it was natural 
that a museum of intelligent machines would have been 
contemplated as a means of integrating research efforts 
from the various sciences. Although formal plans for a 
museum were dropped, the concern with integrating the 
sciences was to become not only the focus of Hull's work 
at the Institute of Human Relations but also the point of 
initial contact between Hull and the agents of logical 
positivism.
It was suggested above that Hull's mechanistic
biases lay at the very kernel of his research program.
But despite the prominence of mechanistic formulations
in his unpublished writings, the extent of their role is
far from apparent in his published works. Hull’s idea
books reveal the probable source of this curious dis~
crepancy. It appears that Hull, with considerable reason,
publicly downplayed his mechanistic views out of a fear
of suppression. Even before authorities at Yale curbed
his hypnosis research, he recorded his concern about the
matter. "No doubt," he wrote in 1929., "this connection
of extremely complex automatic machines with ambitious
psychological projects and programs is a trifle grotesque,
though no one seems to notice this very much except myself.
He added that he was "pretty certain" to be criticized
57and called insane. Following the episode of controversy 
over his hypnosis research, Hull remarked that the
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proposed museum "must be handled discreetly with, an avoid­
ance of newspaper publicity" and that he "should not take 
the models too seriously, at least in the eyes of the
public." In conclusion, he noted to himself, "Let it be,
5 8rather, a hobby." Subsequent idea books contain comments
which suggest that Hull's research in "psychotechnology"
59did later come under the threat of suppression. The 
outcome of this threat is not revealed, but we can surmise 
that Hull was not unaffected by it. The last published 
account of a psychic machine by any of Hull’s group 
appeared in 19.35,
For a variety of reasons, the emphasis of, the Hullian 
program shifted during the thirties from the attempt to 
capture adaptive behavior in the design of literal machines 
to the attempt to capture it through the construction of 
theoretical systems. The shift was not so great as it 
might seem prima facie, since machine design and theory 
construction were considered to be largely equivalent. 
Despite being an important key to understanding Hull’s 
work, this equivalence has gone almost entirely unrecog­
nized by historians of psychology. One who has recognized 
this point, but without elaborating on it, is Robert S. 
Woodworth. He wrote: "Always the inventor’, Hull was
evidently fascinated by the problem of designing a well- 
geared conceptual machine, a theoretical system from which 
definite laws of behavior could be logically deduced for
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submission to the test of experiment,"^  It is to Hull’s 
theoretical machinery, its purported power in methodologi­
cal matters, and its role in the integration of science 
that the following sections are addressed.
Deductive Methods
Early Interest
As was the case with Hull's mechanistic leanings, 
his interest in deductive reasoning arose prior to his 
entry into a career in psychology. His discovery of 
geometry, an event to which he attached great significance, 
came while he was in prep school. The ensuing interest 
in deductive reasoning combined with his mechanical bent 
in the production of the logic machine during his under­
graduate studies at Michigan. Hull's idea book of 1916 
shows him to have had an early interest in hierarchies
in general as well as in the particulars of logical pro- 
61cesses. He viewed his dissertation research on concept 
formation as an empirical investigation of the reasoning 
process. And of course the empirical study of thinking 
from a materialistic viewpoint was the original stated aim 
of his scientific endeavors.
As Hull's program for the study of thinking was 
gradually diverted into the analysis of conditioned 
habits, deductive processes receded from the forefront as
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a subject of investigation and came into prominence instead 
as a method of investigation. When his plan to derive 
thought and logic from learned habits became mired in the 
considerable complexities of conditioned behavior, the 
employment of logic in psychological theorizing emerged 
as the distinguishing feature of Hullian behaviorism. It 
remains today the best-known feature of Hull's work, the 
major source of whatever fame or infamy is attached to 
his name.
Although Hull's methodological application of logic
became obvious only in the 1930s, it had been a concern to
him for some time. In his very first idea book (.1915-
19161, Hull addressed the issue in a short dialogue:
Quest: Just what is the criterion for deciding
where logic must be rigorous in the science of 
psychology and where it must not be applied at 
all?
Ans: Perhaps in determining matter of fact it
may be applied so far as objective evidence goes,
But clearly we must not deduce much or perhaps 
any from preconceived notions. Possibly this 
means that there can be little theorizing or 
prophecy— that there is little uniformity in men­
tal things or at least that the uniformity is 
only approximate, appearing only in averages and 
central tendencies of other kinds.
6 2X Work this out more X
Work it out he did. Sometime around 1930, Hull became
convinced that psychology was susceptible of d-eductive
theorizing and could therefore become a legitimate
6 3natural science. The dearth of uniformity in psychologi­
cal phenomena which concerned him in the above passage
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would later be attributed to unavoidable variability in
initial conditions and was thus not taken as impugning
the deterministic nature of the scientific laws of
behavior (see following chapter!.
As we have seen, Hull's mechanistic views gave
impetus and form to his views on theory. Machine design
was seen as translatable into theoretical structure. In
the 1926 idea book which contains Hull's first formulation
of the rationale for his proto-cybernetics, we find him
recognizing the need for a means of expressing that
structure. "If I work out a coherent system of S-R psy-
cliology," he wrote, "it must be done by means of some
64coherent symbolism and it must be quantified," Shortly
thereafter, Hull arrived at one characteristic of the
required symbolism. While reading Edwin B. Holt's Concept
of Consciousness (.19141, he was struck by Holt's notion of
the neutrality of logic, a notion which Hull decided to
give serious consideration in his own system. According
to Holt, the proposition and rules of logic subsist in
a neutral realm, and they operate whether experienced or
not. In this respect, they operate just as they might in
a calculating device or a logic machine. Hull's conclusion
was an important one: "Possibly this means that logic
6 5is not so much neutral as indifferent,"
Of course, Hull's materialism prevented him from 
accepting Holt's idea of logic's ontological neutrality.
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For Hull, logic had to be in some sense material (.see 
Chapter 81. But the possibility which Hull read into 
Holt— that logic might be epistemologically indifferent—  
was just what Hull had been looking for. The hierarchical 
and deterministic characteristics of organismic behavior 
called for theories of behavior to be couched in hier­
archical and deductive logic. But now Hull could go one 
better. The epistemological indifference of logic meant 
that those, and only those, theories of behavior which 
were framed in rigorous logic could be tested and decided 
between on an objective basis. Furthermore, Hull recog­
nized that this assessment of theories was in principle 
capable of being carried out by a machine Csee below}.. In 
the scientific process of deduce-and-test, the closer the
i
scientist is to behaving like a machine, the more- objective 
is the resulting science.
Whether all these implications were fully evident to 
Hull at the time of his reinterpretation of Holt's neutral­
ity of logic is uncertain. In any case, it was not long 
before he was spelling them out. Speaking before a 
faculty group at Columbia University in the summer of 
1929, Hull extolled the virtues of deductive reasoning 
in scientific theorizing. In what was to become a common 
refrain among psychologists of the Hullian persuasion,
Hull argued that deductive methodology could be relied 
on to decide between competing systems of psychology, and
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that such decisions were a straightforward matter of com­
paring the number of empirically confirmed deductions from 
each system.^
Around the same time, Hull spent a summer teaching 
at Harvard. His experiences there furthered his ambitions 
for deductive theorizing in psychology. The summer at 
Harvard has been described by Frank Beach in his biographi­
cal sketch of Hull;
Discussions of various scientific concepts with 
C. I. Lewis and A. N. Whitehead strengthened 
Hull’s interest in theory-building. At this time 
he purchased and become thoroughly familiar with 
Newton's Principia, a work which strongly influ­
enced his thinking from that time on. He also 
found stimulating the Principia Mathematics of 
Whitehead and Russell.^7
As we shall see, Hull's emulation of Newton became a 
well-known feature of his program. As for the Principia 
Mathematics, his attraction to it was most likely not 
due to any working interest in logic— there is no evi­
dence that Hull ever seriously delved into symbolic logic—  
but rather to its promise as a highly systematic and 
powerful system, yet one which evaded unnecessary philo­
sophical attachments. Russell and Whitehead had stated in
their preface that they had deliberately "avoided both
6 8controversy and general philosophy," There was no need 
for Hull to work through the theorems to see the point; 
here was a symbolic machinery which was comprehensive 
and rigorous, authoritative yet uncontroversial, perhaps
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even neutral in the required sense. That Hull never 
learned the system is probably the only reason that its 
application to his theoretical efforts waited until the 
1940 publication of the Mathematico-Deductive Theory of 
Rote Learning. Even then, the application was achieved 
only by enlisting the assistance of the Yale logician 
Frederic B. Fitch.
By 1930, Hull was firmly convinced of the value of 
deductive methodology and was committed to its propaga­
tion wherever he could find a receptive audience. This 
central characteristic of his philosophy of science was 
thus arrived at well in advance of his contact with the 
philosophical movement of logical empiricism. The logical 
emphasis to which he resonated in that movement was 
clearly indigenous to his own thought and in particular 
to his mechanistic conception of organismic behavior.
The Changing Styles of Deductive Theorizing
In his detailed analysis of Hullian learning theory,
Sigmund Koch has delineated three phases of Hull’s theoreti- 
6 Qcal activity. " The earliest phase, which covers the 
articles appearing from 1929 to 1935, is characterized 
by small sets of qualitative hypotheses designed to 
range over a restricted domain (e.g., simple trial-and-error 
learning) and informal derivations of their consequences.
In the second phase, which includes the famous "miniature
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7Qsystems" of 1935 and 1937 , Hull's hypotheses were still
essentially qualitative, but they were expressed in imita­
tion of formal geometry in terms of definitions and 
axioms, and their consequences (called "theorems"! were 
derived in a more explicit and detailed deductive manner. 
After the appearance of the rote learning theory in 1940 
came the third phase, in which the overriding concern was 
quantification. Hull's publications in the period 19.4 0- 
1952 showed a generally increasing interest in techniques 
for metricizing the variables of the system and relating 
them through equations. At the same time, they showed 
a decreasing interest in explicit formalization; the 194 0 
theory represented the peak in that regard.
The trend of these three stages in Hull's theorizing 
and the transitions between them are matters of considerable 
historical complexity. Without going into a detailed 
account, the present section will briefly sketch the 
historical circumstances surrounding these devlopments, 
especially the shift from the first phase to the second. 
Treatment of the final phase itself will be reserved for 
the following chapter.
The first phase, in which hypotheses were qualitative 
and deductions informal, reflected most directly Hull's 
interest in machine design. It was these restricted 
formulations that could actually serve as schemata for 
simple learning mechanisms, as Ellson was able to show.
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Like the machine programs of cybernetics, Hull's early
formulations were stated at a sufficiently abstract and
functional level as to remain independent of the specific
physical means and empirical parameters by which they
might be realized. Had Hull remained true to his early
mechanistic theoretical impulse, his proto-cybernetic
animus, he might well have founded a branch of cognitive
psychology strongly akin to the information processing
71approach that arose in the 1960s. But several factors 
operated to subdue and deflect this impulse, Two of these 
factors we have already touched upon: the threat of
suppression from without and the unavailability in the 
1930s of a highly appropriate means of expressing simula­
tions. In the absence of modern programming languages, Hull 
was limited to a passing familiarity with geometrical 
method, and his enthusiasm for the method was never quite 
able to compensate for its meager utility in the early 
stages of psychological theorizing.
Hull apparently felt dissatisfied with his early 
papers in that each developed one or another mechanism of 
adaptive behavior, but there was no indication of how the 
various specific mechanisms might contribute to the over­
all functioning of the organism. In accordance with his 
early insights abox^ t hierarchical control, the solution 
to this problem was sought in the expressions of mechanisms 
as principles which could than be arranged in a hierarchy.
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Each mechanism would exert its action from its place in 
the hierarchy, and the resulting interactions would deter­
mine the output of molar behavior. This approach to 
achieving theoretical integration and generality called 
for a more explicitly hierarchical form of expression to 
mirror the hierarchical structure of behavior. Hull's 
adoption of explicit geometrical method, which led to the 
second phase of theorizing, can thus be understood not 
only as part of his quest for objective method, but also 
as a highly appropriate strategy for the subject matter of 
psychology as it was construed by Hull. This conclusion 
suggests the need to reconsider those criticisms of Hull 
which claim that he imported an alien methodology ill- 
suited to the realm of psychology. He was, without ques­
tion, influenced by the methods of mathematical and physi­
cal sciences, but given his particular conception of
72behaving organisms, such methods were far from alien,
Around 1934, Hull was propelled into the second 
phase of theorizing by two sorts of events. First, as 
was described above, a medical report on his failing health 
convinced him that he was nearing the end of his intellec­
tual effectiveness. His gloomy estimate that perhaps two, 
but no more than five, years remained for him to contribute 
to the advancement of psychology added an acute sense of 
urgency to his already robust theoretical ambitions.
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Second, Hull's ambitions began to be realized when
his deductive approach started to gain favor among his
fellow.psychologists. This new favor came into evidence
most notably at the 19.34 annual meeting of the American
Psychological Association. For example, Hull wrote that
the discussion there
made it rather clearly evident that Tolman has 
never even considered making his work a theory 
in the sense that I use the term. This came 
out very clearly when he stated both publicly 
and to me privately that he would try to see what 
he could do in the way of deducing the results 
of his experiments by the rigorous processes 
which the Yale group a s p i r e s , 73
Having just returned from Vienna, Tolman was temporarily
disposed to favor deductive methods, but as we have seen
he shortly thereafter became skeptical of the value of
such methods. What was significant in this episode was
that Tolman lent to Hull's approach both public endorse-*
ment and private encouragement. Tolman's favorable reaction
would have been all the more influential because of the
acclaim generated by his recently published Purposive
Behavior.
The favorable response was by no means limited to 
Tolman, Hull recorded that the "evident appeal" of his 
"rigorous approach" was widespread. During the meeting, 
Richard M, Elliott, editor of the prestigious Century 
Psychology Series, requested the rights to publish Hull's 
book on theory whenever it was ready. To Hull's delight,
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Elliott referred to the book as Hull’s "magnum opus,"
Another "influential factor," according to Hull, was the 
"evident enthusiasm" for his deductive approach shown by 
Edna Heidbreder, whose Seven Psychologies of 1933 had 
recently established her as an authority in systematic 
psychology. ~
In this sort of encouragement, Hull saw a possible 
solution to the personal crisis precipitated by his poor 
health. The most direct route to the goal of an integrated, 
comprehensive theory would be for Hull to focus on the basic 
structure of the theory rather than on experimental investi­
gations. The selection of research problems would be- 
subordinated to and determined by the elaboration of theory. 
This strategy seemed, in Hull's words, "extremely fortunate
since as a result I shall be able to avoid the further
75scattering of my energies." Hull's new priority was 
starkly revealed in a statement made just after the APA 
meeting: "I have definitely decided to do the work on
theory first and leave the matter of the conditioned reflex 
to be treated incidentally, though possibly very effectively 
nevertheless."7  ^ The fact that theory was able to usurp 
from Hull's attention a phenomenon as central as the con­
ditioned reflex may have appeared fortuitous to Hull at 
the time; but it was characteristic of Hull's growing 
tendency to let his speculations run injudiciously far 
ahead of their empirical base. With the benefit of hind-
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sight, even psychologists within the Hullian tradition 
came to lament this tendency. As one put it: ''Hull was
evidently in a hurry. He wanted to try to get away with 
doing the 100 experiments in a given area instead of 
100,000."77
Hull presented his "miniature system" of rote
learning at two other conferences in 1234, once in informal
7 8terms and once in the method of formal geometry. He was
surprised to find that the latter presentation was
received much more favorably than the former. The impact
of this observation on Hull was great, driving him further
from close contact with his subject matter and with, his
original theoretical impulse to simulate mechanisms. He
penned the following reaction to the difference between
the responses to the two presentations;
. . , the apparent reason for this change is the 
use which I have recently made of the formal 
geometrical method in deriving my theorems. People 
apparently are impressed by the mere external 
appearance of rigor. This is a factor of con­
siderable importance in the matter of propaganda.
I shall certainly heed the evident moral in empha­
sizing this aspect when I write up the system as 
a whole.
As a part of his "bid for a place in the history of science," 
Hull had since 1930 been making waves as a proponent of 
rigorous methods in psychology. Now in 19.34, he felt that 
the wave of psychological opinion had sufficiently coales­
ced to carry him on toward his ambitious goals. Expediently 
ignoring his aversion to propaganda in the hands of Watson, 
he was himself ready and willing to propagandize in order to
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maintain his position at the crest of that wave, Hull's
eminence was recognized officially by his colleagues when
in 1936 he was elected president of the APA. In his widely
8 0cited presidential address, Hull responded by present­
ing a second formalized miniature system, this time on 
adaptive behavior, but again in the geometrical style.
As early as 1936, the limitations of the geometrical 
method in psychology were coming to be acknowledged by 
Hull. In that year, he decided to seek Fitch's assistance
in applying the symbolic logic of Principia Mathematics
81to the rote learning system. The reasons given by Hull
for this change were that the geometrical method was
limited in its versatility "for mediating quantitative
deductions in the field of behavior," and that it had
"proved to be clumsy in practice and limited in the logi-
8 2cal rigor attainable." The decision to go more explicit­
ly formal was reinforced by the opinion of the British 
biologist and logician J. H, Woodger, whom Hull met in 
1937 and who had just completed an axiomatization of bio­
logical theory in PM notation. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, Woodger briefly worked with Hull on a formalized 
and expanded version of the 1935 miniature system,.after 
which Fitch took over full responsibility for the symbolic 
translation. The resulting monograph of 1940 on rote 
learning theory was noteworthy both for its attempted logi­
cal rigor and for its use of equations. Although it seemed
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no less "clumsy in practice" than earlier versions, it cer­
tainly gave the appearance of having overcome the other 
limitations of the geometrical method.
To serve his growing reliance on equations, Hull had 
hired mathematicians to work out the quantitative implica­
tions of the 1940 theory. With this step, the 'third 
phase of Hull’s theorizing began in earnest. The emphasis 
had shifted from the mechanistic to the axiomatic and now 
to the mathematical. Impressed with the deductive power 
which equations brought to the system, Hull noted with due 
seriousness that "the change from qualitative to quantita­
tive postulates with known constants increases the fertility
33of the postulate set between ten and fifty times," At 
the same time, the new mathematical focus opened up two 
closely related methodological problem areas: intervening
variables and the quantification of behavior. These topics, 
which comprised the bulk of Hull’s later writings on methoa*- 
ological issues, will be treated in the following chapter.
This section has briefly reviewed the passage of 
Hull's deductive theorizing through its proto-cybernetic 
and axiomatic phases and up to its mathematical phase.
These phases were by no means discontinuous; the transi­
tions between them were gradual and incomplete. We find, 
for instance, polemical uses of deductive methodology in 
his early work and references to the correspondence 
between hierarchical theory and hierarchical subject matter 
in his later work. Nonetheless, we can discern a general
330
shift from deductive theory as mirroring psychological 
phenomena, as Hull saw them, to deductive theory as a 
propagandistic means of exhibiting formal rigor. In other 
words, there was a trend from indigenous method to method- 
olatry. This shift was driven in part by the peculiar 
combination of Hull’s failing health and inflated ambitions, 
and in part by the rising clamor among psychologists for 
rigor and objectivity. Hull was only partly responsible 
for this clamor, and once caught up in it, he was as much 
its pawn as its perpetrator.
Deductive Method versus Metaphysics
Hull’s emphasis on deduction naturally predisposed
him to formulate views on the philosophy of science in
close agreement with those of the logical empiricists.
For example, even in 1930 he was asserting the symmetry
of explanation and prediction, a claim which became a
8 4standard feature of the new positivist philosophy. In 
a related vein, Hull appears to have adopted a version of 
the distinction between the contexts of discovery and 
justification. In 19.35, he wrote:
The history of scientific practice so far 
shows that, in the main, the credentials of sci­
entific postulates have consisted in what the 
postulates can do, rather than in some metaphysical 
quibble about where they came from. If a set of 
postulates is really bad it will sooner or later 
get its user into trouble with experimental 
results. . . . In a word, a complete laissez-
faire policy should obtain in regard to postu­
lates .
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It is clear that Hull shared with the logical empiricists 
not only a core attitude toward deductive method, but also 
various ramifications of that attitude.
One of these ramifications, a particularly salient
one in Hull's case, was the notion that deductive method
could serve to combat metaphysics by keeping it distinct
from science proper, Hull wrote in 19.30 that:
if an hypothesis be so vague and indefinite, 
or so lacking in relevancy to the phenomena 
which it seeks to explain that the results 
neither of previous experiments nor those of 
experiments subsequently to be performed' may 
be deduced from it, it will be difficult in­
deed to prove it false, . . , Unfortunately,
because of its very sterility and barrenness 
in the above deductive sense, such an hypo­
thesis should have no status in science. It 
savors more of metaphysics, religion, or 
theology.86
In a way strongly reminiscent of Karl Popper, Hull thus
linked unfalsifiability with metaphysics and non-science.
This sort of contention was of course commonly advanced
by scientific empiricists, but Hull's expression of it
had its own emphasis. In contrast to many of the European
positivists and American operationists who focused on
observability per se, Hull emphasized the deductive capacity
of a theory as the mark of its scientific status. Early
in his career, Hull assumed the final link between deduced
consequence and actual observation to be wholly unproblematic.
The burden of establishing empirical contact was placed more
on the system of deductively interrelated propositions than
8 7on its concepts and their empirical definitions.
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Since deduced observable consequences were the sine 
qua non of scientific theory, there was for hull no place 
in science for theory of any other kind. He conceded the 
possibility that, unlike physics, psychology was not amen­
able to scientific theorizing, but added, "if -so we ought 
not to pretend to have theories at all,” It was with this 
sort of attitude that Hull summarized his stance on theory 
in 1935:
If the deductions are lacking or logically invalid, 
there is no theory; if the deductions involve con­
ditions of observations which are impossible of 
attainment, the theory is metaphysical rather than 
scientific; and if the deduced phenomenon is not 
observed when the conditions are fulfilled, the 
theory is false.
As close as Hull's views came to logical positivism 
on this point, there was in them no suggestion that meta­
physics was strictly meaningless or nonsensical. In this 
respect, he was more like Popper, attempting to distinguish 
science from non-science rather than meaningfulness from 
meaninglessness. Not until after S, S. Stevens's ground­
breaking papers of 1935 had triggered an interest in 
operationism and logical positivism did Hull's writings 
contain any mention of meaninglessness. This occurred in 
the 19.37 published version of his APA presidential address, 
which also contained Hull's first reference to operationism.
Only then aid he invoke the trichotomy, familiar to European
8 SLpositivists, of truth, falsehood, and meaninglessness.
Even so, operational definition and meaninglessness were
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each mentioned but once. They appeared to have been tossed 
in as an afterthought, as an offhand concession to a new 
brand of objectivism, and certainly not as an integral 
aspect of Hull's own views. The important respects in 
which Hull's deductivism stood in antithesis to•an opera­
tional empiricism will be discussed in the following chapter.
In addition to its use in combatting metaphysics, 
deductive rigor was used by Hull as a weapon against forms 
of implicit knowledge such as anthropomorphism, at least 
as they might be used in science. Anthropomorphically 
generated predictions about behavior could have practical 
value according to Hull. He felt, however, that anthropo­
morphic accounts of behavior
are of no value as scientific theory because a 
truly scientific theory seeks to deduce what 
anthropomorphism reaches by intuition or by 
naive assumption. Prophecies as to the outcome 
of untried experiments based merely on such 
anthropomorphic intuitions should be credited 
to the intuitional genius of the prophet rather 
than to the theoretical system to which the 
prophet may adhere. Predictions, however 
successful, can have no evidential value as to 
the prophet's system until he is willing and 
able to exhibit the logic by which his predictions 
flow from the postulates of that system. , . .^
Hull1s idea books clearly reveal that the above comments
91were written in response to Tollman's Purposive Behavior.
In fact, Tollman's refusal to formally systematize his 
ideas proved to be a long-term source of frustration for 
Hull.
If only psychology could adhere to the ideal of
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deductive theorizing, metaphysical and other subjective 
influences could be kept outside its scientific sphere.
The way would thus be cleared for the progress which is 
expected— or even inevitable— in genuine science, The 
assurance of progress which was integral to Hullfs concep­
tion of scientific psychology is the subject of the follow­
ing section.
Method as a Guarantor of Positive Progress
Method and Advance
When at the end of the 1920s Hull became convinced 
that psychology could attain the status of a true natural 
science, his optimism rested largely on the notion that 
appropriate methods would bring to psychology the sort 
of advance that appeared to be characteristic of physics. 
Hull surveyed the psychological scene at the turn of the 
decade and was appalled by the diversity of seemingly 
incompatible systems. Of the dozen or so systems des­
cribed in Carl Murchison's Psychologies of 1930, Hull wrote:
To put the matter in an extreme form: if all of 
these twelve psychologies should be in specific 
disagreement on a specific point, then at least 
eleven of them must be wrong, and in such a 
welter of error the twelfth may very well be 
wrong also. . .
The rectification of this situation, as anticipated in his
talk at Columbia in 1929, called for the derivation of
consequences from each system and the tallying of their
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observed adequacy. In this way the logjam might be broken 
and the natural flow of progress set in motion.
With the zeal of a crusader, Hull promulgated his 
notion of progress through method during the thirties. The 
classic statement of this line is found in his i935 "The 
Conflicting Psychologies of Learning— A Way Out," Therein 
he invoked the familiar distinction between fact and theory. 
Whereas the logical empiricists had drawn this distinction 
in terms of observation and theoretical language, Hull 
simply asserted that, in actual scientific practice, dis­
agreement is almost entirely confined to theory. Evidence 
itself is neutral, objective, and unproblematic; all that
is needed is a sure way to bring theories under the "impar-
93tial arbitration of the facts." "If the theories of a
science really agree with the experimental evidence," Hull
worte, "and if there is general agreement as to this
evidence, there should be a corresponding agreement re-
94garding theory."
Consensus on fact would force consensus on theory 
provided that there was a determinate and effective way to 
relate the two. The way, of course, was through deductive 
logic. As we have seen, Hull was convinced of logic's 
objectivity, its epistemological neutrality. He had known 
since his undergraduate days that it could be performed by 
a machine, and surely machines could show no bias or 
emotionalism. Although he never literally used machines
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to derive theorems from his postulates, Hull did occasion­
ally employ such machines as conceptual devices in advancing
95his methodological arguments. Viewing both fact and 
logic as theoretically neutral meant that the crucial steps 
in the deduce-and-observe method were objective in a quite 
unproblematic sense. In light of the power of arbitration 
inherent in these two steps, the initial step of arriving 
at postulates could be downplayed, submitted to a policy 
of laissez-faire, or even presumably left to chance.
Systems of psychology which failed to pass muster 
under the deduceT->and-test regimen would fall by the way­
side. Those which did reasonably well could undergo altera­
tions and adjustments followed by further tests. Through 
a gradual trial-and-error process, a system in the hands 
of responsible theorists would progress by successive 
approximations toward an ideal of perfection. If the pro­
ponents of a theory were willing to revise it each time it 
faced "a collision with a stubborn experimental fact," the
proportion of erroneous deductions from it would inevit- 
26ably decrease. Depending on its relationship to other 
surviving systems, a theory had to meet one of two fates.
If it attempted explanations at a level different from 
other systems (le.g. , perceptual versus neurophysiological}., 
it would hierarchically subsume the others or be subsumed 
by them. If the competing systems operated on the same 
level, they would gradually converge toward agreement,
337
differing finally, if at all, only in the vocabularies in 
which they were expressed. The certain result of the con­
sistent application of objective method was thus convergence
97toward agreement, either through subsumption or identity.
The sort of guaranteed progress which Hull envisioned
could be objectively monitored and recorded. To record this
progress, Hull devised a kind of a scoresheet which was as
objective as the methods for producing the progress. These
so-called "validity tables" appeared frequently in his
9 8unpublished writings but rarely surfaced in print. They 
typically consisted of a column listing the theorems and 
corollaries of the system under scrutiny. In a second col­
umn, a plus or minus sign indicated the availability or 
absence of empirical evidence for each proposition. Wher­
ever there was a plus in the second column, a third column 
held a plus or a minus signifying empirical validity or 
invalidity. The validity tables provided at a glance 
information on which experiments needed to be performed and 
which posutlates needed revision. They could easily pro­
vide summary statistics of a system's current status, and 
did so in a way that could conveniently; be reported to 
colleagues, granting agencies, and the like. Progress 
became an observable matter of converting minuses and blank 
spaces to plusses.
All told, the Hullian version of scientific method 
was a highly mechanized procedure. The derivation of con­
sequences, their empirical check, the recording of their 
adequacy, and even the resulting progress were conceived 
of as automatic as if science were a great calculating 
machine. These aspects of Hullian methodology have led one 
observer to view neobehaviorism as "the only systematic,
extensive, and detailed attempt ever made to fulfill
99.Leibniz's dream of a universal calculus." Indeed, 
logical methods were something like a universal calculus 
for Hull. Although he specifically viewed them as the 
salvation of psychology (or any other scientific effort), 
the significance he attached to them spread far beyond the 
confines of academic psychology. The tenets of scientific 
method, he believed, would enhance social progress by 
establishing the basis of an effective moral education and 
generally provide a means for the conversion of long­
standing philosophical issues into tractable scientific 
problems.
It is by now widely agreed that Hullian methodology 
rather seriously failed to live up to its promise. The 
depth of its misconception of the scientific enterprise has 
become especially clear in light of recent developments in 
the history and philosophy of science. From the strictly 
historical standpoint, it is pertinent to note that cogent 
objections to the Hullian view were quickly raised after its
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pronouncement. They came from within the psychological 
community, were voiced in prominent channels, and often 
concerned its most basic features, namely the ease of 
consensus on observational evidence and the unproblematic 
deductive contact between fact and theory.
As regards the former feature, for instance, Tolman 
insisted in his presidential address of 1937 that not 
even the simplest of conditioning phenomena were capable 
of unequivocal interpretation. With his background in 
neorealism, Tolman would naturally have been aware of the 
tenuousness, in principle, of any distinction between pure 
observation and inference; with his knowledge of the 
literature on learning in the 1930s, he was certainly aware 
of the practical difficulties involved in trying to forge 
any consensus on the "facts" of learning. As regards the 
deductive contact between theory and observation, D, K.
Adams was quick to point out in the Psychological Review 
that even when a prediction could be derived via a chain 
of deductions, its confirmation was incapable of being 
conveyed back up the chain to the theory. Hull’s deter­
minate linkage was unidirectional; to speak of a fulfilled 
prediction confirming a theory was to commit the fallacy 
of affirming the consequent.
Hull believed so strongly in the essential soundness 
of his methods that he never even bothered to give systematic 
replies to critics of his methodological strictures. The
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replies he did give were usually relegated to footnotes 
102and asides. Ever conscious of the imminent failure or
his health, he devoted little time to what were for him 
unimportant details of a promising methodology. The pre­
ferred course was to proceed full tilt with the develop­
ment of his system and let the results speak for the method. 
This strategy left one problem: the progress and convergence 
of theories promised by his methods would be reached only 
by those who subscribed to the methods in the first place.
The proof would be in the pudding, but not everyone agreed 
to follow Hull's recipe. Those who would not were regarded 
by Hull as failing to be scientific, and were thus legiti­
mate targets for persuasion and propaganda.
Objectivity versus Emotionalism
Hull was eager to draw a sharp line between the object­
ivity of scientific procedure and the subjectivity common 
to metaphysical disputes. Commenting on the conflict 
between systems of psychology in the early 1930s, he wrote:
This emotionalism and this inability to progress 
materially toward agreement obviously do not 
square with the ideals of objectivity and cer­
tainty which we associate with scientific investi­
gation; they are, on the other hand, more than a 
little characteristic of metaphysical and 
theological controversy.
The situation in physics was, of course, quite different
thanks to the adherence of physicists to the deductive method.
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Had Newton's system not been firmly anchored to 
observable facts, its- overthrow would not have 
been possible and we would presumably be having 
at the present time emotionally warring camps 
of Newtonians and Einsteinians. Fortunately, we 
are spared this spectacle.10
Emotionalism was for Hull just an unpleasant reminder that
unexorcized metaphysical influences were still preventing
the acceptance of scientific method.
Given the mechanical character of the deduce-and- 
observe procedure, Hull believed there was never any 
need for emotional dispute in science. Matters of logic 
and fact, being possessed of objective neturality, remained 
all that was was worthy of scientific attention. The tena­
cious maintenance of one's objectivity became a test of one's 
scientific character. The extremes to which Hull pursued 
these beliefs are revealed in the account he sent to Spence 
of an encounter in 1941 with the Gestalt pyschologist 
Wolfgang Kohler, Hull wrote:
. . , appropos of the general argument I was putting 
forwar'd to the effect that scientific matters should 
be settled on a scientific and logical basis rather 
than by some kind of warfare, he came out with this 
remark: he said that he was willing to discuss most 
things in a logical and scientific manner, but when 
people try to make man out to be a kind of slot 
machine, then he would fighti And when he said the 
word "fight," he brought his fist down on the table 
with a resounding smack, and he did not smile when 
he said it either. . . .  I pointed out to him that 
even though a person did feel like fighting about 
such a matter, the fighting wouldn't settle it and 
was really futile sc far as the scientific status of 
the thing was concerned. At that point he began 
telling me about the trouble he had had with the 
Nazis in Germany and commented on how stupid the
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English had been not to prepare for war while the 
Germans were preparing for war, and so on. This 
seemed, and still seems to me to be utterly irrele­
vant to the logical question involved, though as 
a psychological proposition I can understand how 
a man's scientific wires might get crossed through 
emotional upsets in his personal life. Actually 
one would hardly expect a thoroughgoing scientist 
to do a thing like that, but Kohler clearly did it 
on that occasion. Upon the whole, it was not a very 
impressive demonstration of either scientific or 
philosophical poise.
Hull laid much of the blame for human misery and
105conflict on the "prevalent subjectivity" of the world. 
Psychologists could not begin to 3clve those problems 
until their own subjectivity was cured. The Gestaltists' 
refusal to state their postulates, to submit their views 
to the machinery of science, was greeted by Hull with dis­
may and scorn, for it indicated an unscientific attitude. 
The well-known feuds between the Gestaltists and the 
behaviorists posed a special problem for the Hullian hope 
of progress through method. With a touch of sad resig­
nation, Hull wrote in Principles of Behavior that
optimism in this connection is seriously 
dampened by the conviction that the differences 
involved arise largely from a conflict of cul­
tures . . . which, unfortunately, are extra- 
scientific and are not ordinarily resolvable by 
either logical or empirical procedures,
Naturally, there was still no need for dispute in science;
to engage in science was to subscribe to Hull's notion of
method. Those who disputed were simply not in the arena
of science as it was defined by Hull. Within the confines
of science, Hull tried to respond to challenges in the
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usual manner of contriving elaborate derivations of 
phenomena. In extra—scientific matters, he could not-—  
and did not— avoid explicit polemic and propaganda,
Hull's claim to have had "an intense aversion to contro­
versies, seems odd in light of the vigor and relish with
107which he engaged in controversy; but his claim amounts 
to little more than another expression of regret that his 
particular view never achieved unanimous support.
Integration of Science
In Hull's vision of science, the absence of meta­
physical dispute and emotionalism led naturally to the 
integration of science. With a single method accepted for 
all branches of science, the various laws of those branches 
would eventually take their place in a deductive hier­
archy of knowledge. A single method of obviating dispute 
also removed any barrier to social cooperation among 
scientists and even provided the rationale for a division 
of scientific labor. In what follows, the integration of 




One of the most salient and widely known features of 
Hull's philosophy of science is the conviction that the 
methods appropriate for the physical sciences are equally 
appropriate for psychology. As has often been pointed out, 
the notion that psychology might be united with the older 
and more advanced sciences by a common method was one which 
held great appeal for psychologists in the 19.30s. Faced 
with a bewildering proliferation of theoretical systems 
on one hand and the practical demands of a society in 
turmoil on the other, psychologists no doubt longed to share 
the prestige of the "hard" sciences. Among them, Hull was 
the most audacious advocate of the unity of method.
Not surprisingly, Hull turned early and often to
physics as a model. In 1930, he wrote that in developing
his system "the method will be the same as that which has
108proven so successful with the mathematical physicists." 
Hull's paper of that year on trial-and-error learning 
began with a reference to Einstein's gedanken experiments, 
which were construed by Hull as deductive processes like 
those he was himself employing. Hull also occasionally 
invoked quantum mechanics, especially when he wished to 
highlight the tentative nature of his own theoretical 
ventures (see Chapter 8 below!. But by far the scientific 
theory most emulated by Hull was Newtonian mechanics.
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Hull's discovery of Newton's Principia around 193 0 
had a strong impact on him. Here was a powerful scientific 
theory expressed in the mode of the Euclidean geometry he 
so admired. With its eight explicit definitions and three 
postulates, the theory showed a degree of formal rigor 
and implied a hypothetico-deductive method for its assess­
ment. Principles were deductively related to phenomena in 
a way that compelled the theory's abandonment when con­
fronted with its Einsteinian successor.
The Principia became a kind of a bible for Hull. In 
the 1930s he began the practice of assigning portions of 
it to be studied by members of his seminar, "Several hours," 
he admonished, "devoted to a perusal of this great work 
would scarcely be wasted, even by a social scientist,"
The purpose of reading Newton was "not to understand the 
details of the mathematics but to observe his procedure."
The importance of the Newtonian model in Hull's advocacy 
of postulational technique would be difficult to over­
estimate, One visitor to Hull's lab in the late thirties 
characterized the scene as follows: "On his large table 
Newton's Principia was placed demonstratively between him­
self and any visitors. No nonsense: admit your postu­
lates!"^"^ Hull's exhortation to psychologists was often 
repeated in his published works as well,. As Hull was 
emboldened by the favorable reaction to his views, his 
statements of the unity of method gradually sounded less
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like recommendations for scientific praxis and more like
logical imperatives. In his presidential address to the
APA, he stated, "Surely the same logic which demands strict
deduction from explicitly stated postulates in physical theory
112demands it for the theory of adaptive behavior.'"
Integration of Laws
As has already been described, Hull believed that the
consistent application of rigorous methods would result in
a system of deductively interlocked scientific laws. The
search for basic behavioral laws from which subsidiary
lav;s and phenomena could be derived was an early concern
for Hull. Even in the late twenties, he was attempting to
integrate the facts of Pavlovian and instrumental con-
113ditionmg under a single rubric. In 1931, a student
suggested to Hull that the remote excitatory tendencies
of Ebbinghaus might be governed by the same principles
114as the trace conditioned reflexes of Pavlov. This
suggestion, later known as Lepley's hypothesis, was the 
basis of Hull's subsequent rote-learning system, in which 
he tried to assimilate verbal learning to Pavlovian con­
ditioning. As a third example of theoretical integration,
Hull speculated on the relations between learning theory 
and psychoanalytic theory, suggesting for instance that 
Freudian sublimation might be a form of response alterna-
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When in the mid-thirties the trappings of postula- 
tional technique began to figure prominently in Hull's 
writings, the issue of integration was phrased in terms 
of postulate systems. He wrote in 19.35 that "each, lower 
level should be able to deduce the relevant basic postu-
116lates of the system above it in the hierarchy of systems.""
Hull's view of the hierarchy of the sciences was elaborated
in his APA presidential address.
According to this view the theoretical physicists 
will ultimately deduce as theorems from electrons, 
protons, etc., the six postulates which we have 
employed as the basis for the deduction of adap­
tive behavior. If this deduction were accomplished 
we should have an unbroken logical chain extending 
from the primitive electron all the way up to 
complex purposive behavior. Further developments 
may conceivably extend the system to include the 
highest rational and moral behavior. Such is the 
natural goal of science. This is the picture 
which a complete scientific monism would present. 
Unfortunately, theoretical physics is very far 
from this achievement, and judgment regarding its 
ultimate accomplishment must be indefinitely sus­
pended. At most such, a view, attractive as it is, 
can be regarded only as a working hypothesis.117
Like the logical positivists' second thesis of physicalism,
Hull's view placed phsyics at the foundation of a hierarchy
of deductive explanation. The attainability of such an
integration was admitted to be an open question, but it
was a hypothesis in which great faith was invested.
As in matters of methodology, Hull looked to physics 
for a model of how to achieve integration of laws. To this 
end, he brought the Yale physicist Leigh Page into his 
seminar in 1936 to lecture on theoretical integration in
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physics. Page reviewed the development of physics with
emphasis on the subsumption of earlier laws Ce.g,, Kepler's],
under later more general laws (_e.g., Newton'sL. "It was
an impressive story," wrote one psychologist in attendance,
IIS"one we wanted to emulate in our own field," Page was
apparently as sanguine as Hull about the possibilities for
future integration. His diagram of the branches of physical
theory showed, arching over relativity theory and quantum
mechanics, an as yet undiscovered theory representing the
119"assumed point of contact between the two."
Faith in the hierarchical coordination of theories 
took on more and more imporatnce through the late thirties 
as its implications for the strategy of research became 
clear. The following section describes how Hull and his 
co-workers responded to a push for integration at. the 
Institute of Human Relations by adopting integrated theory 
as the basis for a coordinated attack on the problems of 
the social sciences.
Scientific Cooperation
The Institute of Human Relations was founded in 1929 
with a ten-year grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. 
Several million dollars of support was granted on the 
premise that the Institute would develop a coherent 
research program for the unification of the social and 
biological sciences. The original plan of attack, based
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on the model of medical research, was to bring together 
experts from different areas to work on specific problems, 
just as chemists arid physicians might work together on 
curing a certain disease, The various experts who were 
actually enlisted in the IHR, however, tended to carry on 
their own research, in isolation from one another, and by 
the mid-thirties the Rockefeller Foundation’s agents were 
conveying their dissatisfaction to officials of the IHR.
The prospects for renewal of funding were dim unless
120demonstrable scientific integrations could be effected.
In response to this crisis, the IHR took several steps. 
The psychologist Mark May took over as director of the 
Institute, a group of younger researchers with broader 
training was recruited, and Clark Hull in 193 6 devoted his 
Wednesday evening seminar to the development of a concerted 
research program. These were auspicious ingredients for 
a reorganization. Unlike his predecessors, May was willing 
to exert pressure on the Institute's various researchers 
to collaborate. Hull was a natural to assume leadership 
in the efforts at integration given his views on science 
and its methods. The cast of talented participants in 
Hull's seminar included John Dollard, Neal Miller, Robert 
Sears, Leonard Doob, Donald Marquis, 0. Hobart Mowrer,
F. S. C. Northrop, and Warren S. McCulloch. Hull evidently 
had little difficulty advancing his views on integration 
in the seminar. He recorded in 19.36 that "all seem to
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be wholly sold on the desirability of having a clearly
explicit theory Cin the strict deductive sense! as the
basis for the systematic attack on the problems of any
,.121Institute program.
The move toward integration would begin a't the 
simplest level of cooperation. Each member of a research 
group might be assigned one value of an independent variable
so that each would contribute a point in the overall behav-
122 . ioral function. Haphazard investigations were to be
replaced by systematic studies in the hope that results 
would add up to a new principle rather than a mere collec­
tion of facts. Postulated relationships would guide the 
selection of research problems, and experiments would lead 
to revisions and discoveries of postulates. Efforts at 
systematizing within disciplines would be .'followed up. by 
integrations across disciplines.
The assumed hierarchy of the sciences provided the 
basic structure of the enterprise. In his seminar notes, 
Hull listed "in order of logical development" the various 
problem areas to be addressed. The list began with the 
physiology of motivation and passed through conditioned 
reflexes and psychoanalytic phenomena, leading eventually
to the complex social institutions of law, economics,
123and religion. This hierarchy made possible a division
of labor by subject matter. Hull's group would cover 
the range of topics from reflexes to psychoanalytic
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phenomena, leaving the rest to Dollard's group. Hull 
himself would attempt to derive certain higher-level postu­
lates from the more basic ones. At each level, postulates 
would be isolated and then deduced from those of a more 
basic level. In this way, wrote Hull,
the looseness will pull from the top and we shall 
secure a very tight integration far up and down 
the hierarchy of the social sciences. Note:
This ought to be a very valuable formula for the 
coordination of effort of the different groups.^ 24
After an initial division of labor was made according 
to subject matter, efforts could be further divided accord­
ing to one's role in the deduce-and-test method of science. 
Thus, Hull employed mathematicians and a logician to help 
with the deductions and psychologists to run the empirical 
tests. Mark May later described the procedure used in 
developing the rote learning theory as
quite analogous to that used in the planning and 
construction of a building. The senior author 
LHull3 has acted as the planning and supervising 
architect while his collaborators have checked 
the plans and supplied much of the technical 
skill necessary for their execution. The work 
has been carefully coordinated throughout with 
the result that the end product is a unified 
whole. *
May and Hull worked closely together to implement 
their vision of integrated research at the IHR. Revealed 
as a division of labor, their notion of scientific coopera­
tion derived from and reflected not only the hierarchical 
structure of scientific theory itself, but also the method 
of testing it. If theories were a type of mechanism in
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Hull's view, so too were the social groups which devised 
and tested them. Each scientist was like a gear in the 
machine of science, the output of which was the conceptual 
machine known as scientific theory. Needless to say,
Hull's status in the hierarchy of research suited his 
ambitions well. Driven by fears for his health, Hull's 
rush toward a comprehensive theory of psychology left no 
time for personal involvement in experimentation. The 
best hope of fulfilling his amibtions lay in his super­
vision of the most direct possible assault on the Integra-
126tion of psychological theory.
Conclusion
Like many of the logical empiricists, Clark Hull was 
a philosophizing scientist. He shared with them a scient­
istic attitude which colored all his thinking. Given their 
shared intellectual background— especially in British 
empiricism— and their mutual interest in logic, it is not 
surprising that their respective philosophies of science 
developed along similar lines. This chapter has described 
Hull's views in terms of four themes which, to varying 
degreees, he held in common with the European scientific 
philosophers.
Like the phvsicalism of the Vienna Circle, Hull's 
materialism stood in sharp opposition to the idealism and 
vitalism which were considered antithetical to the
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"scientific attitude." In its anti-idealist aspect,
Hullian materialism was most like the version of physicalism
espoused by Otto Neurath. Being a genuine metaphysical
commitment, it was decidedly unlike Carnap's ametaphysical
brand of physicalism. Hull was simply not a positivist
in the Vienna sense of the term. The logical empiricists
were sympathetic to mechanistic conceptions of organic
phenomena, but none developed a mechanistic philosophy to 
1 2 7any degree. Hull's mechanism, on the other hand, was
centrally related both to his materialistic philosophy and 
to his research program.
A very close intellectual convergence between Hull 
and the logical empiricists can be seen in their views on 
scientific theory and methodology. The similarity of 
these views stems from their shared emphasis on the logical 
structure of theories and extends to the associated 
doctrines of the distinction between discovery and justi­
fication, of the hypothetico-deductive method, and of the 
denial of scientific status to implicit knowledge. Des­
pite these close parallels, however, there were important 
differences between Hull and the logical positivists in 
their viewTs of logic and scientific theory. The following 
chapters will treat these divergences.
Just as r.he logical empiricists viewed the elimination 
to metaphysics from philosophy as the key to philosophical 
progress, Hull viewed its elimination from science as the
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key to scientific progress. They alike took physics as a 
model of scientific progress and saw unwarranted emotionalism 
as a serious hindrance to the extension of a physics-based 
philosophy of science to the social sciences, They further 
shared the Comtean belief that the cultivation of the 
"scientific attitude" was a basic ingredient of social 
progress.
Finally, Hull and the logical positivists held in 
common a series of closely related views on the unification 
of science. They believed first that a single method 
could be successfully applied in all the sciences, indeed 
that success in science was contingent on a unity of method. 
They believed secondly in the eventual unification of 
various desciplines through the arrangement of their laws 
in hierarchies of deductive explanation. The third shared 
view was that the unity of science should be manifested 
at the level of cooperation among groups of scientists.
To the extent that their respective views on this matter 
were explicitly formulated, they coincided in remarkable 
detail. It was this congruence of beliefs about scientific 
cooperation, more than any other aspect of their shared 
views, that led to the actual interaction of Hull with 
the logical positivists.
Like logical positivism, the Hullian philosophy of 
science represented a culmination of strong tendencies in 
Western thought. They both evolved out of and blended
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together strains of British, associationism and scientific 
monism, but their respective developments were parallel 
and independent. Hull and the logical empiricists similarly 
added to these traditions a conspicuous emphasis on logical 
methods. Without the actual logical expertise of the logi­
cal positivists, Hull remained perhaps closer philosophically 
to the German scientific monism of the nineteenth century, 
particularly in his melding of materialism, mechanism, and 
Comtean positivism. But, in itself, this was a relatively 
minor difference of focus. Especially after the broadening 
of the early logical positivism into the Unity of Science 
movement, the Hullian and logical empiricist views of 
science showed a clear and mutually recognizable kinship.
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CHAPTER 7
HULL AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM
In terms of the events which brought about the inter­
action of European logical empiricism with American psy­
chology in general, and Hullian behaviorism in particular, 
the years 1935 and 1936 were of great significance. On 
the American side, 1935 saw the beginning of a prolifera­
tion of essays on operationism in psychology. One of
S. S. Stevens's influential papers of that year contained 
references to Carnap's work, thereby introducing logical 
positivism to the readership of American psychological 
journals. In the same year, Yale's Institute of Human 
Relations began its renewed push for the integration of 
the social sciences. Hull's leading role in the Institute' 
efforts at unifying science led naturally to an interest 
in the Unity of Science movement.
On the European side of the Atlantic, the assassina­
tion of Moritz Schlick in 1936 shifted the focus of logical 
positivism from the Vienna Circle proper to the broader 
movement for the unity of science. As Charles Morris 
wrote to Neurath upon receiving word of Schlick's death, 
"The fate of the Wiener Kreis now becomes linked with the 
fate of the international movements— Vienna is no longer 
its home."^ Whether or not Schlick"s murder was an
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explicitly political act, it clearly portended the increas­
ingly inhospitable climate of Austria for those associated 
with the Vienna Circle.
At the same time the movement was being forced to 
expand geographically, it was beginning to broaden also 
in terms of the areas of science which were represented.
The Vienna Circle had been comprised predominently of 
logicians and phsycists The leadership of the Unity of 
Science movement, namely Morris and Neurath, began an 
effort in 1935 to recruit more biological and social 
scientists into their ranks. In addition to adding breadth 
to the movement, the inclusion of objectively oriented 
behavioral scientists would help to reduce skepticism 
about whether the recently adopted physicalist language 
could be a truly universal language, one that was as ade­
quate for psychology as for physics. As Morris was quick 
to point out, the expansion of the movement would necessar­
ily involve attracting more American members since European 
science was considered weakest in the biological and 
social disciplines. Even so, Morris acknowledged that where
social scientists were involved it would "be difficult to
2keep the material on a scientific level."
The important period at mid-decade reveals that 
American behavioral scientists and European positivists had 
much to offer each other. The Americans could help build 
the international base needed by the positivists to ensure
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the scope and plausibility of their movement, as well as 
its very survival in the face of a hostile environment. In 
return, the Europeans appeared to offer American psycholog­
ists a means of guaranteeing scientific status to their 
field, a model of scientific cooperation, and the logical 
expertise to integrate the fruits of their theoretical 
labors with those of the advanced sciences. The seeds of 
mutual interest were beginning to sprout,
Hull and the Unity of Science Movement
Given the extent of interests shared by Hull and the
logical empiricists, it was natural for them to join
forces. The Third International Congress for the Unity
of Science, which was held in Paris in 19.37, was devoted to
"the problems of scientific co-operation, especially in
connection with, the Encyclopedia and the unification of
3
logical symbolism." With his long-term interest in logical 
methods and his more recent involvement in the integration 
of science, Hull surely found the program attractive. His 
attendance at the Congress initiated a period of personal 
and intellectual contact with various of the figures and 
ideas associated with the Vienna Circle. At the level of 
personal contact, the interactions included visits to the 
Institute of Human Relations by Neurath in 1937, J, H. 
Woodger in 1H38, Arne Naess in 19.38-39., and Gustav Bergmann 
in 1S39. Hull also took on a modest role in the Unity of
371
Science movement, in which, he occasionally contributed 
papers and served on committees.
Despite these interactions, the influence of logical 
positivism on Hull was, perhaps not surprisingly, more to 
corroborate certain views he already held than to suggest 
new ones to him. Specific influences can be detected in 
certain additions to the vocabulary of Hull's methodological 
exhortations and in the limited assistance he received from 
J. H. Woodger in formalizing the rote learning theory 
(.see following section).. But, as we shall see, the explicit 
elaboration of a coalition between behaviorism and logical 
positivism awaited the works of Gustav Bergmann and 
Kenneth Spence, one of whose contributions was in fact the 
clarification of the divergence between Hullian theory and 
theory as classically conceived by the Vienna Circle.
The aim of the present section is simply to review 
Hull's involvement in the Unity of Science movement. The 
account will indicate the scope and limitations of this 
involvement, but the suggestion of intellectual reasons 
for its limited extent will be deferred until the next 
chapter.
One immediate consequence of Hull's attendance at 
the Paris Congress was his adoption of the phrase "logical 
empiricism" to describe the scientific procedure he was 
advocating. The phrase first appeared in a memorandum 
to his seminar in October 1937, less than three months
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after the Congress. It was also invoked in a published 
article which appeared in 1938 but was completed in Nov­
ember 1937. The expression "logico-empirical method" 
began to show up in his idea books not long thereafter. 
Similarly, in the year following his trip to Paris, Hull 
began using the term "Geisteswissenschaft" to designate 
unscientific approaches to psychology. In contrast, the
accepted approach at the IHR was, as Hull noted, "a
4
Geisteswissenschaft without the Geist."
A second consequence which quickly followed Hull's 
attendance at Paris was his being drawn into the activities 
of the Unity of Science movement. Shortly after the congress, 
Neurath reported to members of the movement's permanent 
committee that Hull was "very interested in our work," 
that he had been "very happy to meet with Woodger," and 
that he had invited Neurath to come stay with him and visit 
the Institute.”’ Neurath visited the IHR that fall, at 
which time he asked Hull to contribute to the pamphlet 
series Einheitswissenschaft and to become a member of the
g
movement's Advisory Committee. Hull accepted both invita­
tions .
Hull's brief contribution to Einheitswissenschaft 
appeared in 19.38. Being based on his remarks at the Paris 
Congress, the paper summarized the research program of 
the IHR as if had developed with Hull's guidance and pointed 
out its similarities to logical empiricism, Hull began:
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There has recently grown up in America a 
scientific development which shows certain resemb— 
lances to the approach, of the Vienna Circle, This 
movement tends to center around the Institute of 
Human Relations, at Yale University,
Proceeding to a discussion of the difficulty involyed in
coordinating researchers of diverse backgrounds/ Hull wrote;
From this difficulty has gradually evolved a method­
ology of integrating scientific effort which involves 
an intimate combination and coordination of logical 
and empirical procedures. The methodology consists 
of three phases— two empirical and one logical.
In the first phase, postulates representing basic laws of 
behavior are determined directly by experiment, Data from 
conditioning experiments are fitted by mathematical equa­
tions which serve as "first-approximation" postulates. In 
the second phase, "theorems" about observable phenomena 
are derived from the postulates "by the procedures of sym­
bolic and of ordinary mathematics." In the third phase, 
the attempt is made “to determine by observation whether 
the deduced sequels really occur." When deductions fail 
to conform to fact, the postulates are recast with the aid 
of further experiments on the basic laws. "Following such 
new postulate determinations," wrote Hull, "new implications
are drawn, new verificational investigations are set up,
7
and so on in continuously recurring cycles,"
Hull then slimmed up the three-phase procedure as 
follows;
374
The methodology begins with an empirical deter­
mination of its postulates and ends with an empiri­
cal check on the objective validity of its 
theorems; between the two there lies the inte­
grating symbolic structure of logic and mathematics.
Thus arises the kinship to ‘'logical empiricism,H 8
Hull's characterization of the relationship between his 
methodology and logical empiricism as a kinship was an 
accurate one. The relationship was certainly not one of 
identity. V7hile the logical empiricists would have 
felt sympathetic to hypothetico-deductive method in any of 
its variants, and would have especially applauded its use 
in the social sciences, they also must have found Hull's 
methodology remote from their own views in some respects.
In particular, they must have been struck by the odd notion 
that postulates could be generated directly from experi­
mental data by curve-fitting. Even if relations between 
experimental variables could plausibly be construed as 
scientific laws, such "laws" were far from qualifying as 
postulates in any formal sense. The standard logical posi­
tivist view of the early thirties had held that the axioms 
of a theory receive empirical significance when the terms 
in them are explicitly defined as equivalent to expressions 
in the observation language. But not even this simplistic 
view countenanced the Hullian idea that the level of theoret­
ical postulate might be directly invaded by experimental 
method, that lawfulness itself could rise from empirical 
relation to law and then to postulate so as to ensure
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empirical content to whole postulates and not merely to the 
q
terms in them, ' Needless to say, the notion of recurring
cycles of this procedure would also have sounded strange
to philosophers who were accustomed to applying logic to
the rational reconstruction of extant,, highly developed
theories in the physical sciences.
If Hull’s views on methodology sounded somewhat odd
to the logical positivists, his views on the unity of
science and scientific cooperation must have struck a
chord with them. The second half of his paper was devoted
to these topics. Hull wrote:
Ideally, each investigator takes his postulates 
from the level just below his specialty and the 
verified theorems deduced from them by him at his 
own level become the postulates of the men work­
ing at the next higher (more complexl level, and 
so on throughout the whole range of the phenomena 
under investigation. Thus a theoretical integra­
tion joining all levels becomes possible.
The separate theorems of such a system, to­
gether with the postulates from which they have 
been derived, present automatically an integrated 
empirical research program. . . . The methodology 
of "logical empiricism" as here interpreted 
accordingly presents a means of solving the pro­
blem of making effectively a simultaneous integrated 
and coordinated attack by many workers over a wide 
range of phenomena.
Hull then recited in order of complexity a list of twenty
problem areas ranging from the physiology of motivation to
the comparative study of primitive cultures.
Given that the theme of the conference emphasized
scientific cooperation in connection with the unification
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of logical symbolism, Hull’s contribution could hafdly have 
been more fitting- Here was a clear statement of his sugges­
tion that the coordination of scientific efforts be. based 
on the logical integration of theory. Indeed, logical 
integration was said to provide "automatically" for social 
cooperation. It mattered little that Hull’s prescription 
was based more on faith than on accomplishment or that his 
methodology was peculiar- In Hull's statement was a vision 
of unity that went beyond the mere unity of terminology 
promised by the doctrine of physicalism. Furthermore, it 
was coming from a psychologist, one who was influential in 
America and who was pressing the objectivist attack into 
the heart of the social sciences. It is thus not surprising 
that Neurath wasted no time in making contact with the 
Institute and enlisting Hull's aid in promoting the Unity 
of Science movement.
When the movement held its first congress in America 
in 1939, Hull served on its American Organizing Committee. 
However, he was unable to attend the congress because of 
psychology meetings being held in California at the same 
time. The next congress was held at the University 
of Chicago in 1941. Neurath and Morris planned as part 
of it a special symposium on psychology and scientific 
method. Hull was invited to be a principal speaker, along 
with Lewin and Brunswik. After accepting the invitation,
Hull wrote to Morris that he "would like very much, to
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make the acquaintance of the active American members of
11this exceedingly important movement." This remark
suggests that while Hull was an enthusiastic supporter
of the movement, he was not highly involved in it.
The title originally submitted for his presentation
was "The Objective versus Subjective Approach to a Scient-
ific Theory of Behavior." The title captured a familiar
but perhaps overly general theme and was later changed to
"The Problem of Intervening Variables and of Intuitional
Irrationality in Molar Behavior Theory." This change was
evidently made in an attempt to target the anthropomorphism
which Hull saw as the great shrotcoming of the Berkeley
approach; but when Brunswik avoided any semblance of
anthropomorphism in his address, Hull again revised the
title and published the paper as "The Problem of Inter-
12vening Variables m  Molar Behavior Theory."
The paper began predictably with an acknowledgement
of the general convergence between logical positivism
and behaviorism. Hull wrote:
There is a striking and significant similarity 
between the physicalism doctrine of the logical 
positivists CVienna Circle) and the approach 
characteristic of the American behaviorism orir 
ginating in the work of J. B. Watson. Intimately 
related to both of the above movements are the 
pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey on the one 
hand, and the operationism of Bridgman, Boring, 
and Stevens, on the other. These several 
methodological movements, together with the pio­
neering experimental work of Pavlov and the other 
Russian reflexologists, are, I believe, uniting 
to produce in America a behavioral discipline
which will be a full-blown natural science; this 
means it may be expected to possess not only the 
basic empirical component of natural science, but 
a genuinely scientific theoretical component as 
well. It is with, the latter that the present paper
is primarily concerned.13
Hull felt that the empirical component of psychology had 
more than enough defenders and viewed himself as a rare 
champion of the theoretical component. Accordingly he 
was eager to argue his own brand of theory against Brunswik' 
particularly in regard to two points. First, whereas 
Brunswik had claimed that the laws of molar behavior were 
necessarily probablistic, Hull held them to be uniform and 
exact. Secondly, whereas Brunswik was Cat that time! 
claiming to eschew intervening variables, Hull was eagerly 
embracing them. These two points, the uniformity of law 
and the legitimacy of intervening variables, were closely 
related in Hull's thinking. The equations which would 
express the exact causal laws were presumed to provide the 
determinate linkages between intervening variables and 
their "anchors," namely the observable antecendent and 
consequent variables. Causal uniformities and intervening 
variables were mainstays of his Principles, which he was 
writing at that time, so he was duly eager to defend these 
positions in advance of the book's appearance.
On the first point of dispute, Brunswik had asserted 
that since the environment is composed of probabilistic 
event sequences, the organism can adapt to it at best
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optimally, but never perfectly. As a consequence, he
maintained that the laws- of molar behavior should themelves
14be probabilistic, Hull, of course, viewed such an
approach as an unjustified and defeatist resort to 
probabilism. He preferred to carry on the search for uni­
form causal laws expressed as mathematical equations. Any
variability in these laws, he argued, could be attributed 
to limitations on the precision with which values of variables 
and constants could be determined. The equations themselves 
would continue to capture causal sequences even when the 
measured values which went into the equations were less 
than e x a c t . I n  a typical rhetorical gesture, Hull inti­
mated that he could derive from his own behavioral laws the 
type of correlations found by Brunswik in his vision studies. 
"If Brunswik is prepared publicly to challenge the possib­
ility of such a derivation," Hull wrote, "I am prepared 
to attempt it and publish in this journal the outcome, 
whatever it turns out to be."^
For his part, Brunswik felt that his views had been 
misunderstood and misrepresented by Hull, and that they 
were complementary rather than contradictory to Hull’s.
Indeed, Brunswik and Hull seemed to be speaking past each 
other, as often happens when differences spring from sub­
merged presuppositions. In this case, those presuppositions 
involved no less than deeply rooted conceptions of nature 
itself. Under the influence of Reichenbach and with the
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collaboration of Tolman, Brunswik viewed the natural world 
as a loosely woven texture of probabilistic event sequences. 
As a committed mechanist, Hull saw the world at large as 
a machine governed by a rigid structure of causality. Be­
cause both men were ardent environmentalists, they believed 
alike that the behavior of organisms takes on the structure 
of the enviornment, Without realizing it, they also 
agreed that the structure of behavioral theories should 
mirror the behavior in their domain. Hence, it was agree­
ment on intermediate issues that brought the deeper diver­
gence to the surface in the form of an unfruitful "method­
ological" dispute.
The second point of contention between Brunswik and 
Hull, namely that of the legitimacy of intervening variables, 
likewise rested on a deeper issue, Brunswik's major objec­
tion to their use seemed to be that since they represented 
intra-organismic processes, they would draw attention away 
from the all-important environment. In Brunswik's termin­
ology, "psychological ecology" was properly a precursor 
to "ecological psychology." But there was another, perhaps 
more compelling reason for a probabilistic functionalist 
to doubt the practicability of intervening variables. For 
an advocate of strict causality like Hull, the widely 
acknowledged drawback of intervening variables— their 
unobservable status— was compensated for by the fact that 
they could be causally linked to observables, For the
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advocate of probabilism, however, they could be only 
probabilistically related to observables, in which case 
their inherent unobservability counted seriously against 
them.
Despite this added difficulty of intervening variables
on the probabilist view, Brunswik did not object in principle
to their use. Hull even argued, on dubitable grounds, that
Brunswik had invoked them in his studies on visual con- 
17stancy. In any case, Brunswik's skepticism concerning
their value provided Hull with an occasion to rise to their
defense. One line of defense was to argue, as had Tolman,
that intervening variables were in fact widely used,
implicitly or explicitly, in theories of behavior. To this
end, Hull presented diagrams purportedly representing the
role of intervening variables in the formulations of various
theorists. Perhaps to highlight the kinship of behaviorism
and logical positivism, Hull included Carnap among them.
Referring to Carnap's treatment of anger in Philosophy and
Logical Syntax (19351, Hull depicted anger (see figure) as a
variable intervening between antecedent stimulus conditions
*
CSI and the observable response (Rl. The functions f^  
and linking anger




At the crudest level, Hull was correct in stressing 
that he and Carnap agreed on the legitimacy of introducing 
unobservables into psychological theory. At any other 
level, however, Hull had misrepresented Carnap’s approach 
and had done so in ways that minimized the differences 
between their approaches. In his 1935 monograph, Carnap 
had spoken only of equivalences, either analytic or syn­
thetic, between statements about anger and statements
19about bodily states of dispositions. Nowhere had he 
specified those equivalences as quantitative functions. Nor 
had he spoken at all of antecedent stimuli or consequent 
responses. Thus, Hull not only showed a limited under­
standing of Carnap's early view of theoretical concepts but
he also showed no awareness of the important changes in
20Carnap's position after 1935.
In sum, Hull's involvement in the Unity of Science 
movement is revealing in both its extent and its limitations. 
Hull shared with the movement's major figures a general 
outlook and certain specific views on the integration of 
science. He recognized in these shared ideas a broad 
confluence of movements which he enthusiastically welcomed.
He happily lent his name and prestige to the Unity of 
Science movement and contributed papers to its congresses.
But the kinship which Hull perceived between behaviorism and 
logical positivism was no more than a kinship. He adopted 
snippets of the jargon of logical positivism, but he was in
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no way a serious student of its philosophical stances 
and appeared not even to follow important developments in 
its basic doctrines.
Woodger and Formalized Theory
Shared Views of Science
In 1929, the British biologist Joseph Henry Woodger
21published a book entitled Biological Principles in which
he applied the linguistic analysis characteristic of the
Cambridge philosophers to various concepts and issues of
biology. He claimed to show that many biological disputes
were due to the lack of clarity in the concepts used or to
the intrusion of unnecessary metaphysical influences. In
the further pursuit of these claims, he turned during the
early thirties to the application of the new symbolic logic
to the formalization of biological theory. With the help
of Carl Hempel and Olaf Helmer, who were associated with
the Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy, Woodger studied
the Principia Mathematics. At the First International
Congress for the Unity of Science in 1935, he gave a paper
on "An Axiom System for Biology." He then enlisted the
assistance of Rudolf Carnap and Alfred Tarski in expanding
the work into his 1937 volume The Axiomatic Method in 
22Biology.
It was in 1937, at the Third International Congress
for the Unity of Science, that Woodger met Hull in what
seemed to be a highly auspicious encounter. At that time,
Hull was, as we have seen, becoming disillusioned with the
geometrical method as it had been used in his miniature
systems. The 1935 system, as he put it, "revealed serious
defects . . .  as to the versatility of the geometrical
methodology for mediating quantitative deductions in the
23field of behavior." Already for some years he had been 
impressed with the potential of the PM logic for system­
atizing his theoretical efforts. Here at the congress 
was Woodger who had just completed his application of 
logistic technique to biological theory. Hull’s inclina­
tion toward symbolic logic was sharply strengthened by 
this meeting with Woodger. Somewhat later he recorded 
that Woodger "had convinced us of the indispensability 
of the methods and symbolism of symbolic logic for the 
rigorous formulation fo definitions and postulates in 
any genuinely scientific system.
The two men were obviously drawn together, not only
by their interest in logic, but more importantly by its
application to "dynamic natural-science systems" in the 
25life sciences. For both, symbolic logic was no mere 
tool for reconstructing previously established theories 
but rather a potent means for clarifying and evaluating 
new ones; it offered a methodology for scientific acitivity,
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2 6not just a post hoc system for displaying results. That 
this attitude toward the use of logic came from two life 
scientists was no coincidence. Whereas the mathematicians 
and physicists of the Vienna and Berlin groups had a stock 
of highly developed theories on which to perform their 
rational reconstructions, Woodger and Hull were restricted 
to the relatively inchoate theoretical efforts of the 
social and biological disciplines. As a consequence, their 
adaptation of logistic techniques involved an important, 
but not clearly 'perceived, shift in emphasis from the use 
of those techniques for reconstruction per se to their 
use in methodology. As we shall see, the resulting ambi­
guity later contributed to misunderstandings about the use 
of "axiomatic" methods in psychology.
Hull found in* Woodger not only an expert in applied 
symbolic logic but also one who shared his optimism about 
the benefits of deductive methodology. Like Hull, Woodger 
was convinced that the clarity introduced by such, methods 
would effectively combat undesi'red metaphysical influences 
and eliminate needless controversy. He wrote, for instance, 
that
a wider diffusion of a knowledge of modern dis­
coveries relating to logic would dispel a good 
deal of the prevailing confusion (which shows 
itself from time to time in the controversies 
which disfigure the pages of Nature}, concerning 
topics which are usually included under the 
title 'methodology,' such as the relation of 
mathematics to natural science, 1 the logic of 
science,n the relation of science to meta­
physics, and kindred subjects,27
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The key to realizing such benefits was the development
of "an ideal scientific language" because, according to
Woodger, "if we have a perfect language we need not dispute,
28we need only calculate and experiment." Hull's vision 
of scientific salvation was more focussed on deductive 
method itself, and Woodger's more on linguistic construc­
tion, but the outcome was the same. Science would become 
a sort of smooth-running conceptual and social machinery; 
unity of method and theory would give rise to scientific 
and social cooperation. Hull and Woodger had arrived in 
parallel at a modern version of the Leibnizian dream.
The division of labor which Hull had conceived and 
in part enacted at the Institute of Human Relations had 
its counterpart in Woodger's thought. In his contribution 
to the Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Woodger concluded 
with a colorful revision of Francis Bacon’s fantasy 
New Atlantis, in which Bacon had laid out a blueprint for 
cooperation at a futuristic college of science. In Woodger*s 
version, certain knowledgeable individuals called Lamps 
are assigned the duty of conceiving new hypotheses. Each 
hypothesis so conceived is written on a card in the uni­
versal symbolic langauge and sent to a worker called a Cal­
culator. Woodger continued:
The Calculator operates a gigantic calculating 
machine, like our machines but of very much wider 
scope, being capable of working out the conse­
quences of any hypothesis which can be formulated 
in the universal notation, . . . The consequences
of the new hypothesis . . , are then shot out of 
the machine printed on cards.29
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From among these, the Sorters then select novel and non­
trivial consequences and send them to the Inoculators for 
experimental tests. The empirical results are given to 
the Lamps for use in future hypothesizing as well as to 
the Compilers who keep an index of all the postulates and 
scrutinize them for "mutual relations." Woodger's pic­
ture of science was quite close to Hull’s, especially in 
it striking emphasis on the related unities of scientific 
method and activity, and even on the automatic qualities 
of each,^
Both Hull and Woodger were motivated by the per­
ceived imbalance in their respective disciplines between 
the relatively well-developed empirical component and the 
regrettably underdeveloped theoretical component. Both 
looked to logic, in particular that of the Princlpia 
Mathematica, as the means of systematizing their fields.
With that background and the shared views of science which 
grew out of it, they were similarly drawn toward the Unity 
of Science movement. But their shared belief that logic 
would ensure clarity, understanding, and cooperation did 
not automatically guarantee that they would themselves come 
to a full mutual understanding, much less that others 
would understand their uses of logic. As it turned out, 
logic in either its pure or applied form was itself sub­
ject to controversy and conflicting interpretations. Conse­
quently it proved to be no surer a route to forging a 
consensus on scientific matters than did operationism.
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The Problem of Definition in Formal Theory
Woodger's book on axiomatic technique in biology
was completed in July 1937, the same month in which he
met Hull at the Paris Congress. Like Neurath, he wasted
little time in getting to the IHR to pursue the interests
he held in common with Hull. He applied to the Rockefeller
Foundation for a fellowship to work with Hull and Fitch
on systematizing the rote learning theory, gained approval
of the grant in September of that year, and spent nine
weeks at the IHR in early 1938.^ Woodger had felt that
two or three months would be adequate time to effect an
axiomatization, but there arose various difficulties which
prevented an easy accomplishment of the task, Hull later
wrote that Woodger
worked with me on the problem a good many weeks but 
was forced to return to London before anything 
publishable was written. Largely because of the 
delay of the mail in crossing the Atlantic at that 
time we were unable to complete what Woodger had 
begun, so that . . . Fitch . . . finally wrote
out the eighty-six definitions and formulated the 
eighteen postulates in symbolic l o g i c ,32
Woodger did eventually complete a formalization of a small
portion of the rote learning theory and presented it at
33the 1938 Congress for the Unity of Science. But by then, 
the application of symbolic logic to the theory was in 
Fitch's hands.
With his background in the Cambridge style of con­
ceptual analysis, as pursued in his 1929 book, Woodger's
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formal approach, placed emphasis on the clarification and de­
finition of terms from ordinary and scientific discourse rather 
than on the analysis of axiom systems or quantitative laws.
Even with his subsequent interest in axiomatics, Woodger viewed 
the construction of formal vocabulary from the scientific 
languages as prior to the use of that vocabulary in state­
ments or deductive hierarchies of statements. "In employing 
the logistic method," Woodger wrote, "we make use of the 
results of the logistic analysis of ordinary language for
the more exact systematization of the branch of science with
34which we are concerned." In effect, Woodger was working
upward from the conceptual base rather than downward from
an axiom system. His approach was that of constructive
35rather than deductive axiomatics.
Partly as a consequence of Woodger's focus on con­
cepts per se, he and Hull met with difficulties in working 
out the equations in Hull's system. As we have seen, 
one of the stated reasons for Hull's dissatisfaction in 
the mid-thirties with the geometrical method was that it 
had proven awkward in dealing with quantitative deductions. 
Spurred by Tolman's development of the intervening variable 
paradigm, Hull was increasingly using equation and had 
even hired mathematicians to help with their formulation. 
Woodger, on the other hand, had formalized only non- 
quantitative systems. The seriousness of the problems 
confronting Hull and Woodger is suggested in a passage
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in Hull1s idea books in which the attempt is made to
revise the basic dependent variable of reaction potential
(E). The passage is titled "New start on a theory of E"
and begins with the following statement:
The great difficulty encountered^by Woodger in 
securing a logical statement of E because of 
the finite size of R forces us to seek some other 
way of stating the matter, because the mathe­
matics seems to work out all right except that 
some of the expressions can't be solved.36
While such technical problems occupied much of the 
attention of Hull and Woodger, a deeper confusion con­
cerning the use of equations in theoretical psychology 
involved intervening variables, which by their very 
nature were unobservable. Hull had already arrived at 
his general notion that unobservables could be legitimized 
by being linked to antecedent and consequent observables. 
But for a rigorous way of applying this vague dictum to 
definitions in his system, Hull looked to Woodger. From 
Woodger's rather ambiguous statements on the matter of 
definition Hull drew an interpretation of the place of 
unobservables in a formal system which would become a 
significant source of misunderstanding.
Early in his visit to the IHR, Woodger wrote and 
distributed to Hull's seminar a lengthy memorandum entitled
"Brief Statement of What is Involved in the Formalization 
37of a Theory." In it, he outlined, m  the order to be 
carried out, the four basic steps in formalizing a theory.
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They were (.1) the choice of fundamental (.undefined) 
terms; (2). the construction of defined terms from the 
fundamental terms via explicit definitions; C3) the 
formulation of statements using the vocabulary thus de­
fined and the choice among them of those statements which 
conform empirically to the facts and logically to the rest 
of the theory; and (4) the search for consequence relations 
among the accepted statements so that they might be ordered 
into a deductive system. Even from this scant summary, 
it is clear that Woodger1s formalization differed sharply 
from the Hilbert style of deductive axiomatics, which 
began with the choice of an uninterpreted deductive sys­
tem and worked downward by a process of empirical inter­
pretation. Woodger1s emphasis on explicit definition 
(in the sense of definition by biconditional), as the means 
of building up the language from primitive terms was 
also significant, for it neglected important liberaliza­
tions in the logical positivist notion of empirical defini­
tion. Woodger did in fact give passing mention to
Carnap's recently devised reduction sentences in a foot-
3 8note of his memorandum; but as we have seen, Hull was 
interested in rigid logical connections between concepts 
and remained oblivious to the newer and looser versions 
of empirical definition.
Hull1s immediate problem was to ensure the legitimacy 
of intervening variables in the face of their inherent
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unobservability. In Woodger1s exposition of fundamental
terms, Hull found the following account of how meaning is
imparted to them:
Their meaning should be clear to whoever is con— 
structing the system and it should be possible to 
make their meaning clear to anyone else either by 
verbal explication (which would not itself be 
part of the system) or through the part they play 
in the system when the latter is finally con— 
structed.39
The second alternative amounted a peculiar sort of implicit 
definition, not the usual sort in which the term gets its 
meaning from its place in an abstract axiom system set 
up ab initio, but rather from its role-to-be as the system 
is developed. The first alternative was also not a 
typical feature of the standard deductive axiomatics. For 
Woodger, it would have involved explicating the term as it 
is commonly used, i.e., performing a bit of ordinary lan­
guage analysis. For Hull, who was not well-versed in
either logistic technique or linguistic analysis, the two 
alternatives were rather ambiguous directives.
This ambiguity left Hull with ample room for inter­
pretive license in applying the two strategies to the 
problem of the intervening variables. As he pushed the 
rote learning monograph to its completion in late 1939., 
he alternatively tried out the verbal explication techni­
que and an adaptation of the implicit definition approach. 
When he turned to the method of verbal explanation, he saw 
it as a way to fit operational definition into his
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postulational technique. As we shall see below, the attempt 
to do so resulted in the confusing and incongruous situation 
of his giving operational definitions to the "undefined" terms 
in his system. The following section will review Hull's 
efforts, in the wake of Woodger's visit to the IHR, to sys- 
tematize the rote learning theory. The key problem in this 
enterprise proved to be that of defining the intervening 
variables,
The Definition of Intervening Variables
In the fall of 1938, Hull drew up a concise statement 
of the roles played by mathematics and symbolic logic in sci­
entific method. As recorded in his idea book, the statement 
read:
Scientific method in. theory needs:
1. Mathematics to mediate metricized implications
of the postulates.
2. Symbolic logic to mediate,
A. the drawing of implication from qualitative 
postulates
B. the precise formulation of all postulates
C. the differentiation of the terms left 
undefined from those to be defined-
D. the actual definition of the terms to be
defined. 4 0.
The notion represented in point 2C to the effect that logic 
could distinguish terms to be defined from those to -be 
left undefined was characteristic of Hull's overly optim­
istic faith in logic. Woodger had left the determination 
of undefined terms, in the spirit of the principle of 
tolerance, as a matter to be decided by careful considera­
tion of the system being formalized. In any case, Woodger's
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visit had failed to produce any consensus on the issue, 
and Hull continued to struggle with the problem.
In Hull's view, intervening variables could be
assured of having scientific status by being linked to
antecedent and consequent variables. This meant that,
in principle at least, the intervening variables could
always be given definitions in terms of observables, As
Hull put it, "all unobservables must ultimately Cbel
linked logically in a strict manner in a more or less
complicated way to either one, or a combination of, the
observables in order to mean anything," But, he added,
while this seems to be almost certainly true, 
it happens that, at least in the rote learning 
theory, such a form of definition would be 
exceedingly involved and quite unintelligible 
to all but the most sophisticated, It is fairly 
clear that such a procedure is an exceedingly 
inconvenient form of procedure, to say the 
least. For this reason it becomes very desir­
able to see whether the canon of being able to 
observe both Cantecedent and consequent link­
ages 3 cannot be conformed to when the unobserv­
ables are placed in the undefined notions?4d
This comment, coming shortly after the above quoted formula­
tion of the role of logic, indicates that Hull was pre­
pared to give up the presumed logical criteria for 
differentiating defined and undefined terms and adopt 
instead a pragmatic basis for the decision. This was, of 
course, not the only case in which Hull gave expedience 
priority over rigor, and without an accompanying reduction 
in the rhetoric of objectivism. But it was a significant
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case because it involved the very roots of his claim to 
objectivity, namely his systematic approach to theory.
The possibility of leaving unobservables undefined 
went against Hull's own conditions of linkage to observ­
ables, but he pursued the idea nonetheless. Speaking of 
those conditions of observability, he wrote;
Upon further reflection and conference with 
Dr. Fitch, it rather seems as if Cthey1 may be 
satisfied perfectly well even though the unobserv-^ - 
ables were all placed among the undefined notions. 
After all, whether Ltheyl are conformed to depends, 
in the final analysis, upon the statement of the 
theorems. If they conform, everything will be
all right.42
Then, after considering a couple of examples, Hull con­
cluded, "Thus, apparently, the problem finds solution at 
43last." Given the emphasis placed by Hull himself and 
other methodologists of the time on the empirical defin­
ability of unobservables, this was a peculiar solution 
indeed. In effect, it constituted a sort of implicit 
definition, as in Woodger's second alternative, by which 
the terms derived their meaning from their context in the 
theory, but in the absence of the usual uninterpreted 
axiom system.
Having worked on the rote learning monograph for a 
period of several years, Hull viewed it as a long overdue 
predecessor to an eventual magnum opus, a ground-breaker 
to establish the viability of his deductive methodology. 
As he stated in the preface of the work, "its chief value
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consists in the large-scale pioneering demonstration of the
44logico-empirical methodology in the field of behavior,”
As to the problem of defining unobservables., the "solution"
arrived at by him and Fitch was realized in the text by
placing such terms as "stimulus trace" and "inhibitory
45potential" among the undefined concepts. The hypothetical 
and unobservable nature of these concepts was explicitly 
recognized in the material accompanying their introduction 
as undefined concepts. For example, Hull wrote:
The concept stimulus trace has substantially 
the status of a symbolic or logical construct.
While there are physiological indications that 
the expression represents an entity which may 
ultimately be observable in some indirect manner, 
for the present purposes it may be regarded as 
an unobservable. The existence of this hypo- 
th|£ical entity is explicitly assumed by Postulate
As will be discussed in the following ..section, 
various criticisms expressed during the writing of the 
Mathematico-Deductive Theory made Hull aware of the 
inappropriateness of assigning unobservables to the cate^ - 
gory of the undefined terms. In his idea book of that 
time, Hull wrote the following entry:
It seems very clear from the criticisms 
which have been leveled at my two miniature for­
mal systems together with the experience in the 
writing of the rote-learning monograph, that I 
really must make the greatest possible effort to 
state all the undefined notions in terms such 
that they may be directly observed for this is^y 
the real virtue of the "operational" movement.
397
Hull was just coining to grips with operationism at this 
time (see below)., and he viewed it as a means of expli­
cating the undefined terms in his system, much in the manner 
of Woodger's first alternative strategy. At the time it 
provided a way to avoid the awkward treatment of the 
unobservable concepts as undefined. This had become 
apparent to Hull by the time the rote-learning volume was 
nearing completion. In the conclusion to it, he wrote:
In the statement of the groundwork of the.system, 
the undefined notions are formally defective in a 
number of cases in that they do not represent 
observable objects, processes, or operations, 
either logical or experimental. More specifically, 
it is believed that several of the undefined 
notions (logical signs1, including all those 
representing unobservables, should have appeared 
among the defined terms. Presumably the next 
attempt at a formalization of rote-learning 
theory should make this correction one of its 
earliest objectives. . . . Here, evidently, is a 
place where the principles of ''operationism," . 
with their very real scientific virtues, should
be applied.4 8
Without acknowledging them as such, Hull had already
employed operational definitions in the rote learning
theory. Indeed, of the sixteen "undefined" concepts,
the majority were actually given operational definitions.
To cite but one example, the concept of "syllable exposure"
was characterized as a "class of events each of which may
be described as the stationary presence in the window of
a memory machine , . . of a syllable consisting of a vowel
placed between consonants in a combination not used as a
49word by the subject." As Bergmann and Spence were to
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point out shortly thereafter (see below), most of Hull's 
defined and undefined terms were in reality operationally 
defined, the difference between them consisting for the 
most part only in the length of their defining expressions. 
Thus, Hull was not only placing unobservable terms among 
the undefined terms, in abrogation of the usual empiri­
cist methods, but he was also placing operationally defined 
terms among them, in contrast with the usual formalist 
practice of giving undefined terms only implicit defini­
tions .
To summarize, Hull's confusing use of axiomatic 
technique came about as the result of a rather peculiar 
set of circumstances. When Woodger came to the IHR to 
help axiomatize the rote learning theory, he brought 
with him an emphasis on constructive axiomatics and- ordi­
nary language analysis, neither of which was typical of 
the standard formalist approach to axiomatization. As 
a formalizer of biological theory, he lacked any particular 
experience with formalizing the sort of equations and 
quantitative methods which Hull was becoming interested 
in at the time. He was apparently not especially alert 
to the more sophisticated versions of empirical defini^ 
tion, or at least did not convey them effectively to 
Hull as a possible means of treating intervening variables. 
By the time Woodger returned to England, the hoped-for 
systematization had not materialized, and the task was
left to Hull and Fitch. The final decision on which terms 
to use as primitives had not been made— even though this 
was to have been the first step in a formalization— so in 
accordance with their apparent license in the matter, Hull 
and Fitch chose on grounds of expository convenience to 
include unobservables among the undefined terms. Adapting 
Woodger's strategy of verbal explication to the current 
operationist drive in psychology, Hull gave what amounted 
to operational definitions, without calling them such, to 
the observable undefined concepts. Woodger had con­
tributed to this latter difficulty in part by speaking of 
the defined concepts of a system as being explicitly 
defined (i.e., by biconditionals} in terms of the primitive 
(undefined! concepts; many of Hull's concepts could not 
literally qualify as defined terms under this strict view 
of definition and so were relegated, with or without 
operational definitions, to the realm of undefined terms.
Hull's curious use of axiomatic methods was thus 
a cumulative effect of a series of ambiguities and partial 
misunderstandings. There was (.11 an underlying ambiguity 
as to the nature of axiomatics, depending on whether it 
worked constructively from the empirical language upward 
or deductively from an axiomatic calculus downward. As 
a consequence, there was C21 a conflation of the empirical 
and formal senses of the distinction between defined and 
undefined concepts. Despite his generally constructivist
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orientation, Woodger seemed to make explicit definability 
the criterion of definability, in the manner of deductive 
axiomatics. This encouraged in Hull the misleading tend­
ency to indiscriminately give operational (i.e., empirical) 
definitions to defined and undefined terms. This' con­
fusion was heightened by (.31 a general lack of sophistica­
tion regarding the problem of empirical definition.
Hull's system was a relatively complex one and might have 
benefitted from the application of refined techniques of 
empirical definition. But Woodger's use of linguistic 
analysis, in particular his strategy of verbally expli­
cating undefined concepts, reinforced Hull's conception of 
operationism, a conception made somewhat naive by its 
neglect of such developments as reduction sentences.
Hull and Fitch were both acquainted with Principia 
Mathematica and Woodger*s Axiomatic Method in Biology, but 
had not become directly familiar with the axiomatic tech­
nique, e.g., of Carnap or Tarski, that was more typical 
of the Vienna approach. The logics to which they made 
reference in the Mathematico-Deductive Theory were those 
of Cohen and Nagel, John Dewey, and Lewis and Langford,5 1^ 
As we shall see in the following chapter, this fact is 
symptomatic of their general rejection of certain logical 
views held by the Vienna Circle, For our present pur­
poses, the significance of this fact is that Hull and 
Fitch were not aware, and perhaps had no reason to be
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aware, of the differences between the usual logical positi­
vist approach to axiomatics and their own approach Cor 
that of Woodger1 to the systematization of theory. The task 
of clarifying that divergence fell to those who were 
intimately familiar with the Vienna Circle's account of 
deductive theory, namely Gustav Bergmann and Feigl1s 
student Sigmund Koch Csee next section!,
As has already been shown, Hull and Woodger shared 
a good many views on the nature of science in general and 
a strong desire to systematize theory in the life sciences. 
If anyone could have brought the abstract machinery of 
modern logic to bear on the intricacies of behavior theory, 
Woodger and Hull seemed to be the ones to do it. Yet 
they failed for a variety of reasons to close that gap 
between the formally structured world of logic and the com­
plex and fluid world of empirical data. This failure has 
been recalled by two of those who worked with Hull on 
his efforts at systematization. According to the logician 
Fitch,
Woodger tried somewhat in vain to teach logic to 
Hull. Woodger believed that logic, especially 
that of the Principia Mathematica, was essentially 
teachable, but he did not realize that some people, 
such as Hull, find it hard to assimilate. Finally 
Woodger gave up and returned to England somewhat 
disillusioned. This more or less ended the rela­
tionship between Hull and Woodger.51
The behaviorist Ellson, who also worked on the formalization
of Hullian theory, has stated that "Woodger was rejected
by Hull because his theorizing was only vaguely Cor in
52principle) connected to data." From the logical per­
spective, Hull was seen as insufficiently versed in logical 
technique; from the persepective of psychology, Woodger was 
seen as insufficiently in contact with the necessary empiri­
cal groundwork. Thus, there is evidence that the confusion 
and misunderstanding, as reviewed above, which stemmed from 
their joint efforts was partly an unfortunate but natural out­
come of their respective limitations in the knowledge of each 
other's field of expertise.
In important respects, Hull's interaction with Woodger 
can be viewed as "representative of the relationship between 
behaviorism and logical positivism. As we saw in the preceding 
section, Hull's involvement with the Unity of Science movement 
was based on a general confluence of views on science, but not 
on either agreements on detail or any serious mutual scholarly 
interest. Much the same might be said of Hull' s involvement 
with Woodger, The two held strikingly similar views of sci­
ence in general, of the role of deductive methods, of the in­
adequacies of theories in the life sciences, and of the unity 
of science. They shared an ideal vision of science and em­
ployed similar rhetoric to advance their ideals. But those 
ideals proved difficult to realize. The shared notion that de­
ductive methods could force consensus on scientific matters 
could not be made practicable, at least in psychology, by two 
of its more able and zealous advocates. The reasons for 
this failure were not simple, but they began with the fact
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that axiomatization was not itself an unequivocal enter­
prise and extended through nearly every facet of its 
attempted implementation. As proved to be the case with 
operationism, the very means of eliminating controversy 
turned out to be controversial in its own right.
For all of Hull's talk about the use of symbolic 
logic in behavior theory, the actual achievements of Hull 
and Fitch in that respect were rather limited. The defini­
tions and postulates of the Mathematico-Deductive Theory 
were stated in symbolic logic, but the theorems and 
corollaries were not. Only one of the theorems was derived 
in symbolic logic. Concerning the ideals of logical 
methodology that were laid out in the introduction of the 
volume, Hull noted somewhat apologetically, "Despite our 
best efforts we have probably attained none of these
ideals completely, and a number have not been approached 
53even closely." Hull had expended a great deal of effort 
in what had been conceived as a relatively simple demonstra­
tion of formal methods, and it had cost him years in the 
pursuit of his magnum opus.
With the rote learning book, in all its acknowledged 
imperfection, behind him, Hull turned to his work on the 
Principles of Behavior. In it, he judiciously abandoned 
the relatively unfruitful emphasis on formalization, 
although he still followed the practice of stating postu­
lates and theorems. In the Principles and subsequent
work, Hull's intense penchant for rigor found expression 
instead in his use of equations and quantification. His 
retreat from explicit formalism was not, however, accom­
panied by a retreat in the rhetoric of deductive method­
ology. He was well aware that by this time he had 
become the leading proponent of deductive psychology, and 
fanned by the input of logical positivism, the blooming 
preoccupation of American psychologists with postulational 
technique created a lively interest in Hullian theory.
In spite of its shortcomings, the Mathematico-Deductive
54Theory enjoyed a generally favorable reception, and 
Hull's faith in his methodological ideals remained firm.
The interest jointly spurred by Hull's ideals and the 
inception of logical positivism gave rise to a body of 
literature in the American psychology journals on logical 
methods. This literature is treated in the following sec­
tion .
The Logic of Theory Construction 
The Logic Boom in Psychology
In the psychological literature of the late thirties, 
the theoretical efforts of Hull and Kurt Lewin were often 
taken as signs of an important new turn in theoretical 
psychology. The apparent rigor of their formulations signi 
fied to many observers of the psychological scene that
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psychology had reached a new level of maturity. One aspect 
of this maturity was psychology's entering a new working 
relationship with philosophy, a relationship viewed as like 
that between physics and philosophy. For those observers 
who had been conscious, and perhaps critical, of psychology's 
divorce from philosophy, the use by Hull and Lewin of logic 
and mathematics suggested a cautious but promising return 
to the mother discipline. In his presidential address to 
the APA in 1938, John F. Dashiell depicted psychology 
returning to philosophy, hot for content, but for method­
ology and logic. One writer in the Psychological Review 
of 1939. asserted that "The fact that psychology was cut 
off from its formerly more intimate contact with logic 
has been particularly detrimental to the progress of 
psychology," but that the situation was currently being 
corrected. Another writer in that volume saw in "the erec­
tion of systematic constructions" the promise of a "new
55fusion between science and philosophy."
The theoretical formulations of Hull and Lewin were 
also celebrated as marking the end of a period of over­
concern on the part of psychologists with the mere collec­
tion of facts. The imbalance which Hull and Woodger 
had perceived between the empirical and theoretical efforts 
of their sciences was also perceived by those who welcomed 
the use of rigorous logic in psychological theory. For 
example, James Grier Miller wrote that:
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Techniques for obtaining extremely accurate 
data have been developed in many fields of psy­
chology, but the theoretical tools with which 
these data are manipulated have not received 
commensurate development. Clumsy theoretical 
treatment of accurate results has often rendered 
insignificant the numbers in their decimal places, 
and made of no avail the experimental care taken 
to make these values accurate.56
Miller went on to recommend the use of Priricip.ia Mathematics
logic for achieving precision in theoretical formulations.
Similarly, L. 0. Katsoff decried the accumulation of "fact
piled on fact" in the absence of theoretical systems.
"The result of the revolt against systems without facts,"
57he wrote, "seemed to be facts without systems." Both 
Miller and Katsoff pointed to Hull’s work as a major step ■ 
in the direction of correcting this imbalance.
Hull's theoretical efforts had clearly struck a
chord with those who longed for rigorous formulations in
psychology. His work, like Lewin's, was seized upon as
an auspicious indicator of future advances. Psychology was
said to be "in the throes of a far-reaching methodological
renaissance," and it was claimed that "the demand for
'postulates,' 'derivations,' and ’theorems' has already
5 8become a must in the 1939. psychological dialect." Just 
how widespread this enthusiasm for theoretical rigor really 
was is difficult to assess in retrospect; certainly Hull 
had found it widespread enough to make propagandistic 
use of it. Now in the late thirties, Hull's approach to 
theorizing was beginning to be associated in the literature
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59with logical positivism. As a consequence, the growing 
popularity of logical positivism, its prestige, and the 
zealous style with which it was advocated contributed to 
the enthusiasm for the Hullian approach to psychology.
But despite the various prominent endorsements of
rigorous theorizing, the literature on symbolic technique
in psychology exhibited remarkably little unanimity on
where Hull's accomplishments stood with respect to the ideals
of logical technique, or, for that matter, just what
those ideals were. As Hull had done in his miniature sys~
tems of 1935 and 1937, Katsoff took geometry as the ideal
model for a postulate system. But he criticized Hull,
first, for failing to demonstrate the consistency of his
postulates and, second, for failing to define his concepts
in terms of protocol statements (which Katsoff took to be
6 0equivalent to experimental operations!. Miller agreed 
with Hull that scientific disputes could be settled through 
the use of deductive technique and that Principia Mathematica 
logic was the ideal tool for the job. But he found in 
Hull's miniature systems illicit intrusions of undefined 
terms, intrusions which he said created the false impression 
that Hull's "simple mechanical notions" were capable of 
explaining complex human behavior.^ Other critics denied 
that logical methods could force agreement or claimed that 
Hull's operational definitions were adequate but that his 
implicit definitions were not.^^
From even this brief review of the literature on 
logical methods in psychology, it is clear that there was 
an enthusiasm for those methods and broad agreement on 
their utility and promise; but at the same time there was 
controversy and misunderstanding about how the methods 
were to be put into practice. In these respects, the 
writers on deductive technique were playing out in pub­
lic the same pattern of discord-within-congruence that 
characterized Hull's encounter with Woodger. And the 
reasons for the pattern were much the same: the different 
individuals brought to the undertaking differing persec- 
tives and degrees of expertise; the logical tools were 
more refined than the rough formulations to which they 
were to apply; and enthusiasm for the techniques masked 
the difficulty of their application. Furthermore, as 
Sigmund Koch has noted, psychology's turn toward logical
methods was "not supported by especially expert scholar-
6 3ship in the relevant sources."
Among the few writers in the psychological literature 
who were well acquainted with logic and the philosophy 
of science were Koch himself and the one-time Vienna Circle 
member Gustav Bergmann. Although they were not the 
first to speak of Hull in connection with logical empiri­
cism, their sympathetic analyses of Hullian theory were 
carried out from the perspective of logical empiricism.
As such, their analyses were instrumental in getting Hull's
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name associated with logical positivism in the minds of 
American psychologists. As we shall see below, their 
works had this effect despite the fact that they showed 
Hull's theoretical formulations to be remote from the 
logical empiricist ideal.
Logical Empiricism: The Iowa Connection
During the 1930s, the University of Iowa became a
sort of center for the "new view" in the philosophy of
science. Herbert Feigl, who took a position there in
1931, was the first proponent of logical empiricism to
arrive. The following year, he offered a seminar on
philosophical problems of psychology and began to apply
the precepts of logical positivism to the mind-body
64problem and psychological methodology. In the mid­
thirties, Kurt Lewin arrived at Iowa, where he wrote on 
problems of theory construction in the realm of psychology. 
Lewin had been a student of Max Wertheimer and Ernst 
Cassirer in Germany. Although he was far from being a 
logical positivist in any usual sense, he had been an 
active participant in Reichenbach's Society for Empirical 
Philosophy in Berlin, and his expositions on theory became 
associated with the "new view" in psychology.
Lewin1s interest in applying topological concepts 
to psychological phenomena was responsible for Gustav 
Bergmann1s coming to Iowa. Bergmann had received a Ph.D.
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in mathematics from the University of Vienna, where he 
had regularly attended meetings of the Vienna Circle from 
1925 to 1931. Having specialised in topology, Bergmann 
was considered to be an ideal candidate to assist Lewin 
with his theoretical endeavors. Feigl and Paul Lazarsfeld 
arranged for him to come to Iowa in 1939. The planned 
collaboration with Lewin did not work out, but Bergmann 
stayed on at Iowa, assuming Feigl's post when Feigl left 
for Minnesota. At Iowa, Bergmann met Kenneth Spence and 
the two collaborated actively until Spence's death, in 
1967.
Spence, of course, had been a student of Hull at 
Yale and is widely regarded as having been Hull's chief 
disciple. Although Spence did not take his Ph.D.' under Hull, 
he enjoyed a close personal and intellectual comradeship 
with Hull dating from 19.32. In Hull's seminar of that- 
year, Spence delivered a paper on scientific explanation 
in which the Newtonian style of deductive theorizing was 
upheld as an ideal for psychology and the positivism of 
Karl Pearson was denigrated for its overemphasis on the' 
purely factual side of science. Hull encouraged Spence 
to publish the paper twhich he never did)., and from then 
on the two were close allies in the campaign for deductive 
technique in psychological theory, Spence's paper made 
no reference to any of the logical positivists, but after 
gaining a position at Iowa in 19.38 he found in Bergmann
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a willing and able compatriot for advancing a (.liberalized! 
version of logical empiricism in the context of psychology. 
With their well-known papers on theoretical psychology, 
Bergmann and Spence became leading figures in the coali­
tion between behaviorism and logical empiricism.
The year 1938 saw the arrival at Iowa of yet another 
would-be expositor of the "new view" in psychology. Sigmund 
Koch came in that year to undertake graduate studies in 
the philosophy of psychology with Herbert Feigl. By the 
time he left Iowa in 1939 (.to pursue a Ph.D. in psychology 
at Duke).., Koch had worked with Spence and Lewin as well 
as with Feigl. Like Bergmann and Spence, Koch viewed the 
somewhat confused state of theoretical psychology as an 
inducement to apply the logical positivist prescriptions 
for science to psychological concerns. The crisis in 
psychology, he believed, "could hardly hold its own against 
a little clear thinking." His Master's thesis, produced 
under Feigl, "sought to convey to psychologists the logical 
positivist codification of scientific theory more accurately
than had been done by the few psychologists who had already
6 5touched on this theme."
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Hull's System: The Logical Empiricist Perspective
The theoretically inclined philosophers and psy­
chologists who assembed at Iowa during the 1930s constituted 
a nucleus of interest in the application of the philosophy 
of science to method in psychology. Out of this group 
came numerous contributions to the literature on theory 
construction in psychology. Among these contributions, 
the most important, both philosophically and historically, 
were the published version of Koch's thesis and a paper 
by Bergmann and Spence entitled "Operationism and Theory 
in Psychology." These works which appeared side by side 
in the Psychological Review of 1941, became classics in 
the psychological literature. Koch has reported that 
"almost instantly" his published thesis "began to appear 
on the required reading lists of advanced courses and
6 6proseminars in psychology departments around the country," 
The Bergmann and Spence paper likewise received widespread
attention and was reprinted in volumes on psychological
. , 67theory.
Both of these works were viewed by their authors as 
responses to the confusions in the literature on theory 
construction and as assessments of Hullian theory from 
the perspective of logical empiricism. As of the late 
thirties, the literature on operationism and the litera­
ture on postulational technique had remained in almost total
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isolation from one another. Because Koch and Bergmann 
and Spence regarded logical empiricism as providing the 
key for the integration of these two movements, they also 
viewed their works as attempts to clarify the relationship 
between the empirical and logical components of scientific 
theory,
Koch began his article with a summary of the standard
logical positivist view of theories as interpreted formal
systems. Formal systems were said to consist of a set
of postulates (implicit definitions}., a set of explicit
definitions of concepts appearing in ,the postulates,
rules of inference, and a set of theorems derivable from
the postulates and definitions by means of the inference
rules. Koch characterized a formal system as a "kind of
grinding machine, the function of which is to grind out
the implications contained in the relationships defined
by the postulate set." In accordance with the standard
Vienna Circle view of theories, Koch took a formal sys^
6 8tern to be an "intricate tautology." Once such a system 
is given an empirical interpretation, however, it becomes 
an empirical theory capable of generating testable pre­
dictions. The interpretation is achieved by means of 
coordinating definitions which relate the concepts of the 
formal system to empirical constructs,
Koch presented this view of theories in a simplified 
diagram of the sort that was commonly invoked by logical
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positivists. A formal system of concepts (A, B, Cl is 
correlated with a system of empirical constructs CD, E, F) 
by the coordinating definitions X, Y, and Z.
p j
■
The aim is to establish an isomorphism between the empiri­
cal and formal systems so that the derived theorems of 
the formal system can be expected to describe observable 
states of affairs. It is only at this point that opera­
tionism comes into play. The wavy lines in the diagram 
represent the operational definitions connecting the 
empirical constructs with, their "observable symptoms."
The multiplicity of symptoms for each construct reflects 
Koch's recognition of Carnap's arguments for the reduc­
tion of empirical constructs to sets of conditional reduc-
69tion sentences.
Even in this simplified form, the logical positivist 
account of theories was obviously remote from scientific’—  
or at least psychological— practice, Koch acknowledged 
that his account represented "a logical reconstruction 
of the processes involved in theory building, rather than 
an historically accurate description of how theories are
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70brought into being." But by speaking of the account m  
terms of the "processes involved in theory building," he 
reinforced the impression that the account was quite rele­
vant to the methodology of the practicing scientist.. 
According to Koch, there are two kinds of procedure for 
constructing systems of the sort described. In the first, 
the "interpretive" procedure, the investigator begins with 
an extant system, say, from mathematics, then searches for 
coordinating definitions for relating the system to the 
domain of interest. This method was said to be "the one 
most commonly employed in physics," but Koch identified
Kurt Lewin as "the only psychologist who has ever pro-
71ceeded more or less explicitly along these lines."
The second method, referred to as the "telescopic"
procedure, was not so directly related to the reconstructed
account of theories. In this procedure, which was said
to be "rarely used in physics,"
Elaboration of the formal and empirical aspects 
of the system proceed simultaneously. The two 
steps of development of the formal system and 
interpretation are, in a sense, telescoped into 
one. In this case the scientist usually pro­
ceeds by asserting as postulates either certain 
empirical laws which appear in his field or prior 
assumptions as the functional relationships 
holding between certain of the empirical con— . 
structs, or both..72
As we have seen, it was just this sort of procedure that
Hull had advocated at the Paris Congress when he spoke
of using equations which had been fitted to experimental
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data as "first-approximation" postulates in his system. 
Hull's later practice of giving operational definitions to 
the "undefined" primitive terms in his system was like­
wise a telescopic procedure. In fact, with reference to 
Koch's exposition of theory, it was telescopic in the 
extreme: in operationally defining the terms in his 
postulates, Hull was collapsing Koch's theoretical struc­
ture from the very top to the very bottom, Koch called 
attention to this aspect of Hull's approach and identified 
Hull as psychology's major practitioner of the telescopic 
method. As he put it, Hull "seems to identify hypothetico- 
deductive procedure with what we have called 'telescopic 
procedure' both in his general discussions of scientific
theory, and in the 'miniature systems’ which he has
73actually worked out."
Given the substantial disparity between Hull’s actual 
methods and systems, on the one hand, and the relatively 
intricate account of method and theory presented by Koch, 
on the other, it is perhaps surprising that Koch proceeded 
nonetheless to analyze and evaluate Hull's systems on 
the basis of that account. But psychologists were looking 
for theory and logical positivism appeared to have the 
recipe for it. The process of constructing full-fledged 
theories in psychology had to begin somewhere, and the 
efforts of Hull and Lewin were the most obvious points of 
departure. Koch's conclusion to his assessment of Hull's
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miniature systems reflected this state of affairs:
CThe3 limitations of Hull's theories only 
accentuate the vast gap between theory and what 
currently passes for theory in psychology. For 
the distance between Hull and strict theory is 
infinitesmal in comparison with the distance 
between most psychological theory and Hull.
Even if the deductive procedure that Hull so • 
energetically advocates could contribute no more 
to present-day psychology than the institution 
of a warmer intimacy between theory and fact, 
his enthusiasm will have been well invested.74
Koch's thesis left two somewhat conflicting impressions,
namely that Hull's systems fell far short of the ideal
of theory and that they were relatively advanced and
commendable efforts, The attempt to fit Hull's work into
the logical positivist mold and to measure it by that
standard created a presumption among psychologists and
philosophers that Hull's view of science was closely
associated with logical positivism. Indeed, they were
closely related views; but as we shall see in the following
chapter, there lay between Hull's view and that of the
logical positivists deep differences which, were obscured
by the juxtaposition of them in the literature on theory
construction.
Bergmann and Spence's paper analyzing Hullian theory 
proceeded along much the same lines as Koch's critique. 
Paralleling Koch's distinction between the interpretive 
and telescopic procedures, Bergmann and Spence distinguished 
between two senses of 'hypotheticc-deductive method" and 
"postulational technique." They wrote that a "certain
amount of confusion is apt to arise, and indeed has arisen, 
from an ambiguity in the meaning of these terms" and that 
the clarification of them is "one of the most important 
tasks" for a discussion of scientific method in psychology. 
The first sense of these terms, one corresponding to 
Koch's interpretive procedure, is that of Hilbert's 
axiomatics. Hypothetico-deductive method in this sense 
involves the statement of postulates which implicitly de­
fine the basic terms of the system, and the subsequent 
interpretation of these terms by means of coordinating 
definitions. As Koch had done, they pointed out that such 
a procedure is rarely found in actual scientific prac­
tice :
. . . there are few, if any, instances of such, a 
method being exclusively relied upon in the 
development of the empirical sciences. As a 
matter of fact, even in geometry, the postula- 
tional method was a late achievement, born out 
of the need for systematic organization and 
epistemological clarification.
The "mathematico-deductive" method employed by Hull, on
the other hand, was said to consist of "making guesses
or hypotheses as to the choice of constructs (.variables 1.
77and the mathematical relationships holding between them,"
In actual operation, Hull's methodological practice was 
not an unusual one, but his use of such expressions as 
"postulates" and "undefined terms"— expressions deriving 
from his interest in geometry— gave his method the appear­
ance of being formal in the stronger sense.
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The confusions and conflicts which had arisen in 
the psychological literature on theory construction could 
be attributed, according to Bergmann and Spence, to Hull's 
misleading use of terminology associated with geometry and 
the formal axiomatics of Hilbert. They wrote:
Misunderstanding might have been avoided if 
there had always been clear recognition of the 
fact that Hull's theorizing is hypothetico- 
deductive only in the second meaning outlined 
above. Hull does not begin with a set of purely 
formal terms, having no other meaning than that 
imparted to them by a set of implicit definitions, 
from which are then derived new terms and theorems 
made testable by means of co-ordinating defini­
tions. Instead he actually begins with terms 
directly operationally defined. Unfortuntely, 
he called them "undefined concepts," and thus 
created the erroneous impression that he started 
with purely formal terms which are never given 
the necessary co-ordinations to empirical con­
structs .
To this passage Bergmann and Spence added a footnote con­
cerning Hull's definitions in the Mathematico-Deductive 
Theory, a work which appeared shortly before their paper.
In the recent monograph on rote learning 
Hull . . , uses the terms "undefined concepts” 
and "definitions” (.defined concepts 1 . Both 
undefined and defined concepts consist largely 
in what might be described as directly opera­
tionally defined concepts and there is no 
essential methodological difference between them. 
Apparently the idea underlying Hull's distinct 
tion between these two categories is that the 
undefined concepts are those most directly 
point-at-able, i.e., involve the shortest de­
fining sentences, . . .  By and large, however, 
operationists will correctly interpret Hull by 
substituting "operationally defined” for his 
expressions "undefined concepts” and "defini^ 
tions."7^
Thus, Bergmann and Spence emphasized, as did Koch, 
that Hull had incongruously given operational definitions 
to his "undefined" terms. The historical circumstances 
in which this curious practice arose have already been 
described. Hull had been a late-comer to the operationist 
movement and had developed a peculiar view of how opera­
tionism was to fit into his deductive method. When 
Woodger stated that the meanings of primitive terms must 
be made clear to anyone using a given system, Hull took 
operationism to be the appropriate method for doing so.
As a result, Hull placed operational definitions, which 
the logical positivists understood as the final link 
between a theoretical structure and its empirical grounding 
at the top of the theoretical structure. The loftiest 
parts of the presumed structure— the implicit definitions-^ 
were in Hull’s work completely conflated with the parts 
closest to the empirical bedrock— the operational definiru: 
tions. Everything in between, the empirical constructs 
and coordinating definitions, seemed to vanish in the 
process.
In attempting to fit Hull’s systems into the logi­
cal positivist mold, Koch had spoken of this conflation 
as the "telescopic" method; the upper and lower levels in 
the theoretical structure were said to be telescoped into 
one. Under the influence of the account of explanatory 
levels which. Feigl was developing at the time, Koch wanted
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to maintain the level of postulate as distinct from the 
level of empirical law. But this was a distinction not 
to be found in Hull's practice, despite Hull's claims to 
be seeking a Newtonian hierarchy of theory and law. 
Recognizing that Hull in fact had no such hierarchy,
Bergmann and Spence developed a new means of depicting 
the structure of theories, one better suited than Koch's 
for conveying the actual structure of Hull’s systems.
In the pictorial scheme presented by Bergmann and 
Spence, operational definitions (wavy lines 1 are shown 
occupying both the final and initial stages of the 
theoretical structure. The edifice of theory, rather than 
rising continuously upward from an observation base, 
arches over the empirical base, bending downward to meet 
it at both ends. The left-most letters are the opera­
tionally defined variables of antecedent conditions 
(stimulus intensities, motivation levels, and such). From 
these initial variables are defined the various intervening 
variables, which are related to each other by chains of 
hypothesized functions (dotted lines). The final inter­
vening constructs (r^ / are then compared by means of
experiments to the operationally defined response variables 
and R0 (amplitude and latency of response, for instance). 
Bergmann and Spece characerized the empirical test of a 
theory as follows:
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These two sets of formally different terms 
(r's and R'sl are then identified and the success 
of the construction depends upon whether this 
identification is borne out by the experimental 
data. If so, the gap at the right end of the 
bridge is closed and the desired formulation of 
the empirical law has been attained.
Whereas Koch had responded to Hull’s peculiar use of opera­
tional definitions by referring to the telescoping of 
layers in the theoretical hierarchy, Bergmann and Spence 
responded, by turning the traditional
vertical structure of theory into an explicitly horizontal 
structure. This horizontal structure was still said to 
represent "the hierarchic order of the terms involved," 
but it was a hierarchy of intervening variables running 
parallel to the empirical base and not one of constructs 
rising from the "soil" of observation upward to general 
theoretical principles.
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If Bergmann and Spence1 s scheme was truer to Hull's 
practice, it was certainly remote from the standard logical 
positivist view of the structure of theory. By beginning 
with temporally antecedent variables and ending with 
consequent variables, the new schema invited speculations 
about the existential status of intervening variables.
Those psychologists who took them to be temporally and 
physically existing states of the organism began to speak 
of them as hypothetical constructs. These constructs 
in turn became conflated in the psychological literature 
with the high-level theoretical constructs which stood 
at the top of the traditional schema. In the ensuing 
discussion of theory construction in psychology the new 
schema became the standard view of the structure of theories, 
but the important differences between this new view and 
the logical positivist's standard view often went unrec­
ognized .
The general view that psychological systems consist 
of sets of intervening variables and specifications of 
the functions relating them to each other and to independent 
and dependent variables was of course originally articulated 
by Tolman. Bergmann and Spence acknowledged this fact and 
looked with optimism upon the growing consensus on the 
suitability of the intervening variable paradigm for 
psychology. Tolman's description of the paradigm was, they 
said, "fully in line, indeed identical, with the picture
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of Hull's actual procedure as outlined by our preceding
analysis." In concluding their paper, they stated that
"Such essential convergence between two theoretical
viewpoints which are often regarded as being far apart
strongly suggests that essential agreement on this level
of general methodology is about to be reached in psych- 
8 0ology." As was the case with Koch's thesis, the 
Bergmann and Spence paper showed Hull's theoretical efforts 
to be remote from the logical positivist standards for 
deductive theory and yet it warmly endorsed those efforts, 
But just by virtue of having provided a discussion of 
Hull's theories in the context of logical empiricism 
(and moreover by a former member of the Vienna Circle).,, 
the paper, like Koch's, had the net effect of reinforcing 
•the association between Hull and the logical positivists 
in the minds of the psychological public.
Hull and the New Methodologists
As the preceding sections indicate, the burgeoning 
interest at Iowa and elsewhere in the application of logi­
cal technique to psychological theory drew considerable 
attention to Hullian theory and generated a climate of 
optimism in which Hull's work came to be associated with 
that of the logical positivists. Hull was, of course, 
not himself a logician, but he was at the peak of his 
interest in deductive methods around 1940, and he naturally
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followed these developments with interest. Logical 
positivism was by the late 1930s enjoying great popularity 
in America, and the difficulties which had faced him in 
writing the Mathematico-Deductive Theory must have con­
vinced him that the expert advice of its adherents was 
well worth seeking out.
Because of his close contact with Spence, Hull was 
privy to at least some of the developments at Iowa before 
they appeared in print. Koch has reported that
Spence , . . was in my humble office vir­
tually every afternoon during the writing of the 
thesis in quest of discussion and bibliographic 
advice. He advised me to publish the master­
piece at the earliest possible date, seeming 
actually to believe that the fate of psychology 
would be deeply affected by the event.
After finishing his thesis under Feigl, Koch transferred
to Duke at just the time that Hull was rushing to complete
the problem-ridden manuscript of the Mathematico-Deductive
Theory. Koch's account continues:
Immediately upon arrival at Durham (.fall, 19391,
I learned that Spence had been trying to reach 
me (I had spent a month or so in New YorkL*
Spence had shown my thesis to Hull at some point 
after my departure; Hull wanted the author at 
Yale; neither knew the author's whereabouts,
I contacted Hull and was advised to stand by in 
Durham while the difficult problem of finding 
a stipend at that late date was addressed. For 
a few weeks I did not unpack, but the upshot was 
negative. 83-
Hull was thus apparently eager to have on hand a method­
ologist, someone with whom he could consult on the 
technical aspects of definition and theory construction.
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By the summer of 1939, Hull had already had the
benefit of consulting with Gustav Bergmann on such matters.
After arriving at Iowa in April 1939, Bergmann quickly
began his association with Spence, who arranged for
Bergmann to visit the IHR. Bergmann has recalled: "During
the siimmer of 1939 I was for two months an Cunofficiall
guest at Hull’s Institute at Yale and found him as eager
a questioner and listener in all matters philosophical and
8 2methodological as Spence remained all his life," During 
this visit, Bergmann undoubtedly conveyed to Hull both the 
clarifications and endorsement of his theoretical efforts 
from the logical empiricist perspective, probably much 
as they appeared in the Bergmann and Spence paper the 
following year.
The influence of Koch’s thesis and especially of 
Bergmann’s actual presence at Yale can be discerned in 
the Mathematico-Deductive Theory. Under the exigencies 
of an impending decision on the renewal of Rockefeller 
funding, Hull sent the book to press in December 1939 des-^  
pite its flaws which had been made apparent by the criti­
ques of Bergmann and Koch. These were the problems to 
which Hull called attention in the conclusion of the 
work. Among the "two or three major defects of the 
present system," Hull noted that
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. . , several of the undefined notions (.logical
signs 1, including all those representing unobserv­
ables, should have appeared among the defined 
terms. Presumably the next attempt at a form­
alization of rote-leaning theory should make this 
correction one of its earliest objectives. . . .
Here, evidently, is a place where the principles 
of "operationism," with their very real scientific 
virtues should be applied,8 3
As has already been described, Hull's placement of terms 
that had actually been given definitions among the "unde­
fined" terms and his failure to adequately integrate opera­
tionism into his approach were shortcomings which Bergmann 
and Spence pointed out in print shortly thereafter.
One other figure who was associated with logical 
empiricism and who was involved in methodological dis­
cussions with Hull was the Norwegian philosopher Arne 
Naess. In 1938-39., Naess spent a year in Berkeley and 
New Haven studying the groups around Tolman and Hull 
and the competition between them from a social psychological 
perspective. Naess had been a participant in the Vienna 
Circle, as Hull recognized, and was engaged by Hull in 
discussions of deductive methods. Naess's reactions to 
Hull's methodological notions were much the same as those 
of Koch and Bergmann and Spence: he was generally encour­
aging of Hull's attempts at formal rigor and yet critical 
of HullJs equivocal use of the language of formalization. 
After having a series of discussions of methodology with 
Hull in the spring of 1938, Naess wrote to Hull summarizing 
his impressions. The letter stated:
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It is quite common to praise the hypothetico- 
deductive method as the only one which is strictly 
scientific. You are the only one who makes the 
bold jump from theory to practice, and whatever 
the results of this jump may be, they will cer­
tainly be of first-rate importance to methodology.
At the same time, Naess pointed out the problems involved
in Hull's confusing use of the terminology of postulational
technique and his failure to distinguish full-blown
formalization from ordinary hypothetico-deductive method.
Misunderstandings are to a large extent due 
to incompleteness and ambiguity of your method­
ological remarks themselves. You underestimate 
the difficulties involved in an unambiguous 
description of methods. There is an enormous 
literature on scientic method and every word 
used in a brief outline of a method must be 
expected to cause large aggregates of associa­
tions to occur to the reader familiar with that 
literature. . . .
If you use the word "formalization” in the 
wide sense of "making explicit postulates and in­
ferences connecting postulates, definitions, 
theorems, corrolaries, and predictions" you 
could distinguish between the high grade formal­
izations requiring symbolic logic and inferior 
grade formalizations possible without this 
tool.
This reaction to Hull's methodological pronouncements 
was, as we have seen, later reinforced by other writers. 
Taken collectively, these critical responses seem not 
to have shaken Hull's belief in the basic soundness of 
his approach, but they were probably instrumental in 
encouraging Hull's retreat away from explicit formaliza­
tion in the years following 1940.
This section has briefly reviewed Hull' s interest 
during the late thirties in the new methodology that was
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inspired by logical positivism. While he was struggling 
with the formalization of learning theory which appeared 
in his system of 1940, he actively sought advice from the 
proponents of logical positivism. But as has already 
been pointed out, Hull’s interest in logical positivism 
focused on the logical; the advice he sought concerned 
primarily deductive technique rather than empirical defini 
tion. Hull was simply not a positivist of the operationist 
bent that was common among other psychologists, Hull's 
views on the limited value of operationism are treated 
in the following section.
Operationism, Positivism,and Quantification 
Operationism and Positivism
Hull was clearly an empiricist and he identified 
himself as such. But the empiricism with which Hull 
allied himself was the philosophical empiricism of the 
British associationists, and it was their explanatory 
theoretical principles rather than their views of the 
experiential foundations of knowledge that attracted his 
favor. Hull was not at all an adherent of the more 
inductive or positivistic brands of empiricism, such as 
James's radical empiricism or Mach’s experiential posi­
tivism. In fact, Hull took pleasure in deriding the 
descriptive approach to science, an approach which he felt
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could only add "one more potato to the bin" and thereby 
contribute to the tonnage of data but not to its system-
4- '  4. *  8 5atization.
The operationist movement in psychology was viewed
by Hull in much the same way. Hull did eventually embrace
operationism (albeit in a heterodox way).; but unlike-the
majority of operational psychologists who viewed opera—
tionism as a means of infusing concepts with meaning from
the empirical ground up, Hull saw it as a limited tool
in light of the inherent capacity of theoretical systems
to convey such meaning and status from the top down.
According to Hull, concepts are shown to be scientific
when they are incorporated into the postulates of a
deductive system.^
Hull's outlook on these matters was most clearly
expressed in a letter he wrote to Tolman in 1936, responding
to Tolman's newly formulated operational behaviorism.
In the letter, he referred to Stevens's two articles which
had in the previous year triggered the infatuation of
psychologists with operationism. He wrote;
It has occurred to me as possible that we may, 
through a false analogy, be badly misled by 
Bridgman's approach to the current problems of 
theoretical physics. Bridgman is laying about 
him in the presence of an elaborately systems 
atized science. To a very large extent the 
appropriateness of the categories has already 
been determined by the technique of physical 
theory. In psychology, however, this system^ - 
atization has not yet occurred and therefore we 
have little indication as to what the appropriate
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categories will turn out to be. From my own con— 
ception of positivism, I don’t see how it can go 
very far in determining the correctness o.r in-' 
correctness of categories. It has, of course, the 
immense virtue of squeezing mythology out of terms, 
and so cannot possibly go wrong. The only thing 
which I would be inclined to urge is that opera- 
tionism should be combined with parallel attempts 
at theoretical systematization. This, it seems 
to me, is the chief weakness of the attempts of 
Stevens. It is not that Stevens makes error; it 
is rather, that if his positivism were combined with 
a vigorous parallel attempt at theoretical system­
atization his work might be very much more fruit­
ful. To say the same thing in brief: without a 
vigorous parallel attempt at theoretical system­
atization the positivist may waste immense amounts 
of effort trying to refine a concept which may turn 
out to have no deductive potentialities,®-^
Thus, the mark of a worthy scientific concept for Hull was 
its "deductive potentialities," a feature which took 
precedence over the concept's capacity for being observ­
able or operationalizable. In Hull's methodological 
scheme, operationism was simply not a very important tool, 
although its value as a weapon against subjectivity and 
metaphysics was recognized. As Hull later noted to him­
self, "It appears that this operationism business is 
what gives the final coup de grace to the subjective by
driving it from its last hiding place the ambiguity of the
• +. .,88 private.
There is evidence that Hull was a relative late­
comer to operationism and that he never fully comprehended 
the role assigned to operationism by the logical positivist 
scheme of science. The influence of operationist thought 
on him was first apparent in the published version of his
APA presidential address of 1937, but operationism was not
mentioned by name until the Mathematico-Deductive Theory
of 1940. Even then, as we have seen, the operational
definitions he gave were not recognized as such by him.
As Koch put it in 19.41, "Hull nowhere devotes sufficient
attention to the problem of how the empirical constructs
appearing in the postulate set are introduced (.i.e., the
89question of operational definition)." This judgment
still stood in 1954 when Koch made his final assessment
90of the Hullian system. It is instructive to note m  
this context that Hull’s discussion of operationism in 
the Principles of Behavior was confined to a single para­
graph appended to the second chapter. In that passage, 
Hull expressed misgivings over the misuse of operationism 
by psychologists, and in a curious error that epitomizes 
Hull's inattention to operationism, he claimed that
91Bridgman's Logic of Modern Physics was written m  1938,
The general lack of interest shown by Hull in operationism 
is perhaps puzzling if Hull is viewed as having striven 
to emulate the logical positivist model of science; but 
as will be argued in the following chapter, Hull was 
actually operating under a psychological model of science, 
a model which differed importantly from the logical positi­
vist model and which gave no significant role to opera­
tionism .
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If Hull was not an operationist in any important 
sense, neither was he a positivist in any usual sense.
He opposed the descriptive positivism of Mach and Karl 
Pearson. His materialist metaphysics was incompatible with 
the ametaphysical positivism of Carnap, In using his 
materialism to argue against idealist metaphysics, Hull 
was perhaps close to Neurath’s physicalistic positivism.
But Neurath’s physicalism was a version of descriptive 
positivism. Neurath conceived of science as a set of 
statements of physicalistic correlations. For Neurath, 
the ’world has no depth," whereas for Hull the world was 
a rich structure of material hierarchies, Hull’s radical 
scientism, his advocacy of a science-based ethics, his 
views on science as a vehicle of social integration, and 
his linking of social progress with scientific progress 
were all views which brought him close to the positivism 
of Auguste Comte. But Comtean positivists, having worn 
their metaphysical commitments openly, were an embarrass­
ment to twentieth century positivists, and many of their
92philosophical views were no longer taken seriously. All 
in all, Hull could not fairly be deemed a positivist in 
any sense current in his time.
As was pointed out in Chapter 2, the logical positi­
vists encountered serious difficulties in combining their 
empiricism, which for them involved the testability of 
scientific claims, with their formalism, i.e., the demand
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that theories be cast in a definite logical structure.
This problem of reconciling the formal and testable aspects 
of theory was also a continuing vexation to Hull. His 
labored efforts to define the intervening variables of 
the 1940 system in such a way as to ensure their observ- 
ability were described above in some detail. This pro­
blem was one that was made all the more difficult by 
Hull's failure to give careful consideration to issues of 
empirical definition,. By and large, Hull’s theoretical 
systems were aimed more at generality and systematicity 
than at empirical specificity and descriptive adequacy. 
However, Hull was by no means neglectful of the desir­
ability of clearly connecting his postulates with empirical 
phenomena. The sort of empirical contact that he sought, 
especially in his later formulations, was that of measure­
ment. But, as Hull realized, measurement required a 
scheme for quantifying behavior, and it was such a scheme 
that was the goal of his activities in the years after 
1940. Hull's attempts to quantify behavior are the topic 
of the following section.
The Quantification of Behavior
As we have seen, Hull's theoretical efforts can be 
divided into three phases. Chapter 6 described the first 
phase, in which deductions were laid out informally and 
in close relation to Hull's mechanical conception of
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behavior. In the second phase, discussed ahove, Hull's 
theorizing became more formal, involving geometrical 
method and later the techniques of symbolic logic, In 
the third phase, the emphasis was on the mathematical and 
quantitative aspects of theory. Hull had aimed ■ for a 
quantitative system since early in his career, but this 
intent became prominent only in the later thirties after 
Toiman had introduced and popularized the intervening 
variable paradigm. It was in this period that Hull hired 
mathematicians and undertook the extensive use of equa­
tions that dominated his later work.
As we have already seen, the problem of giving 
formal definitions to intervening variables proved to be 
a difficult one for Hull. But given his mechanistic 
conception of theory, intervening variables were in­
herently well-suited for adoption into the Hullian scheme. 
Hull, it will be recalled, believed that the structure of 
theory should mirror the structure of the mechanistic 
behavior in question. Just as the internal gears of a 
behavior-generating machine would intervene between the 
inputs which set it in motion and its behavioral output, 
so would the intervening variables of a prediction- 
generating conceptual machine mediate between its ante— 
cedent-variables and its predicted-behavior output. The 
fact that intervening variables were unobservable was, 
in principle at least, no more a source of consternation
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for Hull than the fact that a machine’s inner workings are
normally hidden from view. Hull's widely known maxim that
intervening variables should be securely linked to ante-
cedent and conseqeunce observables in effect mimicked the
determinate linkage of machine parts via gears and levers.
As one commentator on Hull has astutely observed, "it is
possible to appreciate that if we treat the chains of
intervening variables that form part of the mature theory
as parts of a mechanism it is possible to advance a com—
93pletely deterministic picture of behavior, ” The linkage 
of choice for Hull was of course the mathematical equation. 
Although intervening variables posed no philosophical 
difficulty for Hull, the quantification which accompanied 
their use proved to be a formidable obstacle in prac­
tice. Although he had early voiced the desirability of 
quantification, Hull's early machine-modeling efforts
engaged in it, if at all, only to elucidate how adaptive
94machanisms could potentially be simulated. The numbers 
were merely illustrative, representing hypothetical 
response tendencies, and there was no attempt at, or even 
point in, assigning specific values to actual behavior, 
Hull's informal derivations sufficed to show how adapta­
tions could be exhibited by inorganic devices: and occasion­
ally even indicated the general form of some behavioral 
function. In this early work, he was guided by qualitative
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results of experiments (performed mainly by others), but not
by actual response measures, which were of scant rele—
95vance to issues of abstract design. Had Hull been 
satisfied to remain at this level of abstraction, he might 
well be recognized today as a founder of modern- cybernetics. 
But Hull was not satisfied with such an approach, and as 
a consequence his theories suffered from a tension between 
his deductive mechanistic thrust and the demand for empiri­
cal specificity and predictive precision.
This tension was exacerbated, on the one hand, by 
Hull's opposition to narrow empiricism and, on the other 
hand, by his skepticism about the booming operational 
empiricism which surrounded him from the mid-thirties on.
The essence of Hull's scientific style was to invent and 
systematize, to contrive and reason through. Tying his 
ratiocinations to specific detailed response measures 
constituted for him a difficult challenge, the pursuit 
of which turned out to be unnecessary, ill-advised, and 
at odds with his earlier and more fruitful mechanistic 
approach. But the promise of rigor on which Hull had 
risen to prominence could not be paid off entirely in 
programmatic deductive theorizing, no matter how elaborately 
it may have been axiomatized. As conceived in the late 
1930s, scientific rigor involved not only formal methods 
but also operational definition, measurement, and quanti­
fication. Hull acknowledged the need for this kind of
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rigor, but he subordinated it to the deductive rigor
which was his forte. Had he ever been tempted to overlook
the need for rigor on the empirical side, the bedrock
empiricist wing of the movement for the "new methodology"
was there to remind him of it. Even worse, from Hull’s
point of view, the empiricist wing was threatening to
steal away the banner of objectivity in the name of
operationism.
Spurred by these circumstances, Hull forged ahead
with attempts at quantification. Principles of Behavior
was richly infused with the trappings of quantification
([definitions of variables, units of hypothetical scales
for intervening variables, etc), but as Koch has amply 
96shown, these efforts fell far short of genuine quanti~
fication. One difficulty among others was that the
theoretical variables— independent and dependent as
well as intervening— remained unattached to measures of
actual behavior, Hull was aware of the sketchiness of
his account, but his confessions to that effect were
expediently submerged in the rhetoric of rigor, power, and 
97generality. In the Principles, Hull had devoted a 
chapter to behavioral variability or oscillation, which 
he took to be a universal characteristic of molar behavior. 
Whereas other psychologists interpreted such variability 
as reason for giving up deterministic laws as the goal 
of psychology, Hull emphasized the lawful nature of
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variability by construing it as an inhibitory tendency with 
normally distributed strengths. The assumption of normality 
in behavioral oscillations'opened the way for applying 
statistical methods to the problem of response scaling, 
specifically for adapting L. L. Thurstone's psychophysical 
method of paired comparisons to the task. In 19.4 5, at the 
age of sixty, Hull arrived at what he felt was a break­
through :
. . . I seem at last to have devised an experi­
mental technique and a parallel statistical 
technique whereby I shall probably be able to 
penetrate the hitherto inaccessible rings of 
constants of my system in such a way as to 
measure sHr, D, sEr, sOr , and so on. This 
seems at present to be a really major achieve­
ment ,
The remainder of Hull's career was devoted to 
seeking a reconciliation of his mensurati.onal technique 
with his theoretical postulates. Essentials of Behavior 
C19491 was a major effort in that direction, but not a 
very successful one. As Koch as argued in detail, not 
only did the method of measurement rest on a grossly 
inadequate data base and several unjustified theoretical 
assumptions, but the theory itself suffered from being 
adapted to it. In Koch's words, the changes in the theory 
from the 19.43 version were "enforced by the relentless
demands of an infeasible and prematurely over-elaborated
. . 99quantificational methodology,"
In the transition from the 1943 version of Hull's
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system to the 134a version, there was, as Koch, has noted,
an increased "localism" in the theory language, Sys-
tematic variables presumed to represent general pro-
cesses in the determination of behavior were, in the new
version, found to have exceedingly narrow empirical
definitions. But these changes were not accompanied
by any explicit retraction of Hull’s stated aim of
ascertaining general principles of behavior. To emphasize
the extent of the new localism and its incompatibility
with any pretense of generality, Koch offered the example
of Hull’s definition of the wat, the unit of the systematic
dependent variable (reaction potentialI:
The wat is the mean standard deviation of the 
momentary reaction potential (sEa)_ of standard 
albino rats, 90 days of age, learning a simple 
manipulative act requiring a 10 gram pressure 
by 24-hour distributed trials under 23 hours’ 
hunger, water available, with reward in the 
form of 2.5-gram pellet of the usual dry dog 
food, the mean being taken from all the rein­
forced trials producing the habit strength 
from .75 to ,85 habs inclusive,101
By way of contrast, the 194 3 system specified the wat only
as a unit on a 100-point scale of reaction potential
ranging from no response tendency to an asymptotic limit.
Unlike the later quantification, which was unjustifiably
tied to the specifics of both organism and apparatus, the
19.4 3 version modestly employed an arbitrary scale on a
hypothetical response dimension. In this modest form,
it served Hull well as a conceptual device for developing
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and expressing various consequences (e.g., general func-
1Q2tional forms), of his postulates.
Significantly, Hull's last book, which appeared
just months after his death in 1952, represented a retreat
from his previous excesses. First, he showed a,realistic
skepticism about the quantificational and formal aspects
of his earlier systems. The efforts at quantifying behavior
were admitted to be a "small and tentative beginning."
Speaking of the type of axiomatization attempted in the
rote learning monograph, Hull confessed, "It is probably
1Q3too early to do this on a large scale." Second, he
gave up much of the pretense of generality found in
his previous work, returning instead to the set of limited
problem areas which had been addressed in his earliest
104 . . .papers. Research, m  the Hullian tradition continues
today at this more restricted level of scope and formality.
As one prominent researcher in this tradition has put it,
"much of the current neo-Hullian thinking is closer to
the kind of theorizing contained in the writings of Hull,
Spence, Miller, and others in the thirties than it is to
the 1943 (Principles of Behavior 1 Hull and its revisions.
Hull's early and deep interests in mechanical and
logical hierarchies were closely linked in his vision of
psychology, but he never found a clear expression of
their intimate relationship. His vision was blunted and
diverted by an undue stress on methodological formality
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and by an excessive concern for empirical specificity.
Hull has commonly been criticized for an overemphasis on 
theory, but, after all, his genius lay in deriving the 
consequences of his mechanistic insights. His sounder 
impulses were admittedly distorted by his theoretical 
excesses, but certainly no more so than by his empirical 
excesses. Unable to resolve the tension between broad 
theory and narrow fact, Hull was never able, despite some 
eleventh-hour efforts, to get his program back on its 
original track, that more modest middle road which had 
been laid out in his early papers.
Logical empiricism contributed to this derail­
ment by reinforcing both the formal and empirical tend­
encies in Hull. The former influence was, as we have 
seen, exerted directly through J. H, Woodger as well as 
indirectly through the postulational movement in psychology. 
As for the later influence, logical positivism encouraged 
psychologists to operationalize concepts and undertake 
exact measurement. It helped create the climate in which 
these practices were often demanded by psychologists and 
in which Hullian theory with its quantificational machinery 
flourished. But this influence on Hull was mainly indirect. 
Unlike the measurement theory of S. S. Stevens, which was
worked out largely in connection with the Unity of Science 
106movement, the measurement technique of Hull was devised 
on his own from the earlier methods of Thurstone. The
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popularity of Hull's formal and empirical methods cer­
tainly benefitted from the American reception of logical 
empiricism, but the net effect of this influence was to 
push the extension of those methods to untenable extremes.
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed Hull's interactions with 
various of the figures associated with logical positivism. 
The involvement of Hull with logical positivism took the 
form of his actual participation in the Unity of Science 
movement, direct interactions with certain adherents of 
logical positivism, and indirect influences mediated by 
the literature on theory construction in psychology,
Hull's activities in the Unity of Science movement 
took place during a period in which logical positivists 
and behaviorists had much to offer each other in terms 
of mutual support for their respective causes. The 
behaviorist and logical positivist movements were based 
on similar presuppositions concerning the nature of science, 
the unification of science, and the general inculcation of 
the "scientific attitude." The kinship between them was 
clearly recognized by their proponents, who actively sought 
to strengthen the bonds between them. As a result, Hull 
was drawn into the Unity of Science movement. He served 
on its committees, spoke at two of its congresses, wrote 
about the integration of science, and hosted visits from
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its members. Hull found support for his views on logical 
methods, and the logical positivists found support for 
the extension of their doctrine of physicalism to psychology 
and the social sciences. But for the most part Hull’s 
association with, the Unity of Science movement remained 
at the level of jargon, rhetoric, and alliance against 
common perceived enemies. Hull's interest in the Unity 
of Science movement appears not to have extended to an 
interest in the more substantive issues of logical positi­
vist philosophy. He referred to the philosophical litera­
ture only very rarely, and when he did so he showed little 
understanding of its content and no appreciation of the 
technical subtleties and difficulties with which, it was 
beset.
Hull's closest and most sustained contact with 
logical positivist ideas occurred during his collaboration 
with Woodger on the formalization of rote-learning theory,
To a remarkable degree, Hull and Woodger shared common 
views on the co-operative aspect of science, an enthusiasm 
for the deductive systematization of theory, and an 
optimism about the benefits of systematizating even the 
relatively immature theories of the biological and 
psychological sciences. But despite their enthusiasm 
and concerted efforts, their collaboration did not result 
in a fruitful formalization of Hullian theory. Woodger's 
visit apparently failed even to convey to Hull a clear
445
understanding of the more technical details of formalization, 
Hull also seemed to remain unaware of the difference bet— 
ween commonplace hypothetico-deductive method and full- 
fledged formalization.
Hull's advocacy of deductive systematization and 
his apparent success with his "miniature systems" of the 
thirties helped to excite a literature in the psychology 
journals on logical technique. On the whole,, this 
literature contained varied responses to Hull's theoretical 
efforts. Of the writers who responded to Hull's sys­
tems, those who were closest to the Vienna Circle phil­
osophy— Koch and Bergmann and Spence— produced the most 
influential assessments. Their conclusions were of a 
similar thrust: Hull's systems fell far short of the 
logical positivist ideal for theory, but Hull's attempts 
were on the right track and were thus to be commended.
These conclusions were also conveyed informally to Hull • 
by Arne Naess, another philosopher closely associated with 
the Vienna Circle, These critiques were probably influ­
ential in Hull's retreat after 1940 away from explicit 
formalization, but they had the effect of engendering 
a widely held perception that Hull was closely linked 
with the logical positivist philosophy. The enthusiasm 
for Hull’s deductive approach to psychology, coming as it 
did despite the critical evaluations of his actual 
accomplishments, suggests that the inception of logical
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positivism in America combined with the quasi-formal 
techniques of Hull and others to produce a strong demand 
and respect for what was perceived as rigorous objectivism 
in psychology.
Hull had helped to create an exaggerated demand for 
rigor and unrealistic expectations about the prospects 
for a rigorous approach to psychology. Once the demand 
was established, Hull became as much its pawn as its 
perpetrator. One consequence of this strong demand was 
the subsequent attempt by him to quantify his system of 
adaptive behavior. The substantial disparity between 
Hull's claims for his quantified theory and its actual 
limited utility and generality soon became apparent, 
Largely because of Koch's persistent efforts to point 
out this disparity Cand other weaknesses in the system).., 
Hullian theory quickly fell during the fifties from its 
previous stature. In the long run, Hull thus became a 
victim of the very climate of rigor which he and the 
logical positivists had jointly inspired. This climate 
appears to have dissuaded Hull from pursuing his sounder 
insights both by encouraging inappropriate strategies for 
elaborating his theoretical scheme and by discouraging 
the more appropriate strategies. On the one :• hand, it 
encouraged him first to formalize and then to quantify his 
systems far beyond the extent that was warrantedf given 
the modest degree of their development. On the other
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hand, it diverted Hull's attention away from those 
strategies which grew out of, and were inherently better 
suited to, his conception of behavior based on the organism- 
machine analogy. As will be argued in the following 
chapter, Hull's mechanical metaphor was a potent heuristic 
device from which he drew his views of organismic behavior 
and even his views of scientific knowledge. But the domi­
nant logical positivist model of.science assigned no signi­
ficant role to heuristic, analogy, and metaphor; as a 
result, Hull downplayed the role of his mechanical meta­
phor in his thought and ceased his explicit pursuit of 
the implications of that metaphor,
Hull's involvement with logical positivism thus 
exhibited a more complex pattern than would be expected 
if Hull were simply identified as an adherent of logical 
positivism. At the level of rhetoric and general views 
of science, Hull and the logical positivists were clearly 
allies. Within that convergence over broad issues, 
however, there was little mutual understanding or genuine 
cooperation on substantive matters, Despite his inter­
actions with several notable logical empiricists, Hull 
showed no signs of following even the more basic develop­
ments in the evolution of logical empiricist thought.
All the same, Hull came to be identified with logical 
positivism, He did nothing to dispel this widespread 
impression, and assessments of his work were regularly
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made from the perspective of logical positivism, Hull 
chose not to emphasize his differences with the logical 
positivists, but they were deep differences and his views 
on science and psychology can not be adequately under­
stood without recognizing them. It will be argued in 
the following chapter that Hull's "philosophy of 
science" was in reality a "psychology of science"—  
a fact which is crucial for understanding the extent and 
limitations of his relationship to logical positivism.
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CHAPTER 8
HULL'S BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
The preceding chapters have documented Hull's anti­
cipation of several cardinal positions of logical empiri­
cism and his actual interactions with the logical 
empiricist movement. We have seen that, despite the 
remarkable confluence of general positions, Hull's involve 
ment with and understanding of logical empiricism was in 
fact quite restricted. In effect, he was eager to con­
tribute to the mutual support that behaviorism and 
European positivism could provide for each other, but he 
was by no means a student of logical positivism and 
apparently never delved into its technical literature. 
Hull's philosophical views— his empiricism, associationism 
and materialism— were well fixed in the 1920s, before the 
influence of the Vienna Circle was felt in America. From 
his philosophical views, Hull evolved a rudimentary 
theory of knowledge of his own, a behavioral theory of 
knowledge which, although based on the elementary concepts 
of conditioning, aspired to account for the higher forms 
of scientific reasoning and theorizing. Never fully 
articulated by Hull, this theory went beyond logical 
empiricism in subsuming theory itself under a naturalistic 
psychology of science. More importantly, it conflicted
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with logical empiricism by further subsuming logic under 
psychology, thereby constituting a behavioristic psy­
chologism. Hull's behavioral psychology of science is 
the topic of this chapter.
It is well to remember that Hull's original ambition 
in psychology was to establish a theory of knowledge on 
a materialistic basis. He had read and admired the 
systematic philosophies of Locke and Hume, and had endorsed 
their attempts to ground philosophy on the facts of 
psychology. But he felt that their failures to arrive 
at uncontroversial epistemological theories stemmed from 
their adoption of conscious experience rather than action 
as their factual base. Believing that something like 
Hume's system could be made viable by placing it on a 
behavioristic foundation, Hull planned to model his magnum 
opus on Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 
following its organization and chapter headings. He viewed 
his dissertation on abstraction and concept formation as 
a step in that direction. But when this research failed 
to draw the attention he thought it deserved from other 
psychologists, he became disillusioned with the prospects 
for his goal and turned temporarily to research in apti'- 
tude testing and hypnosis. Around 1930, he judged con^ - 
ditions favorable for taking up the challenge once again.
He wrote:
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The more I think about it, the more con­
vinced I become that the time is ripe for a new 
work on the problems which Locke and Hume struggled 
with as reported in their great classics. . . .
The time is evidently here for a searching 
naturalistic account of the manner that men ac­
quire the various types of knowledge and the 
nature of this knowledge, done in the modern 
manner.
From this point on, Hull's idea books make it clear that 
his ultimate aim was to achieve a behavioristic theory 
of knowledge and that his research on conditioned habits 
was for him an attempt to realize what he called "my 
hope to achieve a major contribution to the theory of 
knowledge.
Knowledge as a Habit Mechanism
From the time of his earliest ruminations on a 
behavioristic epistemology, Hull took a very Humean 
strategy as a model well-suited to the enterprise. "After 
all," he wrote in 1927, "a good deal of modern behavior­
ism is implicit in Hume and a considerable amount of it 
is explicit also, probably much more than is ordinarily 
realized." Hume had spoken of unitary impressions 
becoming associated and concatenated according to the laws 
of a mental chemistry. To invert the associationist 
framework onto a materialist basis, Hull needed some 
physical equivalents of Hume's atomic units as well as 
principles by which they could become associated. This 
need was met, in Hull's view, by Pavlov's classic
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Conditioned Reflexes, which became a sort of bible for
Hull upon the appearance of its English translation in
1927-28. Adapting Pavlov's work to Hume's associationism,
Hull spoke of "small unitary stimulus-response units . . .
being aggregated into larger and larger units always
2
operating on the same general principle." The principle, 
of course, was that of Pavlovian conditioning. With 
characteristic ambition and the ingenuity of an engineer, 
Hull set out to derive the whole range of mental phenomena 
and types of knowledge from these simple elements and 
principles.
Hull never came very close to his goal. When con­
ditioning turned out to be a much more complicated affair 
than he had initially supposed, his energies became 
diffused into the details of his narrower theory of 
conditioning. But he did make a substantial start on his 
behavior—based epistemology during the 1930s, and there 
is ample evidence that he continued for the rest of his 
career to view science from the perspective of that 
epistemology, despite its sketchiness and its shortcomings. 
The basic mechanism of knowledge was laid out in
Hull's paper of 1930 entitled "Knowledge and Purpose as
3Habit Mechanisms." Given a causal sequence of stimulus 
events in the world and a sensitive organism receiving 
those stimuli, Hull reasoned that each event (31. would set 
up within the organism a corresponding response CRl. The
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result would be a sequence of responses ordered at this 
point only by the causal sequence of stimuli producing 
them. But, Hull continued, since higher organisms 
possess internal receptors for sensing their own res­
ponses, each R will give rise to an internal stimulus (s). 
By virtue of being paired with the succeeding external 
event S, each of these internal stimuli acquires the 
capacity to evoke (i.e., to cause) the succeeding R 
(.see figure). In this way, contact
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with the environment instills in the organism a chain of
classically conditioned reactions which copies the external
sequence and is capable of running its course independently
of the world. In summarizing this mechanism, Hull wrote:
. . . it may be said that through the operation of 
a variety of principles and circumstances, the 
world in a very important sense has stamped the 
pattern of its action upon a physical object Cthe 
organism!. The imprint has been made in such a way 
that a functional parallel of this action segment 
of the physical world has become a part of the 
organism. Henceforth the organism will carry about 
continuously a kind of replica of this world seg­
ment. In this very intimate and biologically 
significant sense the organism may be said to know 
• the world. No spiritual or supernatural forces 
need be assumed to understand the acquisition of 
this knowledge. The process is entirely a natur­
alistic one throughout.^
The biological value of such a mechanism is readily 
apparent. Once established, the internal sequence can
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proceed more rapidly than the external sequence. This 
phenomenon, according to Hull, is what is commonly re­
ferred to as foresight or fore-knowledge. Defensive 
reactions provide a clear example. If the last event 
in the world sequence (S,-) is, for example, a threatening 
or noxious stimulus, then the final response (R,-). of, 
say, flight will be all the more adaptive if it takes 
place before the actual occurrence of S^. For such cases, 
Hull noted that the intervening responses in the internal 
sequence R3 ' have no value other than to set
up stimuli which maintain the integrity and independence 
of the internal sequence. Since the only function of 
such responses is to serve as stimuli for subsequent 
responses, Hull called them "pure stimulus acts" or 
equivalently "pure symbolic acts."^
Although pure stimulus acts were clearly inventions 
rather than observed responses, they played a crucial role 
in Hull’s learning theory and later in his psychology of 
science (see following section).. They provided a 
behavioristic equivalent of ideas in the sense of their 
being internal events which could guide action with 
respect to a goal. "While indubitably physical," said 
Hull, "they occupy at the same time the very citadel of
g
the mental." Furthermore, pure stimulus acts provided 
a way to account for the flexibility and spontaneity of
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organismic behavior. As Hull saw it,
the advent of the pure stimulus act into 
biological economy marks a great advance.
It makes available at once a new and enlarged 
range of behavior possibilities. The organ­
ism is no longer a passive reactor to stimuli 
from without, but becomes relatively free and 
dynamic.^
Clearly, such a conceptual device would facilitate explana­
tions of the higher forms of behavior, but this advantage 
was gained by Hull at the cost of invoking unobservables 
in his theorizing, a ploy which was to draw criticism 
from his fellow psychologists.
In fact, it might be said that it was Hull's use 
of the pure stimulus act as an explanatory concept that 
become "relatively free and dynamic." In one especially
g
laborious and arcane application of the device in 19.35,
Hull claimed to have derived the phenomenon of insight,
but only by virtue of having invoked a multitude of pure
stimulus acts drawn from three distinct but complexly
interacting internal sequences. Hull was cognizant of
the unobservable status of these supposed acts, and
accordingly took great pains to insist that they could be
materially realized in the construction of highly sophisti-
9
cated physical machines. Nevertheless, the uninhibited 
use which Hull made of them understandably generated some 
skepticism among other psychologists, Tolman, for instance, 
recorded his misgivings in his presidential address to 
the APA. Speaking of Hull’s intricate diagrams of pure
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stimulus acts, Tolman said, "They are very clever and can
be invented, as I know to my cost, to explain practically
any type of behavior, however far distant from an instance
of conditioning such a behavior might at first sight 
If10appear. " •
During the early 1930s, Hull described two further 
knowledge mechanisms which were to supplement the basic 
mechanism outlined above. The first of these auxilliary 
mechanisms, that of "short-circuiting," was a consequence 
of biological economy. Hull noted that the internal 
chain offered two possibilities for adaptive efficiency.^ 
First, the intervening responses of which it is composed 
could undergo an energy-saving reduction in magnitude, 
as long as they remained just strong enough to set up the 
succeeding stimulus in the chain. Second, energy and time 
could be saved by the dropping out of intervening res­
ponses until there existed the bare minimum number necessary 
for the maintenance of the chain up to the final instru­
mental act. This short-circuiting would tend to occur,
12according to Hull, when there was intrasenal competition 
among the members of the chain and when there was a per­
sisting or "purposive" stimulus (either a goal stimulus or 
a drive stimulus1 which could help bind together the 
chain.
The second auxilliary mechanism of knowledge was
13Hull’s well-known concept of the habit-family hierarchy.
According to this notion, response chains which share a 
common initiating stimulus and a common final goal res­
ponse may be grouped together in a habit family. Within 
the family, the chains would be ordered into a hierarchy 
which would represent the relative strengths of the habit 
tendencies and could subsequently govern the selection of 
a habit from the family under particular circumstances (.as 
when, for example, external inhibition is applied to 
certain of the chainsl. Since the chains in a family 
could differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively 
Ce.g., in length}., the habit-family hierarchy contained 
the possibility for considerable flexibility in the attain­
ing of a goal. The divergence of the chains suggested—  
as Hull recognized— a strong kinship between the habit- 
family hierarchy and Tolman's means-end-field. But 
whereas Tolman preferred the spatial metaphor of "fanning" 
lines of causal texture, Hull fell back on his affinity 
for geometry and chose to think of his families in the 
mathematical sense. He noted:
The term 'families' is here used in much 
the same sense that geometers use the term to 
designate a series of curves, such as para­
bolas, which originate at the same point but 
thereafter follow different courses, all being 
generated by a single formula but each having 
a different value for one of the parameters.14
Although Hull never formally developed his notion of habit-
family hierarchies as derived from a single formula,
the notion clearly suited his conception of the organism
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as a deterministic machine, one whose behavior could be 
described and integrated under a simple mathematical 
expression.
To summarize, Hull's theory of knowledge was in its 
general outlines a behavioristic version of traditional 
associationism. The theory rested on three basic 
mechanisms; ("11 chains of internal responses, the pure 
symbolic acts, which were said to copy the external world 
through a process of associative conditioning; C2L short- 
circuiting, by means of which the chains were pared down 
by the forces of biological economy to their minimal 
effective length and magnitude; and C31 hierarchies in 
which a flexible family of alternative habit sequences 
was arranged and ordered. These mechanisms were not the 
only ones discussed by Hull, but they became the most 
important in his psychology of science,
Behaviorist Theory of Theory
Theory as a Habit Mechanism
Hull recognized early on that the core problem of 
a materialistic psychology of science was that of giving 
an account of theory itself. In preparing his seminar on 
behaviorism in 1925, Hull read A. P. Weiss's newly pub­
lished A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior. When Weiss 
claimed that mental properties could not be integrated 
into science's "system of natural law," Hull responded by
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asking, "Behavioristically, what is a 'system of natural 
15law'?" Weiss and other behaviorists CWatson, for 
example! were content, at least for the time being, to 
let behaviorism hold the same epistemological views toward 
theory as those held in the established sciences of 
physics, chemistry, and biology. It was characteristic 
of Hull's ambition and intellectual courage that he faced 
the necessity for behaviorism to account for the activity 
of theorizing— even though to do so called for the 
peculiar activity of theorizing about theorizing. An 
adequate and self-consistent behaviorism, wrote Hull, 
requires
as a background at least a basic epistemology, 
i.e., a theory of the nature of theory itself.
This is one of those cases where the very thing 
under controversy is involved in the method of 
proof through, no fault of anyone. Clearly in 
this system is a new phase of pragmatism but 
based on a sound and rigorous basis.
17Undaunted by the apparent circularity of the situation, 
Hull proceeded to pursue his theory of theory through the 
later half of the 1920s.
Hull's first extended consideration of th.e matter 
appeared in his idea book of 1926-27, under the title 
"Behavioristic theory of the 'nature of theory'." The 
ideas were roughly formulated, but they contained the 
germ of his later thoughts on theory. The passage 
begins:
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I have been haunted for many days by the 
profound importance of ideas and theories 
being nothing but habits— mainly symbolic habit 
activities. This means that all science, all 
mathematical processes, are at bottom nothing 
but symbolic habits.
In elaborating this notion, Hull took up the example of 
formulas, which according to him, "may be taken as the 
essence of theory." Hull viewed formulas as representa­
tions of generalized habits.
A formula is merely an objectified stimulus 
which will touch, off a specialized series of 
habits. This can be constructed by a genius 
and employed by any person who has acquired the 
sub-habits. Note:— A generalized habit is one 
that does the duty of a formula only internal.
i
Thus, for example, the formula for a right triangle inte­
grates the symbolic sub-habits of squaring and adding into 
a generalized habit. The outcome in a given instance 
is a symbolic action equivalent to the gross action of
actually measuring off the distance. "It is thus," said
20Hull, "an alternative and more economical method."
In its economical aspect, Hull’s early concept of theory 
adumbrated the later notion of short-circuiting. But the 
development of the short-circuiting notion came only 
after the mechanism of associative chaining had assumed 
central importance in his system.
Similarly, the idea that the sequence of internal 
habits governed by a formula Cor theoryL is an alternative, 
equivalent in outcome, to actual observation or measurement 
constitutes a clear precursor to the habit-family hierarchy.
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Hull asserted that under appropriate initiating conditions
a symbolic formulation of theory
will evoke a series of habit units each of which, 
in turn, will result in an act which will, in 
conjunction with the formula and the internal 
pattern (purpose! evoke another definite reaction 
and so on, until the final reaction will be the 
same, or practically the same, as if the subject 
had made a symbolic representation of what would 
have resulted from actually making the experi- 
ment.21
Sharing a final goal response and initiating conditions, 
the routes of theoretically calculating a value and 
empirically ascertaining it comprised— despite the quali­
tative differences between them— what Hull would later 
call a habit family. But once again, the explicit 
development of this concept came only after Hull had 
formulated the basic mechanism of internal copies con­
ditioned by association with the external world.
This latter mechanism was not long in coming. In 
1927, Hull wrote:
It has just struck me very forcibly that 
the pragmatic theory of theory itself really 
goes back to Hume. . . , The moral . . .  is 
that I should study Hume with a good deal of 
care before proceeding much farther with my 
system.22
What he found in Hume, of course, squared neatly with 
what he found in Pavlov. As was mentioned above, Pavlov’s 
stimulus-response bonds and conditioning procedures pro­
vided Hull with materialistic equivalents of Hume’s 
impressions and associations. Diagrams of internal copies
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arising from external sequences (such as in Figure 11 
soon began to appear in the idea books, along with remarks 
about their translatability into actual machines. As for 
the theory of theory, Hull's task became one of making 
plausible the notion that theories can be construed as 
internal copies of this sort.
This problem became an enduring one for Hull and one 
which constituted a stumbling block in his attempts to 
give an explicit public formulation to his psychology of 
science. By the time of his paper on "Knowledge and 
Purpose" in 1930, he felt the metatheory was sufficiently 
crystallized to begin alluding to it in print. In that 
paper, he urged that the pure stimulus act, the building 
block of internal copies of the world sequence, be con­
strued as "an organic, physiological— strictly internal 
and individual— symbolism." He was quick to add, however, 
that this "peculiarly individual form of symbolism is not 
to be confused with the purely stimulus acts of social
communication," which he admitted were "so complex as to
23preclude consideration here." Despite this qualification, 
Hull's strategy was clear, A scientific theory about 
causal sequences in the world was, according to the 
metatheory, to be viewed first as a generalized sequence 
of internal symbolic responses and then— through an as 
yet unspecified mechanism— as a public copy of the world 
expressed in social symbolism.
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Hull's enthusiasm for this approach was dampened
.when he presented it, shortly before its appearance in
print, to a group at Harvard. His audience there was
apparently unconvinced by his diagram of knowledge as a
functional copy of the world sequence and by his concept
of short-circuiting. As he recorded in his notes, "They
objected to the propriety of my calling the temporal
antecedence of R,_ to S,. a case of foresight, or of the
parallelism of the lower series a case of knowledge,"
The conclusion he drew from the episode was that "I must
recast and improve my presentation of the notion that the
organism can acquire a replica of the law operating in
the external world which is a functioning type of know-
24ledge, though not conscious at all."
The net effect of Hull's enounter at Harvard was to 
make him more cautious in advancing his system of know­
ledge and to tone down his ambitions about writing a major 
work on the behaviorist epistemology. In 19.33, he was
still planning to write an article on the theory of know- 
25ledge, but even this plan was eventually abandoned. All 
the same, the Harvard experience seems not to have shaken 
Hull’s faith in the general soundness of his epistemological 
views. On the contrary, they continued to underlie his 
thoughts on science and to find expression both in his 
private writings and more obliquely, in his published 
works. As such, these views are crucial for understanding
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the peculiarities of his approach to science and his 
relationship to logical positivism, even though, he never 
fully developed or expressed them.
By claiming that pure stimulus acts were a rudi­
mentary form of symbolism, Hull felt that scientific 
theories could be reduced to associatively conditioned 
habit sequences. But the fact that theories are socially 
shared linguistic entities continued to pose a problem 
for his metatheory. Lacking a theory of social symbolism, 
Hull was never able to close the gap, which he had 
acknowledged in 1930, between the internal symbolic system 
of pure stimulus acts and the external symbolic system of 
language. The best he could do in this respect was to 
speak elliptically and loosely of pure stimulus acts and 
their ''graphic equivalents." Presumably these socially 
communicable equivalents could become attached to the 
internal symbols through some process of associative 
conditioning; but Hull nowhere defended such a view in 
detail or in public.
This lacuna in his theory of theory did not prevent 
his continued adherence to it. During the push for inte­
gration of social science at the IHR in 19.36, Hull invoked 
his metatheory in characterizing the sought-for integra­
tion. In science, he asserted, the
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integrative medium is a structure of implicative 
pure stimulus acts Cor their graphic equivalents I 
which set out with a small number of concepts and 
postulates and from these derive the same symbolic 
actions Cor their equivalents) as are evoked in 
the investigator when the relevant aspec^of the 
external world is exposed to his senses.
In this assertion is found a concise summary statement
of Hull's theory of theory. The pure stimulus acts which
comprise a scientific theory run parallel to some general
causal sequence in the world. They are arranged in an
implicative structure because genuinely scientific
theories are deductive systems which mirror the hier-
27archical causal organization of the world. The output 
of such an implicative structure, whether embodied in 
internal or social symbols, is a pure stimulus act like 
the one that would arise in the investigator making the 
relevant empirical observation. That is to say, the out­
put is a theoretical prediction, a specialized kind of 
foresight made possible by the mechanism of short-circuiting. 
Humans can couch their theories in graphic symbols, but at 
root a scientific theory is no different from "a replica 
of the law operating in the external world” which any 
higher organism can acquire. As was the case with Tolman's 
empirical epistemology, Hull refused to draw a sharp 
distinction between the higher forms of human knowledge 
and the kinds of knowledge attributable to lower organisms. 
Like Tolman, he was striving to interpret science as a 
psychological phenomenon rather than as a logical one.
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A Behaviorist Theory of Truth
Traditionally, accounts of science have included, 
at least implicitly, some attempted solution to the pro­
blem of what constitutes truth in science. Seeing the 
need to address this fundamental issue, Hull extended 
his psychology of science to a behavioristic approach to 
truth. His characterization of scientific truth involved 
the notion that different activities of the scientist 
could lead to the same outcome. The symbolic actions of 
theorizing and computing predictions, said Hull, could 
give rise to a final symbolic act which under optimal 
conditions would be the same as the pure stimulus act 
arising from empirical observation. Accordingly, the 
independent processes of theorizing and observing were 
said to converge on a final common act and thus form a
habit-family hierarchy. For Hull, then, the test of truth
was the convergence of multiple processes on the same out­
come. Since these processes were construed as action 
sequences, either overt or covert, he called it "a
behavioristic theory of truth" and viewed it as part of
28"a behavioristic pragmatism." Just as a lower organism 
typically achieves a goal by means of various alternative 
routes, so the scientist approaches true statements through 
various means.
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Hull ' s view of truth placed the burden of theor- 
izing on the ability of a theory to produce novel pre­
dictions which could be approached and confirmed via the
empirical route. This prediction-generating capacity
29constituted for Hull the "crucial test" of a theory.
Since predictions, qua symbolic act calculations, could
be carried out within an individual and then checked by
that individual, Hull's theory of truth was not inherently
30one of truth-by-agreement. But given Hull's advocacy 
of a scientific division of labor between theoreticians 
and experimentalists (_see Chapter 6] , the theory in its 
application had a social dimension in which agreement was 
mediated by the overt symbols of social communication.
Hull's setting of the problem of truth in the context 
of adaptive behavior gave his theory the flavor of various 
pragmatic theories of truth. In its emphasis on the pre­
dictive aspect of scientific theories, his version of truth 
was somewhat similar to John Dewey's characterization of 
theories as leading principles. Although Hull sometimes 
spoke of the internal symbolic sequence as a "copy" or 
"replica" of the world, he was usually careful (_as was 
Dewey) to avoid the implication that ideas and theories 
copy or image the world. Instead, Hull generally spoke 
of the internal reaction sequence as no more than a 
"functionally parallel event" with respect to the outer- 
world s e q u e n c e . A s  in any habit family, the alternative
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habits of theorizing and observing bore no necessary quali­
tative relation to each other. In Hull’s words, the "sever­
al habit sequences' In effect (not actually) run a parallel
,,32 course."
Aside from these general similarities between Hull's 
view and that of the pragmatists, it is not clear what 
grounds Hull had for calling his system a behavioristic 
pragmatism. More often than not, Hull’s views on science 
seemed to qualify his system as a brand of realism. His 
materialism and mechanism, his occasional reference to 
internal "'copies" of the world, his notion that theories 
could "collide" with "stubborn facts," and his holding 
out for physiological interpretations of his intervening 
variables— all of these views made him sound more like 
a realist than a pragmatist. Being freely extrapolated 
from a theory of conditioning which itself was not highly 
developed, Hull’s psychological metatheory of science 
simply failed to conform clearly to the philosophical 
categories of his time. When it was pointed out to him 
in 1930 that the realistic elements of his view made 
dubious his characterization of it as a pragmatism, Hull 
expressed interest but remained unconvinced.^ He was not 
especially well-versed in contemporary philosophy, and in 
any case felt that an adequate behaviorism would provide 
objective solutions to philosophical problems.
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Hull's theory of truth and the role of the habit- 
family hierarchy in it were formulated during the late 
1920s. During his summer at Harvard in 1930, he pro­
posed the theory to the realist philosopher Edward G. 
Spaulding. The example he used in explaining the theory 
was that of multiplying 5 X 6, a feat which could be per­
formed (by human or machine! in alternative ways such as 
counting five groups of six or adding six five times. 
According to Hull, the theory was "scouted with great 
scorn." In the face of this negative reaction, Hull
resolved to write a "clear and convincing" article on
34the behavioristic theory of truth. When he introduced
the concept of the habit-family hierarchy in a paper of
1934, he asserted his belief that "the habit-family
hierarchy constitutes the dominant physical mechanism
which mediates such tests of truth and error as organisms
employ— that it provides the basis for a purely physical
theory of knowledge." But he added, "This matter is
35reserved for elaboration in a subsequent paper,"
The proposed paper was never to appear. Like other 
aspects of his psychology of science, Hull's theory of 
truth became submerged during the 193Qs under a morass 
of details and controversies about conditioning theory 
itself. Hull had assumed in the late twenties that the 
simple but powerful conceptual apparatus derived from 
conjoining Humean associationism with Pavlovian conditioning
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would lead directly and rather quickly to his major work 
on a behavioristic theory of knowledge. But conditioning 
proved to be no simple phenomenon, his psychological 
theory of science was not gaining a favorable reception,, 
and by the end of the thirties the logical positivist- 
operationist theory of knowledge had ascended to a posi­
tion of widespread acceptance among psychologists. As 
a result, not only did his major work on knowledge never 
appear, but his more modest plan for a series of papers on 
the subject was also scrapped. In his published writings, 
the theory of knowledge is presented obliquely, in bits 
and pieces, and as asides in works devoted to experiment 
and theory in the narrower context of conditioning theory.
But if Hull gave up on explicitly advancing his 
epistemology, he did not surrender his faith in it or his 
implicit reliance on it in his published works. For 
example, Hull's theory of truth appeared in the Principles 
of Behavior, but without being referred to as such and 
without reference to the habit-family hierarchy. Using 
his favorite example of Newtonian mechanics, Hull des­
cribed how the shape of Neptune could be equivalently 
determined through empirical or theoretical channels.
He continued:
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The critical characteristic of scientific theoret­
ical explanation is that it reaches independently 
through a process of reasoning the same outcome 
with respect to (secondary! principles as is 
attained through the process of empirical general­
ization. . . . The fact that, in certain fields
at least, practically the same statements or pro­
positions can be attained quite independently by 
empirical methods as by theoretical procedures is 
of enormous importance for the development of 
science. For one thing, it makes possible the 
checking of results obtained by one method against • 
those obtained by the o t h e r , 36
Hull's theory of truth was a peculiar one in that it
could sound like many other theories of truth, depending
on which aspect was emphasized in a given expression of
it. When Hull focused on the multiple determination of
truth, or on prediction as the crucial test, or on the
biological value of theory, it sounded like a pragmatism.
When he spoke of comparing theoretical claims with the
facts or of facts correcting theories, he seemed to adhere
to a correspondence theory. And sometimes he empahsized
the logical and deductive aspect of theory, as when he
stated that "it is evident that in its deductive nature
systematic scientific theory closely resembles mathe- 
37matics" ; in these cases his theory seemed like a co­
herence theory. Perhaps this seeming equivocation is 
attributable to Hull's lack of training in philosophy or 
his inattention to detailed philosophical distinctions.
But from the standpoint of philosophical discussions of 
truth, the ambiguity in Hull's theory stemmed in large 
measure from the fact that the theory was based on Hull's
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own peculiar extrapolation of conditioning principles—  
a situation in which, the ambiguity in Hull's formulation 
was exacerbated by his failure to publicly acknowledge 
the behavioristic grounding of the theory.
It was the psychological basis of Hull's version of 
truth that set it apart from any of the logical positivist 
theories of truth. The logical positivists never settled 
on an "official" doctrine of truth, but none of their 
views ever approached the psychologism that was character­
istic of Hull's, This was particularly the case for the 
correspondence view which Carnap had adopted from Alfred
Tarski after the latter had convinced him of the legit-
3 8macy of semantics. On this view, truth was a matter
of correspondence, formulated in a metalanguage, between
a proposition and a state of the world. The psychology of
perception, to be sure, entered into the ascertainment
of the state of the world, but the correspondence notion
of truth itself was strictly a logical matter. The other
version of truth current among logical positivists was the
39coherence theory advanced primarily by Otto Neurath. 
According to Neurath, the truth of an assertion was to 
consist in it cohering with a body of statements which is 
then empirically confirmable only when taken as a whole.
i
Neurath's account called for the observation sentences, 
the protokolsatze, of a theory to be formulated in the 
third person, even when reported by the observer himself.
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In this limited sense, the approach was behavioristic; 
but the stipulation amounted to no more than another 
assertion of physicalism, a doctrine which by Neurath's 
own insistence was independent of any particular version 
of behaviorism. Neurath's "behaviorism" was a recommenda­
tion for linguistic reform and not a behavioristic 
epistemology or any other form of psychologism, Hull's 
behaviorism, on the other hand, was a world-view, a theory 
of behavior, and a conceptual system to which, philosophical 
problems themselves could allegedly be referred for solu­
tion.
Theory and Organism as Parallel Machines
As we have seen, Hull was an ardent advocate of 
a mechanistic conception of nature. He felt that Newton 
had shown the inanimate world to be an elaborate machine.
In Hull's eyes, the organic world was equally a part of 
the world-machine, even in its most complex manifestations. 
Knowledge in general, and science in particular, repre­
sented adaptations of one part of the physical world to 
another. When Hull wrote about the mechanisms of knowledge, 
he typically appended remarks to the effect that the 
realization o f these mechanisms as actual machines would 
be a straightforward matter in the hands of a skilled 
engineer. The arrangement of simple knowledge mechanisms 
into sophisticated, highly flexible knowing machines would
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require diligence and cleverness, but there was otherwise 
no impediment to such an achievement. Higher knowledge 
itself was thought.to be an intricate but mechanical inter­
play of pure stimulus acts, and scientific theory was an 
especially effective conceptual machinery based .on these 
symbolic acts.
For Hull, the relation obtaining between a success­
ful scientific theory and its subject matter was a special 
kind of congruence. He spoke not of a theory describing 
or picturing the world of empirical phenomena, but rather
of a theory "paralleling" a dynamic situation in the 
4 0world. In psychology, qua science of behavior, this 
meant that a theory was a conceptual machinery or system 
which would run parallel to the organismic behavior in its 
domain. By putting initial conditions, e.g., stimulus 
values, into the theoretical machinery a series of compu­
tations could be set off resulting in a prediction Cor 
possibly an explanation! of an organismic action. Internal 
mechanisms mediating the target behavior could be parall­
eled by the theory's intervening variables, which were 
accordingly taken to reflect physiological processes under­
lying the behavior. In sum, a theory of behavior and a 
behaving organism were viewed as parallel machines.
This conclusion can be elucidated by examining the 
common features attributed by Hull to machines, theories, 
and organisms. First and most obvious, all three were 
strictly material entitites. Like literal machines, theories
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and all other forms of knowledge were structured sequences
of material events; no nonmaterial forces, were needed
to account for them. Likewise, organisms were seen as
complex arrangements of pure matter.
A second feature which. Hull saw as common, to machines,
theories, and organisms was that all three were said to
evolve through a process of trial-and-error, This was
a somewhat peculiar notion as applied to the development
of machines, but it was just such a process by which Hull
and his assistant constructed the correlation machine
which later figured so prominently in Hull's mechanistic
thought. In his autobiography, Hull described the gradual
process of manual trial-and-error that went into the time-
41consuming production of the device. Theories, too, 
were said to evolve by trial-and-error, albeit in a some­
what more complicated way. The postulation of principles 
represented a kind of symbolic trial; when their deduced 
implications were in error, they were revised and adjusted 
and tested again. Through this process, theories evolve 
toward truth status, "Thus," wrote Hull, "the determination
of scientific principles is in considerable part a matter
42of symbolic trial-and-error." The phylogenetic evolution 
of organisms took place by a process of variation and 
selection, a kind of trial-and-error, The ontogenetic 
evolution of adaptive behavior was similarly a matter of 
trial-and-error, or equivalently a process of excitation
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and inhibition. In his first paper on behavior theory 
(19291, Hull wrote that the excitatory and inhibitory 
phases of learning operate as an "automatic trial-and- 
error mechanism which mediates, blindly but beautifully,
43the adjustment of the organism to a complex environment."
As for the third property shared by machines, theories, 
and organisms, Hull believed that all three were capable 
of generating novelty through, a computational interplay of 
simple elements. In this sense, a sophisticated machine 
could yield higher order "mental work," such as logical 
calculations or correlation coefficients, by means of 
simpler operations combined according to a small set of 
mechanical principles. Hull saw such output as genuinely 
novel or "emergent" with respect to the simpler elementary 
operations, just as multiplication might be said to be 
emergent from addition. In a similar vein, the set of 
principles making up a theoretical system could combine 
in appropriate ways to generate, via the computational 
procedures of math and logic, novel predictions about 
scientific phenomena. It was just these predictions which. 
Hull took to be the crucial test of a scientific theory.
And of course, Hull insisted that higher organisms were 
constituted in such a way that they could produce novel 
adaptive responses. Emergent behaviors such as goal- 
seeking, purpose, and insight were generated from complex 
but structured interactions of simple sub-habits.
The fourth and final aspect which made machines, 
theories, and organisms alike in Hull’s view was that all 
three were seen as hierarchically structured. As was 
described in Chapter 6, Hull expressed the notion as 
early as 1926 that the various sub-mechanisms of a machine 
needed to be placed under some hierarchy of control. This 
lesson was undoubtedly learned in the course of actually 
constructing his early machines, although his early fas­
cination with hierarchies probably predisposed him to
44think in these terms, The hierarchical character of 
theory was a prominent motif in Hull’s work. He often 
spoke of a theoretical system as a cluster of statements 
which resembled geometry in exhibiting a hierarchical 
structure of primary principles, secondary principles, and 
so on. Finally, the hierarchical structure of organisms 
was the crucial property by which the combination and inter­
play of atomic S-R habits could issue forth in emergent 
adaptive behavior,
Hull's conceptions of machine, theory, and organism 
were of course not independent developments in his thought. 
Theoretical systems in psychology could be said to parallel 
the behavior over which that ranged because the systems and 
the responding organisms were construed alike as machines.
As such, they had all the characteristics attributed by Hull 
to complex mechanisms. The intar-translatability of machine 
design and theoretical principle and the conception of
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organisms as machines led naturally to the metaphor of 
theory paralleling behavior— a metaphor derived ultimately 
from Hull's underlying mechanistic world-view. As often 
happens with fundamental metaphors, Hull’s mechanism tended 
to recede with time from the foreground of his thought 
and writings, thereby making the discernment of its meta­
phorical nature all the more difficult. But it was no 
less operative for its state of lessened visibility. The 
historical reasons for the recession from prominence of 
Hull’s mechanism are surely complex, but it seems quite 
likely that the emphasis of the thirties on the testability
of scientific claims helped to discourage Hull from publicly
45airinc his mechanical metaphor. The view of science 
advanced by operationists and logical positivists simply
made no room for metaphor— which was after all metaphysical—
46 . . .or for research heuristics. Thus, despite its claim to
ensure public scrutability in matters of science, the new 
view of science popularized in the thirties very likely had 
the effect of pushing Hull's basic metaphor of organism 
as machine— a metaphor which animated all his work— farther 
from the arena of public criticism and possible under­
standing, Finally, since the plausibility of Hull's 
psychology of science depended intimately on the mechanistic 
metaphor, it, too, gradually receded from the realm of 
public scrutiny.
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An Empirical Interpretation of Logic 
The Psychology of Logic
As we have seen, Hull placed great stress on the role 
of logic in his theoretical system. Given this fact and 
his overall aim of developing an epistemology based on 
behavioral principles, it is not surprising that he saw 
the necessity of offering a behavioral account of logic 
itself. His efforts in this direction began in the mid­
twenties along with his ruminations on the general theory 
of theory. In fact, his account of logic was, except for 
matters of detail, the same as his account of theories; for 
Hull, the principles of logic had an epistemological 
status no different from that of the principles of science.
The essential elements of his interpretation of logic 
were already evident in his idea book of 1926-27, At that 
time he wrote:
Logical and mathematical theory is nothing 
but certain habits, found by trial to suit the 
world, Cwhich 3 have been isolated, objectified 
by means of graphic symbols and in this way able 
to stimulate others, (.and the maker also at 
different times1. This computation is buta 
series of stimulus response combinations,47
As is apparent from this brief passage, Hull conceived
logical theory as akin to scientific theory proper in
several respects: it is arrived at by trial, it applies in
some sense to the world, it can be conveyed across time
and individuals by means of graphic symbols, and it is
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comprised of computations based on stimulus-response units.
Implicit in the passage is the notion that logic shares
with theory the underlying knowledge mechanism by which
sequences of pure stimulus acts, parallel the causal
sequences of the environment. In this way, Hull- believed,
logic reflects the causal structure of the world in the
same way as ordinary theory, but it does so at a more
general level.
This peculiar view of logic meant, of course, that
the principles of logic were inherently contingent, Hull
was willing to accept this implication, although he insisted
that the causal uniformity of nature was sufficiently
strong to confer a very high degree of reliability on
the laws of logic. Thus, said Hull:
Logical necessity is no stronger than the tend­
ency of one symbol to evoke another. Of course 
in the world there seems to be a uniformity 
which tends to set up in normal organisms cer­
tain habits more or less independent of time 
and space. 8
The fact that these time- and space-independent habits could 
capture generalized causal uniformities in the environ­
ment thus formed the basis of an empirical logic, but it 
also conferred a biological advantage upon those organisms 
which acquired the habits, Hull noted, for example, that 
"a Clogical) inconsistency or (betterl a logical contra­
diction is two series of symbolic activities which lead 
to different and incompatible action from the same stimulus
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49pattern." The habits underlying logic were for Hull
not merely a source of abstract rules; they provided for
the adaptive conformity of action to the causal structure
of the world-machine.
In 19.38, Hull wrote a note to himself saying that
the idea of logical rules capturing causal sequences in
the world should be included in his book as part of the
50chapter on thinking and logic. As we have seen, no 
such chapter was ever published. Nonetheless, there is 
good reason to believe that Hull never actually gave up 
his empirical interpretation of logic. Even in his post­
humously published A Behavior System C.19521 , Hull spoke 
of theory as a "logico-causal hierarchy. Logic, like 
theory, was still being viewed as a conceptual machinery, 
a causal hierarchy of pure stimulus acts.
The Confirmatory Status of Logical Principles
Believing as he did that the principles or rules of
logic had empirical content, Hull was also committed to
their being subject to empirical test. In fact, Hull
did advance an account of how logical rules are confirmed,
over the long run, through experience. In deducing a
prediction from a scientific theory, Hull emphasized, we
use not only the principles of that theory but also the
52rules of logic, Hull recognized, as had Pierre Duhem, 
that if the resulting prediction fails to agree with the
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facts, the fault may rest either with the theory or with 
the other assumptions used in the derivation— and for Hull 
this included the logical assumptions. If the prediction 
is correct, Hull added, both the theory and the tules 
of logic thereby receive an increment in the probability 
that they will correctly mediate future predictions. Hull 
continued:
It thus comes about that the rules of logical 
syntax are validated in exactly the same manner 
and, indeed, at exactly the same instant, that the 
scientific postulates are validated.
The reason why we get the illusion that these 
"laws of thought” or logic are innate and of an 
entirely different order of validation is that the 
above process has been going on more or less since 
man has had the use of speech so that there has 
been an immense amount of trial-and-error which 
has molded these rules of syntax to a high degree 
of precision. The result of this trial-and-error 
has been incorporated into the culture, both 
informally in ordinary speech habits and formally 
as an explicit and self conscious methodology 
taught in the schools. We pick much of this up 
as speech habits with no recollection of the 
circumstances under which the habit was picked up. 
Accordingly when the habits function we are apt 
to think the habit tendency always was in our 
possession, and is therefore inherent in the 
nature of things.
By "the nature of things," Hull meant in this case the
nature of the mind, i.e., that logic represents inherent
laws of thought. He was quick to deny such a view of
logic since logic in his view arose from the causal
regularities of the external world. With this in mind,
he appended the following paragraph to the above passage:
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As a matter of fact, of course, even as 
things now appear, they Cthe rules of logic1 
presumably do reflect in some sense "the nature 
of thingsIr— in the sense that by a selective 
trial-and-error process those symbolic processes 
represented by the rules of logical syntax have 
been selected which will mediate symbolic con­
clusions in agreement with the causal sequences 
in the world,53
This passage was written in 1938, a time when Hull was
feeling the influence of logical positivism Cas evidenced
by his use of the expression "logical syntax").. It is
especially significant, therefore, that he was espousing
an interpretation of logic so clearly at odds with the
logical positivist view of logic as an empirically vacuous
tautology.
Further exposure to logical empiricism did not
dissuade Hull from his view of logic. Even after working
with Woodger, he included a statement on the empirical
status of logic in the introduction of the Mathematico-
54Deductive Theory of 1940. ' The same statement appeared
almost unchanged in Principles of Behavior three years 
later. It appeared near the end of the first chapter 
in a brief section entitled "The 'Truth' Status of Logical 
Principles or Rules," The statement was as follows:
Despite much belief to the contrary, it seems 
likely that logical (mathematical! principles are 
essentially the same in their mode of validation 
as scientific principles; they appear to be merely 
invented rules of symbolic manipulation which have 
been found by trial in a great variety of situations 
to mediate the deduction of existential sequences 
verified by observation. Thus logic in science is 
conceived to be primarily a tool or instrument use­
ful for the derivation of dependable expectations
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regarding the outcome of dynamic situations. Except 
for occasional chance successes, it requires sound 
rules of deduction, as well as sound dynamic postu­
lates, to produce sound theorems. By the same token, 
each observationally confirmed theorem increases 
the justified confidence in the logical rules which 
mediated the deduction, as well as in the "empirical” 
postulates themselves. The rules of logic are more 
dependable, and consequently less subject to' question, 
presumably because they have survived a much longer 
and more exacting period of trial than is the case 
with most scientific postulates. Probably it is 
because of the widespread and relatively unquestioned 
acceptance of the ordinary logical assumptions, and 
because they come to each individual investigator 
ready-made and usually without any appended history, 
that logical principles are so frequently regarded 
with a kind of religious awe as a subtle distilla­
tion of the human spirit; that they are regarded as 
never having been, and as never to be, subjected to 
the tests of validity usually applicable to ordinary 
scientific principles; in short, that they are 
strictly "self-evident" truths, . . , As a kind of 
empirical confirmation of the above view as to the 
nature of logical principles, it may be noted that 
both mathematicians and logicians are at the present 
time busily inventing, modifying, and generally 
perfecting the principles or rules of their dis­
cipline. . . .55
The final sentence concluded with a reference to the 1935
edition of Principia Mathematica. The logical positivists
had greeted this work with enthusiastic acclaim, but had
viewed it in line with the principle of tolerance as an
example of the freely chosen, conventional character of
logical systems. Hull, on the other hand, viewed it as
part of a long-term process of trial-and-error, a process
in which old logics are superseded by new systems of
superior empirical validity.
Two other features of this passage call for comment.
First, the only substantive change in the passage from its
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appearance in the 1940 volume was the insertion of the 
world "invented" into the first sentence.. This change 
appears to have been a concession to the conventionalism 
of the logical positivists,^ although it was unaccompanied 
by any softening of the claim for logic's empirical status. 
The second, and related,comment is that the passage 
makes no reference to Hull's notion that logic arises in 
individual organisms as sequences of symbolic habit acts 
conditioned to causal sequences in the world. By 1943,
Hull had dropped his plans to publish a behaviorist 
epistemology and was no longer even alluding to it. In 
public, he accepted instead the idea that logical rules 
arise through invention, but continued to maintain that 
their validity could be assessed only through empirical 
test.
The Hullian View of Logic
As we have seen, Hull believed that scientific prin­
ciples and logical principles were strictly on a par with 
respect to their epistemological standing. They were 
viewed alike as subject to validation through empirical 
trial-and-error. Sharing the same underlying knowledge 
mechanism, they were also alike in having empirical con­
tent. And being composed of pure stimulus acts or the 
equivalent social symbols, they were equally material 
entities. For all its complexity and power, logic required
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nonmaterial mediation no more than theory.
The relationship between theory and logic was an 
intimate one, for it was by means of logic that the pro­
positions making up a theory could be arranged in their 
hierarchical structure. In fact, this structure was what 
made a theory a "system," in Hull's terminology, as opposed 
to a mere collection of statements. As Hull wrote in 
summarizing Principles of Behavior, "scientific theory in 
its ideal form consists of a hierarchy of logically deduced 
propositions which parallel all the observed empirical 
relationships composing a science." But the hierarchical 
organization of theory was no mere matter of logical form. 
It was a crucial property of a theory which aimed to 
parallel a hierarchically organized subject matter such as 
complex adaptive behavior. Just as a machine or organism 
would need a hierarchy of control to govern its sub­
mechanisms, so would a theory of the. machine or organism 
require a system of control to govern the relative action 
or interaction of its various principles, "The logical 
procedure," said Hull, "yields a statement of the outcome
to be expected if the several principles are jointly
57active as formulated."
In order to determine a single predicted outcome 
from the combined action of several principles, the logical 
system into which they were arranged needed to have the 
capacity for computing and generating novelties. Hull did
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attribute this capacity to logic. In his paper of 1930
on "Simple Trial-and-Error Learning," Hull wrote:
The deductive process is a true generative activity.
The known principles give rise to new knowledge1, as 
the result of a causal sequence in a high-class re- 
dintegrative organism. According to one plaus­
ible hypothesis, principles are symbolic habits 
which, as a result of their functional interaction 
within the organism possessing them, give rise to 
new and distinct habits. These latter constitute 
the new knowledge. Thus the new knowledge, while 
derived from the original principles, is not the 
principles, but something newly come into exist­
ence. By the accumulation of these bits of deduc­
tive explanation, scientific systems become enlarged 
very much as have systems of mathematics.58
59Being aware in 19.30 of the work of Leibniz, ' Hull was
probably encouraged in his views by Leibniz's notion of
logic as a universal computational calculus. Certainly
Hull's logic machine of some fifteen years earlier would
have enabled him to think of logic as generative yet
strictly material. Furthermore, Hull's immersion in
British associationism would have disposed him to think
of logic as having empirical content; indeed, he cited
6 0John Stuart Mill's Logic in a paper of 1935. In any 
case, for Hull neither the material nature nor the empirical 
content of logic disqualified it from having the capacity 
to generate genuine novelties.
From what has been said, it should now be evident 
that, according to Hull, logic possessed all the critical 
characteristics of scientific theory proper Land, for that 
matter, those of machines and organisms 1, It was obviously 
hierarchical in form and was seen as having evolved through
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trial-and-error. Being a system of symbolic habits it 
was a strictly material phenomenon, and since symbolic 
habits were the computational units of mental action, 
it was also generative. By framing theories in logical 
form, the scientist not only made them testable -but also 
imparted to them a generative capacity in accordance with 
the general causal structure of a machine-like world.
To summarize: For Hull, logic was non-tautological.
In terms of content, it was therefore capable of being 
generative, because it embodied empirical regularities.
Logic was nonetheless neutral because it was machine logic.
That is, it was a kind of machinery of material events, 
it could be built into a literal machine, and it paralleled 
the causal sequences of the world-machine. Most important 
was the fact that it was manifested in pure matter. As 
such, it was as objective, as free of ghosts, spirits, 
entelechies, moral judgment, and bias as was any machine.
The conception of logic embedded in Hull's thought reached 
for the best of both worlds: the empirical content of 
Mill's logic and the neutrality, the power of arbitration, found 
in the Vienna Circle's conception of logic. The equation 
of organismic logic with machine logic meant psychologism 
without subjectivity.
One of the usual objections to a psychologistic inter­
pretation of logic was that it would make logic subjective.
One response to this unfortunate implication of psychologism
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was to suggest, as did Holt, that logical propositions 
are ontologically neutral entities. But Hull had no need 
for such a notion. By giving logic a psychologistic 
interpretation in terms of behavior rather than intro­
spective psychology, he felt tht he had overcome- the 
traditional difficulties of psychologism. The notion of 
logic as a material machinery made it objective for Hull,
His materialism and mechanical metaphor, however, were 
metaphysical views which others could share or not share.
Given his metaphor, Hull could have his logic both ways, 
objective and psychological, but his metaphysics could not 
force consensus outside its own boundaries. Unfortunately 
for Hull, the philosophical consensus of his time tended 
to favor the anti-psychologism of the logical positivists 
rather than any sort of metaphorically based neo-psychologism.
Conclusion: Hullian Logic versus Vienna Circle Logic
In previous chapters we have seen that Hull shared 
with the logical positivists a great stress on logic and 
its scientific applications. The present chapter, on the 
other hand, has revealed a number of important respects 
in which Hull's view of logic differed from that of the 
logical positivists. The philosophers who associated with 
the Vienna Circle drew a fundamental distinction between 
logical propositions and scientific propositions; the former 
were viewed, unlike the latter, as tautologous, empirically
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empty, and not subject to empirical validation, For Hull, 
the propositions of science and logic were on an equal 
footing in terms of their epistemological standing? they 
were equally non-tautologous, equally bearers of empirical 
content, and equally subject to the test of experience.
In logical empiricism, logical necessity was possible 
because logic had no empirical content, no dependency on 
the world of contingent events. In the Hullian system, 
logical necessity was possible because the empirical world 
from which it was derived was seen as exhibiting a highly 
reliable structure of causal determinism, The logical 
empiricist view of logic as tautological meant that 
logical conclusions could contain nothing not already 
present in the premises. The Hullian view of logic as 
empirical meant that logical processes could generate truly 
novel conclusions going beyond the content of the pre­
mises. All told, Hull and the logical positivists diverged 
deeply in their perspectives on logic.
On the logical positivist view, the tautological 
character of logic meant that it was subject only to the 
test of internal coherence. Like other formal systems, . 
logical systems had to come and go as a whole and could 
not be adjusted piecemeal through a process of trial-and- 
error, To be sure, formal systems could be abandoned or 
adopted at will— this much was guaranteed by the principle 
of tolerance. The choice between formal systems could be
made, as a matter of convention, according to their rela­
tive utility in dealing with scientific systems. But 
this was the only manner in which formal systems could be 
made responsive to scientific findings; the system had 
to be changed at the root, not merely brought into align­
ment with empirical results through partial adjustments.
For purposes of reconstructing the highly developed, 
largely formalized theories of the physical sciences, the 
logical positivist view of formal systems seemed at least 
plausibly appropriate. In less developed sciences like 
psychology, such a view was out of place. For all its 
shortcomings, the Hullian view was inherently more appro­
priate in the realm of psychological theorizing. Genuine 
reconstructions were simply not applicable to the relatively 
crude and unsystematic formulations which passed as "theory" 
in most of psychology. In their inchoate state, these 
formulations needed the flexibility of low-level trial and 
error, not the rigid structure of formal systems. Some­
what incongruously, Hull recognized this point— even at 
the peak of his interest in formalization— when he called
attention to the tentative, trial-like character of the
6 XMathematico-Deductive Theory. Thus, despite his con­
siderable interest in formal technique, Hull disavowed 
any intention of using logic to finalize and reconstruct 
his system. Logic was viewed, rather, as an instrument 
of ongoing research, as a technique "which will prevent the
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6 2freezing of a system." Writing in the appendix of the 
Mathematico-Deductive Theory, Fitch was no doubt reflecting 
Hull’s opinion as well as expressing his own when he 
asserted that "symbolic logic is a tool not only for veri­
fication of the old but for discovery and invention of
,, „63the new.
Given Hull’s views on logic, it is not surprising 
that the works on logic to which he referred in his pub­
lished writings were not those of the logical empiricists. 
He did, of course, cite Principia Mathematica and Woodger's 
The Axiomatic Method in Biology, but by far the 
logic treatise most often cited by Hull— and one which he 
recommended to his readers— was Dewey's Logic, The Theory 
of Inquiry. Dewey's interpretation of logic was much more
in accord with Hull's own and indeed may have helped shape 
64it. In a passage which Hull cited, Dewey wrote of the 
laws of logic that "like mathematical axioms, their 
meaning, or force, is determined and tested by what follows 
from their operative u s e . L i k e  his characterization of 
scientific theories as leading principles, Dewey's view 
of logic emphasized its capacity to guide the conduct 
of investigation and hence its testability by experience, 
at least in a broad sense. The kinship of this conception 
of logic to Hull's helps to highlight the fact that while 
Hull's stress on formalism was great relative to other 
psychologists, it was not great relative to that of the
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logical positivists, Hull's reputation for forma, 1 rigor 
among psychologists was in large measure a product of his 
propagandizing and rhetoric; in actual practice, his orienta­
tion was not far from the pragmatistic outlook that was 
common in American psychology.
Despite his avowed interest in logic, Hull never 
acquainted himself with it in any depth. As we have seen, 
he accordingly brought in Fitch to apply symbolic logic 
to the rote learning theory. Since Fitch was the one logi­
cian who worked most closely with Hull, it is of interest 
to note that he too rejected the interpretation of logic 
as an empty tautology. In Fitch's own words:
I was not myself very sympathetic with logical 
positivism because it seemed to me to be a too naive 
application of logic to the great and deep pro­
blems of philosophy, and in fact it largely 
ignored most of these problems, treating them as 
imaginary problems or delusions. The idea seemed 
to be that logic was, in some overly simple way, 
to be exploited in seeking answers to these great 
problems Cas far as they could be answered], and 
that logic itself had no real content, but that 
statements of logic were essentially empty. How 
logic could both be the key to these problems and 
still be empty, I never understood. . . .  My own 
view was that logic has real and important content 
and is a powerful tool in dealing with all problems 
in all the sciences, including psychology, and 
also in philosophy.
Fitch had been influenced in these views by his teacher
F. S. C. Northrop, another logician to whom Hull had been
exposed at Yale. On the whole, then, the philosophers
whom Hull was reading and having contact with were not
of a logical positivist persuasion. Their conceptions
of science were much closer to his own.
At root, the greatest difference between Hull's 
view of logic and that of the logical positivists was that 
Hull insisted on a psychologistic interpretation. Under 
the influence of Frege and the early Wittgenstein, the 
logical positivists had equally insisted on an anti- 
psychologistic interpretation, and this stance was not 
among the many positions which underwent liberalization 
during the late thirties and forties, The related dis­
tinctions of necessary-contingent, analytic-synthetic, and 
logical-scientific were so fundamental to logical positivism1 
or even the modified logical empiricism— that to abandon 
them was to give up on the entire enterprise. To agree 
with Quine's 1951 attack on the "dogma" of the analytic- 
synthetic distinction was to no longer be a logical empiri­
cist.
To be sure, the logical positivists had a place for 
the empirical study of the use of linguistic forms, 
including logic. Such an undertaking would be assigned 
to the realm of scientific investigation, in the branch 
of psychology or linguistics, but the task was in no case 
to be confused with that of logic proper. Logic was more 
fundamental than science; it was the very basis for divid­
ing the universe of propositions into the logical, the 
scientific, and the meaningless. For Hull, the situation 
was quite the other way around. With the perspective of 
nineteenth-century naturalism, Hull felt that all philo­
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sophical issues, in particular those having to do with 
knowledge, could be resolved by submitting them to science, 
in particular to psychology. As is amply evident, Hull 
had no qualms about extending this stratgey to logic 
itself. His behavioral psychology of logic was .intended 
not as a mere description of the conditions under which 
logic is acquired and used but rather as a primary account 
of the genesis and ultimate nature of logical processes.
Relevant to the present context, there can be dis­
cerned among the historical variants of psychologism 
three distinct types. First, there was Mill’s psychologism, 
in which logic was taken to be an empirical description 
of the laws of thought. These laws were in turn construed 
as introspectible regularities in the succession and 
association of ideas. Second was the physiological 
psychologism of such nineteenth-century materialists as 
Heinrich Czolbe.^ According to this brand of psychologism, 
logic was simply a matter of neural mechanisms which, in 
some unspecified way, yield concepts, judgments, and 
inferences from perceptual input. Finally, there was the 
newer behavioristic psychologism, of which Hull's version 
was one example. The anti-psychologism of Frege and
Wittgenstein, and hence of the logical positivists, was
6 8directed against the first two of these types. There is 
no evidence that the logical empiricists ever passed 
judgment on the behavioristic version of psychologism,
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and— especially since Hull suppressed his own version^- 
they may have never even come into contact with such a 
view. But, despite their sympathies with behaviorism, 
it is doubtful that this psychologism of the.third kind 
would have been any more acceptable to them than the other 
kinds. The only behaviorist thesis they were committed 
to— namely logical behaviorism— was after all a Xogical 
thesis; that is, it was a peculiar "behaviorism1 based 
on the demands of logic, and was far from a logic based 
on behavior. Their strict distinction between the pro­
positions of logic and those of science ruled out any
brand of psychologism, no matter how objective and rigorous 
/
the psychology on which it was based.
In sum, Hull’s adherence to a psychologistic inter­
pretation of logic placed a deep gulf between his view 
of science and the logical empiricist view. Despite the 
otherwise remarkable parallels between those views, this 
gulf ran deep because it was a profound difference on the 
very topic— logic and its application to science— which 
underlay the parallels. Paradoxically, the very emphasis 
which Hull and the logical positivists shared most was : 
also the most profound, if not conspicuous, source of their 
divergence. When Hull asserted that in science "the 
integrative medium is a structure of implicative pure 
stimulus acts," he was stating a notion very different 
from what the logical empiricists were advancing as the
506
unity of science through logic. All in allf there was
little in Hull’s relationship with logical positivism to
warrant the claim that his conception of science "owes.
a great deal to the work of Moritz Schlick and other members
69of the Vienna Circle."
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CHAPTER 9
B. F. SKINNER: RADICAL BEHAVIORIST
PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
If Hull's claim to rigor in theoretical matters was 
in part responsible for his prominence among psychologists 
during the 1930s and 1940s, then it was also partly res­
ponsible for his loss of influence during the 1950s. By 
the mid-fifties, research in the Hullian tradition, 
including Hull's own A Behavior System (19.521., was clearly 
retreating from its previously grander aims for compre­
hensive theory. Sigmund Koch's 1954 critique'*' of Hullian 
theory documented its shortcomings in massive technical 
detail, and by the end of the decade, researchers in the 
behaviorist tradition were beginning to look toward an 
approach that was free of the sort of cumbersome theoretical 
structure found in the Hullian system. The approach that 
was just then starting to take over the position of domi­
nance in behaviorism was that of B. F. Skinner.
The transition of reigning influences in behaviorism 
was a remarkable one, for it constituted in many respects 
a complete reversal of guiding attitudes toward the nature 
of science and scientific method. The deep differences 
between Hull and Skinner in their views of science were 
rooted in their respective backgrounds and were already 
evident in their earliest thoughts on behaviorism. Although
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Skinner was born twenty years later than Hull, they both
came to behaviorism in the late twenties and published
their first papers on animal behavior within a year of 
2each other. But whereas Hull was guided by a Newtonian 
model of science, Skinner adopted a Baconian-Machian 
model. This difference was manifested in their views on 
many issues: the nature of explanation, the value and role 
of theory, the use of unobservables, and scientific method 
itself. On the deductive-inductive dimension, Hull stood 
very close to the deductive pole and Skinner was equally 
close to the inductive pole. Because of Skinner’s induct- 
ivist, radical empiricist approach, his work enjoyed 
very little popularity during psychology's Age of Theory; 
but once the elaborate theoretical systems began to fall 
from favor in the fifties, Skinner's approach made him 
well-suited to succeed Hull as the dominant figure in 
behaviorism.
Since the 1950s, Skinner's influence on American 
psychology has been monumental. Laboratories and journals 
devoted to operant conditioning have thrived, and Skinner­
ian research has been applied to a wide variety of settings 
in programs of "behavior modification." Skinner has 
advocated broader applications of conditioning research, 
such as the design of cultures, and his views have pro­
voked interest and debate both within and outside of the 
scholarly world. He has exercised his literary skills in
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producing two popular works, the Utopian novel Walden Two
C19481 and the controversial best-seller Beyond Freedom
3
and Dignity Cl 9 711 , His ideas are known throughout much
of the world, and it has been conjectured that history
will judge him to have been "the major contributor to
4
psychology in this century."
Skinner's Background and Turn to Behaviorism 
Background
Skinner was raised in Susquehanna, Pennsylvania, 
where his father worked as a lawyer. As a boy, he derived 
considerable enjoyment from building various toys and 
devices, thereby acquiring skills which he later put to 
use in constructing the pieces of psychological apparatus 
he is now well known for.^ Skinner's parents encouraged 
him in his schoolwork, and he was rather well read even 
as a youth. In school, he especially enjoyed literature 
and biology. During the eighth grade, Skinner's interest 
in the hypothesis that the works of William Shakespeare 
were written by Francis Bacon led him to read some of 
Bacon's works. Skinner reports that although he did not 
grasp Bacon well at the time, Bacon "was to serve me in
g
more serious pursuits later on." While in high school, 
he delved into Darwin's Voyage of the Beagle Cl8451. and 
The Expression of the Emotions of Man and Animals Cl8721,
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the latter of which was Darwin's major work on psychology.
Skinner went to Hamilton College in New York state. 
There he continued to read widely and to pursue his 
interests in literature and biology. His contact with 
psychology as an undergraduate was limited to a 'course 
in "Philosophy, Psychology, and Logic" taught by a former 
student of Wilhelm Wundt. Skinner has recounted that 
"the only psychology in the course was a brief demonstration 
of the two-point limen, in which Dr. Squires applied a 
pair of dividers to his forearm and quickly returned them
Q
to his desk." In a development far more relevant to 
his eventual career, Skinner was directed by a professor 
of biology to the works of Jacques Loeb. Loeb was a 
German-American biologist whose research on, and mechan­
istic interpretation of, animal motion made him an important 
forerunner of behaviorism. Although Skinner had no 
explicit interest in psychology at the time, he was
9
"impressed by the concept of tropism or forced movement."
Loeb's influence would not become manifest for some 
time. Skinner's immediate future was to be determined 
by his literary interests. He began to write a fair amount 
of fiction and poetry, and gradually became known as an 
"aspiring young poet." During one of his college summers, 
he attended a writing school at Bread Loaf, Vermont. There 
he met Robert Frost, who read some of Skinner's fiction 
and encouraged him in his efforts. This encouragement
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proved to be a determining factor in Skinner's decision 
to try out a career in writing upon graduating from 
college. He had planned to spend a year writing a novel, 
but found that he had nothing to write about and suffered 
through what he would later refer to as his "Dark Year." 
After his unsuccessful attempt at writing fiction, he 
undertook, at his father's suggestion, the task of writing 
a digest of legal decisions. The work was tedious but it 
yielded two benefits: the job of classifying grievances 
and decisions turned out to be "not far from a Baconian 
classification of scientific facts" and thus spurred his 
interests in science; and the work produced royalties
which would enable him to return to school for graduate
, 10 work.
Skinner considered the possibility of pursuing 
graduate study in English, but eventually settled on 
psychology instead. The choice of psychology followed 
Skinner's realization that what intrigued him about litera­
ture was actually human behavior, a topic that could be 
approached more suitably through science. Skinner was 
told by a friend that "science is the art of the twentieth 
century," and Skinner took the notion seriously. This idea 
was later reinforced when Skinner read an article by H. G. 
Wells in which Wells posed the dilemma of whom should be 
saved if George Bernard Shaw and Ivan Pavlov were drowning 




Skinner’'s undergraduate coursework in philosophy had
failed to arouse his interest, but the scientifically
oriented philosophical writings of Bacon had appealed to
him. He had discovered Bacon through literature, and it
was again his literary interests that led him to discover
Bertrand Russell and, as a conseqeunce, Pavlovian reflexology
and Watsonian behaviorism. The Dial, a favorite literary
magazine of Skinner's, published in 1926 a book review in
which Russell referred to Watson's Behaviorism (19241. as
"massively impressive." Skinner subsequently purchased
12and read Behaviorism and Russell's Philosophy (19271,
Philosophy was one of Russell's lesser-known works, 
but it was to have a crucial and lasting impact on Skinner.
As Skinner has described the book, "it begins with a 
careful statement of several epistemological issues raised 
by behaviorism considerably more sophisticated than any­
thing of W a t s o n ' s . B u t  the book was more than just 
a statement of issues, It was a lengthy, detailed, and 
direct application of Watsonian behaviorism to the tradi­
tional problems of epistemology, Russell argued that in 
most respects behaviorism provided an adequate and fruit­
ful account of both ordinary and scientific knowledge. 
Scientific knowledge was to be regarded as the end product 
of a chain of processes consisting of perceptions, memory, 
testimony, and inference. Each of these links in the chain 
was the subject of a chapter in Philosophy.
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Conceiving perception in a behavioristic fashion, 
Russell regarded it as a type of sensitivity, not unlike 
that exhibited by scientific instruments. Animals, includ­
ing scientists, were acknowledged to differ from instru­
ments in possessing learned reactions, but Russell believed 
that this factor did not crucially complicate the situa­
tion. Memory, the second stage in the knowledge pro­
cess, was said by Russell to be essentially the recurrence 
of a conditioned response under appropriate stimulus condi­
tions. Testimony, regarded as the linguistic behavior of 
scientists, was viewed as a requisite for establishing 
the intersubjectivity of scientific knowledge. Russell 
saw no difficulty with the behaviorist interpretation of
language, calling Watson's treatment of words as conditioned
14stimuli "the only satisfactory way to treat language," 
Finally, inference or induction was said to be indis­
pensable for science simply because "every scientific law 
is established by its m e a n s . J u s t  as Hume had attri­
buted induction to "animal habit," Russell claimed that "as 
a practice, induction is nothing but our old friend, the 
law of conditioned reflexes or of association" and that 
"scientific induction is an attempt to regularize the above
■| g
process, which we may call 'physiological induction'."- 
All told, Russell felt that behaviorism could account, 
more or less, for the major epistemological processes.
He completed this picture by giving knowledge as a whole
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a behavioristic interpretation:
In ordinary life, knowledge is something which 
can be tested by examinations, that is to say, 
it consists in a certain kind of response to a 
certain kind of stimulus. This objective way 
of viewing knowledge is, to my mind, much more 
fruitful than the way which has been customary 
in philosophy. . , CI]f we wish to give a defini­
tion of "knowing," we ought to define it as a 
manner of reacting to the environment, not as 
involving something (.a "state of mind"! which 
only the person who has the knowledge can 
observe.17
Within a few years, Russell had completely abandoned
his behavioristic approach to knowledge, and Skinner had
developed a non-Watsonian behaviorism to apply to epistemo-
logical problems. Nonetheless, Skinner's reading of
Philosophy had two important effects. First, it led him
to seriously consider behaviorism at a time when his
psychological allegiances had not yet crystallized;
"fRusseim had taken Watson seriously," wrote Skinner,
18"and so did I." Second, and more importantly, Russell's 
application of behavioral psychology to the problem of 
knowledge provided a model which Skinner has followed ever 
since. The details of Russell's account were soon there­
after rejected by Skinner, but the general notion of 
developing an empirical epistemology from a behaviorist 
basis has been a continuing theme throughout Skinner's 
career. As will be discussed below, Skinner's first book, 
begun in the early 123Qs, was his (unpublished! "A Sketch 
for an Epistemology." He has since referred to an empirical 
theory of knowledge as his "first love" and has noted that
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"I eame to behaviorism , , . because of its bearing on
19.epistemology, and I have not been disappointed,"
By 19.23, then, Skinner had decided that he would
pursue a career in psychology— even though he had never
had a course in it— and that he would approach it as a
behaviorist with an eye toward epistemologi.cal issues.
The royalties from the legal digest would finance his
graduate education, and it remained only for him to choose
a school. Without knowing anything about psychology at
Harvard, he decided to go there on the advice of a former
biology professor who had sent some of his premedical
students there. Skinner arrived at Harvard in the fall
of 1928, bringing with him the three books that he felt
had prepared him for a career in psychology: Russell's
Philosophy C1927), Watson's Behaviorism (1924), and I. P.
20Pavlov's Conditioned Reflexes C1927]. The further 
influences he came under at Harvard would serve to reinforce 
the biological and positivistic orientation that he was 
already developing at the time of his arrival. In Darwin 
and Loeb and in Bacon, Skinner had enountered the sorts 
of ideas which, when put together, would constitute the 
intellectual framework that guided his career. By the time 
he left Harvard, that framework had become fully intact and 
was being applied energetically to the problems of psych- . 
ology,
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Intellectual Roots; Biology and Positivism 
Machian Positivism and Biological Economy
In reading Bacon, Skinner had been exposed to a view 
of science which emphasized observation, classification, 
the gradual inductive establishment of laws, and the avoid­
ance of hasty overgeneralization and metaphysical dogma. 
Skinner's sympathies with such a view were greatly strength- ; 
ened and refined by his reading of Ernst Mach during his 
graduate years at Harvard, While taking a course in the
history of science, he was directed to Mach’s' Science of
21Mechanics [1883). Around the same time, he also read 
some of the works of Henri Poincare and P. W. Bridgman's 
Logic of Modern Physics (.1927), but it was Mach's work 
that served as a model for Skinner's doctoral disserta­
tion of 1930 and, as we shall see, as a basis for his own 
positivistic views of science.
In the Science of Mechanics, Mach traced the develop­
ment of mechanics from its primitive origins to its con­
temporary status. Arguing from a wealth of examples, he 
showed that physical concepts such as force have arisen 
from experiences in everyday work and craftsmanship and 
then been extended and refined through the historical 
evolution of scientific mechanics. For Mach, the develop­
ment of mechanics exemplified the continuity between science 
and the practical commerce of humans in their environ-
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merits. The study of its history could reveal the con­
tingent, historically conditioned character of its concepts 
and laws, and make possible the salutary distinction 
between their genuine, experiential import and the super­
fluous metaphysical meaning that had been imputed to them. 
As Mach wrote in the preface of the Science of Mechanics, 
the aim of the treatise was to "clear up ideas, expose
the real significance of the matter, and get rid of meta-
22physical obscurities."
Skinner's dissertation was a polemic urging that
the concept of the reflex be extended to the behavior of
intact organisms. All such beahvior, he claimed, could
be "adequately embraced" by a suitably clarified concept
23of the reflex. . The inspiration for this approach came
from Bertrand Russell, who, according to Skinner, "pointed
out that the concept of the reflex in physiology had the
24same status as the concept of force m  physics." Having 
read Mach and Bridgman, Skinner was receptive to Russell's 
claim and prepared to defend it in his dissertation. The 
first half of the dissertation applied to the reflex 
concept a historio-critical analysis, the method and aim 
of which were explicitly drawn from Mach. Skinner wrote 
in his introduction that
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the chief advantage, first exploited in this res" 
pect by Mach, lies in the use of a historical 
approach. , . . ENlo attempt is made to give an 
exhaustive account of the history of the reflex.
Certain historical facts are considered for two 
reasons: to discover the nature of the observa­
tions upon which the concept has been based; and to 
indicate the source of the incidental interpreta­
tions with which we are concerned.^
As with Mach, Skinner's use of history as a tool for the 
clarification of concepts included the positive function 
of clarifying the experiential origin and basis of con­
cepts and the negative function of disclosing their 
inessential metaphysical components. Skinner concluded 
that the observational import of the reflex was nothing 
more than an observed correlation of stimulus and response; 
the "incidental interpretations" that had been ascribed
to the reflex were that it was "involuntary," "unlearned,"
2 6and "unconscious."
Skinner’s historical method was thus adopted directly
from Mach, but more importantly it was used in the service
of a broad positivistic view of science which was itself
drawn largely from Mach. Skinner had read other positivists,
but in terms of his overall approach to science, Mach had
the major impact. It is no exaggeration to say that Skinner
27was profoundly influenced by Mach, and the signs of that 
influence are spread throughout Skinner's work from 19.30 
on. The dissertation set the pattern for what was to come.
In what follows, it will be shown that the major 
features of Skinner's view of science can all be found in
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the writings of Mach. The discussion will be organized 
along several themes, which., taken jointly, indicate the re­
markable degree to which Skinner's approach echoes that of 
Mach. In laying out these themes, no sharp distinction will be 
drawn between those notions which Skinner adopted directly 
from Mach and those which Skinner, once having embraced the 
Machian framework, may have drawn on his own as implications 
of that framework. In addition to the Science of Mechanics, 
Skinner read Mach's Analysis of Sensations C l9141 and parts of 
Knowledge and Error Cl£051, but it was the Mechanics that
Skinner read first, and by his own reckoning, had the great-
2 8est influence on him.
The Origins of Science. For Mach, science is an out­
growth of the practical concerns of everyday life. In activ­
ities such as hunting and craftsmanship, humans interact with
and manipulate their environments, and such actions constitute
29the rudiments of human knowledge. Likewise, Skinner has 
written that:
. . , the earliest laws of science were probably the 
rules used by craftsmen and artisans in training 
apprentices.
When we speak of the knack of a craftsman or the lore 
of a. hunter, we refer to the skillful or informed be­
havior usually acquired through direct contact with 
things rather than from instructions or rules. The 
behavior is not unlike that of other species, and it 
must have been exhibited by the human species long 
before language was available to make instruction or 
the formulation of rules p o s s i b l e . 30
Furthermore, according to skinner, precursors of scientific
knowledge in the realm of psychology also lie in skilled
behavior,
We speak of similar unanalyzed skills or wis­
dom in dealing with human behavior. We say, for 
example, that a salesman “has a way with people,'* 
or that a politician “is a good judge of human 
nature.'* We mean that he can often anticipate 
what people will do or even arrange matters so 
that they will do certain kinds of things. Like 
the craftsman, he has acquired these skills from 
direct contact, and he often cannot explain -what 
he does or teach others to do it.31
Skilled human behavior is thus the proximate source of
science for both Mach and Skinner, But for neither is it
the ultimate origin. Both, in fact, trace the roots of
knowledge back beyond human history into the biological
evolution of animal behavior.
That this is so for Skinner is not surprising. As 
a behaviorist, he is naturally disposed to viewing the 
evolution of knowledge, in light of the continuity of 
species, as a matter for behavioral biology as well as 
cultural history. Skinner's early sympathy with Russell's 
application of Pavlov's research on dogs to human epistem­
ology is but one example of his belief in the essential 
continuity of human and animal knowledge. This belief is 
evident throughout Skinner's writings.
However, it is perhaps surprising that Mach— who is 
usually placed in the intrspectionist, not behaviorist, 
tradition— also held such a view. His biological orienta­
tion was evident in the Science of Mechanics when he stated 
that in trying to account for knowledge he "found it help­
ful and restraining to look upon everyday thinking and 
science in general, as a biological and organic phenomenon,"
In 1894, after describing the similarities between animals
and humans in reacting to their environments, Mach wrote
that "Csluch primitive acts of knowledge constitute to-day
the solidest foundation of scientific thought" and that
33"knowledge, too, is a product of organic nature," By
1905, Mach had given serious attention to the comparative
psychology of C. Lloyd Morgan, Jacques Loeb, and others,
and he devoted many pages of his Knowledge and' Error (1905}
34to descriptions of intelligent animal behavior. From
his excursions into comparative psychology, Mach drew
conclusions that would be congenial to most behaviorists:
humans and animals form concepts in the same way; the
behavior of humans and animals is governed by associations
acquired through experience and maintained by their
biological utility; and in Mach's own words, "ttlhe basic
feature of animal and human behavior is Hal rigorously
35determined regular automatism," The study of animal 
behavior was for Mach integral to a scientific under­
standing of the activity of the scientist— a type of 
activity which could be recognized "as a variant of the
instinctive activity of animal and man in nature and 
3 6society." In Mach's view, the evolution of animal 
behavior and the history of physics are but two parts 
of a single historical line of epistemological development. 
As he wrote in Knowledge and Error:
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Scientific thought arises out of popular thought, 
and so completes the continuous series of bio-'- 
logical development that begins with the first 
simple manifestations of life.
Animals gather individual experience in the same 
way as humans. Biology and the history of civil­
ization are equally valid and complementary sources 
for psychology and the theory of knowledge,
Associated with Mach's emphasis on the inescapably
historical character of knowledge was a particular set of
views concerning the nature of science. First, he
attributed a larger role in the procuring of scientific
38knowledge to fortuitous accident than to careful logic.
Just as animals make and benefit from accidental dis­
coveries, so too "it is by accidental circumstances , , .
that man is gruadually led to the acquaintance of improved
39means of satisfying his wants." Second, for Mach, his­
tory shows that all propositions, even those of science 
and logic, are contingent because they are based on 
experience. The tendency to invest theories with "meta­
physical garb," to assign a necessary or a priori status 
to them, is perhaps understandable in light of their "high
practical value," but it arises only when their experien-
40tial origins are neglected. Third, the historicity of 
all knowledge means that an understanding of the knowledge 
process calls for the investigation of specific instances 
of scientific discovery. Accordingly, Mach enjoins the 
epistemologist .to study concrete cases of scientific 
behavior and to exercise caution in generalizing from them.
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Fourth, the historical perspective on science reveals it 
to be undergoing continual revision and refinement. As 
a historical phenomenon, it is provisional and incomplete. 
Taken together, these four characteristics of science— its 
fotuitousness, contingency, particularity, and incomplete­
ness— meant for Mach that science cannot be reduced to 
a formula or determinate set of methodological rules. 
Likewise, Skinner has viewed all knowledge as a product of 
history. In doing so, he has emphasized the same character­
istics of science that Mach has, and has drawn the same 
conclusion that science cannot be captured by any formula, 
such as the hypothetico-deductive method. That Skinner in 
fact holds such views will be documented below, when his 
views are discussed in relation to logical positivism.
Biological Economy in Science. Having conceived of 
knowledge as primarily a historical and biological phen­
omenon, Mach proceeded to spell out the various ramifica­
tions of this conception for science. Fundamental to 
these ramifications is his principle of biological economy,
a principle which he applied so frequently and consistently
41that he was accused of "riding his horse to death,"
Science for Mach is simply the economical description of 
facts. Economy in science, which amounts to little more 
than efficiency of practice and simplicity of expression, 
often comes to be seen as a goal in its own right; but 
even so it continues to rest on the economical satisfaction
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of biological needs. As Mach wrote in the preface to 
Science of Mechanics:
Economy of communication and of apprehension is 
of the very essence of science, , , , In the be­
ginning, all economy had in immediate view the 
satisfaction simply of bodily wants. With the 
artisan, and still more so with the investigator, 
the concisest and simplest possible knowledge of 
a given province of natural phenomena— a knowledge 
that is attained with the least intellectual expendi­
ture— naturally becomes in itself an economical aim; 
but though it was at first a means to an end, when 
the mental motives connected therewith are once 
developed and demand their satisfaction, all thought 
of its original purpose, the personal need, dis­
appears . 42
Just as the history of science is continuous with animal 
behavior, so is the intellectual parsimony of science con­
tinuous with the economy of biological needs. The organic 
roots of either may be forgotten, but only at the expense 
of a decrement in our understanding of science.
Scattered through Mach’s works are expressions of 
skepticism toward attempts to set science apart from the 
organic world, to picture it as somehow transcending the 
biological needs in which it is rooted. "Our first 
knowledge," he says, "is a product of the economy of 
self-preservation." The economical collection and communi­
cation of such knowledge, says Mach, gives us "a clue
which strips science of all its mystery, and shows us
43what its power really is." Or again:
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The biological task of science is to provide the 
fully developed human individual with as perfect 
a means of orienting himself as possible. No 
other scientific ideal can be realized, and any 
other must be meaningless. 4
Or stated more baldly: " . . .  the ways even of science
45still lead to the mouth." Science constitutes a con­
tinuing refinement and extension of biological knowledge, 
but it does not transcend the demands of economy and 
survival.
For Skinner, too, scientific activity is a special
type of behavior, and all behavior is governed by the
46contingencies of reinforcement and survival. Science 
promotes self-preservation, at the levels both of indivi­
dual and culture, by providing economical means of ful­
filling those contingencies.. Just as Mach saw science 
as contributing to the orientation of the individual, 
Skinner asserts that the procedures of science benefit 
the individual in operating on the environment. As he
puts it, "What matters to Robinson Crusoe is , , . whether
47he is getting anywhere with his control over nature."
But the contingencies of survival also operate on cultures
A culture, like a species, is selected by 
its adaptation to an environment: to the extent 
that it helps its members to get what they need 
and avoid what is dangerous, it helps them to 
survive and transmit the culture. The two kinds 
of evolution are closely interwoven. . . ,
Survival is the only value according to which a 
culture is eventually to be judged, and any prac­
tice that furthers survival has survival value by 
definition.48
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Science for Skinner is one such, practice.. In particular,
an effective science of behavior can promote the survival
of culture by enhancing control over survival-threatening
behaviors, especially those whose consequences are
49
dangerously remote.
But to be effective in promoting survival, Skinner
argues, science must approach its subject matter in the
most direct possible way. According to him, this may be
achieved by bringing the scientist's behavior of collecting
ordering, and describing observations under the immediate
control of relevant aspects of the environment. Science's
external purpose of furthering survival translates
directly into a set of internal standards for science.
Skinner thus follows Mach in emphasizing efficiency of
investigation, immediacy of observation, and economy of
description and communication as desiderata for science.
As it is for Mach, intellectual parsimony is rooted in
biological economy. Mach's notion that every uneconomical
formulation and superfluous concept or distinction
involves a loss is echoed throughout Skinner's writings 
50on science. Thus, Skinner claims that the purely des­
criptive approach to science possesses "greater efficiency" 
than the hypothetico-deductive approach, that the use of 
unnecessary terms violates "that ultimate simplicity of 
formulation that it is reasonable to demand of a scientific 
system," and that the criteria for judging a system "are
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supplied principally by the usefulness and economy of the 
system with respect to the data at hand,"51 Mach's in­
junction against formulations involving "greater precision 
than fits the needs of the moment" finds its counterpart
in Skinner's warning against making "a fetish of exacti- 
52tude." Scientific practices and formulations which are
acceptable to Skinner are characterized in such terms as
"convenient," "expedient," "effective," "useful," and
"economical"; unacceptable practices and formulations are
said to be "unpractical," "supernumerary," "unnecessary,"
53and even "clumsy and obese." Skinner thus rejects as 
superfluous, or even harmful any scientific practice which 
interferes with the activities of observing and des­
cribing. Like Mach's positivism, Skinner's is one of 
biological expedience.
The major features of Skinner's positivistic view 
of science are all variations on the theme of biological 
expedience. These features and their kinship to Mach's 
philosophy of science will be considered in the following.
Cause as Function and Description as Explanation. 
According to Mach, "For the investigator of nature there
is nothing else to find out but the dependence of phenomena
54on one another." Phenomena for Mach always occur m  
varying relationships of interdependence and are thus 
naturally described in terms of such dependencies. To 
adequately describe phenomena is to explain them: "Does
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description accomplish all that the enquirer can ask? In
55my opinion, it does.” Mach recognized that hxs reduc­
tion of explanation to description would appear inadequate
to those thinkers for whom '"describing leaves the sense of
5 6causality unsatisfied," Most people, he admits are 
accustomed to conceiving of a cause as pushing or pulling 
to produce its effects; but such a notion of cause and 
effect is metaphorical, superfluous, and to be rejected 
in any final scientific formulation. In the Machian 
scheme, cause and effect are simply correlated changes in 
two classes of phenomena, as when a geometer observes 
changes in the length of a hypotenuse when the opposite 
angle is varied. The relation of cause and effect can be 
economically replaced with the notion of a mathematical 
function.^
The Machian views of explanation and causality were 
directly adopted by Skinner early in his career and have 
continued to figure prominently in his remarks on science. 
These views were the basis for Skinner's redefinition of the 
reflex as an observed correlation of stimulus and res­
ponse. In his dissertation, he referred to description and 
explanation as "essentially identical activities" and 
embraced "that more humble view of explanation and causa­
tion which seems to have been first suggested by Mach . . .
wherein, in a word, explanation is reduced to description 
and the notion of function substituted for that of
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58causation." As it did for Mach., the functional notion 
of cause permitted Skinner to eschew the uneconomical and 
potentially misleading connotations of mechanical causa­
tion:
In general, the notion of a reflex is to be .emptied 
of any connotation of the active 'push' of the 
stimulus. The terms refer here to correlated 
entities, and to nothing more. All implications 
of dynamism and all metaphorical and figurative 
definitions should be avoided as far as p o s s i b l e , 59
More recently, Skinner has used the Machian notion of 
causality to argue against the metaphorical interpretation 
of Darwinian selection as selection "pressure. In
any case, Skinner follows Mach in rejecting nondescriptive 
forms of explanation and causation because they are seen 
as impediments to the direct and economical contact between 
an investigator and a domain of phenomena.
Hypotheses and Theories. Closely related to the 
Machian reliance on description in science is the view 
that hypotheses and theories play a limited and inessen­
tial role in scientific investigation. Because the final 
aim of science is complete description, theories and hypo­
theses can serve only in the role of what Mach calls 
"provisional helps"; they will become superfluous as the
final aim is reached, thereby exhibiting their "self-
61destroying function." Theories and hypotheses are simply
not as economical as mathematical functions in expressing
6 2lawful regularities among phenomena. Furthermore, the 
interim use of hypotheses carries the risk of their
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interfering with the essential process of observation,
As Mach puts it: ""We err when we expect more enlighten-
6 3ment from an hypothesis than from the facts themselves," 
Likewise, for Skinner, hypotheses and theories are, 
first, inessential and, second, likely to lead to ineffect­
ive behavior on the part of the scientist, Skinner 
defines unacceptable theory as "any explanation of an 
observed fact which appeals to events taking place some­
where else, at some other level of observation, described
in different terms, and measured, if at all, in different 
64dimensions," Any such theory is dispensible, in Skinner*s 
view, because it goes beyond the task of complete des­
cription. Theories of behavior couched in physiological 
terms are rules out as irrelevant for a science of behav­
ior (though they may be useful in their own domainl,
while theories couched in mentalistic or conceptualistic
6 5terms are eschewed as simply otiose. A descriptive
science can proceed without explanatory hypotheses or
theories toward its goal of concisely organized facts and
6 6inductively established laws.
Skinner admits that "Ctlheories are fun," but he 
insists that the activity of conjecturing is less effi­
cient than that of observing. Conjecturing appeals to 
the investigator "whose curiosity about nature is not
67equal to his interest in the accuracy of his guesses." 
Moreover, conjecturing is said to be "wasteful," to create
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a "false sense of security," and to lead to "useless" and
"misdirected" experimentation, "bootless theorizing," and
6 8the unnecessary loss of "much energy and skill," Not
surprisingly, Skinner is critical of Hull's attempt to
use "theoretical postulates" instead of observed funcational
dependencies. With a Machian eye toward economy, he
characterized Hull's approach as "harmful," "glancing and
ineffective," and "beyond its sphere of usefulness," and
he said that it "diverted CHullH from a frontal attack on
69crucial issues." Xn sum, Skinner has followed Mach in 
questioning the value of hypotheses and theories on the 
grounds that their use violates the precepts of intellectual, 
and ultimately biological, economy.
Truth. Although Mach did not explicitly address the 
philosophical issue of truth, it should be clear from the 
foregoing review of his biological conception of knowledge 
that truth was for him a matter of promoting the adapta­
tion of an individual or species to the surrounding environ­
ment, This means that Mach held a view closely related 
to what later became known as the pragmatist conception
of truth— a conception which, in fact, he probably inspired
70through his influence on William James, Mach's bio­
grapher John T. Blackmore has written that Mach "preferred 
the pragmatic notion that an assertion was true only to 
the extent that it satisfied 'human purposes,' 'human 
biological needs,' or contributed to the 'survival of
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71the human race or species'." Similarly, Skinner is 
reluctant to speak of truth.,, but when he does-, he tends to 
adopt a pragmatic position. Thus, in considering scient­
ific knowledge, he says that "there is a special sense in 
which it could be 'true' if it yields the most effective 
action possible," Or again: "An important part of sci­
entific practice is the evaluation of the probability that
a verbal response is 'right' or 'true'— that it may be
7?
acted upon successfully." “ In therr shared predilection 
for dealing in particulars, both Mach and Skinner naturally 
shy away from offering generalized claims about truth—  
after all, biological expedience will be variously mani­
fested according to the demands of the specific situation 
at hand. But their approaches to the issue of scientific 
truth are obviously closely related.
Psychologistic Epistemology. Being wary of general 
theories, Mach remained skeptical of broad philosophical 
accounts of the nature of knowledge. He denied that he 
was engaged in philosophical pursuits and insisted that 
knowledge be studied in concrete psychological terms,
"Above all there is no Machist philosophy," he wrote.
"At most Cthere isi a scientific methodology and a psych­
ology of knowledge HErkenntnispsychologiel; and like all
scientific theories both are provisional and imperfect 
73efforts," In his Knowledge and Error, which was subtitled 
"Sketches on the Psychology of Inquiry," Mach summarized
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his psychologistic, and largely behavioristic,, approach to 
epistemology:
CWle lay no claim to completeness, and indeed would 
rather guard against premature philosophizing and 
systematizing. Let us take an attentive walk through 
the field of scientific enquiry and observe the 
detailed behavior of the enquirer. By what means has 
our knowledge of nature actually grown in the past, 
and what are the prospects for further growth in 
the future? Tfie enquirer’s behavior has developed 
instinctively in practical activity and popular 
thought, and has merely been transferred to the 
field of science where in the end it has been dev­
eloped into a conscious method. To meet our require­
ments we shall not need to go beyond the empirically 
given. We shall be satisfied if we can reduce the 
features of the enquirer's behavior to actually ob­
servable ones in our own physical and mental life 
(.features that recur in practical life and in the 
action and though-t of peoples); and if we can show 
..........  ’ ' ’’ leads to practical and
Mach believed that a purely empirical epistemology was 
possible, that philosophical preconceptions were not only 
unnecessary for the enterprise but a harmful source of 
prejudice. An epistemology based on economical observa­
tion and description would carry with it a methodology, 
which in Mach's words would be "furthered much more through 
specific living examples, rather than through pallid
abstract formulae that in any case need concrete examples
75to become intelligible."
Like Mach, Skinner has held that an empirical 
epistemology can fruitfully be pursued by studying the 
actual behavior of scientists. As we have seen, he came 
to this belief, prior to his reading of Mach, under .the 
influence of Russell. At the outset of his graduate
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studies at Harvard, Skinner was told by Alfred North. 
Whitehead that a young psychologist should follow develop­
ments in philosophy. Skinner replied that "it was quite
the other way around— we needed a psychological epistem- 
7 6ology." But Skinner's interests in a psychologistic
account of knowledge were no doubt strengthened by Mach's 
77influence. His approach to epistemology has, in any 
case, a decidedly Machian character. For both Mach and 
Skinner, epistemology is a subject for empirical (.generally 
behavioral] psychology rather than for philosophy, it 
focuses more on concrete instances than on general pro­
positions, and it can provide guidance in methodological 
matters. The empirical epistemology developed by Skinner 
in the course of his career will be discussed later in 
this chapter.
The present section has described several aspects of 
the close relationship between Mach's and Skinner's positiv- 
istic views of science. Some of Skinner's views were 
directly influenced by Mach and some perhaps only indirectly, 
but it is clear that his positivism is a Machian positivism. 
The logical positivists had claimed Mach as a forerunner 
of their philosophy of science, but Mach's positivism 
conspicuously lacked the strong formal emphasis found in 
logical positivism. Whereas the logical positivists 
pursued their epistemology and their rejection of meta­
physics through logical analysis, Mach pursued these ends
541
through empirical observation and description, Much, the 
same can be said of Skinner: his positivism, like Mach's, 
is of a descriptive rather than logical variety.
The various specific views that are common to the 
approaches of Mach and Skinner all constitute little more 
than elaborations of a biologico-economical conception of 
knowledge. For both, the intellectual parsimony that con­
stitutes their positivism is an outgrowth of the demands 
of efficient adaptation. Speculative theories and reified 
concepts are eschewed in the belief that they would inter­
fere with the direct study of the subject matter at hand 
and thus lead to ineffective behavior.
If the view of knowledge held by Skinner and Mach 
is based on intellectual economy, then one might well ask 
what this notion of economy is based on. Is it not a 
philosophical principle of the sort that Skinner and Mach 
claim to avoid? Mach denies that it is. For him, the 
"principle" of intellectual economy is a contingent, 
empirical description of biological adaptation, Character­
izing the principle of economy, one prominent Mach scholar 
has written that:
It has no ontological status. It is not a phys­
ical law. . . . Mach claims, as Avenarius had 
done earlier, that the principle of economy of 
thought is but a description of animal behav­
ior. . , . The evolution of science thus becomes
a special case of the larger biological process 
of self-preservation through mental adaptation,78
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Refusing as always- to appeal to transcendental principles,
Mach draws upon description for guidance even in what
79would appear to be regulative matters.
Once again, Skinner’s approach to this issue echoes 
that of Mach. He regards knowledge as a special,kind of 
behavior and behavior, in turn, is known descriptively 
to be a product of the adaptive process of shaping by the 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic contingencies of survival.
Just as adaptation in general is most efficient when 
these contingencies are satisfied in the most economical 
way, so is scientific knowledge most efficient when it 
meets its ends through economical observation, descrip­
tion, and communication. Far from being a logical positiv­
ism, Skinner’s positivism is grounded in biological 
expedience. It arises from a biological conception of 
organismic behavior, the same conception that has guided 
his empirical research on the process of adaptation through 
operant conditioning. In other words, Skinner’s positivistic 
methodology is indigenous to his deep-seated conception of 
psychology.
Positivist Biology of Behavior: Loeb and Crozier
As a behaviorist, Skinner naturally views his work 
as falling in the tradition of biology, and this intellec­
tual heritage is perhaps stronger in his behaviorism than 
in Tolman’s or Hull's. Whereas Tolman and Hull had studied
engineering and philosophy in college, Skinner had studied 
literature and biology. After arriving at Harvard, he 
found that his interests and sympathies lay more with 
physiology than with psychology. Most of his research 
at Harvard was conducted in the newly established Depart­
ment of Physiology, and he seriously considered trans­
ferring to that department before learning that his 
research would be accepted for a dissertation in Psychology.
In sketching the history of behaviorism, Skinner 
has emphasized the contributions of Darwin, Lloyd Morgan, 
Watson, and Pavlov. From Pavlov, Skinner learned the
81lesson: "control your conditions and you will see order."
But Pavlov had claimed to be studying the cerebral cortex
by means of his experiments on the conditioned reflex.
Such an inferential treatment of neurophysiology through
behavioral studies violated Skinner's Machian insistence
on developing accounts in science which remain close to
8 2one's observations. Furthermore, Skinner argued, if 
behavior itself is orderly, it can be treated as a sub­
ject matter in its own right, without appeal to another 
level of explanation. In these views, Skinner was greatly 
influenced by his .teacher, the Harvard physiologist 
W. J, Crozier, and indirectly by Crozier's teacher 
Jacques Loeb, It was the positivistic behavioral biology 
of Loeb and Crozier more than the comparative psychology 
of Darwin's immediate successors that Skinner drew upon in 
his own research.^
Loeb’s energetic application of a mechanistic deter­
minism to the biological realm had made him a controversial 
figure in Europe as well as in America following his 
immigration in 18 9.Q. In the United States, he became one 
of John B. Watson’s teachers and later wrote his 'influential
The Organism as a Whole Cl9161., a book which Skinner read
84as an undergraduate. In that work, Loeb reported his 
extensive experimental research on tropistic movement 
and, discussing the implications of tropisms for psychology, 
suggested that the behavior of higher organisms was simply 
a sum of stimulating forces in the environment. Further­
more, Loeb believed that these causal factors could ade­
quately be expressed as variables in equations representing 
functional relations between enviornment and behavior. The 
view of causation that Loeb was applying here was taken 
directly from Mach, whose ideas on science were described
by Loeb as a source of "inspiration" and "energy" to 
8 5him. Like Mach before him and Crozier and Skinner after 
him, Loeb insisted that equations of this sort should 
contain no "arbitrary constants" and that all variables in
8 6them must have testable reference to observable phenomena.
Even before his arrival at Harvard, Skinner had thus 
encountered the notion of cause as function and the use of 
the behavior of whole organisms as a dependent variable.
But Loeb had not been entirely consistent in his positivism. 
He still tended to speak in physiological terms and to
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supplement his descriptive equations with causal explanations
8 7in terms of chemical and mechanical metaphors. As Loeb's
disciple, Crozier carried on in the Loebian tradition but
sharpened the Machian emphasis in it. In a piece written
around the time that Skinner studied with him, Crozier
eliminated explanatory metaphors and defined the organism
as "a system of' relations," which were Mach's relations
8 8of functional dependence. Crozier was extending the
tropism conception to mammals, experimentally establishing
an expanded set of controlling variables, and stressing
the quantitative and predictive power of the functional
equations. It was this ultrapositivistic form of Loebian
biology that Skinner encountered at Harvard. A prominent
student of Skinner's has written that:
Crozier seemed to be fleshing out Loeb's stark 
conceptual framework with quantitative, empirical 
fact. He contributed more than data, however,, 
for his version of Loebian biology was more dis­
tinctive. In Crozier's hands, it became espec­
ially mathematical in the sense of functional 
relations between the physical measures of stimulus 
and response . . . , concerned more with behavior
as behavior rather than as manifestation of some­
thing else Csuch as a nervous system} . , . , and
experimental rather than statistical. , . , The
line of behaviorist descent as regards actual 
research passes more conspicuously from Loeb via 
Crozier to Skinner, than via Watson,
Skinner followed Crozier in using carefully controlled 
conditions and single organisms to isolate sources of 
variability and thus obviate the need for statistics.
In its emphasis on the whole organism, Crozier's des- 
cipline of "General Physiology" was an unusual brand of
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physiology, but it was just what Skinner was looking for.
Except in one important regard, Crozier's "Analysis of
90
Conduct" became Skinner's "Analysis of Behavior." The
important exception was that Skinner regarded the tropism
as too restricted a concept to apply to behavior in
general; for that purpose, he preferred to retain the reflex
concept in its purified meaning of an observed functional
91relation between stimulus and response. From the reflex, 
Skinner gradually developed the notion of the operant—  
a notion that would become the basic concept of his 
empirical epistemology.
By the time Skinner finished his degree at Harvard, 
his orienting attitudes toward science were fairly well 
established. The Machian framework he adopted was largely 
drawn from his reading of Mach, but he also encountered it 
in applied form in the behavioral research of Crozier. 
Skinner's early acquaintance with Darwinian biology made 
him receptive to Mach's biological positivism. His con­
ceptions of learned behavior as biological adaptation and 
of scientific activity as expedient investigation were but 
two sides of his deeply held biological view of behavior, 
and they have remained so. The basic Machian orientation 
has not changed in Skinner's thought. But it is important 
to bear in mind that the Machian framework explicitly 
includes a provision for the gradual development of an 
empirical, psychological epistemology. Just as Mach took
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up the challenge of developing a descriptive epistemology, 
so too has Skinner; and in this respect there' have been 
changes in his thoughts on science. As we shall see, 
Skinner’s relationship to logical positivism d e p e n d s  on both 
his Machian framework and the behavioral epistemology 
which was licensed by, and later developed out of, that 
framework. It was only after Skinner developed his 
psychologistic epistemology that the deep differences 
between his view of science and that of logical positivism 
became fully evident.
Skinner’s Relation to Logical Positivism 
Early Interest
It will be recalled that the logical positivists 
acknowledged Mach’s experiential positivism as an influ­
ence on their own positivism and even for a time referred 
to themselves as the "Verein Ernst Mach." They drew 
upon Poincare's arguments for.conventionalism and against 
metaphysics, and in Bridgman's operationism they found 
a close parallel to the empiricist side of their logical 
positivism. Mach, Poincare, and Bridgman also served 
as sources of Skinner's positivism, so it is perhaps not 
surprising that he at times showed an interest in logical 
positivism. Skinner has rarely addressed himself to 
logical positivism and has never done so at any length; 
but it is still possible to piece together his attitudes
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toward it on the basis of his occasional remarks.
Even at the time of his arrival at Harvard, Skinner
was deeply interested in the nature of science in general,
He took courses in the history of science under L. J.
Henderson and George Sarton, joined the History of Science
Society, and acquired back issues of the Society’s journal 
92Isis. Skinner has written that: "I also planned to
observe the history of science as it unfolded and, following
Francis Bacon a little too closely, to take all knowledge
93to be my province," That plan proved to be too boldly 
encompassing, but in his "early enthusiasm for scientific 
method and epistemology" he did become a charter sub­
scriber to Erkenntnis and somewhat later, Philosophy of 
94Science. The former journal, which began publishing
in 1930, was of course the journal of the logical positivists,
and the latter, founded in 1934, also published many
articles by logical positivists. Skinner was thus exposed
to logical positivist notions at an early date. But
characteristically, he responded to them from a psychological
rather than philosophical viewpoint. Speaking of these
journals, Skinner wrote:
Causality was a common theme, and I thought it 
was clearly a behavioral one. I wrote about 
observations not unlike those which the Belgian 
psychologist CAlbertl Michotte would later pub­
lish in his book on the perception of causality.95
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In a similar manner, Skinner responded to Rudolf Carnap’s
Erlcenntnis paper on "Psychology in Physical Language” C1932)
by calling him the "latest behaviorist" and including him
in a listing of psychologists who had recently converted
96to behaviorism. In doing so, Skinner was apparently 
ignoring the differences between behaviorism as an approach 
to psychology and behaviorism as an aspect of the phil­
osophical doctrine of physicalism.
However, Skinner did accurately perceive that, at 
least at a general level, logical positivism held impor­
tant common ground with his own operational approach to 
science. Referring to his approach as it stood in the 
early thirties, Skinner has written:
In Mach and in Henri Poincare’s Science et methode 
I found early versions of what was beginning to be 
called operationism. The philosophers of the 
Vienna Circle, not yet dispersed by Hitler, were 
taking a rather similar line and calling it 
logical positivism, and Russell, who had intro­
duced me to behaviorism had been influenced by 
-another, if renegade, Viennese, Ludwig Wittgen­
stein.
And again, in writing of his stance in the mid-thirties,
Skinner has stated: "As far as I was concerned there were
only minor differences between beahviorism, operationism,
9 8and logical positivism." But this remark was followed 
by a discussion of operationism which suggests that Skinner 
was here referring to the general similarity between 
operationism and the logical positivists' emphasis on 
verifiability. There is no evidence that Skinner's sympathy
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with logical positivism ever extended to its formal side,
Skinner was personally acquainted with two of the 
major figures in logical positivism, Rudolf Carnap and 
Herbert Feigl, After receiving his Ph.D., Skiner was 
elected to the Harvard Society of Fellows, of which the 
philosopher-logician W. V, 0, Quine was also a member. 
Through Quine, who had studied with Carnap in Prague, 
Skinner met Carnap at Harvard during the summer of 1936.
In a letter written some months later, Skinner reported, 
with perhaps a touch of overstatement, that Carnap "is 
the only European I have ever met who grasps the signifi­
cance of modern behavioristic psychology and its implica­
tions for the problem of thought," In a remark that was 
more typical of his reactions to philosophers, Skinner 
added: "I have little hope of reconciling logic with 
psychology, however, except by convincing the logician
that most of his problems are essentially psychological—
99and that is not like to be successfulJ" Skinner sub­
sequently referred to Carnap in his Behavior of Organisms 
C19381 and in a paper of 1945, but in both cases he was 
being critical of Carnap's views on the unity of science.
Skinner's relationship with Feigl began in the early 
forties when they were both at the University of Minnesota, 
There they became close friends. Together they read and 
discussed Skinner's Walden Two and engaged in friendly 
arguments over philosophical issues related to psychology,
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But they never reached any substantial agreement on those
issues, and it is doubtful whether Skinner absorbed much
logical positivism through his contact with Feigl, For
his part, Feigl has referred to Skinner as "America’s
most brilliantly and consistently positivistic psychologist,"
and he has summarized his relationship with Skinner by
saying, "We disagreed sharply on philosophical issues of
psychology, but this never disturbed our personal rela- 
102tions," Skinner has acknowledged the support and impetus
provided by Feigl for his work on verbal behavior, but
stated that "Chle and I had never fully resolved the
differences between logical positivism and behaviorism,
and each of us, as Feigl put it, continued to cultivate
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his own garden. . . .
In sum, Skinner had early sympathies with logical 
positivism, but aside from its kinship with operationism, 
it was of no great interest to him and appears to have 
had little influence on his work. Skinner had scant need 
for a logical positivism because, by 1930, he was already 
committed to a Machian variety of positivism which, in 
its descriptive and biological thrust, suited his Baconian 
and Darwinian biases. Moreover, Machian positivism was 
not only devoid of the formalist emphasis found in logical 
positivism, but it was actually antiformalist in important 
respects. Skinner's attitude toward formal characteriza­
tions of science and his continued adherence to a Machian
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positivism are discussed in the following section. 
Reaffirmation of Mach: Skinner’s "Case History"
In 1952, The American Psychological Association and 
the National Science Foundation decided to undertake 
joint sponsorship of "a thorough and critical examination 
of the status and development of psychology." In what 
became known as "Project A," prominent theorists in 
psychology were invited to contribute detailed state­
ments of their systems. Under the directorship of Sigmund 
Koch, these statements were to be collected in a series 
of volumes which would serve as an "aid to the scholars 
and research workers who are striving to increase the rigor 
and further development of scientific psychology.
Prospective contributors were sent a set of guidelines 
suggesting that they address such topics as "the type of 
formal organization . . . considered best suited to
requirements for systematization," the "(sltatus of the 
system with respect to explicitness of axiomatization, and 
of derivational procedures employed," and "a reconstruction 
of the roles of 'implicit' (i.e., 'postulational') 
definition, 'explicit' definition, empirical or 'operational' 
definition, and, in certain cases, 'coordinating' defini­
tion, as these are respectively realized within the
105 . .system." In other words, the participating psychologists
were being asked to represent their systems in the frame­
work of logical positivism.
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Skinner was asked to contribute to the series. 
Following Mach in favoring "specific living examples" over 
"pallid abstract formulae," he turned to old notes and 
records of his research in order to examine his own 
behavior as a scientist. But he found little in the record 
of his own research that could be fit into the framework 
suggested in the project guidelines, and offered instead 
a review of the rather haphazard development of his approach 
to psychology. It was published under the title "A Case 
History in Scientific Method," and began with the follow­
ing introductory remarks:
A scientist is an extremely complex organism, 
and his behavior still resists a successful empir­
ical analysis. Nevertheless, if anything useful 
is to be said about him, either in trying to under­
stand his behavior or in inculcating similar 
behavior in others, it will be by way of an empirical, 
rather than formal, analysis. As an antiformalist, 
it would be inconsistent of me to describe my own 
scientific activity in the formal framework of 
Project A. I have therefore reacted to the proposal 
of the director by illustrating my own philosophy 
of science with a personal history.
Before recounting his personal history, however, Skinner 
stated his general position on formal accounts of scient­
ific method— "model building," "theory construction," 
"experimental design," and the like— and their relation­
ship to scientific practice.
. . . it is a mistake to identify scientific 
practice with the formalized constructions of 
statistics and scientific method. These disci­
plines have their place, but it does not coincide 
with the place of scientific research. . . .  As 
formal disciplines, they arose very late in the 
history of science, and most of the facts of
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science have been discovered without their 
aid. . . . It is no wonder that the laboratory 
scientist is puzzled and often dismayed when he 
discovers how his behavior has been reconstructed 
in the formal analyses of scientific method. He 
is very likely to protest that this is not at all 
a fair representation of what he d o e s , -*-07
True to his descriptive empiricism, Skinner went on to
assert that methdological issues are issues about the
behavior of scientists and that the empirical account of
science that is needed to settle such issues is not
available.
If we are interested in perpetuating the 
practices responsible for the present corpus of 
scientific knowledge, we must keep in mind that 
some very important parts of the scientific 
process do not now lend themselves to mathematical, 
logical, or any other formal treatment. We do not 
know enough about human behavior to know how the 
scientist does what he does. Although statisti­
cians and methodologists may seem to tell us, or 
at least imply, how the mind works— how problems 
arise, how hypotheses are formed, deductions made, 
and crucial experiments designed— we as psych­
ologists are in a position to remind them that 
they do not have the methods appropriate to the 
empirical observation or functional analysis of 
such data. These are aspects of human behavior, 
and no one knows better than we how little can 
at the moment be said about them.-*-^
Once again, Skinner here takes a stance that is decidedly
Machian in character. It is explicitly antiformalist
and specifically critical of the hypothetico-deductive
method. It refuses to leave the level of description even
for epistemological analysis and yet acknowledges that
no adequate empirical account of knowledge exists, Mach
wrote in the Science of Mechanics that the mark of a
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scientist is the "toleration of an incomplete conception 
of the world," and Skinner emphasized the danger of letting
formal treatments of methodology blind the scientist to
.^  . . . 109its incompleteness.
The "Case History" itself is largely a story of the 
different pieces of apparatus built by Skinner, his changes 
of interest as he proceeded, the alteration and redesign­
ing of apparatus, the devising of efficient means of 
recording data, and gradual reconceptualizations of units 
of behavior. Looking for observed consistency of data 
and little else, the story goes, Skinner was exploring 
behavior in an evolving interaction between himself, his 
rats, and his apparatus. He followed his interests, 
found ways to save labor, and benefitted from happen­
stance. Examples of serendipitous findings crop up re­
peatedly. The rat lever, the response manipulandum that 
became a standard of operant conditioning research, was 
originally devised not for the study of operant condi­
tioning but rather in order to investigate the rate of
110an eating reflex.- Smooth extinction curves were
first produced by accident when a piece of equipment for
delivering food failed to operate properly, Schedules
of intermittent reinforcement, which would later become
a major topic of research, were discovered when Skinner
was forced to stop reinforcing every response because
112of an unforeseen shortage of food pellets.
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Skinner's review of his own behavior as a researcher 
seemed to show that he had not been following any parti­
cular method and that some of what turned out to be important 
discoveries were unplanned and incidental to his intentions 
of the time. From the story he extracted five ".unformal­
ized principles of scientific practice":
1. when you run into something interesting, drop 
everything else and study it
2. some ways of doing research are easier than others
3. some people are lucky
4. apparatus sometimes breaks down
5. serendipity— the art of finding one thing while 
looking for something elsell3
Given the suggested framework for Project A, Skinner's 
"principles" were perhaps humorous, but there was a point 
to be made. The formalized principles of hypothetico- 
deductive and statistical methodology failed to give an 
accurate picture of at least one researcher's method in 
practice. Perhaps formalized methods were intended only 
to be prescriptive, but any attempt to prescribe method 
was unacceptable to Skinner unless it was derived induct­
ively from systematic observations of successful scientific 
practice. Summarizing his own practice, Skinner wrote:
I never faced a Problem which was more than the 
eternal problem of finding order. I never attacked 
a problem by constructing a Hypothesis. I never 
deduced Theorems or submitted them to Experimental 
Check. So far as I can see, I had no preconceived 
Model of behavior— certainly not a physiological 
or mentalistic one, and I believe, not a concep­
tual one.^^
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As for the notion of a unity of method in science,
Skinner concluded his "Case History" with the statement
that "it may be best not to try to fit all scientists
115into,.any single mold,"
Nowhere in his paper did Skinner directly .address 
logical positivism, but he was clearly dissociating 
himself from many of the logical positivist notions of 
science. He would remain a Machian positivist, con­
tinuing to view knowledge above all else as a product of 
individual and collective history. His case history and 
his unformalized principles emphasized the same histori­
cally conditioned character of knowledge that Mach had 
stressed. For both Skinner and Mach, the empirical 
study of knowledge reveals its fortuitousness, contin­
gency, particularity, and incompleteness.
Skinner did not refer to logical positivism by name in 
his case history, but he has done so on other occasions, 
usually in the context of dissociating himself from it. 
Thus, he has stated that "Lt]he physicalism of the logical 
positivist has never been good behaviorism" and that 
"behaviorism is not to be identified with logical positiv­
ism. He has also spoken of the need for an empirical
account of scientific verbal behavior "to straighten out
117the Logical Positivists." At other times, he has
alluded to logical positivism's inadequate treatment of 
issues concerning language— issues which, in his view, 
call for behavioral analysis. With regard to the issue
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of meaning:
Modern logic, as a formalization of "real” lang- 
usages^retains and extends CtheH dualistic theory 
of meaning and can scarcely be appealed to by the 
psychologist who recognizes his own responsibility 
in giving an account of verbal behavior.
And on the problem of definition:
To be consistent the psychologist must deal with his 
own verbal practices by developing an empirical 
science of verbal behavior. He cannot, unforr 
tunately, join the logician in defining a definition 
for example, as a ''rule for the use of a term"
(FeigH; he must turn instead to the contingencies 
of reinforcement which account for the functional 
relation between a term, as a verbal response, 
and a given stimulus. This is the "operational 
basis" for his use of terms; and it is not logic 
but science.
As these passages suggest, the basis for Skinner's dis­
agreement with logical positivism lies in his indigenous, 
psychological account of science, an account which rests 
largely on his analysis of verbal behavior, Skinner's 
earlier limited sympathy with logical positivism was 
due to its limited overlap with his Machian positivism; 
but it was this same Machian positivism which called for 
the development of a descriptive epistemology and thus 
also led to his antipathy to logical positivism, Skinner's 
psychologistic epistemology will be discussed in the 
following section. The discussion will begin with a brief 
description of the development of the operant concept—  
a concept that plays a fundamental role in his theory of 
knowledge,
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Skinner’s Behavioral Epistemology 
The Concept of the Operant
As was discussed previously, Skinner has followed 
Mach in expressing the desirability of developing an 
empirical account of knowledge. For both of them, epistem­
ology is a part of psychology rather than a branch of 
philosophy. As such, it must remain a "provisional" and 
"imperfect" enterprise, but one that is important and 
well worth undertaking. Recognizing this provision nature, 
Skinner has referred to his own empirical epistemology 
as "a crude theory of knowledge," but he has often commented 
on the potential benefits to be derived from an adequate
account of knowledge, and has championed his own version
120as an important advance toward a more complete account.
As we have seen, Tolman applied his basic epistemo- 
logical concept of a map indifferently to humans and 
animals, and Hull was equally consistent in applying his 
notion of a serially conditioned response to cases of 
human and animal knowing, Skinner has been no less con­
sistent in this respect. For him, animal and human 
behavior, including the behavior we call knowledge, is 
based on operant conditioning, a process in which behav­
ior is selected and maintained by its consequences.
The important concept of an operant was first adum­
brated by Skinner in an article of 1935, "The Generic
Nature of the Concepts of Stimulus and Response." In
that paper, which is the only part of his "Sketch for an
121Epistemology" ever to be published, Skinner addressed 
the problem of defining a unit of behavior. Beginning 
with his earlier notion of a reflex as an observed correla­
tion of stimulus and response, he considered various 
possible strategies for defining the response. One 
possibility was to define it in terms of its topography, 
as a specifiable movement through space and time. This 
was perhaps a feasible strategy for the physiologist who 
could ensure the reproducibility of the correlation by 
restraining the subject and restricting the response 
to a (.perhaps surgically), isolated muscle or group of 
muscles. But Skinner was working with intact, unrestrained 
organisms and needed a response definition suited to the 
behavior of the organism as a whole. Rather than a topo­
graphical definition he opted for a generic definition, 
according to which a response is defined as a class of 
movements. The problem then became one of how to restrict 
the class appropriately. Skinner's solution was to accept 
as a response whatever class was found to exhibit orderly 
stimulus-response relations when some third variable 
(_drive, for example), was varied. These lawful relations, 
revealed as smooth curves in the data, would emerge at 
a unique point in the progressive restriction of the 
response class. In this way, one could demonstrate the
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"experimental reality" of the defined unit' by determining
"the natural lines of fracture along which behavior and
122environment actually break." Skinner then offered
a revised definition of hhe. reflex as "a correlation
of stimulus and response at a level of restriction marked
123by the orderliness of changes in the correlation."
The key to this crucial orderliness was that with an
appropriately restriected response class, the members of the
124class would be "quantitatively mutually replaceable." This
meant that the actual movement performed in making a given res­
ponse could vary from occasion to occasion— as would naturally 
happen when whole unrestrained organisms were used as subjects—  
but without altering the smoothness of the functional relation 
between the response and its determining variables. Recog­
nizing the generic nature of the response and the intersub- 
stitutability of the members of the response class was the key 
to Skinner's shift from the reflex tradition to molar behavior­
ism. The generic operant was his experimentally derived ver­
sion of Tolman's multiple-track-ness and Hull's habit-family. 
These three largely equivalent notions were arrived at by 
different means, but they were all formulated within a five- 
year period and they were the conceptual cornerstones of molar 
behaviorism.
Skinner did not actually use the term "operant" in 
his 1935 paper. The term first appeared in a 1937 
paper and again in the 1933 Behavior of Organisms, 
wherein Skinner clarified the role of the consequent
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stimulus in defining the operant class, "The operant," 
he wrote, "becomes significant for behavior and takes 
on an identifiable form, when it acts upon the environ­
ment in such a way that a reinforcing stimulus is pro- 
126duced." The operant, then, was conceived as a class
of movements which have a common effect on the environ­
ment and which, as a class, can be shown to vary lawfully 
in their dynamic relations to other variables, The 
actual movements involved in pressing a lever, for example, 
might vary from instance to instance (.e.g., left paw, 
right paw, nose)., but they are equivalent with respect 
to producing reinforcement and they demonstrably function 
together in the face of changing conditions. Similarly, 
the operant of mailing a letter presumably includes such 
topographically distinct instances as driving to the post 
office and walking to the mailbox, instances which are 
nonetheless equivalent in producing return mail. In 
the terminology of operant conditioning, the consequences 
of a response are said to be "contingent" on the response, 
and the functional dependencies of consquences on responses 
are called "contingencies of reinforcement."
With the shift of emphasis from the elicitation of 
the response by antecedent stimulus conditions to its 
function of producing consequences, the operant takes on 
the character of an act rather than a colorless movement.
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The outcome of the act, what might ordinarily be referred 
to as its "purpose" or "intended" consequence, is built 
into the definition of the operant. In fact, Skinner 
has written that "operant behavior is the very field of 
purpose and intention," and he has been interpreted as
127an act psychologist in the tradition of Franz Brentano.
In any case, Skinner clearly views the operant as a con­
cept that is potentially capable of covering cases of 
purposeful human action, including cases involving the 
complex verbal and nonverbal behavior of scientists.
Operant Psychology of Science
In 19.32, Skinner drew up plans for his research of
the subsequent thirty years. Inspired by Russell's
discussion of epistemology in behavioral terms, he included
in his plans a project on "Theories of Knowledge," both
scientific and nonscientific, with a note to publish
128on the subject late in his career. But by 1932, he was
already working on his "Sketch for an Epistemology."
For Skinner:
Behaviorism and epistemology were closely related. 
Behaviorism was a theory of knowledge, and knowing 
and thinking were forms of behavior.
Through the Society of Fellows, Skinner became acquainted
with Alfred North Whitehead, and in his "Sketch" he
called for a
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description of the activity of science wholly in 
terms of the behavior of scientists. . , , Examine 
some of Whitehead's statements about what' science 
did and get at them in terms of the behavior not 
of Science but of scientists.130
In 1935, Skinner published part of the "Sketch" as his
paper on the generic definition of the response, but by
then he had dropped his plans to publish the "Sketch" as 
131a book. In doing so, however, he was deferring— not
abandoning— his project on epistemology. In 1938 , for 
example, he noted that the "relation of organism to environ­
ment must be supposed to include the special case of the
132relation of scientist to subject matter." And m
his contribution to a symposium on operationism in 1945,
he gave an early statement of his gradually evolving
133theory of knowledge.
Skinner recognized that any account of human knowledge 
would require an account of verbal behavior. The activity 
of science, after all, is carried out largely by means 
of language behavior. Under the impetus of a challenge 
from Whitehead, Skinner began work on a book on verbal 
behavior in 1934. He was warned that such a work might 
require as long as five years to complete, and he remarked 
during the thirties that "I write so slowly that I hesi-
1 34tate to predict when I'll have a decent draft finished."
In 1947, he based his William James lectures at Harvard 
on the manuscript, but it was not until 1957 that it 
appeared in print as Verbal Behavior. The book contains
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Skinner's most detailed statement of his behavioral
epistemology, and he has expressed the belief that it
135will prove to be his "most important work." Since
1957, his views on knowledge and science have been further 
developed in Contingencies of Reinforcement Cl96.9.1 and 
About Behaviorism C1274I.
For Skinner, knowledge is behavior, and in its most 
basic form this knowing is simply adaptation to an envir­
onment, Speaking of the relation between a knower and 
an environment, Skinner has written:
The world which establishes contingencies of 
reinforcement of the sort studied in an operant 
analysis is presumably "what knowledge is about."
A person comes to know that world and how to 
behave in it in the sense that he acquires behavior 
which satisfied the contingencies it maintains.^36
Skinner calls such behavior "contingency-shaped" and views
it as "personal knowledge," somewhat like that character-
137lzed by Michael Polanyi. Skinner continues:
Contingency-shaped behavior depends for its 
strength on "genuine" consequences. It is likely 
to be nonverbal and thus to "come to grips with 
reality." It is a personal possession which dies 
with the possessor.
But there is, according to Skinner, a second kind of know­
ledge: behavior controlled by rules which are transmitted 
to the individual by the social environment.
The rules which form the body of science are pub­
lic. They survive the scientist who constructed 
them as well as those who are guided by them. The 
control they exert is primarily verbal, and the 
resulting behavior may not vary in strength with 
consequences having personal signif icance. -*-3®
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In Skinner's scheme, these rules are verbal operants 
which describe contingencies in their environment and 
can thus enable an individual under their control to 
respond appropriately. At any particular time, the sci­
entist's behavior is likely to be under the joint control
139of both contingencies and rules.
Science, says Skinner, is "a corpus of rules for 
effective action," and such rules are what are often 
referred to variously as the facts, laws, or theories of 
s c i e n c e . F a c t s ,  laws, and theories all describe con­
tingencies in the sense of specifying consequences that 
result from particular actions, and they differ only in 
their degree of confirmation (see belowl or perhaps in 
the durability and generality of the contingencies they 
d e s c r i b e , A s  rules for action, the laws of science 
have no special ontological status or relation to their 
subject matter; they simply control the operant behavior 
of those who use them. Skinner writes:
Scientific laws , . . specify or imply res­
ponses and their consequences, They are not, of 
course, obeyed by nature but men who effectively 
deal with nature. The formula s = h g t2 does not 
govern the behavior of falling bodies, it governs 
those who correctly predict the position of fall­
ing bodies at given times.142
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This behavioristic variant of the instrumentalist view 
of scientific laws is surely an unusual construal of laws, 
but Skinner remains consistent in elaborating his posi­
tion. Following Bacon in likening the laws of science 
to those of government, he writes:
The difference between a scientific and a govern­
mental law is not that the one is discovered and 
the other made, for both are discovered. A govern­
ment usually "makes a law" only when the culture 
is already maintaining or disposed to maintain the 
contingencies the law describes. The law is a des­
cription of prevailing . . . practices.143
Both types of law are rules relating response to outcome.
Behavior controlled by either type is more likely to
achieve beneficial outcomes and avoid noxious ones, and
this fact, according to Skinner, helps account for the
shaping and maintenance of the verbal operants which
express the rules.
Contingency-shaped and rule-governed behaviors both 
take place in scientific activity, and they may involve 
physically similar responses. But, says Skinner, even 
when the behaviors are of similar form, they are different 
operants because they are controlled by different variables. 
The distinction between the two is readily seen by noting 
that, historically, contingency-shaped behavior precedes 
rule-governed behavior. Following Mach, Skinner discusses 
how early versions of the law of the lever may have ori­
ginally arisen to supplement the natural contingencies 
involved in the practical work of farming, masonry, and
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144the like. The two kinds of behavior usually differ also
in the details of their execution. Contingency-shaped
behavior is likely to be smoother and more precise than 
behavior governed by a rule describing the same contin­
gency (because of the limited precision of description).
But rule-governed behavior, Skinner argues, enjoys distinct 
advantages over its contingency-shaped courterpart—  
advantages that are characteristic of science. Rules can
be learned rapidly and transmitted efficiently. They
obviate the need to undergo the risks that are often 
involved in learning by contingency. And they can des­
cribe contingencies in which the consequences of behavior
are remote and therefore unlikely to be effective in con-
145trolling behavior through direct shaping.
Whether spoken or written, rules are verbal behavior. 
According to Skinner, such behavior is shaped and main­
tained by a particular subset of the environmental con­
tingencies, namely those maintained by the verbal community. 
Different verbal communities generate verbal behavior 
appropriate to them by enforcing special contingencies.
The scientific verbal community differs from others, such 
as the literary community, in emphasizing the practical 
consequences of verbal behavior. "In the history of logic 
and science," writes Skinner, "we can trace the development
of a verbal community especially concerned with verbal
146behavior which contributes to successful action." A
particularly important way in which scientific verbal 
behavior is made more likely to yield beneficial outcomes 
is for the community to sharpen the control of that 
behavior by antecedent events.
The scientific community encourages the pre­
cise stimulus control under which an object or 
a property of an object is identified or character­
ized in such a way that practical action will be 
most effective. It conditions responses under 
favorable circumstances, where relevant and irrele­
vant properties of stimuli can usually be manipu­
lated. To dispose of irrelevant controlling rela­
tions, it sets up new forms of response as arbitrary 
•replacements for the lay vocabulary. . . . 147
The superfluous, historically acquired connotations of 
terms from ordinary language are symptoms of the irrele­
vant relations controlling their emission. For scientific 
terms, the narrower the range of variables controlling 
them, the more precise and expedient their use.
Scientific verbal behavior is most effective when 
it is free of multiple sources of strength; and 
humor, wit, style, the devices of poetry, and 
fragmentary recombinations and distortions of form 
all go unreinforced, if theg are not punished, by 
the scientific community.
Stimulus control of verbal operants can be sharpened by 
the provision of schemes for classifying phenomena. The 
resulting "classificatory operants" can profitably under­
go generic extension, but "metaphorical, metonymical, and 
solecistic extensions are usually extinguished or punished. 
Here again Skinner reveals his Machian aversion to meta­
phor in science. Citing the molecular theory of gas,
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he admits that metaphorical extension may take place in
science, but he asserts that the metaphor will Be '‘robbed
of its metaphorical nature through the advent of additional
149stimulus control."
Regardless of the conditions that first evoke a given
instance of scientific verbal behavior, it may then become
subject to the process of confirmation. For Skinner,
confirmation is not a matter of some sort of relation
between a proposition and a body of evidence but rather the
strengthening of a verbal operant. According to him:
We confirm any verbal response when we gener— 
ate additional variables to increase its pro­
bability. Thus, our guess that something seen at 
a distance is a telescope is confirmed by moving 
closer until the weak response I think it's a 
telescope may be replaced by the strong I know it's 
a telescope.150
A given verbal response, say, a particular sentence, may 
be part of two different operants if it is controlled by 
different functional relations. In this case, it may be 
strengthened in different ways. In Skinner's terminology, 
it is strengthened as a "tact" when observations make it 
more probable, that is, when the control of it by external 
antecedent stimulus conditions is increased. Alterna­
tively, it is strengthened as an "intraverbal" when it 
is derived as a prediction from other verbal formulations. 
Skinner has written:
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A series of verbal manipulations respecting the 
orbits of the known planets may lead to a state­
ment of the position and size of a hypothetical 
planet. With the aid of a telescope a response 
of similar form may be made as a tact. Subse­
quently the astronomer may emit such a sentence 
as There is a planet of such and such a size at 
such and such a place as a response with at least 
two sources of strength: the observational data with 
respect to which the response is a tact and the cal­
culations which construct a comparable response.151
Skinner's notion here of a sentence being confirmed by
different means is similar to Hull's habit-family conception
of truth, according to which a sentence is confirmed when
a symbolic derivation and an observation give rise to the
152same symbolic habit (.see Chapter 8}.
Along with his account of scientific verbal behavior,
Skinner offers a rudimentary account of logical verbal
behavior. Remaining true to his antiformalist position,
Skinner from the start asserts that logicians and linguists
are misguided in their attempt to give a formal analysis
of language. They commit what he calls the "Formalist
Fallacy" by treating the products of verbal behavior in
a vacuum without reference to the functional relations that
153control their emission. In the absence of information
about the actual circumstances of their production, sen­
tences are then analyzed purely for form. Worse yet, 
in Skinner's view, this unfruitful sort of analysis leads 
to the extraction of rules which are said to govern form 
and these rules are assigned a causal role in the pro­
duction of verbal behavior. But, for Skinner, verbal
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behavior can profitably be studied only through the same
sort of Machian causal Ci.e», functional! analysis that
applies to other forms of behavior. Formal analyses not only
fail to consider the all-important causal variables governing
actual behavior but they draw attention away from them.
In his own account of verbal behavior, says Skinner,
"no form of verbal behavior is significant apart from its
154controlling relations." Under certain circumstances,
the form of an utterance may be separately conditioned
by the verbal environment, but this is not as common a
phenomenon as logical analysis would imply. Skinner
admits that verbal behavior can be "about" other verbal
behavior— that it is evoked by and acts upon other verbal
behavior— and he calls such instances "autoclitic" behav- 
155ior. Verbal behavior is sometimes partially controlled
by "autoclitic frames," which are akin to the syntax of
the logician and linguist. But these frames never wholly
determine actual verbal behavior. In Skinner*s words,
"The relational aspects of the situation strengthen a frame,
and specific features of the situation strengthen the res-
156ponses fitted into it." For Skinner, then, the auto­
clitic framework of verbal behavior is the domain of logic, 
although a functional analysis of autoclitics bears little 
similarity to a formal analysis. Skinner proceeds to 
consider such traditional topics as assertion, negation, and 
quantification Call," "some," etc.)_, but they are treated
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as autoclitic responses and analyzed behaviorally in terms
157of their casuse and effects rather than syntactically.
Like Mach, Skinner denies that the study of science 
or logic in its own right requires transcending the empirical 
realm in any way. Accordingly, he emphasizes that no sort 
of meta-analysis is needed for giving an account of language 
or logic. Talking about talking, which is really just 
behaving in reference to behavior, raises no special 
difficulties beyond those posed by the complexity of the 
subject matter. In particular, autoclitic behavior is 
simply another kind of behavior. Referring to Carnap's 
Logical Syntax of Language C1934), he writes:
A distinction is sometimes made between a lang­
uage which talks about things and a language which 
talks about language. This is essentially the force 
of Carnap's distinction between object language 
and metalanguage. . . . This is not, however, the 
distinction carried by the term autoclitic. Once 
verbal behavior has occurred and become one of the 
objects of the physical world, it can be described 
like any other object. We have no reason to dis­
tinguish the special vocabulary or syntax with 
which this is d o n e .158
Even when verbal behavior is about verbal behavior, it is 
to be accounted for at the level of description and in 
psychological, not logical,terms,
In line with his Machian heritage, Skinner character­
izes the nature of logic in terms of his own ostensibly 
descriptive concepts. In regard to the formal aspect of 
logic, he says that logic "is concerned with interrelations 
among autoclitics, usually without respect to the primary
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verbal behavior to which they are applied." He refers to 
the symbolic manipulations of the logician as "extremely 
complex behaviors" which have to be "laboriously conditioned
i
by the verbal community." Logic, he says, deals with the 
"analysis of the internal, and eventually tautological, 
relationships among autoclitic frames," but any such analysis 
must in the long run be grounded in practical action. 
According to Skinner, "the behavior of both logician and 
scientist leads at last to effective nonverbal action, and 
it is here that we must find the ultimate reinforcing con­
tingencies which maintain the logical and scientific 
verbal community." Science is effective verbal behavior, 
and if logic is to contribute to effective scientific
activity, its techniques must be "adapted to the phenomena
159of verbal behavior." Skinner continues:
Autoclitic frames need to be studied and practices 
need to be devised which maximize the tautological 
validity or truth, to be inferred from relation­
ships among such, frames. But all such analyses, 
together with their products, are verbal behavior 
and subject to some such analysis as the pre­
sent .160
In sum, logic does not approach verbal behavior from a 
separate perspective or a different level of analysis—  
it is verbal behavior and can best serve the practical 
ends of knowledge by being adapted to verbal behavior 
itself.
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Conclusion: The "Bootstrap" Nature of the Epistemological
Enterprise
Traditionally, epistemological views carry with them 
a closely associated set of methodological standards and 
practices; to understand knowledge is to understand the 
means for achieving it. As we have seen, Skinner's early 
positivist methodology was integrally related to his con­
ception of knowledge as biological behavior. But Skinner 
has maintained that continuing advances in knowledge per­
mit changes and refinements in methodology. In Verbal 
Behavior, Skinner sketched the process as follows:
Three steps appear to lead to this sort of 
methodological inquiry: (.11 some kinds of verbal
behavior, including appropriate relational and 
quantifying autoclitics, prove to have important 
practical consquences for both speaker and lis­
tener, (21 the community discovers an<3 adopts 
explicit practices which encourage such behavior, 
being reinforced for this by even more extensive 
practical consequences, and C3) the practices of 
the community are then studied and improved, pre­
sumably also because of increasingly successful
consequences.161
The study of verbal behavior can result in a knowledge of 
the empirical conditions for effective scientific behavior 
and communication. In this way, methodology takes on a 
dual status as both a guide for psychology and a subject 
matter of psychology. As such, methodology will be— as 
Mach put it— "provisional and imperfect," but it will have 
as an aim the production of more and more effective formu­
lations. Skinner has projected the goal of such an enterprise
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One of the ultimate accomplishments of a science of 
verbal behavior may be an empirical logic, or a des­
criptive and analytical scientific epistemology, 
the terms and practices of which will be adapted to 
human behavior as a subject matter.162
Systematic investigation must, of course, begin with cer­
tain methods, but they do not provide an unchanging founda­
tion for further research; rather they evolve under the 
impetus of empirical findings they generate,
In Skinner^s radical empiricism, there is no possib­
ility of escaping the level of description in order to 
establish a higher-order perspective for guiding the 
guest for knowledge. He has written that:
It would be absurd for the behaviorist to contend 
that he is in any way exempt from his analysis.
He cannot step out of the causal stream and ob­
serve behavior from some special point of van­
tage. . . .  In the very act of analyzing human 
behavior he is behaving, . , . 163
For Skinner, logic is a part of scientific methodology,
but it arises out of actual practice and is not prior to
practice in any sense, either temporal or logical. It
is often claimed in discussions of epistemology that the
knower has a different status from that which is known,
that the possibility of knowledge requires the possession
of presuppositions which are necessary for the process
of knowing to begin. In particular, it is sometimes said
that epistemology presupposes logic from the outset. But
for Skinner knowledge begins and ends in the empirical
realm; science can be studied only through science. The
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self-reflexive nature of a descriptive epistemology is 
acknowledged by Skinner, and he addresses the issues 
raised by his approach in a direct fashion:
The philosopher will call this circular. He 
will argue that we must adopt the rules of logic 
in order to make and interpret the experiments 
required in an empirical science of verbal behav­
ior. But talking about talking is no more cir~ 
cular than thinking about thinking or knowing 
about knowing. Whether or not we are lifting our­
selves by our own bootstraps, the simple fact is 
that we can make progress in a scientific analysis 
of verbal behavior. Eventually we shall be able 
to include, and perhaps to understand, our own 
verbal behavior as scientists. If it turns out that 
our final view of verbal behavior invalidates our 
scientific structure from the point of view of 
logic and truth-value, then so much the worse for 
logic, which will also have been embraced by our 
analysis.
This bold statement was written in 1945, at a time when 
the logical positivist view of science was rather widely 
influential. In it, Skinner clearly departs from that 
view and sets out a position which remains controversial 
and raises important issues concerning the nature of 
science. In the following chapter, these issues will be 
discussed in relation to 11 the indigenous epistemologies 
of Tolman and Hull, 2) the epistemology of the logical 
positivists, and 31 the epistemological views which have 
succeeded logical positivism as dominant interpretations 
of science.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters have provided detailed histori­
cal accounts of the views of science held by tlie majpr neo- 
behaviorists. In the course of these accounts, consider­
able evidence has been accumulated to suggest that there 
was in general no close intellectual association between 
behaviorism and logical positivism. Without a doubt, there 
were certain specific influences of logical positivism 
on these neobehaviorists as well as personal interactions 
between them and certain figures in the logical positivist 
movement. But on the whole, the neobehaviorists’ views 
of science were drawn from their own deep-seated pre­
suppositions about organismic behavior, Tolman, Hull, 
and Skinner all embarked on careers in psychology with 
strong interests in epistemology. Their early epistemologi- 
cal interests and the directions in which they subsequently 
pursued those interests were determined far more by their 
conceptions of psychology than by any external philosophical 
or methodological views they encountered during their 
interactions with logical positivism. The sympathies which 
they did have with logical positivism can be understood as
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having been generated and restricted by their psychological 
views of knowledge. And, in the final analysis, their 
psychologizing of the knowledge process placed a deep 
gulf between their indigenous epistemologies and the 
epistemological views of the logical positivists.
In the first part of this concluding chapter, the 
relationship between behaviorism and logical positivism 
will be reconsidered in light of the historical account 
presented in the foregoing chapters. In this reconsidera- 
tion, it will be useful to introduce certain broad notions 
that have emerged from recent work in the philosophy of 
science. First, the revised account will be summarized 
in terms of the relationship between method and meta- 
physics in behaviorist thought. Second, the standard 
account will be reviewed and its major themes assessed. 
Third, some comments will be made concerning the perpetua­
tion of the lore about behaviorism and logical positivism. 
The second part of the chapter deals with broader issues 
concerning psychologism in epistemology and the philosophy 
of science. Issues that will be briefly addressed are the 
contrast between psychological and logical epistemologies, 
psychologistic trends in post-positivist philosophy of 
science, and the implications of psychologism for attempts 
to ground epistemology on firm foundations.
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Neobehaviorism and Logical Postivism;
The Alliance Reconsidered
Metaphysics, Metaphor, and Method in Neobehaviorism
"The testing of hypotheses has been the glory of 
methodologists, but it remains a sterile glory so long 
as little or nothing is said of the primitive roots—  
both imaginal and ideological— from which test­
able ideas spring." ,
— Howard E. Gruber Cl 98 01.
"Philosophy and science are interlocked in such, a 
way that they can only be separated if we make a 
number of more or less arbitrary distinctions,"
— Arne Naess (1972]2
Prominent among the shared outlooks of behaviorism 
and logical positivism was their avowed distaste for 
traditional metaphysics. There was nothing particularly 
novel in their anti-metaphysical tendencies; in many 
respects, they were simply restating views that went back 
to Hume and their positivist ancestors of the nineteenth 
century. But especially in the 1920s and early 1930s, 
these views were stated with renewed vigor in the polemics 
of Watson, Carnap, Neurath, and others. Yet, despite their 
avowed intentions, the behaviorists and logical positivists 
were never able to escape the metaphysical presuppositions 
which underlay, at least implicitly, their own views on 
nature and science. This was particularly clear in the 
case of psychologists. To reject one type of metaphysics 
was to have already accepted another, wittingly or not.
Even in the early thirties, Grace Adams was able to point
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out, with, considerable justification, that;
Though the experimental physiologists would have 
psychology renounce its happy intimacy with meta­
physics for a few paltry data about reflexes and 
sensations, most psychologists have never really 
accepted the severance.
Some psychologists, she added, were "still swimming, some
floating, others with bold overhand strokes" in the "waters
3
of metaphysics." Even those who publicly endorsed the 
severance of metaphysics from psychology frequently relied 
on deep-seated, essentially metaphysical preconceptions 
in developing their theoretical approaches to psychology.
That the neobehaviorists were immersed in meta­
physical currents— -whether swimming or treading water'—  
ought to be apparent from the foregoing accounts of their 
views on science. In each case, the historical record 
of their intellectual development reveals that their 
epistemologies, their psychologies of science, their theories 
of behavior, their selection of problems for study, their 
methods, and even specific types of apparatus used in their 
investigations were all intimately connected with their 
underlying metaphysical views about the nature of the 
world and organismic adaptation to the world. It was these 
fundamental pre-theoretical conceptions that they turned 
to in developing th.eir basic concepts, their metaphors 
and heuristics for problem-solving, and their methods of 
inquiry. Perhaps most importantly, it was their metaphysical 
views that lent cohesion and power to their systems of 
psychology.
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In a very broad sense, the world-views of the major 
neobehaviorists were all inspired by Darwinian biology, 
Knowledge, for all of them, was a form of adaptation to an 
environment. But beyond this general agreement, each 
neobehaviorist's reception and elaboration of Darwinian 
thought depended on his own intellectual background and 
disposition. Thus, for Tolman, the Darwinian impulse was 
filtered through Jamesian pragmatism and then through the 
neorealism and contextualism of those who followed James 
in the pragmatist tradition. The result was Tolman’s 
view of knowledge as a sort of relatively successful 
guided exploration of a complex and ambiguous environment 
consisting of richly interwoven strands of causal texture,
In Hull's thinking, Darwinism was wedded to a mechanical 
philosophy of nature, so that adaptation’— and hence 
knowledge— became a matter of a knowing machine adjusting 
to or running in parallel with a known part of the world- 
machine. In the case of Skinner, the Darwinian world­
view came both from his own knowledge of biology and through 
Darwin's profound influence on Mach. The outcome was a 
positivistic theory of knowledge framed in terms of expedient 
adaptation of organisms to environments..
The heuristic power of these world-views was revealed 
in the fertile metaphors and heuristic devices which they 
helped generate and which in turn contributed to their 
refinement and articulation. James’s functionalist view of
595
mind found expression in the neorealists< belief that mind 
is out there in the world which it operates on, This in 
turn gave rise to Tolmanfs metaphors of mazes and maps,
The world for Tolman was a complex maze and knowledge of 
it was a sort of map. These metaphors were important 
sources of hypotheses for him and they suggested strategies 
for solving particular problems that arose in subjecting 
psychological phenomena to a behavioral analysis, Address­
ing a problem often became simply a matter of designing 
an appropriate maze, Hull's metaphor of the organism as an- 
intelligent mechanism in a world-machine played an analo­
gous role in his systematic thought. It arose from his 
Darwinian-Newtonian metaphysics, and it led to hypotheses 
and problem-solving strategies. For Hull, addressing a 
problem often meant designing a machine that would exhibit 
a certain type of behavior. Skinner's use of metaphor 
and heuristic is less obvious than in the case of Tolman 
and Hull, but his Machian-Darwinian metaphysics are cer­
tainly not without implications in this regard,. When faced 
with a problem, the Machian heuristic is to manipulate and 
observe wherever possible, then to make cautious descrip­
tive extensions to new areas. Despite the Machian injunc­
tion against metaphor, these descriptive extensions are 
largely metaphorical in nature. Skinner's notion of 
selection by consequences— even when divorced from the 
obviously metaphorical connotations of selection "pressure"’—
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remains a metaphorical extension of the Darwinian notion
4
to the behavior of individual organisms.
If the neobehaviorists' metaphors and problem­
solving strategies were deeply linked with their meta^ 
physical beliefs, so too were their general views on 
methodology. Tolman's early operationism was a direct 
outgrowth of his pre^theoretical view that cognitive 
relations subsist out in the observable world. As his 
conception of cognition shifted toward the view that the 
cognitions of other organisms must be inferred, his 
operational methodology underwent corresponding modifica-^ 
tions. Similarly, Hull's deductive methodology was 
intimately connected with his view of the world as a 
deterministic and hierarchically arranged mechanical system, 
A logically ordered theory, in his scheme, would mirror 
the structure of the relevant part of the world, and to 
deduce an observable consequence of a theory was to mimic 
the unseen mechanical process by which the world-machine 
produces its manifest phenomena, Skinner's positivist 
methodology, like Mach's is grounded in his biologistic 
conception of the knowledge process as a type of efficient 
adaptation to an environment--a process unencumbered by 
unnecessary inferences and concepts. For him, the venerable 
methodological device of Occam's razor is finely honed 
by the demands of biological expedience.
The fact that Tolman, Hull, and Skinner were all 
working within a broadly Darwinian framework should not be 
allowed to obscure the important differences between them, 
Darwinian thought gave impetus to a number of intellectual 
trends, not all of which were compatible in their implications 
for psychology. In the hands of Mach and others, Darwinism 
was taken to support a strict positivism according to which 
mental constructs and deductive methods were to be eschewed 
as uneconomical extravagances. In the functionalism and 
pragmatism of James and his followers, Darwinism meant 
that mind was an instrument of adaptation. Cognitive 
activity could be observed in the mind's operations on 
the environment and mind could be known, perhaps only 
inferentially, in terms of its manifest functioning in the 
world. For biological mechanists like Hull, Darwinism called 
for demonstrations that appropriate arrangements of matter 
could exhibit the seemingly intelligent phenomena of 
adaptation. In Hull's case, this meant the use of deduc­
tive reasoning to construct mechanisms capable of 
cognitive behavior, but to do so in such a way that ex­
plicitly cognitive concepts were not needed to explain the 
behavior.
For the neobehaviorists, Darwinism pointed to a 
behavioristic approach to psychology, but it led to differ­
ent behavioral methodologies depending on how its implica­
tions were construed. The extent of those methodological
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differences is suggested in the table below. In it are 
represented three major methodological issues; the 
acceptability of inferred constructs in theorizing, the 
use of explicitly cognitive concepts, and desirability of 
deductive methods. The table shows that on each, of these 
issues a position held by one of the major neobehaviorists 





of inferred constructs was not shared by Tolman and Hull, 
who had no qualms about employing suitably defined unob­
servables. Tolman's use of cognitive concepts was opposed 
by Hull and Skinner, who preferred to treat cognitive 
phenomena as derivative of more basic conditioning principles. 
And Hull's endorsement of deductive methods was opposed by 
Tolman and Skinner, in whose pragmatic and anti-mechanistic 
orientation such methods were regarded as unbeneficial or 
even harmful. As was pointed out in the Introduction of
i
the present work, neobehaviorism cannot properly be under­
stood without careful attention to the differences between 
the various neobehaviorists1 methodologies or, for that 
matter, to the deeper differences from which the method­
ologies arise. On a logical positivist reconstruction, 





selected issues within the context of a generally accepted 
philosophy of science. But in the richer historical con­
text, the methodological differences can be seen as inte­
gral aspects of deeper, fundamentally metaphysical diver­
gences .
The (at least partial\ dependence of methodologies 
on deeper conceptions of nature has a profound bearing on 
certain traditional conceptions of the role of methodology 
in the knowledge process. It has often been assumed that 
specific methods transcend specific theoretical viewpoints 
within science. In its strongest form, this assumption 
entails the possibility of crucial experiments, that is, 
experiments whose outcomes can decide conclusively between 
two opposed theories. On the logical positivist view, such 
experiments become possible when rival theories are suffi­
ciently well formalized to permit unambiguous derivations 
of contradictory observable consequences from them. This 
possibility was a part of Leibniz's dream— a dream revived 
by Woodger and others— of a universal language and cal­
culus of thought by which controversy could be eliminated. 
But if the methods for assessing theories are themselves 
derivative of and relativized to the same pre-theoretical • 
notions which, spawn the theories in question, then the 
capacity of those methods to arbitrate impartially between 
theories is seriously undermined. There would no longer 
appear to be any antecedently defensible neutral means
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of choosing between theories. Even logic, which has long 
been assumed to be the ultimate arbitrator, is susceptible 
to different interpretations in different world-views.
And this is not necessarily a problem only in principle. 
Hull's notion of a "logical" test of a theory was drasti­
cally different from Skinner's idea of developing a sci­
entific psychology by means of "an empirical logic, or a 
descriptive and analytical scientific epistemology," This 
was a difference in actual scientific practice, and a diff­
erence that suffused the daily research activities of Hull 
and Skinner, Likewise, Tolman's refusal to heed Hull's 
call for the systematization of theory and the derivation 
of consguences reflected the basic differences between 
them on the "logic" of research and ultimately the diff­
erences in their fundamental beliefs.
The conclusions being drawn here about the non­
independence of method and theory and the implications of 
this nonindependence for traditional metatheories of science 
may strike the positivistic scientist as novel and dis­
turbing. But for the historian of science, as well as 
those philosophers of science who give serious attention 
to the history of science, these claims will be familiar,
In fact, contemporary philosophers of science routinely 
acknowledge at least a heuristic, if not also a constitu­
tive or regulative, role to metaphysical beliefs in the 
scientific enterprise,^ The best-known example of such
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a philosopher is Thomas S, Kihn, For Kuhn, the unit of 
analysis for the philosophy of science is the paradigm.
Like a theory, a paradigm includes symbolic generalizations 
which the paradigm's adherents are committed to testing 
and articulating. But unlike a theory in the logical 
positivist sense, a praradigm also includes the meta­
physical commitments of its adherents and a set of method-
g
ological "values" shared by them. That is, paradigms
come with their own set of methodological standards, For
this and other reasons, paradigms are said by Kuhn to be
"incommensurable" in the sense that there is no neutral
7
basis for comparing them. The standards of assessment 
for a given theoretical approach are thus shifted from 
a between-paradigm basis to a within-paradigm basis, Or, 
as one philosopher has put it, "to win is to win in rela-
g
tion to a world view, not to any world view,"
Now the psychological theories of Tolman, Hull, and 
Skinner scarcely qualify as Kuhnian paradigms in any 
strict sense. But it is revealing nonetheless to consider 
the respects in which even the rough theoretical formulations 
of these neobehaviorists exhibit some of the characteristics 
of paradigms. The explicit theoretical notions they 
advanced were intimately bound up with implicit world­
views. The theoretical notions also came with their own 
methodological standards, which differed according to their 
world-views and thus overlapped only partially, As a conse­
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quence of these differing standards and the different 
values attached to the importance of various theoretical 
problems, the approaches of Tolman, Hull, and Skinner 
resisted any straightforward comparative assessment, at 
least by purely empirical means. Arne Naess, who in 1938— 
39 performed a first-hand study of the rivalry between 
the Hullian and Tolmanian approaches, has commented that:
Historically, defenders of competing theories 
do not agree about what is derivable. An instruc­
tive example is the systematic and persistent 
disagreement between the camps of E, C. Tolman 
and C. L, Hull during the 1930s as to what were 
the consequences of each other's theories of 
learning,2
Despite the general similarity of broad outlook among the 
neobehaviorists, the attempt to evaluate them against one 
another was largely a rather futile effort to compare world 
views'— or, perhaps more accurately, to compare significant 
variants of a single broad world-view. To call such an 
attempt futile is not necessarily to say that in general 
no means for a comparison exists, but only that mere 
experiment and empirical observation are inadequate to 
the task.
The notion raised by Kuhn that methodological stan­
dards are not independent of the context of presuppositions 
surrounding a theory is currently being given serious con­
sideration in the philosophy of science. Following Kuhn's 
general line, Thomas Nickles has remarked that "it might 
be suggestive to extend some well-worn metaphors to say
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theories are ’value-laden’ and scientific values Ctha.t is, 
methodological rules and constraintsL are ’theory-laden’."^' 
Nickles goes on to point out that the "theory-neutrality" 
of method was occasionally questioned during the nineteenth 
century by figures such as Whewell and Peirce, 'But with 
the advent of logical positivism in this century, the 
dominant belief in the essential independence of theory and 
method was reinforced. There was to be one philosophy of 
science for all the sciences and a unity of method to apply 
to them all. Not until a more historical emphasis began 
to replace the logical emphasis in the philosophy of sci­
ence did the theory-neutrality of method begin to be 
seriously questioned once again. Along with Kuhn, other 
philosophers began to note the great diversity of methods 
and styles of reasoning revealed in the history of science. 
Stephen Toulmin, for example, wrote in 1964 that:
In the natural sciences . . , , men such as Kepler, 
Newton, Lavoisier, Darwin and Freud have trans­
formed not only our beliefs, but also our ways of 
arguing and our standards of relevance and proof: 
they have accordingly enriched the logic as well 
as the content of natural science.
To be sure, recognizing the diversity and partial theory-
ladenness of mfethodology does not mean that there is no
historical continuity or cross-discipline unity of methods
in science. But it does raise the possibility that not
only do methods change with time but that the change may
not even be unidirectional. One of the major points of
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the new philosophy of science is that science does not seem
to provide cumulative knowledge or knowledge that approaches
some final end state. To admit an interdependence of theory
and method is to admit that the same points may apply to
method. As Nickles puts it:
We might even ask a familiar sort of question in 
a new form: is the growth of insight and soph­
istication of our philosophica1 accounts of 
methodology cumulative? Such questions are per­
haps too large to call for immediate commitment 
one way or another, -*-2
Indeed, much detailed study of historical cases will be 
necessary in order to assess the prevalence and significance 
of the theory-ladenness of method. In any case, the pre­
sent study can be considered as something of a contribution 
to that task.
There is one respect in which the present study brings 
to light a new dimension of the problem raised by the inter­
dependence of theory and method. Those who have remarked 
on the problem have stressed the fact that historically 
scientists have adapted theory to method and vice versa,^ 
This mutual adaptation of theory and method can, and pre­
sumably does, take place in any discipline of science. But 
when the science in question happens to be psychology, the 
problem is . raised in an even more virulent form: by its 
very nature, psychology studies, inter alia, the knowledge 
process as part of its subject matter. The means of 
acquiring knowledge, including methods for doing so, and 
the conditions under which knowledge is more or less
reliable are topics for inquiry which, every significant 
finding in the psychologies of learning, cognition, and 
perception have potential bearing on. Among the neo­
behaviorists, Skinner has raised this issue most explicitly 
in his view that methodology is both a guide and a 
subject matter for psychology. Even if less explicitly, 
the issue is equally raised by the case histories of Tolman 
and Hull. A clear example lies in Tolman’s invoking of 
hypotheses about th.e cognitions of others only after he 
had begun to attribute them to his subjects. The reflexive 
relation between psychological accounts and psychological 
methods is, of course, not limited to neobehaviorist 
approaches. The Gestalt psychologists also saw a deep
connection between their psychological views and their
. . 14views on scientific epistemology and method. The general
point may be made by saying that the problem of reflexivity
between theory and method goes beyond the problem of
mutual adaptation of theory and method— and the problem of
reflexivity is more acute in psychology than in other dis- 
15ciplines. If this assertion is even roughly correct, 
it suggests that historical analyses of the theory- 
ladenness of method would find a wealth of highly rele­
vant cases in the history of psychology.
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A Reassessment of the Standard Account
In reconsidering the standard account of the behavior- 
ist-logical positivist alliance, it is important to remember 
that the theories of the major neobehaviorists have tradi­
tionally been reconstructed and evaluated from the per­
spective of logical positivism. This is not surprising 
given that both movements reached their heydays around the 
same time, but it is a fact of deep significance for the 
way behaviorism has been interpreted. Of further signifi­
cance is the fact that the logical positivist perspective 
on science was considered to be the perspective on science; 
philosophy of science was spoken of rather uncritically as 
"the logic of science." When the most important and 
thorough analyses of learning theories appeared in' Modern 
Learning Theories in 19.54, the authors presented an outline 
of the analysis to which each theory was subjected. Among 
the topics for consideration were those of standard logical 
positivism: the theory-neutrality of the data language, the 
reducibility of theoretical concepts to physical langauage, 
the implicit and explicit definition of primitive terms, 
the explicitness of axioms and of the derivation of conse­
quences, and so on. Following this outline, there appeared 
these remarks:
607
The foregoing outline is undoubtedly somewhat 
arbitrary insofar as the breakdown into dimensions 
or categories is concerned. Despite the arbitrari­
ness of the classifications, however, we believe 
wide agreement would obtain among current writers 
in the logic of science that an adequate review 
of any scientific theory must include essentially 
the same features,16
In other words, the logical positivist framework was taken
to be a neutral, and except for matters of detail,, necessary
perspective from which to judge theories. The neobehavior-
ists were all being forced into the same mold, despite the
fact that they themselves held standards that differed
both from those of logical positivism and from those of
one another.
In light of the general similarities between behavior­
ism and logical positivism— especially in the case of Hull's 
deductive behaviorism— this was perhaps a natural strategy 
for evaluating behavioral theories. However, it has had 
some unfortunate effects. First, the inevitable failure 
of behavioral theories to fit the logical positivist mold 
led to the conclusion that, on the one hand, the theories 
were failures as scientific theories and, on the other hand, 
that the behaviorists have misinterpreted logical positivist
epistemology, Both of these conclusions have been drawn at
17one time or another by Sigmund Koch, although as noted 
earlier he views behaviorism as an implausible and self- 
discrediting position anyway. The second unfortunate 
effect of judging behaviorism by logical positivist standards
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was that it created the presumption that behaviorists have 
attempted to fulfill those standards in developing their 
theories. This, in turn, has reinforced tha impression 
that the behaviorists imported methods by which those 
standards could supposedly be attained.
As we have seen, the thesis that the behaviorists 
imported their methodologies from logical positivism is 
one of the chief claims of the standard account. Each of 
the major neobehaviorists did indeed hold methodological 
views that were similar to certain views advanced by 
logical positivism, and each of them had significant 
personal contact with major figures in logical positivism. 
Yet they arrived at their views prior to their contact 
with logical positivism and from perspectives that were 
quite different from that of logical positivism. Thus, 
they had no need to import their methodological views 
because those views had already evolved, in at least rough 
form, in the context of their own respective presuppositions 
about epistemology. To be sure, those views were on 
occasion subsequently expressed in the language of logical 
positivism, but the importation of terminology does not 
mean the views themselves were imported.
In describing the importation of methodology from 
the philosophy of science, Koch has characterized the 
allegedly imported "new view" as an "uneven fusion" of
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logical positivism, neopragmatism, and opera.tiopism, This 
is by no means a wholly misguided characterization, The 
neobehaviorists did, after all, embrace a sort of neo-^  
pragmatism; but it seems odd to say that they "imported" 
it, for behaviorism was all along an integral part of the 
pragmatist tradition. Similarly, behaviorists were in 
fact working operationists before Bridgman officially 
founded operationism, so their post factum "importation" 
of Bridgman's formulations was more a matter of terminology 
than of practice. According to Koch, the "dominant 
contours" of the imported viewpoint were provided by logical 
positivism. While it may be the case that American 
psychology as a whole embraced much of logical positivism, 
the major neobehaviorists were not importing logical 
positivism; rather they were developing indigenous epistem- 
ologies that were actually incompatible with logical 
positivism.
In further characterizing the importation of the logical
positivist-neopragmatist-operationist viewpoint, Koch has
stated that "psychology's selections from this cluster of
formulations was spotty, adventitiously determined, and not
supported by especially expert scholarship in the rele- 
18vant sources." If this statement is intended to apply 
to the neobehaviorists— as it appears to be from the context^—  
then it is only partially correct. What the neobehaviorists 
responded favorably to in these formulations was indeed
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spotty: it was exactly those aspects which were consonant 
with their own world-views and the epistemologies which 
they drew from them. The statement is also correct in 
that the neobehaviorists never devoted serious attention
I
to the logical positivists1 writings or acquired any 
expertise in applying their logical distinctions. But 
the selective responses of the neobehaviorists to the "new 
view" were anything but adventitiously determined. On 
the contrary, they were determined by the deepest of 
considerations, namely, the pre-theoretical beliefs that 
animated the entirety of their systematic thought.
Closely related to the importation thesis is the 
second major claim of the standard account. According to 
the subordination thesis (.Mackenzie), the neobehaviorists’ 
importation of logical positivist methodology led them to 
subordinate subject matter to method. The revised account 
shows this claim, too, to be problematic. For each of 
the neobehaviorists considered here, method was deeply 
linked to substantive views about behavior via an indi­
genous behavioral epistemology. Rather than subordinating 
method to subject matter, they were actually coordinating 
the two. Indeed, once the epistemological views of 
Tolman, Hull, and Skinner were made explicit by analyzing 
their presuppositions in the context of their historical 
development, a remarkable degree of consistency can be 
discerned in the overall systems they espoused. Their
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theories, their general methods, their research findings,
and their metaphysics were all brought into harmony by
continual adjustments and extensions of their thinking.
When inconsistencies did arise in their systems— as when,
for a brief period, Tolman held the subject’s hypotheses
to be knowable without hypotheses on the part of the
observer— -they were usually quick to make the necessary
readjustments,
As part of the subordination thesis, it is usually
maintained that behaviorists have held an inappropriate
conception of psychology's subject matter. Claims to this
effect have been directed against behaviorism since its
inception, but despite their prima facie plausibility
they only serve to beg deeper issues. Underlying such
claims is the misguided and dangerous assumption that there
is some preordained single correct way to construe the
domain of psychology. But the notion that there is some
particular "way the world is" has been roundly discredited
19.by recent work in the philosophy of science. Contrary 
to the assumptions of traditional empiricist and inductivist 
approaches to knowledge, a domain of psychology, or any 
other discipline, can be delineated only with reference 
to a guiding set of presuppositions. Only within the 
context of a world-view can certain empirical phenomena 
and problems be identified as interesting and worthy of 
pursuit. Putting the matter somewhat crudely, there is
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a, sense in which, the claim that behaviorism has an inappro­
priate conception of psychology’s subject matter amounts 
to little more than a-statement of preference for some 
other (often implicit!, metaphysical viewpoint. Of course,, 
such issues of preference are of deep significance for 
science, but the statement of preference for one world­
view against another cannot in itself show one conception 
of psychology to be inappropriate. On the contrary, 
only an explicitly articulated world-view can challenge 
the appropriateness of another.
It would be difficult to underestimate the extent 
to which this realization transforms the nature of the pro­
blem raised by the critics of behaviorism. In light of the 
historical analysis provided by the present work, it would 
appear that the major neobehaviorists can not fairly be 
accused of inappropriately importing alien methods into 
psychology and thereby distorting its subject matter.
Given the context of their presuppositions, their methods 
were eminently suited to their subject matter, indeed, 
carefully coordinated with, their subject matter. What can 
be argued fairly is that their world-views were imported 
from biology CTolman and Skinner), or from biology and 
physics (Hulll., To some degree, these world-views certainly 
were imported from, or at least strongly shaped by, broad 
conceptions from these disciplines. But whether they 
were therefore inappropriate for psychology is a different
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question’— 'and it is certainly not a question to Be decided 
by legislation. Which, particular set of assumptions a 
scientist works under will, depend in fact on the indivi­
dual's cultural and educational background, but in principle 
the scientist's adoption of a world-view is free of legis­
lated constraints. What matters is the consistency with 
which the implications of that world-view are followed 
up and the long-term consequences of its adoption. Given 
that the major neobehaviorists were reasonably consistent 
in articulating and extending their world-views, the pro­
blem of assessing behaviorism's world-views then becomes 
one of evaluating their consequences.
The third major thesis of the standard account of 
behaviorism and logical positivism is concerned with this 
question of evaluating behaviorism. The thesis of "linked 
fates" states that the failure of logical positivism as a 
philosophy of science implies the untenability of behavior­
ism (Kochi, or that the failure of behaviorism as an approach 
to psychology discredits logical positivism CLeaheyi, 
or perhaps both. The revised account strongly suggests that 
the intellectual links between behaviorism and logical 
positivism were far too weak to support the "linked fates" 
thesis in any of its version. The limited views that 
behaviorism and logical positivism did hold in common were 
ones that history shows to have developed in profoundly 
different contexts. Because of this fact, those parallel
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views can be evaluated together only when they are. 
leadingly reconstructed as having been alike, But to base 
any evaluation of behaviorism on such a reconstruction 
is to seriously jeopardize the evaluation from the outset. 
With respect to the third thesis of the standard 
account, the present work can show only the independence 
of the fates of behaviorism and logical positivism; 
to pass jugement on their fates would require much analysis 
beyond the scope of what is presented here. But it is 
perhaps of interest to briefly sketch the sort of analysis 
that would be required. As suggested above, the assess^ - 
ment of an intellectual tradition and the world-view from 
which it arises must focus, in some sense, on its long­
term consequences. Of course, what constitues a conse­
quence, good or bad, is a major philosophical problem.
The consequences of a scientific tradition for society as
a whole are relevant— indeed behaviorism has been both
20attacked and defended on this score. But for the 
philosopher of science, the major concern is with those 
consequences which are (relatively) internal to the sci­
entific enterprise. A promising approach to the evaluation
of intellectual traditions has recently been proposed by 
21Larry Laudan, In barest outline, Laudan's suggestion is 
that research traditions be evaluated in terms of their 
relative effectiveness in generating and solving signifi­
cant congitive problems. On this view, a tradition is
615
rationally "pursuitable" (i.e., worthy of the investment of 
scientific resources:! to the extent that current theories with­
in it maximize the rate of problem-solving and minimize the 
frequency of anaomalous problems, relative to competing tradi­
tions. By virtue of this last clause, Laudan's approach deems 
it irrational to abandon a tradition, despite its unresolved 
anomalies, unless there exists a tradition of greater effect­
iveness to which the scientist's allegiance may be switched. 
There is no provision for truth in Laudan's accounts, only for 
the pragmatic comparative assessment of long-term problem­
solving capacity.
Now to apply some such an approach to the research tradi­
tions of logical positivism and behaviorism is obviously no 
22easy task. Nevertheless, m  important respects the task is
23already being carried out in the case of logical positivism.
The secondary and historical literature on logical positivism 
affords substantial grounds for concluding that logical posi­
tivism failed to solve many of the central problems which it 
generated for itself. Prominent among the unsolved problems 
was the failure to find an acceptable statement of the veri­
fiability (later confirmability) criterion of meaningfulness. 
Until a competing tradition emerged (around the late 1950s), 
the problems of logical positivism continued to be attacked 
from within that tradition. But as the new tradition in the 
philosophy of science began to demonstrate its effectiveness^—  
by dissolving and rephrasing old problems as well as by
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generating new ones— philosophers began to shift allegiances 
to the new tradition, even though that tradition has yet 
to receive a canonical formulation.
Partly due to a relative paucity of critical secondary 
and historical literature in psychology, behaviorism is not 
nearly so amenable to such an assessment. Many psychologists, 
including non-behaviorists, would affirm that current behav­
ioral theories have continued to generate and solve inter­
esting problems— examples include the problems of self-
24control and learned helplessness. But other enduring
problems, such as the nature of reinforcement, have
25resisted solution. It is difficult to say how such 
successes and shortcomings should be weighted in an 
overall assessment of behaviorism. More serious complica­
tions arise from the ambiguous status of pretenders to the 
role of competing research traditions. Contemporary cogni­
tive psychology is often upheld as a tradition to rival 
behaviorism, but serious questions have been raised as to 
the extent to which it differs from behaviorism as a
2 g
research tradition. Similarly, Chomskian psycholinguistics
has been construed as a rival paradigm to behaviorism,
but the overlap of problem areas between the two is so
small as to cast doubt on the degree of rivalry involved.
In short, no serious evaluation of the fate of behaviorism
is currently available from the perspective of contemporary 
27philosophy, and any attempt to provide such an assessment
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would encounter many difficulties. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to see how such an effort might proceed according 
to Laudan’s approach.
The foregoing considerations do make clear that behav­
iorism cannot simply be dismissed with purely philosophical 
arguments or ridicule based on preferences of taste. To 
be sure, there are indications that behaviorism is a tradi­
tion in decline. In the long run, behaviorism may even 
turn out to be a self-discrediting position, but it is 
doubtful whether anyone could know that to be the case, 
much less deomonstrate it to others, in the absence of a 
great deal of serious scholarly inquiry of the sort suggested 
above. Commenting on the fate of behaviorism, Koch has 
written:
In my humble opinion, behaviorism is finished. If 
there is residual motility, it is only that the 
corpse does not understand my arguments,28
But it takes more than arguments and opinions to bring a 
tradition to a close. If Laudan is correct, it takes no 
less than an alternative tradition of demonstrable effect­
iveness to draw adherents and resources away from the 
older tradition. Behaviorism would then presumably perish 
from attrition as scientists abandoned it in an effort
to maximize the problem-solving effectiveness of their re-
29search activities. It remains for future historians 
to determine which alternative research tradition or 
traditions will have proved to be instrumental in luring
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human and other resources away from behaviorism, Jn any 
case, the demise of behaviorism would prove to be a pro­
cess more dignified and considered than the suggested 
scenario of its being "laughed out of existence" because 
of "the ludicrousness of the position.
Remarks on the Lore of Behaviorism and Logical Positivism
In the Introduction of the present work, it was noted 
that the alliance of behaviorism and .logical positivism 
has occupied a central place in the lore of twentieth 
century American psychology. In light of the historical 
argument developed in the succeeding chapters, the per^ 
durance or even existence of the legend of behaviorism and 
logical positivism may appear surprising and puzzling. 
Accordingly, it may be helpful to briefly examine a few 
of the various sources and modes of transmission of this 
lore. Of course, Sigmund Koch’s works from 19-41 to the 
present have constituted a major focus of the lore. Since 
these works have been discussed throughout much of the '
preceding, no further consideration will be given to them 
here except to reiterate that Koch's own close affiliation 
with both logical positivism and behaviorism helps account 
for his confounding of the histories of the two movements.
Boring and Stevens. E. G, Boring and S, S. Stevens, 
Boring' s student and later colleague, were among the first 
psychologists to take a serious interest in logical positivism
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and its implications for psychology. Prior to the American 
inception of logical positivism, Boring had Been introduced 
to the experiential positivism of his teacher, E. B, 
Titchener, Thus predisposed toward positivism, he res­
ponded favorably to logical positivism and Bridgman's 
operationism. As a historian of psychology and an experi­
mental psychologist in the field of perception, he embraced 
logical positivism as a needed historical successor to 
Machian positivism. The doctrine of physicalism, he felt, 
would provide a key to making the psychology of perception 
as objective as behaviorist psychology. In fact, according 
to Boring, both fields would simply be assimilated to 
logical positivist psychology or "behavioristics,” As 
early as 19.42, Boring was emboldened to write that "Cblehav- 
iorism ultimately disappeared, in part because in the 1930’s 
it got to be accepted as psychology, and in part because
modern positivism became the sophisticated substitute for
31 . .it," Stevens, who was a psychophysicist and a proponent
of logical positivist psychology, also thought of himself
as something of a behaviorist. Like Boring, he felt that
sensations could be made objective by reducing them to
32"discriminated responses." Thus, both Boring and Stevens
conspicuously identified behaviorism with logical positivism,
even though neither was a practicing behaviorist nor even
particularly sympathetic to the substance of a behaviorist
33approach as it was practiced by the major behaviorists.
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Bergmann and Spence. As was noted, in Chapter 7 , 
the articles coauthored by Gustav Bergmann, a major figure 
in logical positivism, and Kenneth Spence, a major behavior­
ist, were instrumental in reinforcing the association of 
behaviorism and logical positivism in the minds.of 
American psychologists. Unlike the three neobehaviorists 
treated in detail in the present work, Spence appears to 
have established a genuine intellectual rapport with the 
adherents of logical positivism and to have accepted it 
as a philosophy of science— or at least as an ideal toward 
which psychology could profitably strive. There is no 
evidence that Spence ever developed an indigenous psychological 
epistemology. His failure to do so, as well as his 
acceptance of logical positivism Cor "scientific empiricism'M., 
were reflected in the following statements which he published 
with Bergmann in 19.44:
In the schema outlined by the scientific 
empiricist the experiences of the observing 
scientist do indeed have a privileged, even uni­
que position, , . . CTHhe empiricist scientist 
should realize that his behavior, symbolic or 
otherwise, does not lie on the same method­
ological level as the responses of his sub^ - 
jects. . . .  34
It was just such efforts to draw distinctions between the 
activities of the knowing scientist and those of the sub­
ject that were opposed by the indigenous epistemologies 
of Tolman, Hull, and Skinner, For them-, the scientist's 
behavior does lie on the same methodological level as the
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subject's behavior; as Skinner put it, the behaviorist 
can not step outside of the causal stream.
But even if Spence must be excluded from the general 
arguments of the present study, it should be borne in mind 
that his adoption of logical positivism was, as a matter 
of historical fact, independent of his adoption of behavior­
ism. He was a confirmed behaviorist before he completed 
his graduate work at Yale in the mid-thirties and well 
before his encounter with Bergmann. Moreover, in the years 
Bergmann was collaborating with Spence, Bergmann was not 
advancing logical positivism as a source of methodological 
prescriptions for the practicing scientist. One of the 
large number of students who took their doctorates under 
Spence has recollected Bergmann's teachings as follows:
I remember something Bergmann said to some grad­
uate students at Iowa about fifteen years ago. It 
was to the effect that, perhaps, in the end-- 
after we had taken his courses in history and 
systems of psychology, and philosophy of science, 
and had been led through the methodological ele­
gancies of the distinctions which were possible 
at a philosophical level between various theoret­
ical approaches to the study of behavior— perhaps, 
after all of this, we should go into our labora­
tories as philosophically naive as possible, and 
leave the philosophy of science to the philosophers.
He was saying, as I recollect, that ours was a 
scientific job that might better be approached with 
an attitude of doing what comes naturally to the 
well-trained scientist: accepting the reality of 
the natural phenomena with which he begins and 
being more concerned with what he can discover 
and understand than with what form the discovery 
must take.35
Feigl and Hempel. The logical positivists Herbert
Feigl and Carl Hempel have commented in their writings on
the impact of logical positivism on psychology and in
particular on behaviorists. The manner in which these
comments came about provides an interesting case .study in
the inadvertent inflation of the lore of behaviorism and
logical positivism. Feigl has reported that at the time
he brought logical positivism to America in 1930, the
behaviorists were among the "closest allies our movement
3 6acquired in the United States." In itself, this state­
ment made no claim for an actual intellectual influence 
of logical positivism on behaviorism. In another place, 
however, Feigl cited the Tolman, Ritchie, and Kalish 
paper of 1946 as an example of the "applications of Carnap
original analysis Cof reduction sentencesl to specific
37psychological concepts." Feigl's statement was picked 
up by Hempel, who in turn wrote that "it is of consider­
able interest to note with Feigl that Carnap’s ideas—  
and, I should add, Feigl's as well— have met with con­
siderable interest among psychologists and have found 
applications in the work of such investigators as , . , 
Tolman, Ritchie, and Kalish. . . . "  Twice again in Hempel 
classic Aspects of Scientific Explanation C19651, the
Tolman-Ritchie-Kalish study was cited as an example of
38Carnap's influence. What is ironic about this situation 
of course, is that neither Kalish nor Ritchie was a
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behaviorist, and Tolman was not responsible for the use of 
Carnap's reduction sentences or even particularly sympa­
thetic to such logical distinctions. Yet this series of 
remarks connecting the name of Tolman with that of Carnap 
could easily give the impression— in this case, an 
illusory one— that Tolman had an important intellectual 
debt to Carnap in regard to reduction sentences.
Neobehaviorist Epistemology and the New Psychologism
Psychological Epistemology and the New Image of Science
The decline of logical positivism and its rather
restrictive ways of thinking about science has made room
for a rich proliferation of new conceptions of the
scientific enterprise. The changes in the philosophy of
science during the last twenty-five years have been so
dramatic as to qualify as a major intellectual upheaval,
if not a full-scale revolution. Amid this upheaval, it
is difficult to say whether the wide array of metatheories
that have been produced will soon, or ever, coalesce into
a single canonical formulation. But despite the diversity
of new views there exists among them certain broad
consonances that have led to their being grouped together
39as the "new image" of science. In one or another of 
its versions, the new image admits as relevant to the task 
of giving a general account of science a host of factors
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that were banned from the logical positivist account: the 
perceptual, cognitive, and social psychology of the sci- 
entist; the sociology of scientific groups; the ideological 
values of scientists and their culture at large; the sci­
entist's metaphysical beliefs; the process of discovery; and 
the colorful, and sometimes alarmingly quirky, history of 
scientific activity. In contrast to the "neat image" of 
science that logical positivism was able to maintain by 
suppressing such factors in favor of tidy logical dis­
tinctions , the family of views which make up the new image
40has also been referred to as the "gaudy image,"
Under whatever name, the new philosophies of science 
tend to share a set of views by which they are distinctly 
set apart from logical positivism. Foremost among these 
views is the notion that science is fundamentally a human 
activity rather than a linguistic product of such activity. 
As a result, the appropriate modes of analyzing science 
are taken to be historical, sociological, and psychological 
rather than logical. Empirical studies have replaced 
formal investigations as the substance of metatheories of 
science. This profound shift of emphasis has been 
accompanied by various other shifts. Thus, the functions 
or consequences of scientific activity have taken priority 
over the structure of theories; the effectiveness of science 
at solving particular problems has displaced a concern with 
global truth or certainty; and the discovery of knowledge
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is considered more important than its justification.
The new image has relied heavily on the results of 
investigations in the history of science and has gained 
from them a deep appreciation of the temporal character 
of science and the importance of scientific change. Whereas 
the logical positivists treated science as a static 
commodity to be dissected by post hoc analyses, the pro­
ponents of the new image depict science as an inherently 
temporal, organic process in which change in its many 
forms is the rule rather than the exception. Not surprisingly,
evolutionary models have been proposed as metatheories of 
41science. In various of these models, research traditions 
Cor concepts or paradigms), are said to vary, to undergo 
selection, to compete with rivals, to become extinct, and 
so on. As in biological evolution, the process may typic­
ally lead to diversity rather than unity, so that the image 
of branching becomes more appropriate than that of conver­
gence. Within any one branch or "line of descent," there 
will be a continuity but not necessarily a cumulative 
growth of knowledge. Because individual branches are iso­
lated from one another, there will be no global standards 
of objectivity that can be applied either within or across 
them. However, evolution within the context of a given 
line of descent may be mediated by rational decision 
making. Accordingly, progression can be exhibited within
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a line of descent, but this does not mean that progress
42is being made toward a goal. No allowance is made for 
final truth, or even for some fixed state of the world 
toward which science makes an asymptotic approach.
Even though the history of science has played the
leading role in the reconceptualization of science, most
of the philosophers who have shaped the new image have been
prepared to assign a large role to psychology in the
elucidation of science. This assignment is sometimes
implicit and sometimes explicit. Laudan,for instance,
makes no mention of the psychology of science, but his
model of rationality'— which he takes to be, in part, a
descriptive model— clearly involves assertions as to the
cognitive weightings of the problem solutions and anomalies
which enter into the decisions of the scientist. Kuhn, on
the other hand, has been explicit about the central role
of psychology in the metatheory of science:
Already it should be clear that the explanation 
Lof scientific progress! must, in the final analy­
sis, be psychological or sociological. It must, 
that is, be a description of a value system, an 
ideology, together with an analysis of the insti­
tutions through which that system is transmitted 
and enforced. Knowing what scientists value, we 
may hope to understand what problems they will 
undertake and what choices they will make in parti­
cular circumstances of conflict, I doubt that there 
is another sort of answer to be found.43
Kuhn's emphasis in this passage is on the sociological
side of the psychology of science, but elsewhere he has
drawn upon experimental work in the psychology of perception
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in developing his naturalized account of science. Exactly 
what role psychology might be expected to fulfill in any 
future standard version of the new image is, of course, 
impossible to foresee. In any case, the previous hegemony 
of logical positivism in the philosophy of science ought 
to make philosophers skeptical of the desirability or 
even possibility of standardized epistemologies. The role 
of psychology in the new image of science can presumably 
be expected to depend both on specific developments in the 
metatheory of science and on developments in whatever 
areas of psychology are deemed relevant.
Needless to say, it is unlikely that any of the 
specific formulations of Tolman, Hull, and Skinner will 
figure in current versions of the new image-~if for no 
other reason than that they do not represent the latest 
developments even in their own tradition. Nonetheless, 
their overall strategy of developing psychological 
epistemologies and applying them to science itself has 
been vindicated in some measure by the recent turn of events 
in the philosophy of science. Indeed, their efforts in 
that direction stand as a tribute to the boldness and 
independence of their thought. It has been written that 
after around 192Q
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Ctlhere was , . . the increasing professional in­
sularity of academic philosophers, and their relative 
conviction that disciplines such as psychology and 
sociology, which had played a major role in earlier 
epistemological theories, had no interesting in­
sights to offer. (.This insularity was further 
promoted by the guileless duplicity of scholars 
in other fields, who were all too prepared to 
bequeath 1 the problem of knowledge ” to the pro­
fessional philosophers.)^
In their unwillingness to relinquish epistemology to phil­
osophy, the major neobehaviorists were resisting the anti- 
psychologistic tenor of their time.
In addition to having anticipated general trends in
epistemology, Tolman, Hull, and Skinner developed various
specific views on science which are prominent features of
45current accounts. All three of them, for example, 
gave attention to the context of discovery in expressing 
their methodological views. Thus, Tolman discussed the 
heuristic value of intervening variables for discovering 
the functions by which they combine to produce behavior; 
Hull advocated the designing of automata as a means of 
discovering principles of conditioning and later described 
his deductive methods as a tool of discovery; Skinner has 
concerned himself with such issues as which, formulations 
of concepts will lead to effective behavior on the part 
of the investigator. This concern of neobehaviorists 
with scientific discovery came naturally to them in large 
part because they were all pragmatists. It was pragmatism, 
after all, that emphasized the capacity of science to lead 
the investigator on the new discoveries.
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Many of the points of congruence between the neo-
behaviorist epistemologies and the new image are simply
by-products of the fact that both approaches are psych-
46ologistic and, at least in broad terms, pragmatistic.
Like the neobehaviorists, the proponents of the new image 
view science as an activity to be studied empirically, and 
most of them reject any transcendent notion of truth in 
favor of a more pragmatic conception. But not all of the 
neobehaviorists’ anticipations of the new image were of a 
merely general nature. On the contrary, each of the 
neobehaviorists held certain specific views which have 
recently been viewed as insights characteristic of the new 
image. As we have seen, Tolman was viewing theories as 
maps as early as 1932, more than three decades before two 
of the founders of the new image— Stephen Toulmin and N. R. 
Hanson— made prominent use of that metaphor in their recon­
ceptualizations of science. Another remarkable anticipa­
tion of the currently favored perspective on science may 
be found in Tolmanfs statement, also of 1932, that each 
theory in science
is so obviously bound to be wrong. It is twisted 
out of plumb by the special cultural lack of 
building materials inherent in the time and place 
of its origin, as well as by the lack of skill of 
it individual architect or architects.^
Similarly, Hull’s early attempt to formulate an empirical
epistemology by studying the formation of concepts was a
remarkable anticipation of the recent view that the
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evolution of concepts is a central concern of the philosophy
of science. As one advocate of the new image has stated
the problem, "If we can understand how human beings generate
their concepts, we will understand the method of inference
48employed by both scientific and common sense reasoning."
This was precisely the aim of Hull's doctoral research—
published in 192Q— on the "evolution of concepts," Kuhn's
recent attempts to model the process of concept formation
are strongly reminiscent of Hull's attempts of half a
49century before. Important anticipations of the new image 
may also be found in Skinner's notion of a scientific 
verbal community, by means of which a set of concepts 
and practices are transmitted, and in his insistence on 
the futility of formal analyses of science,
Ironically, another psychologist who was a relatively 
early and persistent advocate of the necessity of incor­
porating psychology into the philosophy of science was 
Sigmund Koch, In response to the early stirrings of 
what later became the new image, Koch wrote that 
scholarly culture
seems to be working toward, or inviting into 
existence, a redefinition of knowledge based on 
an empirical analysis of inquiry of a sort which 
must largely depend on psychological modes of 
analysis. Indeed, extant efforts in this direc­
tion everywhere involve psychological commit­
ments, often of a rough and ready sort.
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To this passage, Koch added the following remarks:
Yet psychology seems hardly cognizant of the challenge 
implicit in these circumstances. Or of the circum­
stances . 51
The irony, of course, lies in the fact that the major neo- 
behaviorists— two of whom Koch had studied with-considerable 
acuity— had not only been aware of the challenge of a 
psychological epistemology but had pursued that challenge 
throughout their careers. Unfortunately, Koch had had 
scant opportunity to be acquainted with the epistemological 
efforts of the neobehaviorists. Hull never published his 
behavioral epistemology, probably out of ill-advised Chut 
realisticl deference to the dominant logical positivism. 
Tolman's epistemology was largely only implicit in his 
writings and in any case could not be appreciated in its 
full extent without historical insight into the develop­
ment of his thought. And by the time Skinner's epistem­
ological writings appeared in clear and explicit form,
Koch's disaffection with behaviorism was apparently so 
great as to preclude his taking them seriously.
Psychologism and the Foundations of Knowledge
"The most common objection to psychologism was that 
it failed to give an adequate account of the ob­
jectivity of knowledge."
— David Lindenfeld CLQSOi^^
"There is no less room for pluralism in meta- 
science than in science." ~ ~
— Arne Naess Cl3-72 1^ 3
The re-emergence of psychologism in this century is 
an intellectual phenomenon of considerable significance for 
both philosophy and psychology. It promises to bring the 
two disciplines closer together than they have been since 
their divorce began in the late nineteenth century. The 
division of labor that started to crystallize at that time 
is no longer viewed as favorable to the combined productivity 
of the two disciplines, even though no new arrangements 
have been finalized. The traditional complaint that psy­
chologism cannot do justice to the objectivity of knowledge 
is no longer given the ground it once was. From the psy­
chologist’s perspective, the complaint seems to lose 
ground as a better understanding of the knowledge processes 
is secured by means of continuing research in the relevant 
areas of psychology. From the philosopher’s perspective, 
on the other hand, the complaint fails more because the 
traditional standards of objectivity are losing the stature 
previously accorded to them. Thus, it would appear that 
the general problem of objectivity which has confronted 
psychologism is gradually being dissolved from both ends.
All that is needed to round out the new image of science, 
it seems, is a firmer understanding of the psychological 
components of science. As Koch has put it: "philosophy 
and, more generally, the methodology of science are beginning
to stand on foundations that only psychology could render
. ,54 secure."
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In the short run, some such arrangement may appear 
quite workable. But in the long run, it would seem that 
an arrangement characterized in this way would be inherently 
unstable. By the new image’s own account, psychology can 
be expected to evolve and undergo continued diversification 
into a variety of mutually incommensurable research tradi­
tions. Each tradition will have its own gradually evolving 
context of theoretical, methodological, and metaphysical 
presuppositions. These interacting presuppositions form 
the important historical backdrop for the tradition, but 
they cannot properly be said to serve as its foundations 
in any stronger sense. But if psychology is itself without 
stable foundations, then it can scarcely serve as even a 
partial foundation for the new image. Either the new image 
must give up its psychologism or else it must give up any 
claim to rest on stable foundations.
Western philosophy has routinely sought to ground 
knowledge on firm foundations. Throughout much of its 
history, substantive principles— theories such as Euclid’s 
geometry or Newtonian mechanics— have been invoked as solid 
bases for the construction of knowledge. When the develop­
ment of non^Euclidean geometries and relativistic physics 
cast doubt on the feasibility of substantive foundations, 
the attempt was made Cby Karl Pearson and othersj_ to shift 
the foundations of knowledge from theory to methodology,
For the logical positivists, all real knowledge was to be
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erected on the two foundations of logic and empirical 
observation. Given the force of this tradition, there is 
an understandable reluctance to abandon the notion that 
an absolute, or at least stable, basis can be found for 
knowledge.
The new image has achieved considerable enlightenment 
by questioning the general feasibility of a foundational 
approach to epistemology and it has done so with respect 
to science— the Western world's most cherished examplar 
of knowledge. What it has not generally achieved, however, 
is a clear application of its new approach to itself.
The impression that the new image, or some version of it, 
will provide a final formulation of the nature of knowledge- 
albeit at the level of metatheory— can only invite the 
presumption that the foundations of knowledge will reside 
at the meta-level. But to understand the implications 
of the new image is to have serious reservations as to the 
possibility of any final account of knowledge.
The failure of the new philosophy of science to make 
plain its implications for itself has been discussed by 
Arne Naess in his provocative monograph The Pluralist and 
Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise Cl9.7 21. 
Taking the Kuhnian approach as an example, Naess argues 
that just as the paradigms of science color the observa­
tions of scientists working within their confines, so too 
the metatheoretical paradigms of historians and philosophers
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of science color their observations of scientific activity. 
In other words, the history of science— the major body of 
evidence for the new image of science— cannot yield neutral 
data any more than scientific observation can. Yet Kuhn 
treats the historical evidence for his metatheory as con­
ferring validity on it and as disconfirming the "text 
book history of science," even though he denies that such 
a straightforward evidential relation can obtain for the 
scientist except within the limited confines of~ a paradigm. 
Naess writes:
In spite of the role of the new historiography 
as a new paradigm of historical and systematic re­
search of science C* science of sciencefI, it is not 
explicitly conceived as such by its representatives. 
Their own perspective, which stresses the broad hist­
orical relativity of the narrow absolutistic pro­
nouncements of paradigm-makers and their followers, 
is not applied reflexively to the pronouncements 
of the representatives and advocates of the new 
historiography,55
Kuhn's belief that the conception of science advanced by
him "can emerge from the historical record of the research
activity itself" reveals his confinement within a meta-
5 6theoretical paradigm; the presuppositional context 
licenses such an inductivist view of evidence, but it also 
makes his belief a relative, not general, one. Referring 
to Kuhn, Naess continues:
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He is caught in his own relativism. So far as I 
can see, the new historiography cannot, on Kuhn's 
premises, properly claim any special status in 
relation to other historiographies. Therefore 
the outsider, for instance the metahistorian, who 
is interested in the history of conceptions of 
history is justified on Kuhn's premises in talcing 
his picture as only one of the many that have 
been offered since Aristotle.
But if Kuhn is caught up in his own metatheoretical para­
digm, his account must be admitted to suffer the conse­
quences. A paradigm, to be sure, is a useful set of 
presuppositions, but in no way can it be considered uni­
quely valid or universal or to be a final means of account­
ing for a domain of phenomena. In short, it cannot serve 
as an ultimate foundation for knowledge.
If Naess's argument is at all applicable to other 
versions of the new image, it suggests that they too are 
ineligible to qualify as final or foundational accounts 
of science. Furthermore, it suggests that they may be 
superseded by any one of an unlimited number of possible 
alternative images of science. To use the new image's own 
evolutionary model, there must be significant variants in 
the conceptual pool if the evolution of metascience is to 
progress. But this is not, of course, to say that progress 
is toward any final state. Like theories in science, 
theories of science proceed in a sort of bootstrap opera­
tion with no endpoint.
The implication of the foregoing considerations is 
that psychologism can be reintroduced into epistemology with­
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out endangering its foundational status, simply because
there will not be any such status to worry about. Once
the new image is applied to itself, it becomes clear that
at root psychology and epistemology share the same status
as knowledge systems, and the way is cleared fob a con-
58sistent psychologism. This continuity of science with 
metascience means that both enterprises involve a pluralism 
of partially insulated research traditions. In both cases, 
these traditions can be conceived as presuppositional 
contexts which are to be assessed in terms of their ability 
to generate and solve cognitive problems.
In the case of psychology and epistemology, it remains 
to be seen which of the several viable traditions in these 
fields will yield up cognitive problems deemed worthy of 
the investment of resources by the traditions of the other
59field. Only very recently has the process begun m  earnest.
Perhaps the most that can be said at this point is that after
a period of relative hegemony of dominant traditions in
psychology and epistemology, these disciplines seem to be
6 0undergoing a healthy proliferation of novel variations.
Such pluralism makes available a large number of incipient 
research traditions that can be combined across disciplines 
in an even larger number of ways for the possible sharing 
of significant unsolved problems. The phenomenon of know­
ledge appears to be an extremely complex one which offers 
an inexhaustible number of aspects for possible investigation.
Perhaps it is only appropriate then that this complexity 
be matched by a proliferation of cross-fertilizing approaches 
within psychology and philosophy. Should some such arrange­
ment prove to be workable, then the two disciplines might 
be able to combine resources and understanding in a fruit­
ful relationship of a sort that behaviorism and logical 
positivism never managed to achieve.
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This section will provide a review of the various 
sources of material relevant to a history of behaviorism 
and logical positivism. This review is not intended as 
an exhaustive survey but rather as a selective overview 
designed to convey the scope of available resources. As 
of this writing, some of the sources cited here have been 
extensively researched- in 'the secondary literature, while 
some remain as yet uninvestigated.
Primary sources (volumes!. Although the roots of 
logical positivism go back at least to David Hume, the 
important immediate forebears of the movement are Ernst 
Mach (.1883, 18861 and Henri Poincare (1902/19.521 . Impor­
tant anticipations of ideas central to logical positivism 
are also found in Gottlob Frege (1884), Moritz Schlick 
(1918)., and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922). The doctrines 
most characteristic of logical positivism found their 
clearest expression in a series of books by Rudolf Carnap 
(1928a, 1928b, 19351, whose productivity and logical acumen 
made him the central intellectual figure of the Vienna 
Circle (whereas Schlick is usually acknowledged to have 
been the central social figure!,. Carnap's counterpart in 
the Berlin branch of the logical empiricist movement was 
Hans Reichenbach (19.381. Among the important figures who
650
strongly influenced the Vienna Circle from its periphery are 
Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell C l9.21, 19 .27L , and Karl Popper 
C 1 9 3 5 1 . A. J. Ayer's C19.36I forceful exposition of logical 
positivist views had a great influence on philosophy in the 
English-speaking world. Some American "philosophers, such 
as W. V. 0. Quine and Charles Morris, were predisposed 
toward logical positivism by the pragmatism of C. S. Peirce, 
William James, and John Dewey, and had already encountered 
a close approximation to the verifiability principle in the 
operationism of Percy Bridgman (.19271., Perhaps the crowning 
achievement of logical positivism is the International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science C 1 9 5 5 1 , conceived and edited 
(with others 1 by Otto Neurath. Foremost among a number 
of anthologies devoted, in part or whole, to logical positi­
vism is a volume edited by Ayer C 1959b) which contains an 
extensive bibliography on the topic.
On the psychological side, the first book-length arti­
culation of behaviorism was John B. Watson’s Behavior:
An Introduction to Comparative Psychology C1 9 1 4)_. Watson 
elaborated his behaviorism in two subsequent books C l919-, 
1 9 2 4 1 ,  the latter of which introduced behaviorist ideas to 
the Vienna Circle. Watson shied away from philosophy, 
but the major post’-Watsonian behaviorists acknowledged 
their affinity for positivistic philosophy. The magnum 
opuses of these neobehaviorists are Tolman's Purposive 
Behavior in Animals and Men C19321., Skinner's Behavior of
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Organisms C1938I, and Hull's Principles of Behavior CL9.431,
Of subsidiary importance are works by Tolman CL9.66L,
Skinner C1953, 19.571, Hull 0.351, 19.521, Guthrie Cl 9-3 5 J_, 
and Spence Cl9601, Although neither was a practicing be- 
haviorist, E, G, Boring C19-331 and C. C, Pratt Cl939-1 wrote 
books which, in a spirit congenial to behaviorism, applied 
operational and positivistic analyses to psychological 
issues.
Primary sources (journals 1, Among the philosophical 
journals relevant to the topic of behaviorism and logical 
positivism, the most important is the Vienna Circle organ 
Erkenntnis, which was edited by Carnap and Reichenbach 
during the 1930s. Its name was changed to The Journal of 
Unified Science before succumbing to the war, and it was 
revived under the title Erkenntis in the 1970s, This jour­
nal contains a multitude of classic papers, including 
Carnap's "Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis 
of Language" CL931-32/1959-1, Schlick's "Positivism and 
Realism" C1932-33/195 9j, and Neurath's "Protocol Sentences"
Cl9.32-33/19591. Many of the works which provided the 
background of logical positivism appeared in the journals 
Mind CG. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell 1., The Monist CRussell,
C, S, Peirce, John Dewey1, and the Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Scientific Method CWilliam James, various 
neorealists 1., The latter became The Journal of Philosophy 
in 1920, and printed in 1931 Herbert Feigl and Albert
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Blumberg's important "Logical Positivism, A New- Movement in 
European Philosophy,V From its founding in 19.34, the Ameri­
can journal Philosophy of Science has published important 
articles by philosophers (.Carnap, Feigl, Gustav Bergmanni. 
and psychologists CTolman, Hull, S. S. StevensL', Other 
journals which carried developments in logical positivism 
include Analysis, Philosophical Review, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, and Synthese.
Because of their theoretical thrust, the psychological 
journals most relevant, to the developments discussed herein 
are Psychological Review and Psychological Bulletin. The 
former contains most of the important theoretical state­
ments of Hull and Tolman, as well as the Presidential 
Addresses of the American Psychological Association, It 
also contains papers given by Skinner (19451 and others 
at the important Symposium on Operationalism, The latter 
contains early debates on the relation between psychology 
and philosophy and Stevens's (J.9391 famous integration 
of psychology, operationism, and logical positivism. The 
late-thirties explosion of articles on psychology and 
philosophy of science nearly filled the pages of both of 
these journals. The Journal of General Psychology published 
B. F. Skinner's early writings, including his two crucial 
theoretical papers C1&31, 19351, as well as a few by Hull 
and Tolman, Other neobehaviorist works have appeared in
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The Journal of Experimental Psychology, The Journal of
Comparative Psychology, and (more recently!; The '-Journal' of 
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.
Secondary sources. The most detailed previous works on 
the topic of behaviorism and logical positivism are those by 
Koch C1959, 1961, 19641 and Brian D, Mackenzie (19.72, 1977L. 
Koch’s admittedly elliptical historical reviews depict the 
alliance of these positions as one of expedience and polemic 
rather than a convergence of understanding and intellectual 
achievement. These reviews are based largely on Koch’s 
earlier conceptual analyses of Hullian theory (.1941, 19.541_ 
and his survey of the status of systematic psychology 
C1959-I. As a consequence, his historical reviews tend to 
emphasize the behaviorism of Hull over other versions 
(especially Skinner’s! and to rely more on conceptual 
analysis than historical analysis. Additionally, these 
reviews are unavoidably limited by their brevity to fairly 
broad characterizations of behaviorism and logical positivism.
Mackenzie's volume (.1977! does not suffer as badly 
from limitations of length, but its treatment of behaviorism 
in relation to logical positivism is limited in two very 
general respects. First, the treatment is intended to be 
more philosophical than historical and is strongly evaluative 
rather than descriptive. Second, Mackenzie's attention to 
logical positivism is necessarily restricted by the broad 
scope of the book, which includes discussion of such topics
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as behaviorism's background in comparative psychology and 
a defense of the introspectionist tradition.
Although there has been little secondary literature 
devoted to the topic of behaviorism and logical positivism, 
historical accounts of either domain alone are not lacking. 
For example, the history of logical positivism has been 
traced in essays by Feigl (12431 and Ayer (1959al and in 
brief volumes by Joergenson (JL9.511 and Kraft (.19531. The 
history of behaviorism has been treated, for example, by 
O’Neil (12681, Herrnstein (12731, and Roback (19.371, Papers 
with a historical orientation have occasionally appeared in 
many of the journals, both philosophical and psychological, 
cited above as primary sources. Two relatively new journals 
containing relevant articles are The Journal of the History 
of the Behavioral Sciences and Behaviorism.
For general background, Passmore's Cl9661 history of 
recent philosophy admirably situates logical positivism 
in its intellectual context. Schneider's (19631 history of 
American philosophy describes some of the developments which 
conditioned America's receptivity to logical positivism.
Two recent works (Morris, 1970; Thayer, 196 81 on pragmatism 
discuss its relation to both the behavioral sciences and 
logical positivism. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy contains 
numerous articles on topics and persons central to logical 
positivism.
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Useful general accounts of behavior theory are pro­
vided by Hilgard and Marquis C19-40L and Hilgard and Bower 
C19661. A set of lengthy critical essays^ on the major 
neobehaviorist. positions appeared as Modern Learning Theory 
CEstes et al., 1954L, a work which coincided with, and 
probably contributed to, the demise of behaviorism's 
"systems," Melvin Marx's series of anthologies (Marx, 19-51, 
1963; Marx & Goodson, 1976) contains several examples of
neobehaviorist theorizing, including Clark Hull's address
/
to the Sixth International Congress for the Unity of Sci­
ence. This series of anthologies is of interest in part 
for the significant changes in material selected for 
inclusion,
Biographies and autobiographies. The autobiographies 
of Carnap GL9641., Popper (.19761., and Ayer (JL9771 contain 
valuable inside information on developments in logical 
positivism. A recent biography CCohen, 19.791 of John B,
Watson provides material on the early development of 
behaviorism. The second volume CL9791 of B, F. Skinner's 
autobiography covers the important period from 1928 to 19-47 
and includes brief accounts of his interactions with 
numerous figures involved in the Unity of Science movement 
CTolman, Hull, Fiegl, W. V. 0. Quine, Carnap, L. J. Henderson, 
Russell, I. A. Richards, etc.). Edited selections CL962). 
from Hull's "idea books" give a fascinating glimpse of his 
ambitions and frustrations. The multi-volume A History of
656
Psychology in Autobiography includes autobiographical state­
ments by several behaviorists Ce.g., Tolman, 1952}..
Archival sources. A number of archival sources have 
been tapped for this: dissertation. Prominent among these 
are Charles Morris's Unity of Science Collection at the 
University of Chicago and various collections at the Archives 
of the History of American Psychology in Akron, Ohio. The 
former contains mostly letters between Morris and supporters 
of the movement, including Hull, Brunswik, S. S, Stevens, 
Bridgman, Neurath, Feigl, Dewey, and Russell, Many deal 
with practical matters such as publicity and fund-raising 
for the International Congresses. The Akron archives con­
tain correspondence, course bibliographies, manuscripts, 
and lecture notes for such figures as Tolman and Brunswik.
Some of Tolman's personal library remains at the University 
of California, but unfortunately the bulk of his papers 
remain in the hands of a would-be biographer in England. An 
extensive collection of Hull's papers resides at Yale 
University. Among these papers is Hull's complete set of 
"idea books," E, G. Boring's papers including his corres­
pondence with his student and fellow champion of operationism, 
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